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The European Union-South Africa Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement 
(EU/SA TDCA), signed in October 1999, is viewed by some in South Africa as not only 
one of the most important trade and development agreements entered into by the 'new' 
South African goverrunent, but also a significant agreement for setting precedents for 
other bi-lateral trade and development pacts between the EU and African, Caribbean and 
Pacific group of states. This thesis considers two major issues related to the EU/SA 
TDCA. First, it describes and evaluates the structures that supported the South African 
side of the TDCA decision-making process. Second, it discusses the potential economic 
impact of the agreement on South Africa and part of southern African. 
Prior to the election of the 'new' South African government in 1994, the majority of 
South Africa's population was excluded - both in terms of access to decision-making 
structures and from economic prosperity. By exploring the TDCA, the thesis provides a 
window through wl-dch to examine contemporary access to decision-making processes in 
South Africa and the likelihood of the TDCA promoting economic prosperity for sections 
of southern African society, particularly the 'traditionally excluded'. Interviews with key 
actors who helped formulate the TDCA provide information that enabled the evaluation 
of the TDCA decision-making process and highlighted potential economic 'winners' and 
'losers'. Interviewing representatives of the South African wine and textile sectors 
provided an opportunity to examine in more detail the likely impact of the agreement and 
decision-making processes, associated to the TDCA, within South Africa. 
The results indicate that an overriding message of this thesis is one of complexity. The 
description of the structures that underpinned the EU/SA TDCA portrayed complex 
relationships between decision-making 'actors'. In evaluating the inclusivity of the policy 
formulation process, there was a lack of consensus over who had been included or 
excluded. Likewise, the identification of potential economic 'winners' and 'losers' proved 
to be somewhat problematic. 
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('11,1pier 011c: filtiodticlion 
1.1 Background 
After the dismantling of apartheid legislation in 1990, the South African state began a process of 
reintegrating into the world economy. South African government,, since 1990 have entered into a 
number of trade-liberalising agreements as part of this integration process. They include bi-lateral 
agreements with Malawi, Zimbabwe and the European Union (EU), ' as well as Inulti-lateral 
agreements, such as that agreed under the Marrakesh Treaty of 1994 and the Southern African 
Development Community's (SADC) Free Trade Protocol. 
This thesis examines the European Union-South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation 
Agreement of 1999 (FU-SA TDCA ), 2 and in particular the South African side of the TDCA's 
decision-making process. It seeks to explore two important issues; the nature of the contemporary 
decision-ma king structures in South Africa supporting the formulation of the TDCA, and the 
potential economic impacts of the TDCA on South Africa and parts of southern Africa. 
The nature of decision-making in South Africa is an important political and academic issue 
because of the exclusion of vast sections of South African society from various decision-making 
structures prior to 1994 (see for example, Brookes, 1968; Lemon, 1976,1987; Lester et al., 2000). An 
analysis of the South African decision-making apparatus which underpinned tile formulation of 
the TDCA therefore provides an opportunity to assess how far stakeholders in the 'new' South 
Africa are now included in decision-making processes. The position of 'previously excluded' 
sections of the South African population (also termed traditionally marginalised or disadvantaged) 
therefore provides a key indicator of how far inclusive politics have permeated 'post-apartheid' 
South African decision-making. 
1 The term EU is used throughout the course of the thesis when discussing many facets of the European 
Union. I am aware that there are legal definitional differences between the EU, European Community and 
European Commission, yet for ease of definition, and for the purpose of this research on South Africa, 
instead of using the terms commission or EC, EU is used unilaterally throughout. This is not to say that tills C 
research regards the EU as a monolithic organisation, as it is comprised of many actors. 41 2 Officially entitled Agreement on Trade. Development and Cooperation between the European CommunitY 
and its member states, of the one part, and the Republic of'South Alftica, of the other part. 
2 
Chapwr Olw: hit. 1-oduclioll 
An analysis of the trade component of the TDCA, described as a trade arrangement 
fundamentally based on neo-classical/neo-liberal economic ideology (Hirsch, 1997; Bond, 1999), 
also permits identification of the perceived 'winners' and 'losers' from the agreement in both South 
Af rica and parts of southern Africa. 
Figure 1.1: Map of SACU 
Aside from these issues, the EU-SA TDCA is also an important agreement in its own right. 
Firstly, it is seen as symbolicallv important, representing the South African state's re-admittance 
into the global economic comrnunity (Phaswana, 2000; Leverniore, Gibb and Cleary, 2000). 
Secondly, the trade agreement also has ramifications for the southern African region - particularly 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (known collectively as the BLNS), who, along with 
South Africa, form the South African Customs Union (SACU). The map in figure 1.1 (see above) 
outlines the SACU region. As the customs union has common trade boundaries, the BLNS have 
become defiacto members of the trade agreement. Thirdly, the TDCA is important to the EU in that 
the agreement has been heralded as a blueprint for reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states (Davies, 2000,6). ' 
However, to re-emphasise, an analysis of the TDCA is undertaken mainly to assist in providing a 
window through which to focus on issues of inclusivity in the new South Africa and the potential 
impact of the agreement. Before beginning the analysis, therefore, this chapter outlines the major 
objectives (1.2), research themes (1.3) and structure (1.4) of the thesis. 
I These EPAs are in the process of being negotiated, and have been agreed to under the terms of the Cotonou L 
Agreement (signed June 2000), which replaces the non-reciprocal Lom6 convention (Eui-opean Centre for 
Development Policy Management, 2001). 
3 
(Alapier Ollo: 11111-oduction 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
This thesis has two central aims. The first is to explore the South African decision-making structure 
supporting the TDCA negotiations. The second is to assess tile potential impact of tile agreement 
oil South and parts of southern Africa. Within these broad aims are four key objectives; 
" First, to outline and model the South African decision-making structures, in relation to 
tile EU-SA TDCA, in particular by identifying the key components and actors ill the 
TDCA decision-making process. 
" Second, to evaluate the inclusiveness of the South African TDCA process by 
investigating the extent to which this trade agreement provided various stakeholders 
(particularly the traditionally marginalised) in southern African with access to tile 
decision-making processes, and influence in determining the content and outcome of 
the TDCA. 
Third, to provide an assessment of the perceptions of the potential econornic impacts 
of the TDCA on southern Africa. This includes a consideration as to what extent the 
agreement might be termed as 'neo-classical'. Although the South African media, and 
academic analysis world-wide (Badurally Adam and Darroch, 1997; IDS and BIDPA, 
1998; Jachia and Teljeur, 1998; Graumans, 1998; Goodison, 1999) have occasionally 
detailed likely beneficiaries and 'losers' of the TDCA, no study to date has considered 
a wide-ranging southern African perception of the likely 'winners' and 'losers' of the 
agreement. 
The fourth objective is to provide a more detailed understanding of both the 
inclusiveness of the decision-making process and the potential impact of the TDCA by 
conducting a micro-analysis of the South African wine and textile industrial sectors. 
1.3 Research thenies 
The chapter now expands upon the salient issues associated with these four main objectives under 
consideration. They are, first, debates describing, exploring and understanding decision-making 
processes; second, issues of inclusivity in decision-making structures; third the perceived economic 
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impact of the TDCA in the context of perspectives of economic development, and; fourth, an 
examination of the South African wine and textile sectors in the context of furthering an 
assessment of the TDCA. 
1.3.1 Objective One: Decision-making structures and the TDCA 
The literature describing decision-making structures suggests that careful consideration needs to 
be given to defining what decisions are taken when policy is formulated (Cox, 1967; Peterson and 
Bornberg, 1999). Sidjanski (1973), for instance, suggests that 'open' or 'closed' decisions are made, 
where open decisions provide opportunities for stakeholder participation but closed decisions do 
not. Traditional literature on decision-making processes focused predominantly on goverrunent 
decision-making process (known as a statist/realist approach). Allison's 1971 description of the 
policy formulation process associated with the Cuban missile crisis is the best-known example of 
this genre (Allison, 1971; Cornford, 1973). These statist/realist theoretical perspectives view 
decision-making as a closed process, where policy was decided by senior decision-makers, 
independent of the society they interact with (Lieberfeld, 2000). The statist/realist position has 
been challenged somewhat by pluralist perspectives. Lieberfeld (2000) for instance, argues that 
many non-governmental actors also influence the decision-making apparatus. The act of describing 
political decision-making structures can be further explored by using models generalising decision- 
making processes in order to attain a framework to enable an understanding of particular decision- 
making systems (Snyder et al., 1969; Allison, 1971; Parsons, 1995). Chapter Two (2.5.1) explores 
competing perspectives on the nature of describing decision-making structures and the benefits 
and problems of applying models to understand their complexities. For this thesis, the Snyder 
model (Snyder et al., 1969) was adapted and applied to the SA TDCA decision-making structure. 
This model is operationalised in Chapter Four, to identify the key decisions made, the various 
components that influenced the construction of the TDCA, and those actors involved in this 
decision-making process. 
1.3.2 Objective Two: Inclusion and Exclusion in the TDCA decision-making structure 
The second theme proceeds from descriptions of decision-making structures to evaluate the 
inclusivity of government policy formulation. This issue of inclusivity is contentious given South 
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Africa's past and has attracted much academic, media and political interest, with a voluminous 
literature considering social and political exclusion in apartheid South Africa (for a list of general 
sources see above). More recent academic and non-academic interest has focused on the changing 
democratic processes since the election of the 'new' South African government in 1994. Debates 
have been wide-ranging - including comparisons between the ANC and previous apartheid 
governments (Butler, 1998; Spence, 1999), the degree of state interference in the media (Miller, 1995; 
Graybill, 2000; Salazar, 2000), democracy in a dominant party system (Lodge, 1999a; Hudson, 
2000), political corruption (Ellis, 1996; Lodge, 1999a), and the transition from resistance politics to 
governance (Butler, 1998). 
Debate concerning the inclusiveness of South African decision-making processes has taken a 
number of directions. For example, a growing body of literature has explored the increasing 
exclusion and intolerance directed towards black non-South Africans within South African society 
(Schutte, 2000) and contests the official government discourse that the renaissance of Africa should 
be based on an inclusive pan-African idea, Ubuntu, where all Africans are incorporated into future 
development (Sindane, undated; Mgibi, 1997; Lodge, 1999a). Other literature explores the inclusion 
of 'previously disadvantaged' or 'traditionally marginalised' peoples, particularly within South 
African civil society (such as Lanegran, 1995; James and Caliguire, 1996; Hilliard and Kemp, 1999; 
Zuern, 2001). The definition of such groups, along with civil society and stakeholders, is difficult 
(James and Caliguire, 1996; Glaser, 1997). Throughout this study, previously disadvantaged groups 
or people have been regarded as those largely excluded from apartheid South Africa's decision- 
making structures. This includes people outside the 'white' political process - i. e. those termed 
'black', 'Indian' or 'coloured'. " Thus, many 'stakeholders' in contemporary South African society 
are included in this group - including the unemployed, agricultural and industrial labourers, 
owners of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs), and civil society in general. 
4 This thesis has faced similar problems to many researchers who study South Africa, particularly in relation 
to the use of certain terminology. Terms such as black, white, coloured, Indian, or South African are used 
without inverted commas despite the ambiguous and contentious nature of using such terms. For a full debate 
on this concern please see Chapter Three (3.2). 
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These issues feed into more general theoretical discussions about participation in decision- 
making structures. Much literature attempts to define the concept of participation, particularly in 
relation to the different levels of inclusion for stakeholders in participatory and representative 
democratic systems (Beetham and Boyle, 1995; Weale, 1999; Lucas, 1976), where it has been argued 
that the state has a tendency to inhibit participation of the community in decision-making 
processes (Botes and van Rensburg, 2000). Of particular relevance to this research is the debate 
concerning the feasibility of stakeholder participation in governmental policy formulation 
processes (Held, 1996; Lucas, 1976). Publications focusing on inclusion and exclusion in 
developmental trade agreement policy-making processes, similar to the EU-SA TDCA, reflect that 
many 'actors' with vested interests can be excluded (Hodd, 1987, Chisti, 2000; Marchand, 1994). 
They note that political marginalisation can occur on many levels, by continents (such as Africa in 
the WTO or IMF) (Hodd, 1987), states, industrial sectors, and stakeholders (such as women, the 
unemployed, migrants). 
In examining the inclusivity and exclusivity of the TDCA this work not only examines 
inclusivity of structures supporting the South African side of the TDCA negotiations, but also the 
inclusion and exclusion taking place on a number of levels (between the EU and South Africa and 
within the South African TDCA decision-making structure itself). 
Chapter Two examines further the conceptual debate surrounding this issue, whilst Chapter 
Five assesses southern African perceptions of the inclusivity of the TDCA policy formulation 
process. Chapters Seven and Eight then consider the theme of exclusion and inclusion in the wine 
and textile sectors (in relation to the TDCA). 
1.3.3 Objective Three: The impact of the TDCA on economic and social development in South Aftica 
The third theme is an evaluation of the perceived impact of the TDCA on economic development 
in South and southern Africa. This relates to research on competing development paradigms and 
critiques of neo-classical economic development perspectives. 
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Pape (2000,1) notes that 'there is a need to go beyond broad generalisations and examine 
national and regional specifics' when evaluating development ideas and policies that are based on 
neo-classical economic perspectives. Examination of the perceptions of those living in southern 
Africa towards the potential impact of the EU-SA TDCA therefore provides the opportunity to look 
at these specifics in a national and regional sense. ' Furthermore, by exploring the wine and textiles 
industries, two sectors suggested by interviewees as distinct winners and losers from the 
agreement, the study provides an understanding of the potential impact of the TDCA at an 
industrial level. 
One of the explicit objectives of the EU-SA TDCA is that the agreement should enhance the 
economic development of South Africa. Many analysts suggest that the TDCA is based mainly on 
neo-liberal economic development theory (Hirsch, 1997, Bond, 1999). This paradigm has gained 
increasing global acceptance, particularly since the 1980's when modernisation and dependency 
perspectives were largely discredited (Belassa, 1993). Chapter Two briefly considers the debate 
surrounding the genealogy of development thinking since 1945, outlining the climate in which 
neo-liberal development policies espoused by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) (such as the 
WTO, IMF) were gradually accepted by governments throughout the world and especially in 
Lesser Developed Regions (LDRs). The parameters of the development debate from 1945 were 
largely set by modernisation perspectives on the one hand, and dependency on the other. Attacks 
on both perspectives facilitated the ascendancy of neo-fiberal development thinking. A common 
criticism of all development perspectives has been that they have failed to reduce poverty, 
economic marginalisation and political exclusion of states, regions and communities (Leys, 1996; 
Cox, 1996; Dickson, 1997). Yet it is neo-liberal inspired policies that have attracted most criticism 
(Payne, 1981; Cox, 1983; Bleaney and Fielding, 1995; Escobar, 1998; Nayyar, 1999), especially in 
their marginalisation of sections of society traditionally defined as 'disadvantaged' or on the 
periphery - such as women (Chowdhry, 1995), migrants (Skeldon, 1998; Dale, 1999), the unskilled 
and unemployed (Ghosh, 1999). 
5 Regional in this sense means southern Africa and not sub-regional areas in South Africa. 
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The post-1945 evolution of development perspectives in South Africa has closely mirrored this 
genealogy of development thinking. The ruling National Party government (from 1948 to 1994) 
broadly borrowed from modernisation theories, applying policies to assist the development of 
'underdeveloped' (i. e. non-white) areas within South Africa, especially the 'homelands' 
(Maasdorp, 1974). The opposition, spearheaded by the ANC, espoused a more 
dependency/Marxist-related development ethos. Following the demise of apartheid legislation, 
the post-1994 ANC-led government policy has to a large extent focused on the development of the 
'previously disadvantaged' with policies designed to 'empower' mainly non-white communities. 
Some of these policies were based on redistribution through taxation, whilst others were based on 
redistribution associated with neo-fiberalism (Bond, 1999; Brohman, 1995a). South African 
government policy is increasingly being linked to neo-liberal economic perspectives, reflecting the 
global acceptance of policies associated with economic neo-classicism. Chapter Six contextualises 
the themes discussed here in an examination of the perceived impact of the TDCA on the southern 
African region. 
1.3.4 Objective Four: Wine and Textile sectors (Micro analysis) 
The South African wine and textiles sectors are examined as examples of industries that are 
perceived to have most benefited or lost out under the agreement. The fourth theme of this study is 
an analysis of these two industries (in chapters Seven and Eight) and their inclusion in the TDCA 
decision-making process and perceptions of the impact of the agreement. Although these two 
sectors represent only a minor part of the overall free trade arrangement, in focusing on wine and 
textiles, themes raised above are re-examined to present a more comprehensive understanding of 
the TDCA process. They take the issues raised above a stage further and allow for an exploration in 
greater empirical detail of a micro-analysis of the agreement. 
The South African wine sector is an industry that epitomises South Africa's past and in some 
ways captures the problems and promise of South Africa's future. It was a symbol of apartheid, 
implementing segregation between 'ethnic' communities, employing people in terrible conditions, 
and was a target of boycotts and sanctions. However, in 2001 the wine sector acts as a quasi- 
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embassy for South Africa - with exports booming and the industry attracting many tourists to the 
Western Cape. 
Textiles, on the other hand, has Suffered from a number of afflictions common to South Africa 
in the 1990's - trade liberalisation, the influx of legal and illegal imports and previous under- 
investment in equipment has resulted in a huge reduction ir) ernployment. It is the type of industry 
that is highlighted in the literature as being marginalised, particularly by those states who can 
compete on a cheaper basis than South African textile companies. 
1.4 Structure 
In order to analyse the four objectives identified the thesis is divided into seven further chapters. 
Chapter Two begins by outlining the main features of the agreement, and examines the TDCA in 
the context of the major post-1945 economic development perspectives; modernisation, 
dependency, and neo-liberalism. It then considers the extent to which the trade component of the 
agreement is based on neo-liberal/neo-classical theoretical assumptions. Responding to the 
criticism that neo-classical trade policies exclude vast sections of society from representation in the 
formulation of these agreements, the final section of the chapter explores the perspectives on the 
constitution of decision-making structures, particularly issues relating to inclusion and exclusion of 
stakeholders. 
Chapter Three discusses methodological and philosophical considerations and the research 
methods employed in this study. It first reviews primary and secondary literature used to explore 
the diversity of issues examined in the research. Two periods of interviews in southern Africa 
provided the primary data for the study. In the first period nearly sixty people closely associated to 
the TDCA decision-making process were interviewed. The second in-depth interviews were 
conducted with representatives of the South African wine and textile industries, including 
employers, employees, Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and exporters. This section 
emphasises that a reflexive account of my positionality throughout the research process is most 
important. The construction of my perspectives and relationship with the interviewees (as well as 
I () 
Chapter One: Introduction 
literature) all contribute to provide an understanding of the methodological concerns expressed 
throughout the information-gathering process of the thesis. 
The remaining chapters concentrate on the four themes identified above. Chapters Four, Five 
and Six present information from the first series of interviews. Chapter Four details the TDCA 
decision-making structure and identifies four major components that influenced the construction 
of the TDCA - the internal environment, the South African statal process, 'detached observers'. - and 
the external environment. It also identifies the 'actors' involved, such as government departments, 
the negotiating team, labour, business, and civil society representatives. This chapter also examines 
the relationships between these actors within the TDCA decision-making process. Chapter Five 
articulates stakeholder and decision-maker perceptions of the inclusiveness of the TDCA decision- 
making process. The chapter also assesses the influence of each component in formulating the 
TDCA and the degree of inclusivity in the process. Chapter Six explores interviewee perceptions of 
the likely impact of the agreement on South Africa and sections of southern Africa. It assesses how 
interviewees tended to view 'winners' and 'losers' of the agreement in terms of industrial sector, 
with many reluctant to identify individual stakeholder groups as being beneficially or adversely 
affected by the TDCA. From these results, the wine and textile industries, winners and losers 
respectively, are examined as case studies to explore further the economic impact and inclusivity of 
the TDCA and the decision-making structure. 
Chapters Seven and Eight conclude the empirical element of the study by exploring the wine 
and textile industries within the context of the TDCA and TDCA decision-making structure. The 
first section in each chapter briefly outlines the geography, history and politico-economic concerns 
of each industry. The second section details the organisation and structure of the sector, key actors, 
and their relationship with the TDCA decision-making process. The third section assesses how 
representatives from these sectors view the potential impact of the agreement on their industry, 
whilst the fourth section presents each sectors' understanding of the inclusiveness of the decision- 
making process. 
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Finally, Chapter Nine presents a summary of the study's main conclusions, reflects on the 
findings, and explores further the conceptual understanding of the issues discussed in relation to 
the broad understanding of the TDCA and TDCA decision-making structure, and in the context of 
the specific results obtained from the wine and textile case studies. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the conceptual background to the European Union-South 
African TDCA and the South African decision-making process. It begins with a summary of the 
TDCA (2.2), outlining the different sections of the agreement. The remainder of the chapter looks at 
concepts that describe and evaluate decision-making processes, as well as economic development 
and trade perspectives (around which objectives one to three are based) in order to facilitate an 
understanding of the issues addressed in this research. 
The TDCA links into a history of development paradigms that place economic growth as one 
of the most important ways of promoting development in 'less-advanced' areas of the world. The 
first debate (section 2.3) conceptualises the TDCA in the context of major development perspectives 
since 1945 (modernisation, dependency and neo-liberalism/neo-classicalism') and places them in a 
South African context. It has been argued that the trade component of the TDCA (hereafter the 
South African-EU Free Trade Agreement - SEFTA) is based primarily on neo-classical/neo-liberal 
economic thinking. In order to gauge the perceived impacts of the agreement on South and parts of 
southern Africa, the third section (2.4) critiques this perspective and examines the literature that 
identifies both the benefits and disadvantages, and more specifically, 'winners' (highlighted in 
2.3.1) and 'losers' from neo-liberal trade liberalising development policies. Criticisms of the neo- 
classical economic approach have highlighted that policies associated with this perspective have, 
overall, failed to alleviate poverty (Brohman, 1995a; Bond, 1999). Instead, they have exacerbated 
economic marginalisation and in the process excluded many sectors of society from related 
decision-making processes (Hodd, 1987). The fourth section (2.5) surveys the literature describing 
and evaluating decision-making structures and considers issues of stakeholder inclusion and 
exclusion in these processes. 
' Although there are subtle variations in the terms neo-classical and neo-liberal, they are used interchangeably 
throughout this thesis. As Pr6gler (2000) notes, the difference is mainly in name only. Both perspectives are 
irrevocably linked to major economic philosophers, such as Milton Friedman. For further discussion on the 
use of these terms, see Chapter Three (3.2). 
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The EU-SA TDCA represents just one aspect of economic, political and social co-operation between 
South Africa and the European Union that dates to before the abolition of apartheid legislation. 
Since 1994, the EU has become the South African state's largest international development aid 
donor, trading partner and foreign investor (European Union in South Africa, 2001). 2 Presentlv, 
40",, of South Africa's exports go to the EU region, and finance from the EU accounts for 70% of 
South Africa's annual total foreign investment (European Union in South Africa, 2001). 
Although negotiations for a long-term trade and co-operation agreement began in 1994 (the 
formal negotiation process was officially opened in June 1995), discussions on trade arrangements 
for products such as wine and fish were discussed in 1993 (for further details of the wine 
negotiations see Chapter Seven). The FU produced two mandates outlining the direction of the 
agreement - (in(, concerning political parameters in 1995 and a trade mandate in 1996. Some co- 
operation negotiations were resolved swiftly. For example, the Science and Technology agreement 
(officially outside the TDCA) was signed in December 1996. Partial accession to the Lom6 
Convention followed rather acrimonious discussions in April 1997. ' However SEFTA negotiations 
were lengthy with over 24 rounds of official face-to-face discussions. ' The main details of the trade 
pact were agreed by the FU at its Berlin Summit in March 1999. The TIVA, including SE117A, was 
not signed until II( N-tober 1999 and negotiations still Continue over arrangements outside the 
II )('A, such a% win(- in(] spirits, and fishing rights. ' The TIX'A was ratified by the South African 
parliament in October 19914, yet ratification is still required by some FU member states and the 
2(XX), note% that in 1999 FIJ imports amounted to R5.5 billion to South Africa. while South 
Africa expow, R4 I billion M good% to the Fj I. 
I Flic South African go%ctnmcnl',, main mill WaS fora more comprehensive inclumon in the Lonlý Convention 
but the final aprrement sa% South Africa excluded front the non-reciprocal trade chapter and financial aid 
paLkagc (Da%ic%, 2(XX), 6). For further details of South Africa's qualified inembcr%hip of' the Lome 
Conwrinon, %cc Furolvan Corminwon Delcgation in South Africa. 1999,4-8 
' 'I lwý doc% not im lude the informal %essions that look place or the recent rounds negotiating the wine and 
%pirit% or fi,. hcric% agrecincriv, 
I I-or a chronolop of the TIWA negotiation proce. %s, from 1994 to 1999. see Berle Istria nn -Scott, Mills and 
Sidiropolou%. 2(X X). III- 135, 
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WTO. " Furthermore, the BLNS have still to concur with the agreement, under terms laid out in the 
1969 SACU treaty! Many aspects of the TDCA began to be implemented from 1 January 2000. 
The official TDCA negotiations took place between representatives of the EU and the South 
African government. At this official level the TDCA can be viewed as a bi-lateral agreement. 
However, SEF17A might also be defined as multilateral as the impact of the trade component 
extends de facto to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) who, along with South 
Africa, form the South African Customs Union (SACU) and, of course, the 15 member states of the 
EU. 
As figure 2.1 Mustrates, the TDCA comprises of the main agreement text, ten annexes and two 
protocols. The main text has 109 articles, divided up into eight main titles (listed in figure 2.1). The 
ten annexes mainly detail EU and South African tariff levels that apply for agricultural and 
industrial products and their phase-down period (apart from those on the reserve list which are 
excluded from tariff reductions). There are also annexes relating to fisheries products (annex V) and 
an exchange of letters in relation to the EU/SA Wine and Spirits Agreement (annex X). The first 
protocol deals with Rules of Origin; the second relates to customs matters. There are also three 
separate agreements that are associated with the TDCA, but officially fall outside its remit. They are 
the Science and Technology Agreement and, at the time of writing, the unresolved Fisheries" and 
Wines and Spirits agreements. 
The European Commission (1999,10) notes that from this main agreement, protocols and 
annexes, the TDCA has eight major aspects. These are as foRows: 
w Political Dialogue 
m Social and Cultural Cooperation 
6 The WTO, under Article XXIV, requires free trade agreements to remove all customs duties on 
'substantially' all trade between parties over a maximum period of ten years. 
7 At the time this thesis was submitted (end of October 2001) an official at the South African Department of 
Trade and Industry noted that the BLNS states have still not given their concurrence, and had no indication of 
when, or whether, they would do so. 
8 Much doubt surrounds the likelihood of any agreement between the South African government and the EU 
on a fisheries agreement. In April 2001, a South African government official was quoted as saying that such 
an agreement would be impossible because there was no 'common ground' between the two parties (Ensor, 4 
April 2001). 
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0 Financial Assistance 
F, conomic Cooperation 
Institutional set up 
0 Development Cooperation 
Developmental Free Trade Area 
Trade Related Issues 
Title I Political Dialogue (and general objectives) 
Title II Trade 
Title ill Trade Related Issues 
Title IV Economic Cooperation 
Title V Development Cooperation 
Title VI Co-operation in other areas 
Title VII Financial Aspects of Cooperation 
Title Vill Final Provisions 
Figure 2.1: The components ot the TDCA 
Although the agreement covers issues such as cooperation in tourism, the environment, 
technology and culture, the political, developmental and trade dimensions of the TDCA are 
considered to be the most important (Nedcor, 1999). These areas of the agreement are explained in 
more detail below. 
0 Political Dialogue 
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Title I of the main agreement considers political dialogue between the EU and South Africa. Article 
2 discusses 'respect for democratic principles and attachment to principles of good governance', 
whilst Article 4.2 promotes social justice to 'help create the necessary conditions to eliminate 
poverty and all forms of discrimination'. Throughout the main text, reference is made to other 
forms of political cooperation. Examples include the establishment of a new decision-making 
institution - the Co-operation Council - responsible for negotiations between South Africa and the 
EU after the implementation of the agreement (see article 97 under Title VIII). Furthermore, part c 
of article 66 (under Title V on Development Cooperation) calls for both parties to 'support the 
democratisation, the protection of human rights, sound public management, and strengthening of 
civil society and its integration in the development process'. 
M Development assistance 
The TDCA 'evolved' as negotiations progressed from being centred solely on a free trade to one 
with a development component (Lowe, 2000). Some argue that a developmental dimension is 
inherent throughout the agreement, especially in Title V (development cooperation) and 
throughout the trade component (Lowe, 2000). ' The development chapter sets the basis for the 
continuation of financial aid and technical cooperation. Prior to 1999, developmental aid to South 
Africa was R900m (130 million Euros) per year from the European Programme for Reconstruction 
and Development (EPRD). Furthermore, South Africa obtained 150m Euros of loans direct from the 
EU budget. However, the TDCA does not provide precise details on any replacement to the EPRD, 
developmental aid figures, or how future aid will be allocated. Under Title V, Article 66, the 
agreement states that 'special attention will be given to providing support to the adjustment efforts 
occasioned in the region by the establishment of the free-trade area under this Agreement, 
- furthermore, 'Programmes shall be focused on the basic needs of the especially in the SACU". 
previously disadvantaged communities and reflect the gender and environmental dimensions of 
development'. Development is also referred to in Title IV (Economic cooperation) noting that the 
9 Philip Lowe, (2000), one of the EU's main negotiators, noted that development was the 'leitmotif behind 
the overall agreement. 
10 This was referred to by some interviewees as 'compensation measures'. 
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agreement should promote 'the economic empowerment of historically disadvantaged groups' 
(Article 50), particularly those from SMMEs (Article 54). 
0 Economic Cooperation, trade and trade-related issues 
The tariff liberalising dimension of the agreement is described as being a reciprocal trade 
arrangement, but one that is asymmetrical and differentiated. It is asymmetrical in that South 
Africa usually has more time to reduce tariffs than the EU (a maximum of 12 years compared to 10 
for the EU). Most of the EU tariff reductions take place within the first three years - the bulk of 
South Africa's fiberalisation takes place between 6 and 12 years. As table 2.1 illustrates, SEFTA is 
also termed a differentiated agreement because the EU liberalises 95% of its total imports from 
South Africa, with South Africa reducing tariffs on 86% of imports from the EU. 
Years SA! s access to the EU EU's access to SA 
Start 77% 50% 
3 years 83% 55% 
6 years 89% 64% 
10 years 95% - 
12 years 95% 86% 
Table 2.1: Transition table for total trade in the SEFI'A part of the EU/SA TDCA 
Additionally, SEFrA has to take into account the Southern African Development 
Community's (SADCs) trade protocol, in that the EU/SA FTA allows a 'margin of preference for 
products from SADC countries seeking access to the SA market over competing products from the 
EU' (Davies, 2000,8). Under the main agreement, trade is covered almost entirely under Title II, 
with industrial products under section B and agricultural products under section C. Safeguard of 
agricultural products takes place under article 16. " Title III considers trade-related issues, such as 
the safeguard clause (Article 24) and safeguard procedures (Article 26). Rules of Origin are referred 
to in Article 28, but explained in detail under Protocol One. This sets the rules for where goods are 
11 The agricultural support mechanism is prompted if imports cause serious disruption to industries from 
either the EU or South Africa. 
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allowed to originate from, though cumulation of products from other southern Africa states is fully 
or partially permitted depending on whether the product/material originates from non-SACU ACP 
states, or from materials originating in the BLNS. 
However, the main trade aspect of the agreement surrounds tariff liberalising arrangements 
for some 8000 industrial and agricultural products. Annexes II to IV outline the rate at which the 
tariff for each product will be reduced after implementation. There are six lists with varying tariff 
reduction periods, ranging from no tariffs at implementation to list six, the reserve list, which 
includes goods that are not currently eligible for tariff reduction, but are open to review in the 
future. 
On the industrial products side, the EU has placed six items on the reserve list (such as 
aluminiurn powder) whilst South Africa has included tyres, footwear, various leather products, 
certain clothing, textiles and yams, carpets, and motor vehicles and components (Nedcor, 1999). In 
terms of agriculture, 61% of total (EU and South Africa combined) goods will be duty-free and 
between 26-28% of SA goods will not benefit from preferential tariff levels or quotaS. '2 However, 
for many of South Africa's agricultural products, access will only be allowed towards the end of the 
10-year commitment period. The EU has many agricultural products on its reserve list, including 
beef, some dairy products, cut flowers, rice, maize, certain canned fruits and wine. The South 
African government has included beefand mutton; maize, wheat, dairy and sugar. Beef and sugar 
have been included by both sides to protect the preferential trade granted by the EU to the ACP. In 
terms of EU subsidies there is also a joint Declaration that refers broadly to EU subsidies, though 
this contains no detailed provisions. 
In summary, the TDCA has established key trade, development and political criteria for future 
EU-South Africa cooperation. The main motivation for the TDCA was the use of regulated free- 
trade policies to encourage South Africa's development, and correspondingly, access to new 
markets for the EU member states. Despite its important political component, therefore, the TDCA 
12 The industries benefiting from quotas includes cut flowers, canned fruit, fruit juice, dairy, wine and 
sparkling wine. 
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exhibits strong trade and development policies, designed to promote and disseminate wealth to 
Lesser Developed Regions (LDRs). A key aspect of this should be enhanced prospects for 
traditionally marginalised societies. The next section examines this issue further by reviewing the 
TDCA in the context of post-1945 economic development paradigms. 
2.3 The TDCA and competing paradigms of economic development 
An explicit objective of the TDCA is the support of economic development in South Africa and, 
indirectly, to the southern African region. Indeed, trade and trading relations have been one of the 
most important policies in furthering economic development (Peet, 1991). In order to develop this 
debate a stage further, this section places the EU-SA TDCA within the context of tile maill 
competing development paradigms (section 2.3.1) as well as development practices iii South Africa 
(section 2.3.2), from 1945 to the present. 
2.3.1 Parattieters of the ecorionfic developtýie? it delute: Modcriiisatioti, Depetidoicy aild 'Nco-libcral' 
Perspectives 
As noted in chapter one (see 1.3.3), the parameters of development thinking after 1945 were mainly 
set by, on the one hand, modernisation approaches and, on the other, dependency perspectives. " 
Central to the assumption of much early development thinking was the belief that economic 
growth was fundamental to the process of development and progress in LDRs (Peshkin and Cohen, 
1967,11; Potter et aL, 1999,43). Although more recent thinking has recognised non-economic 
influences on development (Potter, et al., 1999,43), many post-1945 theoretical perspectives and 
development institutions, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade 
Organisation, still adhere to such a belief (Slater, 1993,423). This notion of progress has tended to 
emanate from the 'developed' world, who teach 'the rest of the world that escape from their lot is 
possible, and this has made the desire for economic growth, modernization, and rapid 
industrialization the universal ideology of political elites in all countries' (Gilpin, 1987,263). 
13 This is not to say that other development perspectives have not been influential. For instance, Arnirahmadi 
( 1987) assesses the impact of 'non-capitalist forms of development' on the socialist world from 1945 to 1995. 
Post-modern perspectives have become increasingly prevalent in contemporary development discourse 
(Simon, 1999). 
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Although there are many strands of economic-development thinking (examples include orthodox 
Marxist, functionalist, mercantilist, post-modem and structuration)" this survey of post-1945 
development paradigms places the EU/SA TDCA in the context of the three main broad 
development schools - modernisation, dependency, and neo-liberalism. These broad schools of 
thought, apart from capturing many of the disparate dimensions of development thinking also 
represent the paradigm shifts that have characterised post-1945 development theory. 
I Modernisation approaches 
Although this discussion considers moden-tisation theory since 1945, its origins date back decades 
and centuries (Peet, 1991,10). The diverse and heterogeneous modernisation approaches to 
development have been comprehensively chronicled (see for example Harrison, 1988,57-61). 
However, some of the tenets central to Most modernisation perspectives can be summarised in two 
debates. 
First, the central message from classic moden-dsation theorists was that the world essentially 
consisted of two halves - developed (or advanced and modem) and undeveloped (or traditional). " 
Developed societies 'were distinguished by their economic, social, cultural, and political modernity, 
which sharply contrasted with the traditional values of underdeveloped, developing... societies' 
(Corbridge, 1995,2). The aim of development in modemisation perspectives is the transformation 
of the social, cultural, political and economic aspects of undeveloped societies into those of 
developed societies (Roberts and Hite, 2000,9). 
The second is the centrality of economic growth to modernisation advanced by Ndrman (1999, 
151) who noted that 'the idea of modernisation can be seen as a logical extension of economic 
growth theories'. Moden-dsation perspectives were rooted in Keynesian economics, which 
14 For information on these and other perspectives refer to Leys 1996; Corbridge 1995; Preston 1996; 
Webster 1990; Harrison; 1988; Peet 1991; Potter, et al., 1999; Simon and Narman, 1999. 
15 The reasons for this perceived dichotomy between developed and undeveloped preoccupied modernisation 
scholars. Talcott Parsons for instance built upon Weber and Durkheim explanations relating to the uniqueness 
and 'superiority' of Western civilisation (Webster, 1990). 
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advocated state intervention (for example, through state investment in infrastructure and 
technology, Rostow, quoted in Corbridge, 1995), and a partial rejection of neo-classical economic 
theory. This partial rejection was a result of the perceived socio-econornic devastation caused by 
the collapse of relatively unregulated global financial markets during the 1930s (Preston, 1996). 
Assured by the perceived success of state-intervention and centrally planned economies (adopted 
in 1930s America, during the war years and under the Marshall Plan in Europe after 1945), 
modernisation promoted development-oriented and targeted state intervention in the economy and 
the market (Webster, 1990; Harrison, 1988). That said, other modernisation approaches advocated 
the implementation of laissez-faire, liberal economic policies, promoting capitalism, the market, 
and tariff liberalisation (Preston, 1996). Indeed, Chowdhry (1995,30) argued that 'it is... the goal of 
modernization theory to turn Third World countries into capitalist market economies'. " 
Furthermore, the philosophies of moden-tisation, whether economically, psychologically, culturally, 
or biologically inspired, had at their centre the advocacy of economic growth as a recipe for 
developing the 'undeveloped' areas of the world. For instance, Hagen argued that psychological 
changes were necessary to overcome and discredit superstitions which were seen to be prevalent in 
developing regions and a barrier to the acceptance of economic modernity (Peet, 1991,26). 
Moreover, a stable political structure was critical to economic moderrdsation, as was the national 
media in disseminating the ideas of capitalist modernity (Lerner, as quoted in Roberts and Hite, 
2000,10). Additionally, Hoselitz argued that it was necessary to create an atmosphere for 
entrepreneurs to thrive, as they reputedly did within 'civilised' Western societies (Peet, 1991,25-6). 
II Dependency 
Many dependency perspectives arose out of criticisms of moderrdsation approaches. For instance, 
dependency theorists, such as Gunder Frank, objected to the simplistic manner in which the 
traditional or undeveloped world was portrayed (Harrison, 1988,44, and 77-79). Dependency 
theorists also criticised aspects of capitalism, and argued that it led to the exploitation of the 'Third 
World' (Webster, 1990,80). A process of exploitation was fuelled by international trade and 
colonialism (Frank 1967,22). Moreover, Wallerstein declared that 'all states within the capitalist 
16 This is not to say that these two strains of modernisation were incompatible. 
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system cannot develop simultaneously by definition because the system functions by virtue of 
having an unequal core and peripheral regions' (quoted in Larrain, 1989,15). This distinction 
between core and periphery (also termed self-centred and peripheral by Amin and developed by 
Wallerstein into three divisions; core, periphery, and semi-periphery), is a common characteristic 
that binds the broad school of dependency theories. Frank identified the existence of the 
centre/periphery divide as one reason for the lack of development in many LDRs and noted that, 
'the centre consistently and systematically expropriates the economic surplus from the periphery 
through the mechanisms of the international market' (quoted in Dickson, 1997,40). This 
'exploitation', dependency perspectives argue, resulted in economic marginalisation, particularly of 
those in the periphery (Roberts and Hite, 2000,12). 
Despite its opposition to the effects of modernisation and capitalism, it is fair to say that 
dependency theorists produced few alternatives to challenge modemisation. Although opposing 
the implications of unregulated market capitalism, many dependency thinkers supported the idea 
of strong state intervention, economic growth, and Western oriented socio-cultural policies to 
achieve development and 'progress' (Skeldon, 1997). Indeed, Palma (1981) divided dependency 
into three broad schools and noted that all advocated economic growth to achieve development in 
LDRs. One of these perspectives emanated from the UN Economic Commission on Latin America 
(ECLA), which supported the policy of Import Substitute Industrialisation (ISI) to protect 
indigenous industrialisation. within Latin America from the detrimental effects of capitalism 
(Roberts and Hite, 2000,14). 
III Modernisation, Dependency and trade 
Modernisation and dependency approaches provided two opposing faces of post-war development 
thinking. However, both perspectives had some common ground, in that both believed in economic 
growth to promote development of underdeveloped/peripheral regions (Potter et al., 1999). An 
important component of economic growth for both perspectives was the creation of trade. Global 
trade policy in the era of modernisation and dependency - between 1945 and the mid 1970s - was 
on the one hand characterised by the establishment of international financial institutions (IFIs), for 
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example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), to increase international trade and reduce tariffs, 17 particularly in more industrialised. 
regions, and on the other, the implementation of arguably protectionist regional trade regimes 
using inward-oriented trade policies, predominantly in LDRs (Krueger, 1995,1-2). 
Although these developments, particularly trade and tariff liberalisation, were mainly 
associated with moden-tisation (Peet, 1991), " ISI and more protectionist stances were supported by 
early dependency theorists and practitioners (especially Raul Prebisch and ECLA). For instance, 
they asserted that 'regional integration constitutes a defensive reaction on the part of the 
developing countries both to enhance their bargaining power vis-A-vis the developed world and to 
mobilize regionally their own limited resources for development in lieu of external assistance' 
(Segal, 1966-7,252). Furthermore, some dependency theorists believed that protectionist trade 
policies were necessary to facilitate the development process in LDRs (Lall, 1993,47). ISI was the 
main policy assisting the sheltering of new infant industries behind protective trade barriers which 
were thought to be in danger from international competition because of their high initial costs of 
production (Lall, 1993). In the early 1960s, ISI was heralded as a 'successful economic growth model 
in combining the interests of various classes around the project of inward-oriented national 
development' (Giilalp, 1998,955). " Newly formed (and plentiful) Regional Integration 
Arrangements (RIAs) in LDRs quickly adopted these policies (Balassa and StoutJesdik, 1975-6,57- 
9). Hazelwood (1979,41) noted how the United Nations propagated the view that these RIAs were 
important organisations in fostering economic and industrial development. However, following 
their ascendancy at the start of the 1970s, RIAs and protectionist trade policies were challenged and 
increasingly supplanted by development thinking and policies associated with neo-classical 
economic perspectives. 
17 For example, average tariff levels reduced from approximately 38% in 1947 to approximately 8% in 1972 
amongst the 62 countries that comprised the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (which had started off 
with 23 in 1947) (Gibb and Michalak, 1994,13). 
18 Modernisation supported conventional theories advocating the increase in global trade through a reduction 
in the level of tariffs, whereas dependency theorists claimed that while an increase in trade benefited the 
whole world, it was 'of much greater benefit to the centre (where manufacturing production is concentrated) 
than to the periphery (which was destined to produce primary products)' (Palma, 1981,408). 
'9 Gwynne (1985,24-8) notes that the areas where ISI successfully occurred include the motor industry in 
Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Venezuela. 
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IV Neo-classical/neo-liberal economic development perspectives 
In many ways, criticisms of modernisation and dependency theories led to the re-emergence of 
neo-liberal economic perspectives. Attacks on modernisation theory from the mid-1970s 
increasingly emanated from neo-liberal sources who criticised Keynesian economics, the 
underpinning of many modernisation theories. Kay (1993,695) highlighted one such criticism, in 
that: 
state interventionism... has created distortions in the price mechanisms which has 
resulted in the misallocation of productive resources and therefore lower rates of 
growth. The neo-liberal slogan is that imperfect markets work far better than 
imperfect govermnents and planning. 
The neo-liberal 'crusade' was led by individual academics (such as Deepak Lal and Bela 
Belassa), the financial press, politicians and government officials, as well as by IFIs (such as the 
World Bank and GATT - now the World Trade Organisation - WTO). Lal, a persistent critic of state 
intervention in the economy and one-time economic adviser to the World Bank, argued that the 
state was effective at social control and developing infrastructure but, by using what he termed 
'Dirigisme dogma', the state should not intervene in economic policies - be they foreign trade 
controls, industrial licensing, or forms of protectionism (Lal, reproduced in Corbridge, 1990,62-3). 
In many ways it could be argued that such state intervention continues today, with policies such as 
the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (referred to in 7.4) being an obvious target for neo- 
classical economic criticism. Furthermore, a big element of ISIs downfall, as well as theoretical 
objections, was its poor performance in achieving development. 
Belassa (1993,25-6), also with links to the World Bank, asserted that LDRs benefit in three 
ways from the neo-liberal concept of economic development. First, they can benefit from 
specialising and exporting (exploiting) their valuable natural resource products. Second, 
particularly in the early stages of industrialisation, LDRs can utilise unskilled and therefore cheap 
labour forces (making them more competitive). Third, they can compete on the global market 
where international specialisation creates 'comparative advantage. Neo-hberal thinking suggests 
that wealth created by the unhindered operation of the market will 'trickle-down' to all sections of 
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society (Friedman, as noted in Krugman, 1994) and reduce, or eventually eliminate, regional 
inequalities (Simon, 1990). 
Furthermore, neo-liberal developmental agreements are often tied to a condition that signatory 
parties have a commitment to the democratic process (Zack-Williams, 2000), which should provide 
the basis for stable internal conditions upon which neo-classical economics can thrive. In addition, 
Lal and Rajapatirana (1987) claim that statistical tests validate the neo-fiberal case that freer trade 
enhances economic growth and therefore development in LDRs. Furthermore, Ng and Yeats (1997, 
898), contend that open economies work better for LDRs, supporting the view that trade 
liberalisation and Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) make an important contribution to 
industrialisation and the more efficient utilisation of resources. Neo-liberal and neo-modernisation 
theorists also contend that the increasing marginalisation of the LDRs is due more to either the 
freedom of the market being impeded (Lal, 1993) or the corruption and domestic discord in these 
areas. 
IFIs also initiated a change in development discourse, planning and policy by advancing 
economic neo-liberal approaches to development. During the 1980's the World Bank and IMF 
informed developing states that they needed to put 'their own houses in order. They needed to 
have freer markets and export-oriented growth, not to blame their problems on some hostile and 
amorphous [core/periphery] 'world system" (Lister, 1997,58). Peet (1991,40) adds that, 'theories 
very similar to modernization continue to direct policy in governmental and international aid 
agencies (such as the World Bank), but theoretical justification tends to be sought more in neo- 
classical economics than developmental society'. 
Clare Short, the UK's secretary of state for international development, exemplifies many 
(although not all) government officials around the world who promote neo-liberalism. For example, 
Short argued that globalisation (based on neo-classical economics): 
... increases wealth creation... To avoid [being marginalised] ... developing countries 
must become full participants on the global economic stage, shaping and 
influencing the global rules in line with their interests and needs. (Short, 1998,456). 
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In many ways neo-liberal approaches to development are identical to those of modernisation, 
in that they continue to promote capitalism and only advocate social and political intervention to 
maintain the operation of the market (Marchand and Parpart, 1995). Modernisation theorists 
demanded the maintenance of political order; under neo-liberalism there are requests for 'good 
governance' (Slater, 1993,426-8; Moore, 2001) and a commitment in developmental agreements to 
democratic and transparent decision-making processes. The EU-SA TDCA is just such an example 
of this linking of economic and political criteria. 
V Neo-classical economic trade policy 
Despite analysts proclaiming the limited success of ISI, by the mid-1970s both ISI and state 
intervention in the market were enduring a barrage of criticism. Radical dependency theorists 
became increasingly frustrated with ISI failing to break the 'cycle of poverty' in the periphery 
(Gfflalp, 1998,955), and it was also viewed as a dangerous form of dependence (Seers, 1981,14). 
Yet, most criticism arose from neo-classical/neo-fiberal economic perspectives, as ISIs and RIAs 
were considered to be diverting and reducing, rather than creating, trade (Mwase, 1995,480). As an 
alternative neo-liberals advocated that LDRs should accept more open trade policies, such as those 
credited for achieving high levels of economic growth in the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) 
in South East Asia. Their perceived success further undermined both protectionist trade policies 
and RIAs (Lall, 1993,48-51). The alternative neo-liberal trade approach was based on 'getting prices 
right' by reducing government intervention in the market and reducing tariff levels as far as 
possible, and to bring about the kind of 'dynamic growth' registered by the East Asian NICs' (Lall, 
1993,52). In order to initiate this: 
transparent, liberal, outward-looking trade policies are critical in attracting 
foreign investment. Private capital flows to Africa have risen much less than to 
other countries, and Africa has missed out on the benefits that often accompany 
such flows - the transfer of technologies and management and organizational 
skills, and the creation of jobs (Sharer, 1999,2). 
IFIs played an important role in promoting trade liberalisation as an 'engine of economic growth 
and a road to development' (Lutz and Singer, 1994,1697). Indeed: 
international agencies have attempted, through mechanisms such as the World 
Bank's Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) programme, to push developing 
countries in the direction of greater outward orientation by ... promoting trade liberalisation (Bleaney and Fielding, 1995,175). 
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A 1983 World Bank report noted that states pursuing tariff liberalising strategies had a 'superior 
performance in terms of export, economic growth and employment' (as quoted in Kiely, 1998,65). 
Mike Moore, director-general of the WTO argues that trade is an 'important part' of promoting 
development in LDRs (Moore, 2001). 
The re-emergence of RIAs in the late 1980s (termed the era of New Regionalism) caused 
concern amongst neo-liberals, and led to numerous writings investigating whether these new 
regional arrangements would hinder or assist trade liberalisation policies (see Gibb and Michalak, 
1996; Mwase, 1995; Richards and Kirkpatrick, 1999; Robson, 1993; Hine, 1992; Poon, 1997, Cook, 
1998). Lal (1993,353) epitomised those sceptical of the resurgence of regional trading blocs, arguing 
that they would hinder multilateral trade liberalisation, and that, 'historically, FTAs [Free Trade 
Areas] have been the economic policy of the uncompetitive and the foreign policy of the weak'. 
However, at the same time, there were those who argued that New Regionalism posed little 
threat to the opening of global trade and that new RIAs actually assisted in freeing trade as the new 
agreements differed fundamentally from the regionalism of the 1960s (Langhammer, 1992,217-27). 
Most regional economic integration schemes are based on outward-looking trade policies and are 
established to promote trade liberalisation (Robson, 1993,329-348). The enthusiasm for the more 
overtly protectionist RIAs seen in the 1960s had all but disappeared in most areas of the world 
(Langhammer, 1992,217). In adopting neo-liberal trade policies, regional integration 'can help the 
sub-region attain greater economies of scale, widen markets, enhance industrial efficiency, reduce 
the sub-region's external dependency and the vulnerability of its economy' (Mwase, 1995,481). 
Marchand argues that the link between New Regionalism and neo-liberal economic development is 
clearly evident, noting that, 'the current wave of 'new regionalism' appears to have become the 
developmentalist dogma of the 1990s. Its advocates expect it to be the new cure-all for many 
problems', in much the same way as neo-liberal policies have been heralded (Marchand 1994,65). 
The dominant form of trade policy now operating in LDRs are those supporting trade liberalisation 
and a lessening of statal intervention in the market place (i. e. neo-classicalism). The wave of new 
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regionalism assists in reducing tariffs and their trade liberalising policies and proclaimed benefits 
have been underpinned by the neo-liberal justifications outlined above. 
2.3.2 Development perspectives in South Aftica: 1945-2001 and the EU-SA TDCA 
Two strands of South African development ideology existed from 1948-1990. The first emanated 
from apartheid governments, who, following a Verwoerdian7o model, regarded South Africa as 
comprising developed (white) and undeveloped (non-white) peoples. Tapscott asserts that the 
model regarded this divide as analogous to divisions between 'First' and 'Third' worlds (Tapscott, 
1995,178-80). Governmental policies during this era therefore could mainly be considered as being 
rooted in modernisation theory. Policies were adopted (in rhetoric at least) to 'develop' Bantustans 
(Maasdorp, 1974). 'Economic underdevelopment and poverty was attributed to the backwardness 
of the Africans themselves and their resistance to modernizing forces' (Tapscott, 1995,177). Official 
government documents commented that the black, African population was only at the start of the 
modernisation trail. " However, these 'development' policies differed from modernisation 
elsewhere. South African economic policies did not espouse partial marketisation. Furthermore 
policies were used as a way of legitimising the apartheid regime (Tapscott, 1995,177). Global 
criticisms of modernisation policies from the 1960s onwards were used by South African 
developmentalists to excuse the poor conditions of Bantustans and the failure of apartheid 
development policies. Tapscott (1995,177) argues that it is a 'gross distortion' to blame Keynesian 
economics for the failure of such goverrunental policies. A search for an alternative development 
'solution' was initiated by government in the 1980s. Big business, economic developmentalists, 
think-tanks and other organisations called for more free-market reform, and with government 
receiving sizeable finance from the private sector, legislation for privatisation and more 'neo- 
liberal' economic policies was introduced (Tapscott, 1995,187). 
20 Referring to policies associated with Hendrik Verwoerd, South African Minister responsible for 'Native 
Affairs' (1950) and Prime Minister (1958-66), and generally seen as an architect of apartheid. 
2' Tapscott (1997) notes this. See pp. 175-179. 
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A second strand of development thinking in South Africa came from anti-apartheid groups 
(such as the ANC and the South African Communist Party) whose main goal was the 'liberation of 
society from apartheid and capitalism' (Bond, 1997,1). Their policies for socio-economic 
development were premised on dependency/Marxist theories. Bond (1997) traces six variants of 
this: 
a) Colonialism of a Special Type 
b) Articulations of a mode of production 
c) Fractions of capital 
d) Racial capitalism 
e) Social history 
0 Regulation theory. 
The original theories (a-c) argued that revolution against racist colonialism should be 
accompanied by revolution against capitalism - asserting that both fostered dependent relations 
between the core and periphery (Bond, 1997,9-14). However, this position was challenged by 
Regulation theorists who noted that 'post-Fordist' institutions were necessary in order to "kick- 
start' capitalist growth' (Bond, 1997,14). These Marxist/dependency theories were central to ANC 
policy when apartheid policies were being dismantled in the early 1990s. It should be noted that 
development, also termed empowerment, policies, particularly of those communities marginalised 
by apartheid, were central to the 'new' South African goverrunent's developmental policy. 
However, previous dependency theories were replaced in favour of more neo-liberal-style 
development policies (Adelzadeh, 1996; Bond, 1997,1999,2000; Adam et al., 1997; Saul, 1999; 
Simon, 2001; ILRIG, 1998). This has been acknowledged by government officials. For instance, Alan 
Hirsch, a director in the South African Department for Trade and Industry, observed that 'the 
government's position could be described as neo-liberal - but only in a restricted view and in 
relation to issues such as trade policy reform, privatisation and tax reduction' (Hirsch, 1997,98). 
Many interviewees accordingly identify neo-hberahsm as the dominant development paradigm in 
South Africa, particularly since the partial replacement of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) with the Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy (GEAR). Bond (1997) 
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adds that GEAR blends together elements of neo-moden-dsation with neo-liberalism. It is within 
these contexts of the evolution of South African development policy that the EU-SA TDCA was 
negotiated. 
There are however two major obstacles to characterising the EU/SA TDCA as being 
exclusively based on neo-liberal economic thinking. First, the agreement is a new RIA and, as 
identified above, many neo-classical analysts oppose these regional arrangements, arguing they are 
detrimental to reducing tariffs globally. Second, both the EU and South Africa have implemented 
many non-tariff barriers and protectionist restrictions in their new trading relationship. One South 
African economist interviewed in 1999 noted that in terms of anti-dumping laws, the EU was the 
world's leading user and South Africa was placed fourth. This suggests that the actions of the two 
signatories can be seen to be protectionist and thus challenges the TDCA's neo-liberal tendencies 
(#59' 1999). 
Despite these concerns about protectionism, the agreement has many dimensions that reflect 
neo-classical economic perspectives. The central element of SEFrA is the liberalisation of tariffs, 
which is fundamental to neo-liberal perspectives, on 8000 industrial and agricultural products. 
Furthermore, the EU-SA TDCA is seen to be most important to GEAR, " as Hirsch noted: 
We want to ensure that the arrangement with the EU will allow for us to diversify 
our trade, both in terms of our imports and in terms of our exports so that we will 
be able to get raw materials that we can't obtain elsewhere at a suitable price from 
the European Union, and be able to export non-traditional exports to the EU. So 
in terms of ... [GEAR], it is not so much a question of massively increasing the level of trade with the European Union... it is also the restructuring of the trading 
relationship between the EU and South Africa. This will be a very important 
element as it will contribute to the success of the GEAR strategy (Hirsch, 1997, 
77). 
Furthermore, many of those interviewed accepted that the TDCA was based on neo-classical 
economic thinking. For instance, a senior economist, noted that that TDCA is 'picking up a lot of 
IMF type structural adjustment programmes and giving it a kind of South African flavour' (#5, 
1999). 
22 Hirsch notes that GEAR is based on neo-liberal policies, such as the reduction of the protection system, the 
removal of demand-side interventions, introduction of supply-side support, and the facilitation of exports. For 
details see Hirsch (1997,74-5). 
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To summarise, in considering the TDCA in the context of general and SOLIth African 
development, the agreement can be seen as partly reflecting the evolutioi-i of development 
discourse since 1945. Furthermore, the TDCA can be classified as being mainly based oil neo- 
classical economic perspectives, yet it possesses some characteristics that might be regarded as 
protectionist. Having discussed the ascendancy of neo-liberalism and the perceived benefits which 
prompted this, the following section critiques neo-liberal economic development and trade 
thinking and policies, with particular reference to issues of inclusivity. 
2.4 Critique of neo-classical economic development 
Despite the dominance of economic neo-liberalism in contemporary development discourse there is 
mounting criticism of this approach. Two common themes emerge from the literature criticising 
neo-liberal development theory. The first refers to 'general' criticisms; the second to claims that 
neo-classical developmental policies have perpetuated economic marginalisation and political 
exclusion. 
I General Criticisms 
The importance of the notion of the market, Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), the 
perceived success of neo-classical economics in NICs, the trickle-down effect, and the support of 
IFIs for neo-liberalism are the most commonly criticised aspects of neo-classical economic 
developmental perspectives and policies. These five concerns are now briefly considered. 
First, the neo-liberal definition of the market has been contested as being excessively abstract. 
For example, Brohman (1995b, 126) notes that, 'highly skewed power relations and structural 
inequalities within many societies produce real-world markets that are far removed from the ideal 
types of neoliberal theory', and that: 
neoclassical theory treats people as atomistic individuals who are bound together 
only through market forces. People are reduced to isolated creatures of the 
marketplace, devoid of history, cultural traditions, political opinions and social 
relationships beyond simple market considerations (Brohman, 1995a, 297). 
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That neo-liberalism places such importance on the unhindered operation of the market has led to 
concerns that the preponderance on 'market imperatives [is] ruining ordinary people's lives' 
(Daniels and Macfarlane, 16-22 February 2001). 
Second, although neo-liberal development theory may be characterised as embracing the 
virtues of the free market, in reality many such programmes are accompanied by SAPs designed to 
restructure the econon-dcs of countries seeking neo-liberal development. The detrimental impact of 
SAPs have been well chronicled, particularly in terms of 'conditionality', where those governments 
receiving aid have their policy influenced under the terms of the aid with the donor body (Bond, 
1999,12-15). Hodd (1987,336) contests that 'there is no strong evidence that the reform programmes 
[introduced by SAPs] will make the distribution of income more egalitarian or help those sections 
of the population in most poverty'. 
Third, the pitfalls of inward oriented trade regimes and the perceived success of NICs have 
also been overstated in many neo-liberal accounts of development programmes. Many of the 
inward-oriented RIAs were hampered by the oil crisis and the resulting international economic 
crisis (Payne, 1981; Cox, 1983; Cochrane and Sloan, 1973). Similarly, the success story relating to 
NICs is a crude characterisation, based more on state intervention in the market than non- 
intervention (Nayyar, 1999). 
Fourth, there have been very few indications to support the contention that the 'trickle-down 
effect' has actually occurred within LDRs (Founou-Tchuigoua, 1996; Brohman, 1995a, 299-300), or if 
they have, benefits have been very localised (Simon, 1990). Indeed, certain statistics show that 
living conditions have worsened for many people since neo-liberal programmes have been the 
dominant form of development assistance. Keet (199,20) estimated that in 1996,1.6 billion people, 
from over 100 countries had lower living standards than they had experienced in the early 1980s 
(Keet, 1999,20). Keet asserted that this situation will deteriorate whilst both the EU and US follow 
'predatory and pre-emptive regional free trade strategies'. Their 'aim is to incorporate such 
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emergent regional groupings into broader FTAs in order to open them up to the dominant 
economies /companies therein' (Keet, 1999,23). Keet (1999) also sees radical flaws in the trade 
policies of free market economics which discredits the trickle-down effect. First, it enables and 
encourages 'the already strong, the well-endowed, the well-placed, favoured, fortunate - or ruthless 
- to prosper, radical deregulation and unfettered competition simultaneously play upon and 
intensify the disadvantages of the weak' (Keet, 1999,19). Indeed, many analysts contend that 
development in the LDRs has failed because of the ethnocentric manner in which Western values 
were replicated and universally applied without taking into account the processes of indigenous 
regions (Brohman, 1995a; Bruton, 1985; Crush, 1995). As Brohman (1995b, 121) comments, 'from the 
more traditional modernisation paradigm to the newer neoliberal framework, mainstream 
development theory has been almost entirely rooted in the historical and social experiences of a few 
Western industrialised societies'. 3 
Fifth, questions have also been raised about IFIs for their role in promoting economic neo- 
liberal policies. For example: 
IMF policies are based on an idealistic view of the role and efficacy of market forces 
which, on the one hand, ignores the informal and non-market sectors of Third 
World economies, and on the other reinforces the capabilities of monopolies, 
multinational corporations and powerful Northern economies (Dickenson et al., 
1996,274). 
It should be noted however that institutions which support neo-liberal economic policies have (to 
an extent) recognised these criticisms. The World Bank for example, noted that: 
a deeper understanding of development involves a recognition that sweeping 
beliefs are often incomplete, that layers of complexity are buried not far beneath the 
surface, and that wisdom is often contingent on the particular conditions of time 
and place (World Bank, 2000,2). 
Furthermore, Mike Moore has accepted that 'most citizens in the world's 49 least-developed 
countries (LDCs) have apparently been bypassed by the benefits of globalisation. They are 
experiencing marginalisation' (Moore, 2001). However, Moore argues that the alleviation of this 
peripheralisation is the escalation of tariff liberalisation (Moore, 2001). 
23 Other analysts note that all development theories - including dependency - have a Eurocentric Grand 
narrative (GUlalp, 1998,957). 
35 
Chapter Two: The Trade. Developnient and Cooperation Agreement. dmelopnient theories and 
decision-making processes 
II Economic marginalisation and political exclusion 
The second strand of criticisms relating to neo-classical economic development theory and practice 
(although it extends also to all forms of development) concerns its primary focus on economic 
growth at the expense of socio-cultural factors. This neglect, analysts argue, has resulted in the 
increased exclusion of LDRs in the global economy, the marginalisation of its peoples and their lack 
of representation in decision-making bodies (Leys, 1996; Dickson 1997, Chatterjee and Finger 1994; 
Cox and Sinclair, 1996). 
Despite a commitment to democracy, which implies an adherence to inclusive decision- 
making, neo-classical economic development has been criticised for excluding and marginalising 
peoples its policies are supposed to assist. For example, LDRs are poorly represented in global 
economic decision-making bodies like the IMF and World Bank, both in terms of voting rights and 
the lack of resources available at their disposal for lobbying and thus influencing policy decisions 
(Hodd, 1987). Furthermore, some analysts believe that the WTO dispute system is heavily weighted 
in favour of developed countries. Wadula (22 March 2001) for example notes that developing 
countries have lost 90% of cases disputed with developed countries. He suggests that this is due to 
location of the WTO, the language used (English -a 'language used by the majority' of developed 
countries), and the lack of capacity and resources of LDRs to provide a credible defence. Despite 
the evidence presented here, some analysts argue that the 'democratic deficit' in IFIs is changing. 
Beattie (31 January 2001) for example, notes that the IMF increasingly insists that goverru-nent's 
consult with civil society representatives whilst development policies are being formulated. The 
issues relating to exclusion and marginalisation in decision-making systems, particularly within 
neo-classical trade agreements, are discussed further in section 2.5.2. 
In terms of economic marginalisation, Bruton (1985,1100) notes that, 'the most frequently 
noted failures are... inadequate growth of employment opportunities and the apparent increases in 
inequality combined with little, if any, reductions in the percentage of populations classified as 
living in poverty'. Economic marginalisation can occur in terms of social class, ethnic and gender 
group (Brohman, 1995b, 125), as well as being based on territory. Brohman notes that 'development 
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theory has focused almost exclusively on 'states' and 'national economies' as its basic units of 
analysis, precluding any serious treatment of local cultures and ethnic identities' (Brohman, 1995b, 
124). Indeed, it is claimed that many free trade policies have been applied aspatially, taking little 
account of the specific regions, geographical location, or history (Nayyar, 1999). 
The 1999 UNCTAD Trade and Development Report draws similar conclusions concerning 
excessive trade liberalisation (Raghavan, undated). Keet noted that: 
subordination and marginalisation of the weak is not an incidental side-effect of 
free market economics. It is inherent in a system that requires the small or weak 
to compete "on an equal" footing with the large and strong, and with each other 
for the attentions of the large and strong; and which actively encourages the latter 
to take advantage of such competition to maximise their own already 
considerable advantages (Keet, 1999,19). 
The literature on economic marginalisation identifies three 'groups' or areas as being most 
excluded; women, migrants, and marginalisation dependent on industry or region. The position of 
each group are briefly evaluated below. 
Exclusion based on gender 
The literature on the marginalisation of women within the discourse of development has evolved in 
four stages since 1945. In the first two 'development decades' (from 1945 to 1960s) women were 
either 'invisible' or seen as an obstacle to development because they represented traditional family 
life - seen by some developmentalists as a hindrance to the introduction of moden-tisation (Parpart, 
1995,21; Marchand and Parpart, 1995,13; Townsend, 1993,170). Ester Boserup's 1970 report, 
Women's Role in Economic Development, marked a second stage in the post-1945 analysis of the 
relationship between marginalised women and development (Whitworth, 1994). The Women In 
Development (WID) school, which originated after this report, advocated a mainly liberal-leaning 
approach to development, asserting that if women were allowed to participate in areas they were 
hitherto excluded, this would alleviate their situation (Whitworth, 1994). Indeed, WID was 
supportive of the perceived emancipatory benefits of liberal markets (Chowdhry, 1995,29-30) and 
the liberal WID approach impacted considerably on global development institutions, such as the 
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World Bank, which in 1979 produced a report entitled Recognizing the "Invisible" Women in 
Development (as noted in Chowdhry, 1995). 
This liberal approach was criticised by a broad grouping of dependency/structuralist/Marxist 
feminists, who comprised the third stage of post-1945 development feminist thought, and 'post- 
14 
modem' feminists, who comprise the fourth stage. Dependency perspectives argued that 
increased participation and reliance on the market would not remove the inequalities experienced 
by women. Instead they suggested that the core/periphery structure actually perpetuates 
inequalities. Both dependency and post-modem perspectives also argue that neo-liberal 
development policies - such as SAPs and trade liberalisation - have a negative impact on women in 
LDRs by exacerbating the poverty of poor women, by increasing the workload, and by decreasing 
social spending and 'throwing the burden of this reduction largely on women's unpaid labour' 
(Chowdhry, 1995,33). 
Contemporary perspectives on the impact of neo-liberalism on women suggest that although 
neo-classical economics has meant increased participation of women in the formal economy (Pape, 
2000), the policies associated with trade liberalisation have affected womens lives as workers 
traders, consumers and as mothers (Goldman, undated). For instance, neo-classicalism advocates 
the reduction in government expenditure on welfare provision, thus reducing finance spent on 
state aid to women in some countries around the world. Hale (1998) notes that women are 
employed in industrial sectors that are most prone to unemployment as a result of reducing tariffs 
on trade (such as textiles and clothing). 
B Migrant exclusion and marginalisation 
Migration is an important issue in the analysis of economic development in LDRs. As Amin (1995, 
29) notes, whilst migration has always happened and occurs because of many factors, 'what makes 
the modem n-dgratory phenomenon unique is its connection to the globalisation of the capitalist 
24 Post-modern perspectives criticize previous feminist perspectives on development for their portrayal of 
women from LDRs as 'benighted, overburdened beasts, helplessly entangled in the tentacles of regressive 
Third World patriarchy. The imaginary of poverty, powerlessness and vulnerability was readily captured by 
development discourse' (Parpart, 1995,2 1). 
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economy'. Furthermore, the relevance of migration to development and (capitalist) economic 
growth has been noted by the three major post-1945 development paradigms (Skeldon, 1997). To 
some, migration was seen as a necessary factor in the modernisation of LDRs (Appleyard, 1989), 
while for others, excessive migration was evidence of underdevelopment or the peripheralisation of 
the margins (Skeldon, 1997). Modernisation and neo-liberal development theorists have generally 
argued that migration, or the utilisation of labour in international markets, assists in the economic 
growth of LDRs by reducing unemployment and introducing foreign currency in the form of 
remittances. These were valued for instance at $2.5 billion to India in 1980 (Appleyard, 1989,487- 
490). 
Neo-liberal/modernisation development has been criticised for exacerbating the 
marginalisation of LDRs by promoting migration. There appears to be a contradiction between neo- 
classicalism's market aspiration of labour mobility and its requirement for strong statal units to 
organise modes of production and control property and the workforce. As Dale (1999,8) notes: 
Capitalism engenders tendencies towards labour mobility and towards the 
generalization of political rights and citizenship, but simultaneously depends upon 
the establishment of economic, political and cultural infrastructures through which 
management of social reproduction occurs. These processes invariably entail the 
transgression of the free mobility of labour, and indeed, the limitation of rights. 
Such limitations have sometimes resulted in the victimisation of migrants. Statal migration policies 
(within developed and lesser-developed regions) have created a culture of hostility towards 
migrants, 'that makes him or her an object of suspicion at best, and abuse and exploitation at worst' 
(Skeldon, 1997,4). Dale (1999,1) adds that such racism is prevalent amongst mainstream parties 
and the media, ensuring that 'the public arena is supplied with a regular diet of scare stories about 
the "threat" of undocumented immigrants and the dangers of 'floods' of refugees 'swamping' the 
nation'. The xenophobic victimisation of migrants adds to the marginalisation they already 
experience through temporary, poorly paid and exploitative labour conditions. The World 
Development Report 199912000 (World Bank, 1999,6) recognises such marginalisation, and suggests 
that public policies should take into account the marginalisation caused by the "forces of trade". 
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C Marginalisation based on regions and industries 
Marginalisation can also occur on numerous regional and industrial levels and these have long 
been recognised in the development literature. Indeed the very existence of Puch inequalities 
provides the development discipline with its raison Xgtre. Gunnar Myrdal for instance, 
concentrated almost entirely on regional inequality, noting that 'the play of free market forces 
works towards inequality between regions, and such inequality is reinforced by the movements of 
capital, goods and services' (Myrdal, quoted in Brookfield, 1975,100). 
Africa has been highlighted as an area where structural marginalisation dominates the region, 
more so than any other area of the globe (Hodd, 1987). It has been argued that this is because of 
Africa's lack of representation within IFI decision-making structures that have had a profound 
impact on the continents development. For example, Africa has a cumulative vote worth 5.2*/o in 
the IMF, compared with 67.5% for 'industrialised' countries (Hodd, 1987,332). In the three World 
Bank voting chambers, Africa has between 4.5 and 7.6% of the vote, compared to the industrialised 
states who have between 65.4% and 67.1% (Hodd, 1987,334). Other analysts have claimed that IFIs 
have a 'Green room' where 'the rich and powerful countries retreat to strike agreements to the 
exclusion of developing countries and then seek to superimpose their decisions on the meeting' 
(Masemola, 2001). 
Koo (1981) suggests that the periphery-centre dichotomy caused by economic neo-liberal 
policies and furthered by the influx of multinational companies, has created strong labour- 
displacement in marginalised regions and has resulted in many industries, particularly in LDRs, 
being uncompetitive and excluded in global trading patterns. Moll (1993) states that the intended 
effect of neo-liberalism on industrial firms is that they 'will respond to the bracing winds of 
competition by becoming more competitive and efficient'. However, 'the problem with this... is 
that exposure to foreign competition can just as easily kill off certain industries as spur them to 
greater heights of efficiency and competitiveness. This is exactly what has been happening in the 
South African textile industry' (Moll, 1993,220). Furthermore, these factors push the unemployed 
towards more 'marginal service activities' such as the indirect economy, and fuels immigration. 
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However, it must be stated here that neo-liberals counter that economic marginalisation and 
political exclusion are not caused by neo-classical economics but by the continuation of 
protectionism and high tariff barriers (Moore, 28 May 2001). Indeed, all development perspectives 
have been blamed for facilitating exclusion and marginalisation. Brohman (1995b, 125) argues that 
'patterns of discrimination and inequalities based on social class, ethnicity, gender and other social 
relations were virtually ignored [by development theories]'. 
To summarise, the first finding to emerge from this debate on neo-classical economics is that it 
is has been highly polarised. According to some, the gap between the supporters and detractors is 
becoming an 'ever widening chasm' (Simpson, 2001). Intergovernmental financial institutions (IMF, 
World Bank and WTO), academics (usually either economists or those linked to these institutions 
such as Deepak Lal and Bela Belassa), government officials and the 'financial press' are based in 
one camp promoting neo-classical economics. In the other are many NGOs. ' academics and the 
'protesting public'. Very little middle ground exists (Simpson, 2001). That said, a 'third way' has 
been noted by some writers of development issues. Goldman for instance argues: 
Trade is not a neutral process. Some people argue that trade has only positive 
impacts. Others argue that trade liberalisation has only negative impacts. A third 
group argues that trade can have positive impacts, but that the benefits of trade are 
often unevenly distributed because of inequality in society. They argue that poor 
people, and particularly women, often bear the brunt of the negative impacts of 
trade such as job losses or a pressure for wages to decrease. (Goldman, undated, 5). 
Examples that the polarised debate has softened slightly have also been noted above (see for 
example, Moore, 2001). Furthermore, not all goverrunents have welcomed neo-classical economic 
policies. The Tanzanian government for example have suggested that it has resulted in exclusion, 
not inclusion (Jones, 29 January 2001). 
However, there are far more examples of hard-line positions being adopted by both sides. 
Tony Blair, the UK Prime Minister, labelled those opposing neo-classical economics as a 'travelling 
25 This is a rather crude stereotyping. The groups are not homogenous, and some government officials, 
economists etceteras will be critical of neo-liberalism. Conversely, not all NGOs are critical of capitalism 
(Petras, 1997). 
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anarchists' circus' (Black and White, 18 June 2001). Those opposing nco-liberalism have argued that 
it represents the 'rule of corporate tyranny' (Masemola, 2001). 
The second finding arising from this review of literature critiquing neo-liberalism is that those 
supporting neo-classical economic thinking tend to be less specific in identifying 'winners' frojii 
trade policies and agreements. Instead vague references are made towards the trickle-down effect 
and benefits accruing through comparative advantage. The literature criticising neo-liberalism is 
more specific in identifying 'losers'. Three of the most common groups identified as being 'losers' 
are women, migrants and marginalised industries and regions. These 'losers' are not only excluded 
in terms of the economic impact of neo-liberalism but also excluded from the clecision-making 
processes that formulate these policies. This is despite neo-liberal trade and development 
agreements advocating democratic decision-ma king. The following section therefore surveys the 
literature that surrounds describing and analysing the inclusivity of decision-making systems. 
2.5 Decision-making approaches and issues of inclusion and exclusion 
Section 2.2 noted that the TDCA commits itself to democratic principles, and in Article 66, affirms 
its allegiance to strengthening the integrative aspects of the developmental process, particularly the 
inclusion of civil society. There are those who have argued that the TDCA links economic growth 
with greater inclusiveness and democratic decision-making systems in South Africa. For instance, 
Rob Davies, notes that the EU-SA relationship 'could contribute to economic growth and 
development and thus to the strengthening of democracy in South and southern Africa' (Davies, 
2000,5). However, as the literature in section 2.4 has indicated, neo-liberal economic and trade 
development agreements ostensibly have a vague commitment to democratic - and by association 
inclusive - decision-making structures, yet in reality many stakeholders are often excluded - 
particularly those defined as 'disadvantaged'. 
Chapters Four and Five describe and examine the specifics of the South African TDCA 
decision-making structure. To provide context for this later analysis, this section reflects on the 
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literature that firstly describes decision-making structures, and secondly, evaluates their inclusivity 
in relation to issues of participation and exclusion. 
2.5.1 Literature describing decision-making processes 
The pursuit of describing and understanding decision-making processes dates back centuries, with 
Machiavelli's work exploring 'statecraft' being one of the earliest. In the twentieth century, 
Allison's 1971 account of the Cuban missile crisis is seen as the core analysis in furthering the 
understanding of decision-making systems (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). By examining decision- 
making models of the time, Allison argued that the crisis could be understood through three 
perspectives - as a rational actor process (choices that the national governments had), 
organisational process (saw that government was composed of different organisations), and/or 
through bureaucratic politics (where national government is comprised of individual 
actors/decision-makers who have their own interests and objectives). 
There are multitudes of contemporary approaches used to examine decision-making processes 
drawing from a number of academic disciplines (Parsons, 1995, xvii). For instance, psychologists 
have considered the cognitive processes behind the making of decisions (see Ranyard, Crozier and 
Svenson, 1997). Economics and management studies also have a substantive number of 
publications considering decision-making in the workplace (see Samuels et al., 1999, who presents a 
useful summary of these). Philosophical approaches examine how decision-making systems can 
best be understood (Nagel, 1990). The literature contains many perspectives on the dimensions of 
describing decision-making. Table 2.2 illustrates a summary of the diverse array of many 
perspectives available for analysts of decision-making processes. 
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Approach Description 
Stagist Policy formulation is composed of a series of steps and stages (see Lasswell, 
1956). 
Statist Nation-state acts as an autonomous actor. free of Influence from interest groups 
(Hansen and Park. 1995,186-189). Cutting and Kouzmin (1999) are concerned 
with the dynamics of cabinet decision-making. Closely linked to realist 
perspectives. 
Realism Views decision-making as a 'power relations' event between adversarial parties, 
in which internal political influences (such as perceptions of decision-makers 
and the society they interact with) are largely omitted (Lieberfeld, 2000,19-20). 
Pluralist- Focuses on power and how it is distributed and the way It shapes the decision- 
elitist making process reference. Considers an array of influences on decision-making 
structures, away from the narrower realist perspective. Pluralist perspectives 
argue that 'the perceptions of decision-makers and their constituents, and the 
relationship between the state with the society that surrounds it, can each 
influence policy choices in ways unaccounted for by realism' (Lieberfeld, 2000, 
20). 
Neo-Marxist Critiques policy-making in capitalist societies (Poulanzas, 1978). 
Comparative Compares different statal decision-making process and notes that policy Is often 
public policy determined by: 
" socio-economic factors (XVilensky, 1975). 
" party government (Castles, 1982). 
" class struggle (Offe, 1984). 
" neo-corporatism (focus of big business in shaping policy) (Lehmbruch 
and Schmitter, 1982). 
" institutionalism (role that state and other institutions play) (Hall, 1986). 
" intergovernmental (other external actors influence the decision-making 
process) (Rhodes, 1992). 
" Interest group influence (Williams, 2000). 
M 
Technocratic The role of technical expertise in shaping decisions (Bell, 1976). 
approaches 
Rationality Decisions are made on the basis of rational theory (Heineman et al., 1997; 
and Stone, 1997). 
irrationality 
approaches 
Personality Decision-makers, as humans, influence decisions (Verplanken and Svenson. 
1997). Stresses the importance of leadership (Vroom and Yetton, 1973). 
Decision- Considers state and non-statal policy structures, using approaches described 
making In above (such as pluralism, elitist, rational actor) (Turner and Hulme (1997)) 
LDRs. 
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Decision- Hansen and Park, (1995) argue that the nation-state is an autonomous actor not 
making in influenced by interest groups. But pluralists argue that interest groups do exert 
trade policy pressure. Hansen and Park apply a statistical model for their work and apply it 
to the International Trade Administration. 
Table 2.2: Summary of different perspectives describing decision-making systems 
Chapter Four (section 4.2) uses these approaches to construct a framework to describe the 
South African structure supporting the TDCA policy formulation process. One of the major debates 
surrounding decision-making political systems has been between realist/statist and pluralist 
perspectives. An example of the realist/statist position is provided by Allison - the three 
perspectives he used to examine the Cuban missile crisis place the state as primary actor. Pluralist 
approaches criticise the narrow scope adopted by realists and broaden their analysis to incorporate 
other actors who influence the decision-making processes leading to policy formulation. 
A second debate discusses the complexity of understanding decision-making and that defining 
the level, nature and type of decisions (and often non-decisions) taken can delineate, and thus 
simplify the process of describing decision-making processes (Turner and Hulme, 1997; Cox, 1967, 
Peterson and Bomberg, 1999). For example, Sidjanski (1973,7) notes that policy formulation 
involves the making of 'open' or 'closed' decisions; closed means no participation is permitted 
from outside the official governmental process. 
Many of the approaches identified in Table 2.2 advocate the use of models in order to 
'comprehend the multiplicity of factors and forces which shape' decisions (Parsons, 1995,57) and 
provide a framework to explain, describe and simplify the complexity of decision-making 
structures. David Easton's 'black box' model is one of the best known examples of this genre. 
Easton's model views decision-makers as being influenced by a number of 'inputs' from channels 
such as political parties, the media, and interest groups and attempts to understand the 
'conversion' of these influences into formal policy (termed an 'output'). ' Rational-choice theory 
provides alternative models, often based on statistical modeling, to describe the science of 
explaining (and often predicting) policy outcomes. According to Stone, these models aim to 
26 For further information of the Eastonian black box model, see Parsons 0 995,23-4). 
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consider all possible alternatives when deciding a policy. In so doing some analysts believe that the 
rational decision model offers a 'determinateness, the promise that if you go through the process of 
analysis, you will get a definite answer' (Stone, 1997,250). 27 
However, the use of models to simplify complex processes does pose certain dangers. For 
instance, 'in trying to make sense of the abstract... we tend to see them as real concrete things' 
(Parsons, 1995,61). Allison's model of the Cuban missile crisis was criticised for hugely over- 
simplifying very complex decision-making processes (Comford, 1973). Furthermore, these models 
have been promoted as an attempt to capture the 'reality' of a situation, but, as Parsons (1995, xvii) 
remarks, 'there can be no one definition of policy analysis, and no one theory or model can capture 
or explain the complexity involved in... the 'web of decisions". Indeed, a complete understanding 
of how a policy has been formulated is 'unknowable' (Parsons, 1995,1). Instead, this thesis 
appreciates that a description of decision-making is an interpretation and 'it exists in the context of 
contending interpretations' (Parsons, 1995,62). 
A survey of work describing the South African decision-making process reveals that although 
much has been written on how policies have been constructed and formulated, ' relatively little has 
successfuRy described the decision-making structure. WiNiams (2000) provides anecdotal evidence 
to suggest that 'resistance' analyses of the South African apartheid decision-making processes took 
a neo-Marxist approach, which argued that the apartheid decision-making apparatus was 
supported by capitalism. Perhaps the best-known description of apartheid South Africa's decision- 
making system was provided by Geldenhuys and Kotzi (1983). This account identified the most 
important and influential decision-making and actors in South African political society at that time. 
The most recent publications that describe pohcy formulation emanates from Lodge (1999b), Khan 
(1998), and Lieberfeld (2000). Lieberfeld in particular advocates the use of pluralistic approaches to 
provide an accurate description of the South African decision-making structure. 
27 Other models describing decision-making processes included Vroom and Yetton's (1973) normative model 
of leadership styles, and Bueno De Mesquita's (1997) expected utility model. 
28 This literature mainly examines the formulation of apartheid policies. See in particular Brookes (1968) and 
Butler (1998). 
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This survey of the literature has therefore provided useful frameworks for describing 
governmental decision-making processes in the EU/SA TDCA context. In detailing the South 
African structures supporting the TDCA decision-making process, this research reflects on the 
following: 
" The diversity of approaches that can be used to describe decision-making processes 
" The importance of defining what decisions were taken in formulating policy 
" Although useful for simplifying a complex picture, models rarely depict reality entirely 
accurately 
" Work on South African decision-making structures is limited. 
2.5.2 Literature evaluating inclusion, exclusion and marginalisation of decision-making systems 
This section considers literature that debates issues of inclusion, exclusion and participation in 
decision-making systems that surround goverrunental policy formulation processes, particularly in 
relation to South Africa and neo-liberal economic developmental policies. 
There is a tendency for the work examining inclusion/exclusion issues in governmental 
decision-making processes to assume that optimum participation of all stakeholders is desirable 
and that it would lead to greater levels of inclusion in decision-making systems (Hilliard and 
Kemp, 1999; Lucas, 1976). This is especially the case in developmental-related policies, where the de 
facto participation of the local population is viewed as most important (Hoddinott et al., 1999; Botes 
and van Rensburg, 2000). Furthermore, many in the field consider that those in power, such as 
government, strive to reduce the levels of participation open to stakeholders (Held, 1996). 
Those that suggest stakeholder participation is desirable argue that the system of 
representative democracy, prevalent in many countries that adhere to liberal democracy practices, 
provides only the most minimal form of inclusion for society (Beetham and Boyle, 1995,9). Weale 
(1999,85) notes that in a representative system, 'the public's power of decision is limited to 
choosing those persons or bodies charged with institutional responsibility for making the final 
decision'. Held (1996) maintains that vast numbers of people are excluded from participation under 
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this system - often on the basis of class, ethnicity, or gender. The feeling that government opposes 
participation is supported by Hilliard and Kemp, who argue that 'participatory democracy and 
citizen participation do not come as natural options to any government. There is a perception that 
the public are treading on a holy domain and are, in fact, interfering with the running of the 
country' (Hilliard and Kemp, 1999,368). 
The other side of the debate suggests that mass participation in decision-making systems is 
unfeasible because it creates inertia, through 'sheer weight of numbers' (Lucas, 1976,138). Indeed, 
Held (1996,267) asks: 
is it feasible in densely populated, complex societies, to extend the realm of 
democracy from periodic involvement in elections to participation in decision- 
making in all spheres of life... It is hard - if not impossible - to imagine any 
political system.. - in which all citizens could be involved in face-to-face discussions 
every time a public issue arises. 
This debate on inclusivity and the feasibility of participation raises many interesting questions 
and sub-debates. Firstly, the parameters of the debate are not as dichotomous as might be 
suggested. Many commentators say that within representative democracy systems there are 
chances for direct inclusion, either via the establishment of pressure groups or referenda on key 
issues (Beetharn and Boyle, 1995). The definition of what constitutes participation has also been 
considered in the literature. Lucas (1976,136) notes that participation 'can take many forms. Merely 
to know what decisions are being taken, and why, is to be in on them'. Furthermore, in relation to 
the earlier debate concerning open and closed decisions, participation is not possible unless all 
relevant parties have access to the full debate (Lucas, 1976). Indeed, there are other commentators 
who assert that participation not only means participating in deciding a particular policy 'but also 
having a role on what emerges on to the political agenda in the first place' (Weale, 1999,85). 
Decisions surrounding who should be included in decision-making processes are always being 
taken. Weale (1999) for example says that children, prisoners, and migrants are included or 
excluded depending on the statal decision-making process. However, the question of whether 
potential participants have the will and resources to become included are also addressed in the 
literature. Lack of resources has long hampered stakeholder hopes of participating in decision- 
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making processes (Lucas, 1976; Held, 1996). In addition, stakeholders do not always have the will to 
participate, whether because of apathy, other priorities, or a sense that their input will be ignored 
(Hilliard and Kemp, 1999). 
This debate therefore tends to suggest that inclusion and exclusion can occur at many levels 
and for numerous reasons. Finding an appropriate level of inclusion represents the middle ground 
in this debate. Lucas (1976,138) states that: 
We have to strike a balance, different in different cases, between sharing power 
among a few people effectively, and sharing it with many, but also nominally, 
and between giving participators only the right to know or only the right to speak 
at a relatively low cost in cumbersomeness and formality, and giving a greater 
say at a much greater cost. 
Discussion has also centred around participation associated with neo-classical trade and 
development agreements. As noted in section 2.4 above, decision-making structures surrounding 
trade liberalising agreements and global institutions (such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO) 
supporting neo-classical macro-economic policies are increasingly attacked for excluding many of 
those directly affected by these policies (Diaz-Bonilla and Robinson, 1998; Mudde, 1998; Bond, 1999; 
Tangara, 2001). The literature on this relationship between neo-liberalism and democracy centres 
on an assertion that neo-liberalism. has the tendency to disrupt collective representation (such as 
NGOs and Trade Unions) (Williams and Taylor, 2000,23). Habib and Taylor for example argue that 
neo-liberalism curtails NGOs' ability to help the poor and marginalised because of its ability to 
erode NGO participation in decision-making processes. Indeed, Beckman (1993) notes that neo- 
liberal institutions want to create a civil society in its own image, yet in so doing they suppress 
existing civil society interests that are considered protectionist. Furthermore, de Senarclens (1998, 
95) notes that the IMF and World Bank (along with multinational companies) are frequently 
disillusioned by state's reluctance to embrace neo-liberalism. and therefore have encouraged links 
with civil society group and multinational firms in the global market. 
Mudde (1998) also raises the question of civil society participation in the post-Lom6 
negotiations, which has not occurred thus far, though the ACP secretariat claims it is willing to 
'mainstream' civil society's participation in two of the four negotiating groups. However, the 
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secretariat remarked that the ACP group would firmly oppose civil society being incorporated in 
any decision-making forum at an EU-ACP level (Mudde, 1998). With the volume of criticism 
directed against neo-liberalism's record for excluding many stakeholders from the decision-making 
structures that decide development policies, many are now calling for local people to be more 
empowered to avoid having 'alien' ideas imposed on them (Tangara, 2001). Botes and van 
Rensburg's (2000) work on community participation suggests that the idea of historically 
marginalised peoples being included in decision-making has gained increasing importance in the 
last three decades with the growth of NGOs and CBOs. Indeed, there 'exists a growing view that 
local communities and beneficiaries should be involved in the development, implementation, and 
monitoring of interventions designed to reduce poverty' (Hoddinott, et al, 1999). The chapters that 
evaluate the degree of inclusiveness in the structures supporting the South African side of the 
TDCA decision-making process will reflect on these debates. 
Other debates on inclusion and exclusion have considered the lack of participation that seems 
to occur in LDRs (Zack-Williams, 2000). Turner and Huhne (1997) consider these issues in depth, 
and note that, characteristically, popular participation faces many obstacles, the official channels of 
participation are few, and the civil service/bureaucracy often decides policy. 
Commitment to inclusive democratic decision-making processes appears to sit reasonably 
comfortably with the post-1994, ANC-led South African government. Many analysts have praised 
the democratic inclusiveness of the partners that comprise the government (Lodge, 1999a; Glaser, 
2001). -" Associations closely linked to the ANC during its exclusion from apartheid South Africa 
were renowned for their inclusivity. For example, COSATU is renowned for its participatory 
democracy (Maree, 1998). Likewise, the anti-apartheid movement thrived on grass-roots 
participation (Lanegran, 1995; Hilliard and Kemp, 1999; Zuern, 2001). The ANC itself called for an 
inclusive governmental decision-making structure (Aftican Journal of International and Comparative 
Law, 1993) and it has a strong reputation in representing women's interests (Zulu, 1998). James and 
29 It should be noted that some of the parties that comprise the South African government have been viewed 
as essentially undemocratic. The South African Communist Party for instance was associated with Stalinist 
political systems far removed from liberal-democracy (Glaser, 2001,215). 
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Caliguire (1996) argue that South Africa has achieved much, having undergone a remarkable 
democratic transformation. This was supported by Helga Jansen, a member of an NGO with close 
links to labour, interviewed in 2001. She noted that: 
There are mechanisms, there are all kinds of forums, which we get sick to death of, 
but they are there, ... and there are all kinds of hearings and speAk-outs. I think 
what was recognised by the incumbent government... was that people needed a 
space to vocalise their anguish, their poverty, their dreams, their aspirations. 
People needed mechanisms for that. Otherwise there would have been discontent 
(#Jansen, 2001). 
However, the 'new' South African government has also been criticised for undemocratic 
practices, including curbing the freedom of the media, and for excluding stakeholders from aspects 
of the democratic process (Sampson, 22 April 2001; Daniels and Macfarlane, 16 to 22 February 
2001). This is particularly the case for certain NGOs Games and Caliguire, 1996), civil society 
(Lodge, 1999a; COSATU, 1999), women (Hassim and Gouws, 1998) and n-dgrants. One NGO 
representative argued that 'government has set up the structures but they have not provided civil 
society with the kind of resources that they would need in order to participate as a meaningful 
force' (#51,1999). 
Migrant groups have been identified as the most marginalised from being included in the 
South African decision-making process. This is stated by Vincent Williams, of the Southern African 
Migration Project (SAMP), who noted that: 
Migrants essentially do not have a voice in South African society. There are a 
couple of groups who work with refugees. Migrants per se have absolutely no voice. 
They themselves are usually not very well organised. Those of us who work in the 
field tend to work grappling with policy and research and' not representation, or 
their participation in South African decision-making structures ... We are not in the business of mobilising migrants. We are in the business of looking at migration 
policies... we tend to work with governments rather than the migrants themselves. 
Of course one of the questions is, how do we know what the migrants want, if we 
do not talk to them directly? (#Williams, 2001). 
The 'new' South African governmental decision-making process has consequently been 
defined as an 'elite-mass' model which means that within the constitution, the South African 
government has made many conunitments to participatory democracy whilst recognising that 
many stakeholders in South African will not be able to participate. Hilliard and Kemp (1999,366) 
note that: 
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This model normally inhibits politicians from always sharing iiiformation with 
their constituencies; for both practical and politically expedicilt reasolls. This 
particular policy model prescribes that a handful of persons formulate policies for 
the majority. To keep up a semblance of citizeii participation, the policy-makers 
extensively democratize the policv process. Ultimately, however, grassroots 
participation is more of a nuisance value than anything else. 
An example of this is South Africa's National Economic and Development Liaison Committee 
(NEDLAQ which many herald is an example of citizen participation. The explicit ailn of NFDLAC 
was to bring civil society into the decision-making process (James and Caliguire, 1996). However, in 
determining which NGO's should represent civil society the 'selection criteria turned out to be so 
stringent and inappropriate, however, that only three NGO's qualified' (James and Caliguire, 1996, 
63). 
This section has surveyed the literature that explores describing and evaluating decision- 
making structures. The first finding that emerges is that models have been used to assist in 
describing decision-making structures -a potentially complex process. The second finding 
surrounds the definition of what is meant by the terms inclusion and participation. As the literature 
review has shown little consensus has been reached on finding a common definition acceptable to 
all. This is clearly apparent in the comments that relate to the perceived inclusiveness of the South 
African decision-making process. 
This chapter has explored the conceptual background to the EU-SA TDCA and the South African 
side of its decision-making process. This has resulted in a number of findings and key issues that 
are relevant for the following empirical chapters (chapters Four to Eight). 
First the TDCA has been placed in the context of the major post 1945 economic clevelopment 
perspectives (modernisation, dependency and neo-liberalism). From the summary of the TDCA's 
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contents, the agreement, particularly the trade component SEFTA, can be categorised as being 
premised primarily on neo-classical economic thinking. 
Second, this review implies that neo-classical economic approaches now dominate both the 
philosophy and policy of development (especially trade) across the globe, particularly in LDRs. 
This chapter has also noted that the evolution of development perspectives generally (from 
modernisation to neo-liberalism) was also mirrored to an extent in the South African internal 
environment and it has been argued that since 1994 the South African government's macro- 
economic policy has increasingly been shaped by neo-liberal economic thinking. Due to such 
dominance it might be logical to expect that both the domestic (or internal) and international (or 
external) environment in which decisions are taken in relation to development are inevitably 
shaped to reflect this dominance of neo-liberalism. Indeed, Williams and Taylor (2000,21) believe 
that 'the international discourse of neoliberalism. has played a crucial, and often underestimated, 
role', in influencing South Africa's contemporary macroeconomic policy. As a result those 
'decision-makers' associated with the South African structure supporting the TDCA decision- 
making system who were interviewed might well have been influenced, either consciously or 
subconsciously, by this climate. If so, this situation might result in alternative views to neo- 
liberalism not being considered in economic developmental and trade policy formulation processes. 
That said, since the so-called collapse of the Cold War and 'communism', alternatives to neo- 
liberalism have failed to generate enough support to present a credible assault on the hegemony of 
neo-classicalism. Indeed, this review has noted that although there are different perspectives on 
economic development, their thinking on trade, in terms of any increase in trade being seen as 
desirable, is very similar. The following chapters aim to explore further the influence that the 
dominance of neo-classical economic perspectives might have on decision-makers in the South 
African TDCA policy formulation structure. 
Third, the next key issue to emerge from the literature assessing the neo-classical economic 
development perspective (section 2.3.1 and 2.4) is that it identified that more 'losers' than 'winners' 
result from the implementation of neo-classical trade and development policies. The literature 
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identified an 'ever-widening chasm' between those supporting neo-liberal policies and those 
opposing it. The selection of 'winners' (2.3.1) as a result of economic neo-liberalism. unsurprisingly 
emanated mainly from representatives of intergovernmental institutions (WTO, IMF) or academics 
(Lal and Belassa) with an established record of supporting neo-classical economics. The benefits 
they identified were rather vague, such as LDRs profiting from a cheaper labour source, or that the 
'trickle-down' effect will I)enefit' the whole of society. On the other hand the literature reviewed in 
section 2.4 illustrates that specific 'losers' were identified mainly by NGO officials or academics 
with an established history of criticism against neo-liberalism. Women, migrants, and certain 
regions and industries were highlighted as the most likely categories to be 'marginalised' by free 
market trading agreements, such as the EU-SA TDCA. Future chapters that assess perceptions 
surrounding the likely impact of the TDCA on southern Africa will examine this identification of 
'losers' and 'winners'. 
Fourth, the literature also suggested that certain stakeholders are also excluded from 
developmental decision-making systems. Section 2.5.2 therefore surveyed literature that evaluates 
issues of participation, inclusion and exclusion in decision-making systems that surround policy 
formulation processes, particularly in LDRs, South Africa and also IFIs. A less clearly defined 
polarised debate also takes place in the literature. On the one side are analysts who argue that 
stakeholders should be allowed access to the decision-making processes. The other side suggest 
that too much stakeholder participation may result in inertia and that access to various decision- 
making structures is not feasible. This literature survey provided the foundation for an analysis of 
the perceptions of inclusion and exclusion of stakeholders to the TDCA policy formulation process 
to be conducted in Chapter Five. 
Fifth, although the description of decision-making systems in South Africa is rather limited, 
this chapter has highlighted that differing approaches can be used to describe decision-making 
processes in general. Many perspectives suggest that models, although imperfect, can be 
particularly useful in attempting to simplify what can be a complex picture. This evaluation of the 
literature is important because it provides the foundation for describing the South African TDCA 
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decision-making process in Chapter Four. Before this description proceeds, the methodological and 
philosophical concerns, along with methods, are discussed in Chapter Three. 
55 
Chapter Three: 
Methodological considerat ions, philosophical 
debates and methods 
Contents: 
3.1 Introduction 57 
3.2 Philosophical Issues 57 
3.3 Methods 61 
3.4 Methodological considerations 68 
3.4.1 Objectivity 69 
3.4.2 Relations between interviewer and interviewee 70 
3.5 Conclusion 73 
56 
C. ImpwrThree: Mtlýthoclolo, ý, Ocal considerations, philosophil.; 1I detwic"and nlclllodý- 
Contemporary human geography is characterized by methodological diversity, a 
plethora of methods and approaches which link in complex ways to underlying 
philosophical debates. (Graham, 1997,6). 
The previous chapter considered a range of debates relating to the description and evaluation of 
decision-making processes and assessments of economic development perspectives that underpin 
neo-classical trade and development agreements. Following the advice of Graham in the quotation 
above, this chapter considers methodological issues, methods and underlying philosopliical 
debates that frame this study and which had to be considered before and during this research. 
Much has been written on the problems of retrospective accounts of detailing methodology 
(Cloke et al., 1995; Shaw, 1999). This was negated to an extent within this research programme by a 
continual assessment of the potential methods that could be employed and an awareness of 
methodological/ philosophical concerns that might be experienced. The chapter portrays this, 
dividing the themes (philosophical debate on positionality, methods and methodological concerns) 
into three sections. The first (3.2), philosophical debate, looks at the issue of positionality in relation 
to this research. The second (3-3) describes how content analysis of primary and secondary 
documentation and semi-structured interviews were chosen as central methods. The third (3.4), 
methodological concerns, relates closely to the first two sections, reflecting my position within this 
research process. 
3.2 Philosophical Issues 
'All research... adopts a philosophical position even if this is done so 
unconsciously' (Flowerdew and Martin, 1997,15). 
That all research is determined to some extent by the researchers' philosophical positions and 
epistemological standpoints is argued by many authors within the social sciences (such as Blaikie, 
1993; Christians, 2000; Ladson-Billings, 2000), particularly those involved with cultural /social 
strands of geography (Visser, 2000; Radcliffe, 1994; Graham, 1997; Siclaway, 1992,2000; Madge, 
1993; Pile, 1994). This research is no exception and a reflexive account of my 'positionality' is 
outlined below. Stating such a position is essential to this research when considering the range of 
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predominantly theoretical discussions outlined in the previous chapter and the nature of my 
investigations in southern Africa. 
My 'positionality' is reflected in the sensitivity that this research has towards terminology 
surrounding notions of race and effinicity. There is a great deal of literature that focuses on the 
inherently racist connotations of language based on skin colour (black, white, coloured) or 
nationality (such as South African, British, or Cameroonian) (Boulding, 1959; Balakrishnan, 1995; 
Levermore, 2000). However, the use of such terms is unavoidable in the context of this work - these 
phrases are used with such regularity in everyday and academic discourses that continually 
highlighting and objecting to them throughout this text is just unpractical. Furthermore, the 
specific use of certain phrases was also occasionally objected to by those interviewed (such as 
#Bhorat, 2001). For instance, the use of the term 'neo-liberal' was deemed to be subjective - 
signifying a hostility towards neo-classical economic perspectives, because usually only those 
objecting to 'neo-hberalism' would use the term. in view of this concern, much of this thesis uses 
the phrases neo-classical and neo-liberalism in equal proportions and interchangeably, in order to 
avoid accusations of being biased to any particular side. 
There are also a multitude of potential concerns that confront a white, male, 'Western' 
academic investigating aspects of decision-making and development in a so-called 'developing' 
area of the world. Madge (quoted in Visser, 2000,234) suggests that 'it is worth considering 
whether research in the Third World by First World academics is still only possible by dynamic, 
subtle but ongoing Western imperialism', particularly when studies, such as this research, 
concentrating on development issues, have been accused of being imbued with 'colonialist 
tendencies' (Sidaway, 1992). Whether South Africa can be considered a 'Third World' area is 
debatable, yet this does not alter the terms of this debate, as at best, South Africa is viewed as a 
state 'in transition'. Visser (2000,234) notes that many of these issues (concerning 'Western' 
academics) relate to research undertaken in South Africa, and points to the restraints, 'social, 
economic, gender, race and cultural background of the researcher and researched, [that are placed] 
on the types of investigations one might be able to undertake'. Indeed, Valentine (1997,114) 
cautions that: 
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If you are embarking on research in the developing world it is particularly 
important to be aware of your privileged position in terms of wealth, education 
and so on, in relation to those you will be working with, and to recognise that 
your research is embedded in the context of colonialism. 
A further problem was noted by Sidaway (1992,404) who stated that the 'process of acquiring 
inside knowledge of a foreign environment to enrich the researchers' previous 'external' 
knowledge is often fraught with difficulty'. For instance, there is a one-way flow of information by 
Western academics looking at developing areas. Indeed, some interviewees (such as #Saunderson, 
2001), particularly from the wine industry, implied that researchers, notably from the UK, who 
study development issues and democratic inclusivity in South Africa do so from a rather 
contradictory position, as similar conditions in the UK are often ignored in their reflections on the 
research process. Madge maintains that there is a 'thunderous silence' in the reflexivity of such 
research (Madge, 1993,295). ' Moreover, Pile (1991,463) comments that: 
Quite content to criticise structures of power operating in society, geographers 
have avoided confronting the power relations upon which geographical research 
relies and thrives. The researcher constantly slips out of the analysis, and is never 
rescued... The observer remains mysterious, distant and silent while the subject 
discloses more information: the researched is highlighted and the researcher 
hidden. 
Other geographers suggest that these problems are particularly acute when interviewing 
'foreign elites', which much of this research is based on. Herod (1999,314) notes that: 
There is one issue which seems particularly problematic when interviewing 
foreign elites, and that is the issue of the cultural positionality of the researcher 
and thus the presumed validity and meaningfulness of the knowledge they 
produce. 
This problem is defined as an insider/outsider dilemma, where some scholars claim that only an 
'insider' can obtain 'true' knowledge, whilst others opine that 'outsiders' are more neutral (the 
debate is surnmarised by Mullings, 1999). This discussion is furthered by Sidaway (1992,406) who 
argues that: 
To assume that 'insiders' automatically have a more sophisticated and appropriate 
approach to understanding social reality in 'their' society is to fall into the fallacy 
of Third Worldism, and a potentially reactionary relativism. 
1 This is supported by Ladson-Billings (2000) who campaigns against what she sees as the dominance of a 
'Euro-American' regime of truth. 
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How should this research proceed in the face of these considerations? One way would be to 
follow the path advocated by the anthropologist Vincent Crapanzano. He challenged the 
commonsensical assumptions made in previous research work, proclaiming that the: 
ethnographic encounter, like any encounter between individuals or, for that 
matter, with oneself in moments of self-reflection, is always a complex negotiation 
in which the parties to that encounter acquiesce to a certain reality. This 'reality' 
belongs... to none of the parties to the encounter (Crapanzano, 1980, ix). 
Crapanzano published his entire interviews with an individual named Tuhami, in an attempt to 
make both researcher and research material as visible as the researched. Altematively, Madge 
advises that: 
Perhaps one way to begin to counter Eurocentrism is... to contest and challenge 
the implications of the system which the academy is intimately connected with, 
including the government and grant-awarding bodies. A micro-scale situated non- 
innocent perspective may thus be connected to the macro-scale political economy 
(Madge, 1993,297). 
The scope of this research, although aware of such criticisms, cannot possibly challenge the 
'Eurocentric' system in the ways envisaged by Madge, or publish aH the interview scripts as 
implied by Crapanzano. Far more realistic is Rose, who notes that ultimately: 
We cannot know everything, nor can we survey power as if we fully understand, 
control, or redistribute it. What we may be able to do is something rather more 
modest and yet, perhaps, rather more radical: namely, to inscribe into our research 
practices some absences and fallibility's while recognizing that the significance of 
this does not rest entirely in our own hands (Rose, 1997,318). 
This research has seriously considered these concerns and this is reflected in the attempt to 
make the research material and researcher as visible as possible. Tapes of interviews have, when 
requested, been copied and sent to interviewees. Furthermore, Ph. D. chapters and copies of the 
South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA) report (that was based on the first set of 
interviews and published in 2000) were sent to other interviewees so that information obtained 
was shared and made 'visible'. Additionally, the final version of this thesis will be presented to the 
University of South Africa (UNISA). 
This section has highlighted the problems associated with 'positionality'. The following 
section illustrates the evolution of methods used. 
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3.3 Methods 
Social scientists have gradually realised the advantages of using a variety of 
research strategies so that the problems associated witli one strategy may be 
compensated for by the strengths of others. This is called triangulation - using 
different research methods or sources of data to examine the same problem (Hall 
and Hall, 1996,44). 
This section describes the 'triangulation' method used in this research. Questionnaires, interviews, 
examining documents and ethnographic approaches in gathering 'primary data', in order to 
complement literature reviews ('secondary data'), are the major approaches listed in literature that 
considers qualitative research (such as Herbert, 2000; Valentine, 1997; Blaikie, 1993; Dciiziri and 
Lincoln, 2000). Two of these research methods were employed in this thesis; the examination of 
primary and secondary documents and semi-structured interviews. Selecting appropriate methods 
and analyses of data altered throughout the course of the thesis, depending oil how the research 
path evolved, on what data was being accumulated, and on what information was required for 
each stage of the research process. This section charts the evolution of the research path, noting 
which method was being employed, when, and why. The diagram in figure 3.1 (below) illustrates 
what methods and analytical techniques were used during the duration of the Ph. D. The diagram 
records five research stages. This section is divided accordingly, noting the methods used for each 
research stage and, where necessary, the type of analysis that was utilised. 
I Stage One: November 1998-June 1999 
Throughout the course of the research process secondary and primary literature was collected in 
order to deepen the scope of analysis and clarify issues associated with the four main objectives. 
From November 1998 to June 1999 secondary literature provided differing contexts in which to 
explore the EU-SA TDCA (such as reflecting on differing development theories and the mechanics 
of decision-ma king). This was complemented by a collection of primary documentation, 
specifically from NGO websites and from South African media sources on the Internet. An analysis 
of this documentation was continually undertaken, being grouped around the objectives outlined 
in Chapter One, in the manner of content analysis as suggested by May (1997,173) and Sarantakos 
(1993,212). To June 1999 all media articles collected were summarised and linked to the 
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appropriate research objectives. This content analysis assisted in identifying sorne key people to be 
interviewed before I travelled to southern Africa for the first fieldwork period. 
Semi-structured interviews were considered the most appropriate form of acquiring 
information on the dimensions of the EU-SA TDCA being investigated. The use of questionnaires 
was considered in order to solicit views and perceptions from those people involved in the FU-SA 
TDCA decision-making process, asking them, for example, to identify the key themes they 
associated with the agreement. However, their use was discounted, primarily because fewer than 
15 people had been identified as potential 'decision-makers' bv the time the second research stage 
began in July 1999. It was felt that sending a questionnaire to such a small sample would not be 
conducive to the research process. 
STAGE OF RESEARCH METHODS EMPLOYED ANALYSIS 
1: November 1998-June 1999 Secondary and primary (e. g., Content analvsis 
government documents, 
South African media) 
2: July 1999-October 1999 Semi-st-ructured interviews and 
(Fieldwork I- southern Africa) primary documents 
3: October 1999 - September 2000 Priniary/secondary documentation Comprehensive 
coding of transcribed 
niaterial and content 
analysis 
4: October 2000-FebrLiary 2001 Sen-ii-struct tired interviews and 
(Fieldwork 2- South Africa) Primary documents 
5: March 2001 -June 2001 Primary/secondary documentation Coding of 
transcribed material 
& content analysis 
Figure 3.1: Diagram of methods and analytical techniques employed throughout the research 
process 
Questionnaires were also ruled out because they tend 'to ask a rigid set of simple questions 
which 'force' or push the respondents' answers into particular categories' (Valentine, 1997,110). 
Indeed, questionnaires can limit the kind of information that can be gathered, and sometimes fail 
to inform the researcher of intimate individual perceptions. These perceptions were important for 
the research process because they formed the foundations to analyse the South African TDCA 
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decision-making process, the potential economic impact of the agreement, and an examination of 
the wine and textile sectors. Interviews, however, tend to allow for analysis with depth, 
particularly important when attempting to discover perceptions of the agreement, or to explain the 
rationale behind how policies were decided. Despite the in-depth nature and openness of the 
interviews conducted, the method employed could not be considered ethnographic, as the analysis 
of the interviews does not examine the text produced in sufficient detail (as set out in Herbert, 
2000,551-2). 
2 Stage Two: July-October 1999 
Kvale (1996,81) notes that there are seven stages of interview investigation; thematising, designing, 
interviewing, transcribing, analysing, verifying, and reporting. Thematising asks for research aims 
to be clarified. These were outlined in the introductory chapter (1.2). The transcription, analysing, 
and verification stages are discussed throughout this section. The issues surrounding designing an 
interview and the dynamics of interviewing are so voluminous that a full discussion of them is not 
possible here (see instead Kvale, 1996; Sarantakos, 1993; Hall and Hall, 1996). In terms of design, 
semi-structured interviews were chosen over structured or open-ended because I felt that certain 
common themes should be explored in each interview, but a degree of flexibility was necessary in 
order to assist the flow of conversation. A further aspect of design, choosing an interview medium, 
presented a choice between face-to-face, telephone, email, or Internet exchanges! Despite concerns 
raised above, relating to 'Western' researchers investigating in the 'non-Western' world, the advice 
of Radcliffe (1994,11) was followed; that 'Events can be understood adequately only if they are 
seen in context'. Therefore, two stages of fieldwork in southern Africa were organised throughout 
the research investigation. The first, from July to September 1999 was based at the South African 
Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg and involved interviewing nearly sixty 
people (decision-makers) on various aspects relating to the EU-SA TDCA. A list of all their names, 
occupation status and date interviewed is tabulated in Appendix A. Due to ethical considerations 
(noted in section 3.4) this list will be omitted from the final (post-viva) thesis print. 
' At one stage developing a web page, where interaction on a message board to accrue totally anonymous 
data was considered, but later rejected due to the likelihood that only a miniscule exchange would be 
possible. 
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The interview design reflected the issues that arose from the four main objectives broad 
themes that had evolved at this early stage of the research. Different questions were posed, 
depending on what category the interviewee was assigned to. There were six categories: 
1 South African decision-makers 
BLNS decision-makers 
South African lobbyists (including business, government and civil society) 
Southern African lobbyists 
Academic/think-tanks/researchers 
6 Miscellaneous - Those outside South Africa, yet within the process - such as EU 
delegation. 
An example of these six different interview forms is reproduced in Appendix B-G. Questions 
for aU 'interview types' centred around six themes. They were: 
1 Perception of the agreement ('winners/losers) 
2 Description of the South African structures supporting the TDCA decision-making 
process 
3 Perceptions of how decisions were made (e. g. Who had most influence? ) 
4 Perceptions of the perspectives surrounding trade liberalisation 
5 How the BLNS were included 
How different stakeholder groups participated 
Before the interview process began some of the advice, noted from the literature, concerning 
the potential problems associated with interviews was considered. The first related finding who to 
interview. Valentine (1997,116) suggests that this task is particularly difficult with large 
organisations (such as businesses and governments). This was occasionally the case in this, the 
second stage, of research, in South Africa, as contact from the UK was difficult, with many 
emails/faxes to 'faceless' people either not being answered or not getting through. Telephone 
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contact was often more successful, but a lengthy and expensive process. Even within South Africa, 
the process of locating an 'appropriate' interviewee was time-consuming. However, employing 
what Valentine (1997,116) describes as 'snowballing', once one or two representatives from the 
#elite' were interviewed, access to others (often on recommendation by previous respondents), was 
easier. Furthermore, advice on whom to interview was also provided by officials at SARA. 
The practicalities of where to hold interviews and the asking of questions is also raised in the 
literature (particularly Valentine, 1997; Kitchen and Tate, 2000). Care was taken to be suitably 
presented, avoid places where either the interviewee or myself might feel 'vulnerable', ' or were too 
loud; to phrase questions so that yes/no answers could be avoided; listen carefully; and not to 
repeat questions. Despite this preparation, some inevitable problems occurred. For example, in the 
first interview, when a tape and external microphone was used, I forgot to turn the external 
microphone on, so an hour-long interview was lost, save the notes that were scribbled throughout. 
A further example occurred in the second interviewing period, where during an interview with a 
wine producer, a considerable quantity of wine was consumed, which resulted in the interview 
flowing in unintended directions. Valentine (1997,124) suggested one useful way of initiating 
analysis, and acting as a safety net when such events occur is to write a research diary, describing 
interview experiences in conjunction with the interview process. This was followed to some extent 
during this research, as notes were immediately written following interviews, noting briefly how 
the interview went, and any important points that had to be followed up. An example of this is 
provided in appendix H. This shows my comments of how the interview went, and on mistakes 
made. In other notes, leads to follow up were also noted, and this frequently led to the analysis of 
future documentation. 
Also during this second stage, a large quantity of primary documentation was obtained from 
the government, parliament, NGO's, business, labour and civil society. This even included a copy 
of documents that formed the basis for discussing tariff lines at negotiations between the EU and 
South African negotiators (Kabour Proposal, 1997; SEIFSA, 1997). 
3 Although there were several moments where I felt rather unsafe - for instance, walking for five minutes 
between destinations in central Johannesburg and waiting for a taxi that never arrived in Bellville, Cape 
Town. 
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3 Stage Three: October 1999-September 2000. 
This stage was characterised by continuing the accrual of documentation and undertaking a 
comprehensive coding of the transcribed tapes. 
The process of analysing transcripted data can be convoluted, with some of Tesch's 43 types of 
qualitative analysis techniques (outlined in Crang, 1997) being suitable for an examination of the 
data collected. Indeed, the issue of how to 'interpret' data has been thoroughly documented 
(Crang, 1997, Bryman and Burgess, 1994; Kelle, 1995; Kelle and Laurie, 1995; Lonkila, 1995; Seidel 
and Kelle, 1995; Araujo, 1995). For this research, a basic form of manual coding was applied to 
transcribed interviews (only the 'relevant' aspects of the interviews were transcribed). ' Bryman 
and Burgess (1994,218) see the use of coding as 'a key process since it serves to organise copious 
notes, transcripts and documents that have been collected and it also represents the first step in the 
conceptualisation of data'. However, there are those who see the process of coding as generating 
an inductive approach to forming theories. This is central to grounded theory methods (Lonkila, 
1995), and resonates with positivist assumptions. Indeed, Araujo (1995,96) argues that 'Codes... are 
categories and categories are relations between our cognitive models and representations of the 
social world, available through interview transcripts'. This research did not to use this version of 
coding and instead adopted an approach to coding as suggested by Crang (1997,188), that 'codes 
are not there to be rigidly reproduced, nor to be counted, but as an aid to the researcher in making 
sense of material'. Therefore the coding method used for the interviews conducted during the third 
stage of research was to comprehensively transcribe the interviews and organise the resulting 
'data' into seven therned groups. These were: 
A: Criticisms of the agreement and trade liberalisation in general 
B: Inclusion and marginalisation from the decision-making process. This also incorporates 
the inclusive African theories of Ubuntu and the concept of African Renaissance 
C: Relating to researchers and impact studies 
4 Using such a method meant that other forms of qualitative analysis were not used, such as more detailed 
forms of coding and computer-assisted qualitative research programmes. 
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D: Benefits of the agreement and justification of neo-liberal development 
E: Description of the decision-making process 
F: Impact of the TDCA on SACU and the BLNS 
G: Consequences of the agreement on Lom6 
As appendix I illustrates, transcribed text was divided into different themes, and the 
transcription process also incorporated my experiences. Interviews were written up with space 
provided for personal comments in the right hand column. Some of the conversation was not 
transcribed because the topic of conversation was very general and therefore did not relate to the 
scope of the research. 
One final decision relating to the analysis of the interview transcripts concerns the use of 
computer software to assist in analysing unstructured, bulky and complex qualitative data 
(Bryman and Burgess, 1994,218). A growing literature recommends that such computer software is 
conducive to more efficient analysis. For example, Kelle and Laurie (1995,27) state that computer 
aided research 'increased the trustworthiness of qualitative findings considerably because these 
facilities can ensure that the hypotheses developed are really grounded in data and not based on 
single and highly untypical incidents'. This researcher spent time exploring over ten qualitative 
computer programmes, from NUD*IST to Kwalitan. Indeed, a sample of interviews were tested 
against different software. Ultimately it was decided that manual coding was preferable. This was 
due to the language and communication problems that were experienced during the interviews, 
and it was felt that an intimate knowledge and closeness to the transcribed data would yield a 
more accurate portrayal of the information provided (Bryman and Burgess, 1994). 
4 Stage Four: October 2000-February 2001 
The 'results' from stage three of the research process provided the basis for chapters Four and Five. 
The identification of perceived 'winners' and 'losers' of the agreement, sharpened the focus of the 
research, as the wine and textile industry were clearly identified as a 'winning' and 'losing' 
industrial sector. The fourth stage of research analysed these sectors, and from previous contacts 
made, as well as a content analysis of primary and secondary of literature relating to these 
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industries, thirty people were identified as potential interviewees for the second fieldwork period, 
for four weeks from January to February 2001. A table identifying these representatives are listed 
in Appendices J and K. Once again they have only been included in the first draft of this thesis. As 
is highlighted in Appendices L and M, interview questions (for wine and textile respectively) were 
much more focused, seeking an understanding of how the agreement was perceived within the 
industries and the degree of access that stakeholders within each sector had towards the decision- 
making process. Moreover, the first page of the interview schedule provides a summary of the 
information known, from content analyses of documents, of the interviewee and/or interviewee's 
organisation. The design of the interviews were therefore quite different from the first fieldwork 
period. The first gathered information on a broad range of aspects, mainly concerning the EU-SA 
TDCA and associated decision-making processes; the second was much more specific. 
5: Stage Five: March 2001-june 2001 
As appendix N illustrates, the second interview analysis process was similar to the first, although 
the transcription process was slightly less comprehensive and the coding is conducted immediately 
after the tape was transcribed. There is no 'themed code' as such, with information immediately 
inserted into previously organised (on the basis of the content analysis of documentation) chapters. 
This section has considered the evolution of a triangulation of research methods employed 
throughout this study. This evolution mirrors the continually changing scope of the research from 
a broad to refined focus. The practical process of using these methods, particularly interviewing, 
highlights a number of methodological considerations that are discussed below. 
3.4 Methodological considerations 
This section examines two methodological considerations that arose during the research process. 
The first relates to arguments that interview /qualitative research techniques tend to be unscientific 
and lack objectivity. The second surrounds the often complex relationship that exists between 
interviewee and interviewer, particularly when research is conducted in South Africa - with its 
unique historical and 'ethnic' characteristics. 
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3.4.1 Objectivity 
Ethnographic research is the least scientific of the research approaches since, by 
definition, it involves a small sample size, is difficult to replicate, and contains a 
great deal of subjectivity and interpretation on the part of the researcher (quote by 
Rengert in Herbert, 2000,558). 
Such criticism has been applied to qualitative methods, including interviews. Indeed, 'Positivists 
often criticize in-depth interviews, claiming that interviewers bias the respondents' answers or that 
interviewers are not or cannot be objective or detached' (Valentine, 1997,111). There is a 
substantial and expanding body of literature that contests such a view, arguing that objectivity is 
not possible in any form of scientific investigation, whether quantitative or qualitative methods are 
used (Herbert, 2000; Valentine, 1997). Herbert (2000) argues that all research requires interpretation 
and is therefore subjective. No research is purely 'neutral', even if positivist methodology is 
employed. Valentine notes in defence of interviews that: 
all research work is explicitly or implicitly informed by experiences, aims and 
interpretations of the researcher who designed the questionnaire or the interview 
schedule and that researchers should treat participants as people, not objects to be 
exploited or mined for information (Valentine, 1997,112). 
This concern over the treatment of interviewees has led to other criticisms of the use of 
interviews as a research method. Fontana and Frey (2000,262) are particularly critical; 'The 
techniques and tactics of interviewing... are really ways of manipulating the respondents while 
treating them as objects or numbers rather than human beings'. This research process has certainly 
bome this in mind when interviewing. Measures were taken to reassure the interviewee that an 
interview was considered a two-way process, where information was often swapped, ' and tapes of 
the interview occasionally copied and handed to the interviewee. For example, a tape was sent to 
Helga Jansen (ILRIG). She arranged for an interview with workers at a textile factory in Cape Town 
and contributed to the interview. In these respects I viewed the interview process as not just a 
'passive means of gathering information but... also a social encounter' (Kitchin and Tate, 2000, 
215). 
5 This happened in many interviews, as the interview took the form of a conversation, where information was 
swapped between parties. 
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3.4.2 Relations between interviewer and interviewee 
The treatment of the respondent is just one of the components that forms the complex relationship 
between interviewee and interviewer. The other aspect that concerned this research surrounded 
unequal power relations (particularly between 'elites' and myself) and potential 'communication' 
problems. 
A complex series of power relationships lie between myself, defined and regarded as a white, 
male, 'Western' researcher, and respondents from a society that is marked by a strong sense of 
history and ethnicity. These relationships are far from simple, especially when an interview is 
conducted with a member of the so-called 'elite'. The majority of meetings staged during both 
stages of fieldwork were with what can be termed the elite in South Africa and Botswana. 
Specifically, this included senior civil servants, former Cabinet ministers, MP's, directors of 
business, and senior trade union representatives. Schoenberger (1991), Valentine (1997) and Herod 
(1999) all consider the power relations that exist during such meetings. Valentine, for example, 
observes that power relations are often overturned in researcher-elite interviews, noting that: 
If you are interviewing elites and business people, it is they who often have the 
upper hand, by controlling access to knowledge, information and informants. 
Indeed, they often want to have some influence over the research process, refusing 
to allow interviews to be tape-recorded or demanding the right to vet interview 
transcripts and influencing the way that research findings are presented 
(Valentine, 1997,114). 
Furthermore, Schoenberger argues that: 
The corporate interview is susceptible to problems of control since the likely 
respondents are people accustomed to being in control and exerting authority over 
others. There is a risk that the respondent will impose his or her own agenda on 
the interview and taking it in directions that are not directly relevant to the 
research or are not worth lengthy elaboration (Schoenberger, 1991,182). 
Rarely was such 'influence' exerted during the series of interviews I conducted. On a number of 
occasions tape recording was refused (see discussion below) and research findings were requested. 
Far more common was care taken over information provided (particularly from government 
officials) but many within the business community, as well as trade unionists, appeared to have 
been very candid in their responses, and very helpful in providing information. At times the 
problems of a researcher based over 6000 miles from their respondents was of more concern. 
Herod touches on some of potential problems when noting: 
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... when conducting research involving foreign elites the researcher may face 
particular issues of transcultural communication and understanding that s/he 
does not have to face when conducting research involving non-foreign elites. 
Likewise, when conducting research involving foreign elites the researcher often 
has access to well-defined organizational structures, lines of institutional contact 
and information... which are not available when interviewing foreign non-elites. 
At the same time, however, information about such organizational structures may 
be more difficult to locate for foreign organizations than for domestic ones (Herod, 
1999,313). 
Indeed, as noted elsewhere in this chapter, access to organisations, before any 'snowballing' effects 
registered, was painstakingly slow. The problems of gaining access to the 'elite' in South Africa, 
when considered to be an 'outsider' has hindered the research of both Visser (2000) and an 
academic, from Ghana, and who was interviewed during the first fieldwork period (#10,1999). 
Visser (2000,231) noted that: 
The problem of how I should be perceived, seen, understood, and finding a 
category within which to place me, played an important role in a struggle to get 
interview appointments, access to certain types of information, as well as 
conducting some of the interviews. 
Furthermore, the Ghanaian academic (#10,1999) noted that 'I was deprived of the opportunity to 
have inside knowledge', when attempting to gain access to decision-makers in the EU-SA TDCA 
structure. These experiences rarely affected my research. Indeed, I share with Herod the feeling 
that although it 'would be hard to prove definitively, I have always felt that the simple fact that I 
was a Western academic afforded me a warmer reception than had I been a local researcher' 
(Herod, 1999,317). Indeed, I was accorded very warm receptions, particularly by representatives of 
traditionally disadvantaged peoples. At one meeting, after asking if I was hungry, a roast dinner 
and dessert was served to me, whilst in the middle of conducting an interview. Moreover, 
belonging to a very well known South African organisation (SAIIA) might also have assisted the 
interview process. Access was also granted in the characteristically 'closed' wine industry, even 
following a furore caused by a UK journalist who, a few weeks prior to my second field trip, had 
an expenses paid trip for three days, met a few wine dignitaries, and then extensively criticised the 
sector on his return to the UK (see Mossop, 2001). Irrespective of the merits of his article, his 
comments failed to obstruct my access to the industry. 
Constantly shifting unequal power relations between interviewee and interviewer might 
account for some of the 'Communication' or 'relationship' difficulties that arise in an interview 
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situation. Visser (2000), in his research based on local decision-making in South African towns, 
compiled a list of these. He noted that, due to the historically 'closed' nature of formal South 
African decision-making structures, interviewees tended to be very wary and defensive when 
asked questions about the decision-making process. In my experience, this happened on a number 
of occasions, sometimes by employers or representatives of the wine industry, but more 
particularly when interviewing senior civil servants and EU officials in southern Africa. The reason 
for this could be attributed to the interviewees perception that information being stated was highly 
sensitive. During those times the tape was switched off and only minimal notes were made. Such a 
procedure was agreed upon when considering the ethics involved when interviewing. A form 
concerning ethics was completed and passed by the University of Plymouth Ethics Committee in 
1999. This stated that issues such as anonymity and confidentiality were recognised, and stated to 
the interviewees before individual meetings began. Therefore, for the first series of interviews, 
comments have been recorded anonymously, and as chapters Four and Five demonstrate, only a 
number (prefixed by # and the year - 1999) has been placed by a reference to an interviewee's 
quotations to denote who made the comment. However, the process was altered for the second 
series of interviews - this time interviewees were given a choice and if they requested their 
comments to be anonymous, then the same quotation system is installed in Chapters Seven and 
Eight. However, in those cases where it has not been, their name appears beside their quotation. 
Other ethical considerations have been discussed above (see section 3.2) relating to the 'visibility' 
of the researcher in the interview and transcription/reporting stages. 
Valentine (1997) and Visser (2000) both agree that a common failing with interviews, induced 
by unequal power relations, is that respondents often provide information that they feel the 
interviewer wants to hear. This is compounded by communication problems, mainly 
misunderstandings by both parties of what different words and phrases mean. ' This in not only 
due to language, but also cross-cultural and cross-contextual meanings. An example revolved 
around the definition of development, where in one interview with a representative of the 
61 spoke no other official South African language and often interviewed people whose second or third 
language was English. 
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NEDLAC, I had been asking questions on macro developmental policies and the respondent was 
bemused; to him, development meant running water and electricity (#22,1999). 
One further problem that was encountered in South Africa, and also experienced by Visser, 
was that you had the perception that some respondents felt that you were too young. Visser 
explains this is not an uncommon perception as, 'A young and "nat agter die ore" (wet behind tile 
ears) male, quite simply does not command the same respect and seriousness someone, for 
example, in his or her middle-age, would be able to command' (Visser, 2000,233). 
This section has charted some of the methodological considerations that were CrICOLIntered 
during the research process. At times they touch upon the issues of reflexivity, positionality and 
general ethics of qualitative research as debated above (section 3.2). In view of the calls for a more 
'transparent' scrutiny of the researcher in the research process made under philosophical 
considerations, this section has made visible many of the fieldwork experiences. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The three sections around which this chapter is based - philosophical issues, methods and 
methodological considerations - have highlighted four important methodological aspects that 
relate to this study. First, as the scope and evolution of the research has altered, so to have the 
methods. Second, a process of triangulation, using content analysis of primary and secondary 
documentation, as well as semi-structured interviews, are the main methods that have obtained 
information on which the following chapters are based. Third, the 'positionality' of this study has 
been outlined, and the problems experienced by a so-called 'Western' academic researching in a 
society that is concerned with historical and 'ethnic' positions have been charted. This links to the 
fourth important aspect - that positionality, perceptions of me as a researcher, as well as access to 
organisations and information, and communication problems, were all limitations that posed 
constraining problems on the research conducted. 
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4.1 -Introduction 
This chapter explores the South African dec ision -making processes in the formulation of the TDCA 
by describing the major components and actors that contributed to constructing the TDCA. This 
description derives mainly from interviews conducted with participants in the EU-SA TDCA 
formulation process (as outlined in Chapter Three). The chapter has two main sections. I'lie first 
(4.2) outlines the framework upon which the description of the South African policy forniLlIation 
process is based. The second (4.3) comprehensively describes the decision-making process. 
4.2 - Framework out] i ne 
As discussed in Chapter Two (2.5.1), a plethora of studies have advised how to describe decision- 
making processes. On the basis of one of these debates, concerning whether to use a realist or 
pluralist perspective, this research adopts a more pluralist approach in analysing the EU-SA TDCA 
because of the weaknesses identified in the narrow realist position. The review of literature also 
suggested that a definition of the decisions involved in formulating policy was important. 
Therefore, in relation to the TDCA, there are four major areas where decisions were made (Davies, 
2000). The first set of decisions were made in a iiiacroccotiotiiic context, such as whether or not to 
adopt neo-liberalism in the economic development of South Africa, and whether to join the non- 
reciprocal Lom6 Convention. The second set of decisions concerned the framework in which 
political decisions were made; such as how the mandate should be formed (what were the priorities 
and strategy of the South African government) and should South Africa's neighbours in SACU be 
incorporated? Third, the technical nature of the agreement had to be considered, particularly the 
agreement of tariff levels for individual products. Fourth, the TDCA was officially negotiated on a 
bi-lateral basis - face-to-face meetings occurred between representatives of the EU and the South 
African government. There were also discussions between EU member state officials, EU 
parliamentarians and South African officials. However, due to the South African states membership 
of the South African Customs Union (SACU), the agreement also has a multi-lateral dimension. The 
other SACU members - Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS) are also directly 
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affected by the agreement. Therefore, both the South African government and EU discussed the 
potential impact of the TDCA with the BLNS. 
Under the structure that supported the South African side of the TDCA decision-making 
process, negotiations also took place on a number of other levels and between varying actors. These 
are summarised as follows: 
" Between the South African negotiating team and other South African government departments 
" Within the South African statal process (at an executive level) 
" Between the South African government/negotiating team and industry (on a bi-lateral basis) 
" Between the South African government/negotiating team and labour (on a bi-lateral basis) 
" Between the South African government and non-governmental 'stakeholders' via South African 
governmental departments, the South African parliament and NEDLAC (a tri-partite, and some 
might argue, quad-partite basis) 
" Between the South African government and both business and labour, on a tri-lateral basis (at 
NEDLAC) 
" Within industrial sectors in order to construct different sectoral responses to the agreement 
(often between business, organised labour and occasionally other stakeholders) 
" Between the South African state /negotiating team and stakeholders (including business and 
labour, as well as SACU and SADC) at academic and non-academic conference proceedings 
The literature in Chapter Two also focused on the use of models to simplify complex decision- 
making systems. In order to acquire a thorough understanding of the South African side of the 
TDCA decision-making structure, Snyder's 1969 model (as detailed in Levermore, Gibb and Cleary, 
2000, see figure 4.1 below) is adapted for the purpose of this research. It provides a valuable 
starting point by organising information on the decision-making process into four categories; the 
statal decision-making process; the way that the internal environment influences 
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Figure 4.1: Model ot Factors shaping a characteristic Uecision-Making Process (from 
Levermore, Gibb and Cleary, 2000,3) 
decisions; external factors; and the role of so-called 'detached observers' (such as research bodies 
and the media). As noted in Chapter Two, models have limitations in terms of their analytical 
ability. Most importantly, decisions are not made in such neatly-compartmentalised spheres. In 
some senses there is a blurred distinction between the internal and external factors influencing the 
TDCA decision-making process. This is illustrated in figure 4.2 (see below), with the presence of 
both neo-liberal economics and SACU/SADC in both the internal and external environments. 
However, the model does simplify a very complex picture and helps in evaluating the extent to 
which the structure can be considered inclusive or exclusive. Figure 4.2 places the original diagram 
in a South African context. The following section describes the role of each component in assisting 
the formulation of the EU-SA TDCA. 
4.3. Components of the Decision-Making Structure 
The remainder of the chapter describes in detail each component that comprises the SOLIth African 
structures supporting its formulation of the EU-SA TDCA. The first (4.3.1), lists those factors in the 
internal environment that influenced the climate in which the TDCA was negotiated. The second 
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(4.3.2) documents the diverse array of actors that comprised the 'statal process'. The third section 
(4.3.3) outlines how 'Detached Observers' impacted the EU-SA TDCA. The fourth and final section 
(4.3.4) describes the extemal actors. 
Post - Apartheid political climate 
End of protectionist economic policy 
Economic dislocation 
Trade liberalisation policies 
African Renaissance 
South African acceptance in global community 
Regional Integration/ SAM and SADC 
IDC, SAIIA, IGD, the 
media 
Decision Makers 
Policies (neo-liberal) advocated by WTO 
Historical links with Europe 
Protectionism in the EU (CAP) 
Concerns of SADC 
Concurrence by SACU 
Figure 4.2: Factors shaping the EU-SA TDCA Decision-Making Processes (from Levermore, Gibb 
and Cleary, 2000,4). 
4.3.1 Components of the Decision-Making Structure: A: The Internal Environment 
Accompanying the evolution of South African development policy, as outlined in Chapter Two 
(2.3.2), are internal debates, identified by interviewees, that have influenced the formulation of the 
TDCA in South Africa. These discussions surround the post-apartheid political and economic 
climate, potential for economic dislocation (including the threats posed by crime and AIDS), the 
renaissance of Africa, regional integration, the inclusion of South Africa into the global community, 
and the perceived weakness/inexperience of South African decision-makers. 
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Three of these debates -regional integration, African Renaissance, and opposition to neo- 
classical economic perspectives -which exemplify the influence of the internal environment on the 
TDCA decision-making process, are discussed below. 
I Regional Integration 
The first internal influence on the TDCA is concern expressed for South Africa's neighbours within 
southern Africa and the movement towards regional integration. The lengthy, and often critical, 
analysis of the SA/EU TDCA process promoted a greater understanding of the regional 
implications of the deal (Keet, 1997b) such as the threat posed to BLNS income that is currently 
generated by common SACU tariffs. As stated in the summary of the TDCA (see 2.2) the South 
African government undertook a 'dual track' policy concerning free trade agreements with both 
SADC and the EU. This means that the South African government was trying to 'ensure that its 
neighbours are given preferential access over the EU in its market' so that southern African states 
were not further marginalised by the TDCA (Cassim, 1998, no page number). ' 
11 African Renaissance 
A raft of eclectic ideas, statements and policies that are combined to promote an 'African 
Renaissance', address these regional concerns. Trade liberalisation is seen as central to the 
rejuvenation of the African continent. The importance of African Renaissance to the decision- 
making process is demonstrated in the influence it exerts within the echelons of key South African 
decision-makers. Lodge (1999a) noted that since its earliest public reference in June 1997, the idea of 
African Renaissance has gained an almost iconic status in South Africa. Indeed Khoza (1999,279) 
contends that the 'concept of an African Renaissance has become a central theme to South Africa's 
vision as a country and the geo-economic role of the African continent and its member states. In 
many ways African Renaissance argues for the development of African peoples through economic 
growth, aided by the cancellation of African debt, an improvement in its terms of trade, increases in 
domestic and foreign investment, the expansion of development assistance, and better access to 
developed world markets (Mbeki, 1999a, xvi). African Renaissance is partly founded on a belief in 
1 However, the SADC protocol took effect on I September 2000 but the implementation of a fully operational 
free trade zone is still being hampered. 
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market economics as well as equality to democratic processes (Lodge, 1999a). However it is also 
jointly based on the concept of Ubuntu, an African ideology that promotes the universal 
comradeship of all Africans (Mgibi, 1997; Sindane, undated). ' In the context of the influence this 
has on the decision-making process, economic advancement in the rhetoric of Ubuntu should be for 
the equal benefit of all Africans (particularly in southern Africa). 
III Opposition to neo-liberalism 
There has been heated debate around the implementation of macroeconomic policies, such as 
GEAR, being accepted by South African society. Among those supportive are some government 
officials (see Erwin, 2000), big business, economists and the financial press (see Business Day 
editorial, 23 July 1997). For example, Michael McDonald, a leading representative for the Steel 
Industry, asserted that 'The social partners in NEDLAC are strongly committed to the principles of 
trade liberalisation generally and are not opposed, in principle, to the conclusions of FTA's with the 
EU and SADC' (McDonald, 1998b, no page number). However, he warned that such support could 
not come 'at any price'. 
The policies of the TDCA and GEAR have encountered considerable opposition in South 
Africa, particularly from academics, NGOs, civil society and from within the coalition parties in 
government - COSATU and the South African Communist Party (SACP)(McDonald, 1998a, 3). For 
example, at parliament's public hearing on the TDCA, COSATU argued that tariff liberalisation 
would 'exacerbate the job crisis engulfing the country. We are not convinced that jobs generated 
from increased exports to the EU will outweigh job losses from increased imports' (quoted in South 
African Press Agency (anon. ), 27 October 1999). The SACP were also highly critical, noting that 
'raging capitalism [is] threatening to devour the whole of humanity, destroy our environment and 
multiply poverty throughout the entire globe' (Blade Nzimande, South African Press Agency 
(anon. ), 25 October 1999). Ebrahirn Patel (South African Clothing and Textiles Workers Union - 
SACTWU) adds; 'Our tariffs now are where our international obligations require them to be in the 
2 Ubuntu has many definitions but most centre on the 'spirit of universal collective humanity', with mutual 
respect for humans at its cornerstone. Indeed, Sindane (undated, 1) notes that Ubuntu underpinned African 
democracy before European colonialisation of Africa. 
80 
Chapter Four: 7he South African TDCA decision-making process 
year 2004. By being five years ahead of our obligations we have sacrificed tens of thousands of jobs' 
(Patel, 10 September 1999). 
Adam Habib (Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1997,98-9) noted that four major organs of civil 
society also opposed the GEAR document. A representative of the youth movement criticised both 
the TDCA and tariff liberalisation associated with GEAR, contending that: 
The agreement is only in the interests of capital; sustainable job creation is 
unlikely... Government must stop doing what only benefits the west to the 
detriment of SA and the entire African continent (Phasa, Business Day, 20 October 
1999). 
Furthermore, the South African academic Dot Keet (1997b) argued that policy relating to trade 
liberalisation: 
threatens to incorporate South Africa into the global market-place on terms and at a 
rate very different to what had previously been contemplated - with the attendant 
dangers that many South African producers, forced to face competition from 
powerful industrial producers/exporters, would find it extremely difficult to carry 
through the necessary economic (and social and political) reconstruction and 
transformation (Keet, 1997b, 30). 
Many NGO representatives are also critical of GEAR and trade liberalisation, particularly its 
impact on poorly paid women workers. John Pape (2000), an ILRIG official argues that in the 
contemporary era of tariff liberalisation (1970-1998), the percentage of women in the workforce in 
South Africa has only increased from 32 to 33%. He adds that since the WTO tariff reforms, the 
clothing sector has lost 80,000 jobs. Women account for 76% of this workforce (Pape, 2000). Goetz 
asserts that policies comparable to GEAR 'rule out social welfare measures to subsidise women's 
reproductive contributions to the economy' (Goetz, 1998,241). Indeed, Tamara Jansen, also from 
ILRIG, asserts that: 
South African women workers also have to contend with the government's 
economic policy constraints. The economic policy of GEAR has cut social welfare 
spending, increased unemployment and under-employment, and placed pressures 
on women as single parents Uansen, April 2000,7). 
This debate appears to mirror the polarised discussion identified in Chapter Two. As this 
section has shown, some government officials, economists and the financial press are in one camp, 
generally supportive of neo-liberalism, whilst NGOs, academics, civil society and some of the 
government's partners are in the other. 
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These factors, illustrating the internal debate in South Africa, provide examples of the 
domestic influences on the South African TDCA policy formulation process. Despite considerable 
opposition from groups within South Africa, including two of the three organisations that form 
goven-Lment, the TDCA and tariff liberalisation has been implemented. This leads to speculation 
that the decision to pursue the TDCA has been followed notwithstanding the reservations voiced 
against it. This perhaps indicates that those opposing the government's stance over neo-liberalism 
have had no success in influencing the South African macroeconomic climate. One can suggest that 
the dominant status of the neo-classical economic perspective may have affected South African 
decision-makers more than the internal climate has. However, the portrayal that the 'opposition' 
lack any 'credible' alternatives may also be a factor in the equation. 
4.3.2 - Components of the Decision-Making Structure: B- Statal decision-making mechanics and decision- 
makers 
Interviewees identified this component as central to understanding the complex decision-making 
structure. Figure 4.3 outlines the governmental, para-governmental and non-goven-anental 
institutions and structures involved, to varying extents, in constructing the South African structures 
that supported the formulation of the TDCA. It emphasises that South Africa's negotiators were 
assisted in policy formulation by a multitude of organisations and actors, from both inside and 
outside the goven-anental apparatus. The eight 'bodies' identified as having at least peripheral 
involvement were: 
A: The Negotiating team 
B: Goverrunent/Executive 
C: Parliament 
E: Agricultural Trade Forum 
F: Civil society and civil society representatives 
G: Labour/Business 
D: NEDLAC H: SACU/SADC 
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For ease of identification throughout the thesis the different actors encountered (along witli 
others listed in foflowing chapters) are divided into six categories, which are listed as follows: 
CATEGORY ONE: STATUTORY/GOVERNMENTAL/STATAL BODIES 
CATEGORY TWO: NON-GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH GROUPS/ 
DETACHED &'UN-DETACHED'OBSERVERS 
CATEGORY THREE: EMPLOYER/ BUSINESS 
CATEGORY FOUR: EMPLOYEE ORGANISATIONS 
CATEGORY FIVE: CIVIL SOCIETY AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES 
CATEGORY SIX: EXTERNAL ACTORS 
The figure shows the sheer complexity of the relationship between organisations, actors dild 
categories, involved in formulating the TDCA. This section clarifies relationships between these 
bodies by examining the role each played in formulating the EU-SA TDCA. 
EU: 
H: European Parliament 
SACU/ WTO/ Fluropean Commission *---* SADC/ World Bank/ 
and DGT's IMF 
Council M isters of in 
EXTERNAL 
I 
- 
____ ýI 
IF G: I, abour/ 
A: Negotiating B: Government F: NGOs/ Business/ 
.................... Team/ ..... 
Finance/DTI/NDA/ 
....... C: ....... Research ...... Sectoral 
Co-operation 
B'rT/DF. X/ Parliament -40, bodies 
Interests 
Cabinet & 
Council Presidents Office A 
INTERNAL 
Detached 
IFF: 
Civil Observers 
societýv (From Internal IF; IF 
and External D: NEDLAC Lnvironnients - E. Agricultural Trade Links with 
Forum statal units). 
TESELICO 
A 
Figure 4.3: Organisations involved (and their inter-relationships) in shaping the SA/EU TDCA 
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A Negotiating team (Statutory/Governmental/Statal body) 
The official negotiating team was assembled following EU mandates in 1995 and 1996. Prior to this. there 
was a preliminaný negotiating team. established bv the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) that decided 
the negotiating stance to be taken. the possibility of full/partial Lomd membership. and (lie parameters of 
external trade policy that the South African government should follow. This panel consisted of about 20 
people. including bureaucrats from the old National Party (NP) government and new ANC people. such as 
Trevor Manuel (briefIN. Minister 
EU 
SOUTH AFRICAN 
TASKFORCE 
(EU NEGOTIATING I 
TEAM) I EXTERN 
INTERN ----- ------------ ------ 
A: NEGOTIATING 
TEAM/CO-OPERATION 
COUNCL 
LABOUR AND 
BUSINESS 
TESELICO 
GOVERNMENT 
APPARATUS 
(DTIIDFA/NDA) 
(Presidents Office) 
Figure 4.4: The Negotiating Teams links in the TDCA process 
of Trade and Industry. now Minister for Finance) and Alan Hirsch (presently a senior official at the DTI). A 
leading representative of this group noted that 'we... succeeded in drawing up several parameters. how far 
we should go with trade liberalisation for instance... and should we accept GSp3 rather than making 
sacrifices in trade liberalisation" (#43.1999). 
GSP stands for the Gencralised System of Preferences, a system of preferential trading relations. 
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The official negotiating team for the EU-SA TDCA was led by both South Africa's EU 
Ambassador Eltie Links, and Bahle Sibisi, Director-General of International Trade Relations at the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). They came under the supervision of Alec Erwin (Minister 
at the DTI) and the cabinet. A DFA official detailed the history of the negotiating team and its 
changing composition. When the team was first established the DFA was the major government 
department determining its operation, yet, for most of the talks, due to its economic content, the 
DTI became the Department in charge of the negotiations. The DFA then became responsible for 
organising meetings between the EU and South Africa and within the South African team (which 
on the South African side comprised of the DTI, DFA, National Department of Agriculture (NDA), 
and at the start, Finance). The DFA also provided feedback from diplomatic staff in Brussels, who 
suggested what was and was not viable in terms of negotiating strategy. During the later stages of 
the negotiations, the NDA became influential, being mainly responsible for the wines and spirits 
aspect of the agreement. 
Interviewees noted that only three or four people on the South African side were actually 
engaged in face-to-face negotiations with their EU counterparts (#42; #43,1999). The negotiating 
team also received technical support from the Board of Tariffs and Trade (BTT) and the Industrial 
Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd (IDC) (categorised under category two as an 'un- 
detached' observer). A source from the BTT commented that their role in negotiations was to 
explain the technical problems that restructuring n-dght incur and why full liberalisation offers 
cannot be made in specific sectors (such as textiles and clothing) (#16,1999). The IDC instigated an 
exchange of data between the two sides on tariff levels. 
Superseding the negotiating team is a 'Co-operation Council', which consists of officials from 
the EU's Development Directorate-General and the South African DTI (managed by Alastair 
Ruiters, a DTI Director-General). The Council meets irregularly to discuss progress in dismantling 
tariffs and to examine disputes (Wadula, 30 March 2000 and 3 April 2000). It met for the first time 
on 31 March 2000 and, according to officials from the DTI, it informed the BINS of the meeting's 
details. 
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As Figure 4.4 indicates, only the EU and South African government departments have direct 
participation in the negotiating team and Co-operation Council. This would suý' 'est that the 
negotiating teani, one of the most important actors shaping the final outcome of the TDCA, tends 
to exclude non-governmental stakeholders. This is certainly the case for the Co-operation Council 
and the issues that it considers. However, in reality access to officials of the South African 
negotiating team was possible, either via contact with government departments or, for the social 
partners (business and labour), through the NEDLAC process. 
B Govemment/executive structure (Statutory/GovemmentaVStatal bodv) 
Whereas the negotiating team discussed Lechnical concerns over trade (mainly tariff rates), the 
government/executive body formulated both the broad political mandate and provided 
assistance over technical matters. 
The government/ execu tive structure established under the apartheid regime has been 
transformed since 1994. Apart from the complete change in political personnel within 
government, the composition of the civil service has aftered. The percentage of the black 
population in senior management positions in 1994 was 2%; by 1996 that figure. had risen to 30% 
(Lodge, 1999a, 108). 
Figure 4.5 illustrates that the govemment/executive structure is rather unsurprisingly at the 
very centre of the South African TDCA policy formulation process and links in with all the other 
categories and actors. Interviewees identified four departments that contributed to the policy- 
formulation process, either in shaping policy, and/or supporting the negotiating team in a variety 
of ways; the departments of Trade and Industry, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, and Finance. The 
Director-Generals and Ministers of these departments, along with Cabinet and the Presidents 
Office (termed the executive), are responsible for having the final say over the South African side 
of the agreement. A description of their roles in the TDCA policy formulation process is now 
considered. 
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Figure 4.5: Government structure withiti the Sotith African I'DCA decision-making process 
I Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
One interviewev, a NGO/Detached Observer with close links to goverru-nent, argued that the rnain 
driver behind these negotiations was priniarily a new generation of bureaucrats in the Department of 
Trade and Industry (#5,1999). As figure 4.6 below illustrates, the DTI had contact with niany Categories 
and actors in the TDCA decision-md king process, frorn un-detdched observers to industrial sectors and 
aspects of civil society. These links are detailed below. 
When the 'Siouth AfriCdn negOtidling team received tariff proposals from the EU, on nldiniy 
industrial products, they were divided and sent bdck for analysis by the respective sector within the 
DTI that was responsible for the product under consideration (these sectors range from clothing to 
agro-business). A senior representative for one of these sectors outlined the mechanical process 
undertaken once dn offer for tariff reappraisal was received. The industrial sector (which frequently 
included business and Idbour working together) that the tariff related to WdS informed of the offer 
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and their responses taken into account when the next round of negotiations commenced (#20,1999). 
So, to clarify, the process involved the following stages: 
1- EU has a tariff proposal 00 2- Discussed within negotiating team 10 
3- Passed on to DTI sectors 4- Invite comments from industrial sectors 10 
5- Feedback discussed and taken back to negotiating team --- 00- 6- Discussed again with 
the EU team. 
The DTI representative observed that initially this system of contact 'was not working very 
smoothly, but.... I think the team operated quite well by the end of the negotiations' (#20,1999). 
The DTI also disseminated information by establishing a series of workshops and seminars in 
which interested parties (usually industrial sectors, but also members of 'traditionally marginalised 
society') could find out about how aspects of the agreement would affect them. It also participated 
in NEDLAC discussions and was engaged in the Technical, Sectoral Liaison Committee 
(TESELICO) -a sub-committee of NEDLAC that was mainly responsible for forming a tariff 
response to the EU mandate (for further detailed see section D below). The DTI was also 
responsible for co-ordinating relations with both SADC and the other members of SACU - BLNS. 
The DTI was assisted by the BTT and the IDC on technical matters. The IDC, a state-owned 
financial research institution (and therefore termed here an un-detached observer), supported the 
govemmental negotiating process by providing statistical analyses and undertaking economic 
modelling to form a picture of the potential impact the reduction of tariffs would have on South 
African industrial sectors. 
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Figure 4.6: The DTI in the TDCA decision-making process 
The BIT is a statutory body that advises the government on tariff issues. One of its senior 
representatives detailed BTT's role in the EU-SA TDCA decision-ma king process as follows: 
we developed a tariff offer - the International Trade Relations Department 
[of the DTI] - headed by Bahle [Sibisi] - they handed us a proposal... tha L 
we then published [in the Governnient Gazette] in the name of the Board of 
Tariffs and Trade... for any interested party to comment on that. The 
board then received comments, which we studied and discussed (#16, 
1999). 
These comments were distributed to the relevant DTI sectors. The director of each division sector 
discussed information received with the BTT and 'it would be decided which [of these] would be 
valid or not' (#16,1999). TESELICO finally screened views making it past this stage, and action 
decided upon (#19,1999). This process differs from 'normal' BTT procedures on tariff advice, 
which tend not to seek comments from i-ndustry or the pubhc (#16,1999). Views were received 
from individuals, interest groups, and representatives of business and Idbour. According to a 
representa Live of the DTI, the input provided by individuals was significant. 'We have received a 
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lot of letters... [and in terms of influencing the process] I have received an amazing submission 
from an individual on the Rules of Origin... a complete discussion'. When questioned further the 
representative stated that these 'individuals' were retired people, representatives of companies, 
members of interest groups, or concerned members of the public (many of these would be included 
in category five). However it was the industrial sectors (representing labour and business) who had 
most contact with the BTT, the most influential of which (according to a BTT official) were the 
paper, chemical, motor, and textile industries. There was virtually no contact with organisations 
officially representing civil society. 
This portrayal of the DTI illustrates that opportunities to participate were open to many 
sections of South African society. The extent to which various 'stakeholders' felt that they were 
informed about such opportunities, or that they could influence the DTI, is discussed in Chapter 
Five. 
II National Department of Agriculture (NDA) 
The NDA mainly participated in the formulation of the TDCA only during the later stages of 
negotiations. The Minister of Agriculture at the time that negotiations started, Derek Hanekom, 
appointed advisers to consider issues relating to the TDCA (as well as trade policy in general) and 
formalised relations between the department and the Agricultural Trade Forum (ATF) (for details 
see section E). Meetings took place regularly with this tri-partite organisation. Furthermore, the 
NDA produced an information document on the agreement (National Department of Agriculture, 
1999a) which was widely distributed throughout the agricultural industry. 
Taken together, the advisers, ATF, and dissemination of information, suggests the NDA 
established a comprehensive network of obtaining and disseminating information from the 
agricultural sector. A NDA official suggests that business and labour representatives particularly 
had a fair degree of access to the TDCA policy formulation process on agricultural matters, notably 
via the ATF. However, it is unclear as to what channels were open to civil society groups (#19, 
1999). 
90 
Chapter Four: Ilic South Affican TDCA decision-making process 
III Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
Although sidelined to some extent, the DFA was involved in organising EU-SA meetings (see 
negotiating team) and in obtaining views from other relevant government departments. The 
diverse nature of the TDCA meant that the Health, Communications, and Transport Departments 
were also affected by the agreement. Therefore the DFA organised presentations by those 
departments in order to 'get their visions on how they think cooperation of the EU should be' (DFA 
official, #43,1999). Furthermore, along with the NDA and DTL the DFA lobbied various EU 
institutions. Due to the nature of their role in the TDCA decision-making process it appears as if 
DFA officials rarely consulted non-governmental stakeholders. 
IV Department of Finance 
This Department, although not involved in the day-to-day interactions, nor having representation 
on the negotiating conu-nittees (apart from briefly at the beginning) (#15,1999), was deemed to be 
an important actor because of its involvement as a result of the TDCA's links with trade 
liberalisation measures, which the finance department advocated through the establishment of 
GEAR. It was therefore influential in determining the political decisions in which the negotiations 
took place, and the department also maintains links with external organisations; such as the World 
Bank. 
V Executive level 
Broad policies are decided at the executive level (Director-Generals of the DTI, Cabinet Ministers 
and the President's Office). Many interviewees asserted that Nelson Mandela and Alec Erwin 
considerably influenced the TDCA and the context in which it was negotiated. For instance, some 
interviewees argued that following the dismantlement of apartheid legislation, the 'Mandela factor' 
promoted a 'mood' in which internal and external actors, in rhetoric at least, wanted to assist South 
Africa in rejoining the global community (#11; #12; #23; #27; #44,1999). An example of this 'factor' 
on the internal environment, relates to the transformation of ANC economic policy, which 
provided the climate for the TDCA in which the TDCA was negotiated. According to a 
representative of a lobby group pushing for increased trade liberalisation in South Africa, 
Mandela's influence was seen as vital to this transition. He noted that: 
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I am told of two occasions on which Mandela has been autocratic in Cabinet. 
After one overseas trip he said that naLionatisation is off the Lable... the second 
time was after another overseas trip and he said that we are going, to privatise 
(#27,1999). 
Others argued that Alec Erwin irifluenced the ideological shift wiLhiii South Africa towards 
trade liberdlisation. One interviewee observed that: 
... the key person here is Alec Erwin. He was the key ideological person in 
COSATU in the 80's... he emerges as a supreme technocrat in the 90's... shifting 
the labour party movement from protectionism to market thinking (#8,1999). 
Furthermore, Erwin has also been credited by some as personally propelling the TDCA process 
forward. One business representative asserted that, 'only once he [Erwin] decided that it [the 
agreement] was going to happen that it happened' (#23,1999). 
So, who was responsible for finalising, the South African position in respect to the EU-SA 
TDCA? Mandela and the Cabinet appear to have established the environment for the acceptance 
of trade liberalisation, and Alec Erwin the broad details of the EU-SA TDCA. However, some 
within the DTI say that although the Minister decides policy, it is frequently the Director- 
General's of the DTI who actually determine the details (#20,1999). 
To re-(-dp, government was involved in the policy formulaLion process in d number of wavs - 
the Departments of Trade and Industry, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs and Finance were pnncipally 
involved in organising the negotiations, as well as disseminating information and collecting 
opinions from those most likely to be affected by the TDCA. The diagrams outhrdng governments 
relationship with other actors illustrates that many other 'players' has some level of access to the 
governmental structure. 
c Parliament (Statutory/Governmental/Statal body) II 
The South African parliament had been involved in the TDCA decision-making process from the 
start, participating in debates surrounding South Africa's possible entry into the Lomýý 
Convention. It has had strong relations with the European Pdrlidment, and began engaging with 
them on the subject of the EU-SA TDCA once the EU rejected South Africa's application for full 
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Lom6 membership. MPs close to the negotiations noted that parliament participated iri the EU-SA 
TDCA decision-making process in a number of ways. Initially, government asked it to comment 
on the political parameters of the EU Mandate; three chambers (agricufture, foreigil affairs, and 
trade and industry) met to consider their response and in 1996 produced d report ori the 
agreement. One MP noted that the report 'caused quite a few waves', as people accused 
parliament of 'usurping the role of the executive' (#57,1999). 
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Fiv, urp 4-7. - The South African varliament in the Decision-Makinti, Procp,;. -. 
As figure 4.7 indicates, parliament includes many different stakeholder voices in the 
parliamentary process. Indeed, parliament is one of the few organisations in the TDCA process 
LhaLacLively incorporates civil society interests. In October 1999, parliament, through the National 
Assembly's committees on trade and industry, foreign affairs and agriculture and land, convened 
a half-day of public hearings on many facets of the TDCA. They wanted to 'hear from 
stakeholders... to come and tell us what this thing is going to be for them' (quoted from an MP 
involved, #57,1999). 
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D NEDLAC Mixture of: 
(Statutory/Govemmental/Statal body) 
(Employers/Business) 
(Employee Organisations) 
Even before the establishment of NEDLAC under the 1995 NEDLAC Act (making NEDLAC a 
statutory body), the National Executive Council (established under the Government of National 
Unity - GNU) discussed economic and trade relations between South Africa and the EU. As noted 
in Chapter Two (2.5.2), NEDLAC was founded to promote stakeholder participation in South 
Africa. One of NEDLAC's declarations is that it should be a 'vehicle by which government, 
business, labour, and community organisations seek to co-operate, through problem-solving and 
negotiation, on economic, labour and development issues, and related challenges facing the 
country' (NEDLAC, undated, 8). NEDLAC is comprised of government officials, nineteen 
business organisationS, 4 three organised labour movements5 and five community sectors 
(representing civics, women, youth, rural people, and disabled people). Figure 4.8 (below) 
illustrates the NEDLAC structure. Substantive discussions between the social partners take place 
at the chamber level. 
NEDLAC's role in relation to the EU-SA TDCA was comprehensively outlined by a 
NEDLAC representative as follows: 
NEDLAC 
... is this institution that gets people together... 
The law states that all 
labour-market issues has to come to NEDLAC. And then it says, all other 
significant socio-economic policy, leaving significant open to interpretations. 
There are lots of policies that do not make it to NEDLAC... [However] at the very 
start of the negotiations, government said that this is what we i-nLend to do... there 
[followed] numerous presentations to NEDLAC in the strategy formulation stage 
of the South African government developing its mandate. So, the process in 
NEDLAC has been that whenever there was a meeting between SA and the EU... 
there were, most times, a meeting before and after that meeting. So, before that 
meeting they would say... this is on the agenda... this is our thinking on it, what is 
your feeling? And then business and Idbour would have an opportunity to add 
information, critique their thftiking (#22,1999). 
The same interviewee noted that the TDCA NEDLAC negotiations differed to normal discussions: 
Your typical NEDLAC - type agreement is, government would table d policy document, 
or green paper, or white paper, or draft bill, and there would be meeting scheduled for... a 
period of two months where people would discuss that, and then... agree on the policy 
principles, and then there is d NEDLAC agreement, there is a report that goes out... [Stating 
1 Including Business South Africa (BSA) and the National African Federated Chamber of Commerce 
(NAFCOC). 
' The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU). 
and the Federation of South African Labour Unions (FEDSAL). 
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that] this is what government, business and labour [have] agreed. With the EU trade 
negotiations ... the negotiations are happening between South African government officials 
and EU government officials - it would be unwise to tie up your negotiator to a NEDLAC 
agreement that does not give them any flexibility in the course of the negotiations with the 
other party. So, what we had at NEDLAC then was a forum through which government 
would sound off its emerging strategy as it happened with NEDLAC partners and get 
advice and input, but more importantly to get information (#22,1999). 
Meetings between Business, Links with Business, 
Labour and Government 
II 
Labour, Government 
Link to AGRICULTURAL 
TRADEFORUM 
I 
Link with Business Unk with Labour 
ed of Business, 
Government and 
Figure 4.8: The NEDLAC Structure 
This description of the NEDLAC process highlights the experiences of formulating the EU-SA 
TDCA from the perspective of a person who attended almost every meeting. The TDCA was 
discussed in the Trade and Industry chamber, where government, labour and business met to 
discuss matters (the community representatives sit only on the Development chamber). An 
important sub-committee, TESELICO was established as the main consultative forum (as a sub- 
section to this chamber) in which government trade negotiators met with business and labour to 
monitor the bi-lateral discussions between the DTI's sectoral divisions. Furthermore TESELICO's 
members (a selective group comprising six representatives from government, eight from business, 
and three from labour), devised a clandestine response to the EU mandate (a South African tariff 
6 
proposal), which was finalised in December 1997. Hence, NEDLAC has been characterised as 
being a mix between actors in categories one, three and four. Community representatives were 
6 TESELICO still exists, discussing the unfinished business of the TDCA, and other potential trading 
agreements. 
Meetings between Business, 
Labour and Government 
Unk to DTI/BTF/ I 
Govemment 
I 
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permitted to discuss the TDCA formally, but only at the Executive Council level. Figure 4.9 
displays NEDLAC's links with these and other actors during the TDCA formulation process. 
I 
EXTERNAL 
I 
I INTERNAý] 
Negotiating 
Team 
........... (via 
Government) 
Civil Society 
Government/ 
Executive Labour Business/ 
Sectors 
Figure 4.9: NEDLAC in the TDCA process 
To summarise, NEDLAC (. -dn be viewed as d debating forum and a body which legiLimises 
the government mandate. It was a place where those negotiating with the EU had to defend their 
(ase before and after meetings with their EU counterparts. A NEDLAC representative noted that 
the gov(ýrnmvnt side were given quite a rough time; 'coming to NEDLAC was [the negotiator's] ... 
rehearsal to the actual negotiations. [it] was more terrifying for him at Limes than sitting across 
the Lable with the European Union' (#22,1999). Furthermore, those close to the NEDLAC process 
, irgue that it: 
was one of the better places through which government could gather this kind of 
information... So, its only somebody who is exportine to Europe to sav these 
are the hassles that I had... regarding getting my goods onto the European 
market... because of the barriers. So NEDLAC was the place where the 
governnivnt burvaucraL could speak directly to the businessperson or have a link 
... to gather those kinds of information 
(#11,1999). 
This description of NEDLAC gives the impression of an inclusive relationship that NEDLAC has 
with South Africa's social partners. Labour, Business, sectoral interests, government, and civil 
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society are all represented, although civil society is only included to a limited extent in the TDCA 
formulation process. 
E Agricultural Trade Forum (ATF) Mixture of: 
(Statutory/GovemmentaVStatal body) 
(Employers/Business) 
(Employee Organisations) 
The ATF was established to monitor agricultural features of the TDCA. It operates mainly outside 
the NEDLAC process, although information and opinions accrued at this level were submitted to 
TESELICO (hence its inclusion in figure 4.9). In 1996 the forum was incorporated into the NDA, 
merging its EU Steering Committee with the ATE 
The forum includes primary and secondary sectors of agriculture, incorporating the 
horticultural, animal production and agronomy industries and representatives from the 
developing farm sector, commercial farmers, trade unionists and government officials (Pienaar, 
1999). A representative for labour, who was not part of the forum, said that he perceived that 
those working in the ATF 'really did their work wefl' in representing agriculture and providing 
information about the agricultural aspects of the EU-SA TDCA to them (#52,1999). A senior 
source at the forum commented that consumers were also represented but this was not 
(-orroborated by other sources (#19,1999). 
F Civil Societv and their representatives 
ir I IRI M 'ITIMM WEI 
Some interviewees noted a further, eclectic group participating on the periphery of the South 
African TDCA decision-ma king process. They are labelled here as civil society and their 
representatives and this grouping includes individuals, and Non-Governmental OrganisaLions 
(NGOs), or Community Based Orgartisations (CBOs) who research and represent the interests of 
I- civil society'., 
hidividudl stakeholders pldyed a role in decision-mdking mainly by corresponding with the 
BTT over issues reldted to the TDCA (see the DTI section). A diverse array of NGOs or 'civil 
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society' lobby groups also 'participated. According to a representative from the DFA, some lobbied 
EU organs (such as the European Parliament or member states) in the hope of obtaining a better 
deal for civil society in South Africa. Other bodies organised conferences and workshops in order 
to assist in the general understanding of the agreement. They performed an important function in 
representing the interests of those peoples or regions that are traditionally viewed as excluded and 
marginalised. Examples of such organisations include the International Labour Resource and 
Information Group (ILRIG), Panos, Action South Africa, and the Institute for African Alternatives 
(IFAA). ILRIG (1998) and Panos (1998) produced critical reports of the impact of neo-liberal 
economic policies (see table 4.1 in section 4.3.3 and Chapter Five), in an attempt to influence the 
macroeconomic decision-making climate, whilst also airing alternative economic viewpoints. 
Furthermore, these organisations also communicated frequently with representatives of both 
'excluded' communities in South Africa and the BLNS. Therefore, they acted to allow those defined 
as marginalised to have access to information in the TDCA decision-making process. Aside from 
these NGOs, there are CBOs that took an interest in macroeconomic and development issues. One 
of these is SANGOCO (South African National NGO Coalition), which aims for greater co- 
ordination of civil society forces. A further organisation, Isandla, 'conceptualises and cultivates 
analytical frameworks, decision-making tools and learning processes to empower people in 
government and civil society organisations to act in ways that are consistent with their policy 
intentions' (Isandla, 2001). The Civil Society Initiative is a platform that encourages the growth of 
civil society institutions to increase their participation in the political decision-making process 
Gones, 19 March 2001). ' These initiatives and institutions support those who argue in Chapter Two 
(2.5.2) that there are "bodies' that encourage civil society participation in South African political 
decision-making structures. However, apart from civil society's chance to discuss the TDCA at 
NEDLAC and parliament, it is not clear from either the literature or interviews, the extent to which 
civil society was formally incorporated into the TDCA process. 
7 This research recognises that civil society is a notoriously difficult concept to define. For a discussion on the 
ritfalls of attempting to present a simplified understanding, please see Botes and van Rensburg (2000). 
Mathiane (20 February 2001) note that some see the movement as elitist. 
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G Laboui/Business/Sectoral representation 
Both labour and business have been included together under this section because many 
interviewees stated that for most of the agreement, labour and business lobbied together on a 
sectoral basis (#11; #52,1999). They can be seen as vital ingredients to the South African TDCA 
policy formulation process because both labour and business submitted draft tariff proposals to 
the negotiating team (SEIFSA, 1997; Labour proposal 1997). That said, both labour and business 
had different ways of participating in the TDCA decision-making process. Furthernlore both had 
differing experiences in their perception of being included in the structure (see Chapter Five, 
sections 5.4 and 5.5). This section firstly outlines the labour movements access to the decision- 
making process. Secondly, business perspectives are reflected upon. Thirdly, decision-m d king 
within a sector is considered. 
First, the South African Labour movement has three major collective union movements, each 
of which followed the negotiations extensively, met goverrunent and business, and assisted in the 
construction of the South African response to the original EU trade offer. A representative of the 
National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) noted that he went to each and every union within 
his domdin to ascertdin their opinions of the a ffeement in order to compile. an assessment of each 
sector (#52,1999). The union movements were assisted in their understanding , of the 
issues thal. 
surround the TDCA by a trades union NGO research group (TURP - Trades Union Research 
Project) who provided an assessment of the agreement (TURP, 1997). 
Second, business had similar avenues open to them in acquiring information and participating 
in the decision-Mdking process. As has been illustrated, businesses were represented within 
NEDLAC, TESELICO, and the Agricultural Trade Forum, mainly via business organisations 
organised along sectordl lines and overseen by Business South Africa (BSA) (which represent 
approximately thirty business associations, such as aluminium, steel, motors, and textiles). Some of 
the orgdnisations that comprised BSA kept their members informed by producing reports on tile 
potential impact of the agreement (such as SACOB, 1999, and South Africa Foundation, 1999). 
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Furthermore, institutions such as the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB), asked its 
members to comment on the tariff offers, and to 'bring home their problems, either to SACOB, or 
directly to the DTI. However, the role of these bodies is rather limited. A source from SACOB 
commented that: 
We as a representative body - can only talk about principles, we cannot go in and 
protect the paper and pulp [sector], except to say that they have got these 
problems, they are going to face competition... and that sort of thing. We can only 
be a facilitating body... we could never be expected to know the ins and outs of 
every industry (#21,1999). 
An example of how a large company was kept abreast of the information, and slightly 
influenced the policy formulation process, was provided by a very senior representative of a large 
industrial company in the Western Cape. When in Brussels the company official spoke to the South 
African agricultural attach6 and one of the leaders of the negotiations, Eltie Links. The company 
were also kept informed of the process, both through written correspondence with the NDA, and 
through receiving advice from an academic analyst who specialised in analysing the TDCA. The 
direct, bi-lateral link between business representatives and government officials was highlighted by 
some interviewees (particularly, #53,1999) and within the literature (COSATU, 1999,3). 
The access that Small, Medium, and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) -a sector of industry that was 
target ed for assistance in SEFTA as being an example of where traditionally disadvantaged peoples 
are employed - had to the TDCA decision-making process is unclear. Few organisations exist 
which officially represent SMME interests in the South African decision-making process. One 
agency that does assist the development of SMMEs (including the promotion of SMME access to 
the policy formulation process (NTSIKA, 2001)), NTSIKA, stated that they had no representative in 
the policy formulation processes. 
Third, an example of the decision-making process within an industrial sector was provided by 
an official for the clothing sector. A clothing mandate relating to any proposed tariff reduction in 
the TDCA was formulated by the sector in 1995 and presented to the DTI and at NEDLAC. The 
official described the process as follows: 
The central, national body communicated to its regional offices that they 
required a mandate, and it therefore goes to the regional areas, and then all the 
responses get fed back to our committee structure and they sit together and talk 
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about it. If there is a problem it goes back down... It is a fairly democratic 
structure; the small guys say their piece as well... not only the big guys (#29, 
1999). 
To sunimarise, business and Idbour were mainly represented by sectoral associations during 
the TDCA process. However labour, but more often business, representatives had direct access to 
government departments as well as to NEDLAC. Both also had an important role in constructing 
the South African tariff proposal formulated in TESELICO (as noted under Section D above). This 
therefore indicates a high degree of access in the TDCA formulation process. However, it is 
unclear as to how well incorporated SMME's were within this structure, as well as individual 
companies within industrial sectors. Furthermore, the inclusion of the un-unionised workforce is 
similarly uncertain. 
H SACU Extemal Actors I 
As noted throughout this thesis, the common trade boundaries that exist between SACU member 
states (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) mean that the FTA element of 
the TDCA will de facto impact on the non-South African part of SACU. Under Article 19 of the 
1969 SACU treaty, the BLNS have an effective veto of the TDCA if they do not concur with the 
agreement. Therefore the BLNS are an important element of the statal decision-making structure. 
The EU and South African government consulted the BLNS regularly throughout the negotiations 
and, as figure 4.10 highlights, links between the BLNS and the South African parliament, as well 
as detdched/undetached observers, were recorded by those interviewed. South African 
government officials noted that the BLNS received regular feedback from a variety of sources, 
such as: 
1. The EU (110tdbly DGVIII, and the EU-ACP group). The EU arranged in Maseru (SepternIvr 1999) to 
discuss how to 'compensate' the BLNS for its likely loss of revenue from the impact of the TDCA. 
Furthermore, according to a senior member of the Foreign Ministry in Botswana, the BLNS were 
also 'dsk(-d to submit a list of products that they considered to be sensitive' (#31,1999). 
2. The South African DT] (particularly from the chief director of the African desk). 
3. The South African parliament (workshops were organised to inform the BLNS of the potential 
impacts) 
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4. South African government representatives in Brussels. 
5. NGOs published research papers on the potential impact of the agreement on SACU (see 
examples in section 4.3.3 below) 
Conferences were also organised by a collection of these organisations, as well as academia, 
enabling the dissemination of information within the BLNS. 
H: 
SACU & the BLNS 
EU Institutions 
EXTERNAL 
Detached & South African 
INTERNAL 
"Un- South A rican Parliament 
detached" Government 
Obsemers 
NGO's 
Figure 4.10: SACU in the TDCA process 
However, direct BLNS participdtion in the negotiations was rejected by the EU, arguing that as 
Loni6 members (their terms of access to the EU are via the Lom6 convention) they were 
automatically excluded from TDCA negotiations. 
in conclusion, this section has identified the actors that comprised the statal component of 
the South Africdn TDCA decision-making structure. The role of each of these actors in the TDCA 
formulation process has also been outlined. This description is incomplete. Interviewees, 
understandably, did not (and could not) always provide an entirely comprehensive account of 
how each actor and component related to one another. Despite this, enough of an outline of the 
staLal d ecisi on-ma king process has emerged to illustrate that in theory access to the statal 
decision-making system was incredibly open and inclusive. Not only were labour and business 
representatives provided with opportunities to participate, as one might expect, but so too were 
the BLNS and those identified in Chapter Two as being traditionally marginalised. Certainly 
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parliament and NEDLAC can be considered to have provided a high level of opportunity for all 
parties interested in the TDCA to be included. Even the negotiating team was accessible via 
meetings in the Trade and Industry chamber of NEDLAC. Furthermore, in emerging trend 
identified in this section was that agricultural interests appear to have been well represented by 
both the NDA and ATF, although one interviewee noted that some industrial sectors, such as 
motors and textiles, were also influential participants. Such trends will continue to be elaborated 
upon in the following chapter. 
4.3.3 Contponents of the Decision-Making Structure 
C: Detached Obsenyers 
Detached Observers are based in both the external and internal environments, and include some 
organisations that fall under the partial patronage of either the South African government or EU 
(such as TIPS, or the IDC). It is important to note that the distinction between an 'un-detachod' 
and detached observer is difficult to determine with divisions between the two being far from 
easy to demarcate. However, for the purpose of this study, 'detached' observers are defined as 
orgdnisations or research groups that claims that their research is 'neutral' and is intended to be 
'objective' and unbiased. That is not to say that 'un-detached' bodies are not. However, an 'un- 
detached' organisation, such as the IDC is so closely attached to the South African government 
during the negotiations it can hardly be described as being 'detached'. Those interviewees who 
commented on the role of detached observers noted that in the course of negotiating the EU-SA 
TDCA, NGOs and researchers contributed to the decision-making process in three ways. First, 
some provided advice to the South African government on the likely impact of the agreement. 
Second, they produced reports on differing aspects of the EU-SA TDCA. Third, they provided an 
opportunity to disseminate information relating to the agreement and facilitated discussion of it, 
either via conferences or the media. The following three sections examine the role of these actors 
in the TDCA process. 
I Advice 
A leading analyst of tabour relations in South Africa argued that the tri-partite members of the 
South African government received much advice from research organisdtions, Particularly 
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'overseas economists' (#8,1999). The first influential 'detached observer' was the European 
Research Office (ERO), which provided policy advice for officials in the transitional government 
who were considering the different options of economic relations with the EU. A member of this 
group noted that they were advised to apply for full Lom6 membership, which 'had quite a strong 
influence on government at that stage' (#43,1999). 
A second research organisation - the Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) - was 
established during South Africa's transition from apartheid, to advise COSATU on macro-economic 
policy (#54,1999). One ex-DPRU researcher, Alan Hirsch, now a chief director at the DTI, has been 
influential in driving the South African goven-anent towards trade liberalisation. Two other 
organisations within South Africa - TIPS (the Trade and Industry Policy Secretariat) and the 
National Institute for Economic Policy (NIEP) - have also provided advice to government and 
COSATU about the impact of the EU-SA TDCA and liberalising economic policies in general. TIPS 
in particular has provided a strong link between the research community and government, 
especially over trade policy. One interviewee noted that senior DTI officials attend TIPS 
workshops, which are held every two or three months (#Bhorat, 2001). Bhorat comments that: 
Any interesting or significant work that takes place in the Trade and Industrial 
policy, if you would like policy-makers to have access to it... [TIPS] is the primary 
medium... there is a very strong link between ... academic research and policy 
makers. And so that [TIPS] is the mechanism through which ... we engage with the 
policy makers (#Bhorat, 2001). 
II Reports 
As table 4.1 (below) illustrates, reports concerned with various aspects of the TDCA have been 
published by a rich array of sources - from the World Bank and EU to the South African Council of 
Churches. Those interviewed perceived these reports to have influenced the South African 
negotiations to varying degrees. 
Title of report Date of Produced by Commissioned by 
report 
Study on the Economic 1997 Imani Consultants EU 
Impact of the Proposed 
EU-SA Free Trade 
Agreement on the BLNS 
countries 
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The European Union- 1997 Mustapha Nabli Trade and 
Tunisia Free Trade Area Industrial Policy 
Agreement and Some (World Bank) Secretariat, South 
Lessons for South Africa Africa. 
Overview of Trade Policy in September Carolyn Jenkins TIPS 
South Africa 1997 (Centre for the Study of 
African Economies, 
University of Oxford) 
and Nandipa Siwisa 
(DTI) 
The Impact of Regional December Gavin Maasdorp, Academic journal - 
Integration on Southern 1997 Economic Research Agrekon 
African Agriculture Unit, University of 
Natal. 
Impact on South African December MSA Badurally Adam & Academic journal, 
Meat Demand of a Possible 1997 MAG Darroch, Agrekon. 
Free Trade Agreement with Department of 
the European Union Agricultural Economics, 
University of Natal. 
Responding to Regional 1998 The ACP-EU Joint The ACP-EU Joint 
Realities Assembly and the Assembly and the 
SACU parliamentary SACU 
liaison group. parliamentary 
liaison group. 
Study to Assess the July 1998 Institute of EU and the BLNS 
Economic Impact of the Development Studies 
Proposed EU-SA FrA on (IDS) and the Botswana 
the BLNS Institute for 
Development Policy 
Analysis (BIDPA) 
Free Trade with Europe - July 1998 TIPS/UNCTAD DTI 
the winners and losers. (Jachia & Te1jeur) The results of the SMART 
simulation 
The European Union- July 1998 Anne Graumans, NIZA 
South African Netherlands Institute 
Negotiations: The sting is for Southern Africa 
in the tail (NIZA) 
Trading in Futures - EU- 1998 Panos Panos 
ACP Relations: Putting 
Commerce before 
cooperation? 
An alternative view of 1998 ILRIG ILRIG 
Globalisation 
Measures and Policies 1999 IDC IDC 
Impacting on South 
African Industry 
Marginalisation or 1999 Paul Goodison (ERO) IGD 
Integration?: Implications 
for South Africa's partners 
of the SA-EU trade deal 
The Costs of Staying the June1999 Asghar Adelzadeh NIEP 
Course (NIEP) 
Deindustrialisation In August 1999 David Evans, IDS IDS 
Southern Africa? A 
General Equilibrium 
Analysis 
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After Negotiations: September Jeffrey Lewis, Sherman International Food 
Assessing the Impact of 1999 Robinson and Karen Policy Research 
Free Trade Agreements in Thierfelder Institute 
Southern Africa 
The EU-South Africa 2000 Eurostep - European Eurostep 
Trade, Development and Solidarity Towards 
Co-operation Agreement: Equal Participation of 
An analysis of Its People 
Implications in southern 
Africa 
The European Union- 2000 South African 
South Africa Trade Council of 
Agreement: Implications Churches 
for Post-Iom6 Relations 
Geographical Indications 2000 Emily Craven and University of WITS, 
and the South Africa- Charles Mather South Africa 
European Union Free 
Trade Agreement 
Regional or Multilateral March 2000 Maurizio Bussolo European 
agreements? An evaluation Development Policy 
of the Southern-Africa (Overseas Development Study Group 
Trade Policy Scenarios Institute) 
The impact of the SA-EU June 2000 South African Institute Ntsika Enterprise 
Agreement on Small. of International Affairs Promotion Agency 
Medium and Micro 
Enterprises in South 
Africa 
Rhetoric or Reality? EU October Beth Perry European 
policy towards South 2000 Development Policy 
Africa, 1977-2000 (Bradford University) Study Group 
Table 4.1: Summary of reports relating to the TDCA or tariff liberalisation 
Some reports clearly did have an impact. One academic analyst suggested that articles from 
the academic journal Agrekon, which were heavily based on econometric modelling, exerted a 
strong influence on the NDA and, in particular, the previous minister Derek Hanekom (#6,1999). 
The analyst states that 'Hanekoms speeches... [have] clearly been influenced by people who... are 
pushing free trade and... fiberalised agricultural regimes in a very unthinking way... this is 
mobilisation - get on track - or get off' (#6,1999). 
The second influential report was produced by the Botswana Institute for Development Policy 
Analysis (BIDPA) in July 1998, assessing the impact of the agreement on the BINS. The assessment, 
highlighting potential revenue loss, received widespread publicity in the Botswanan government. 
The reports central contention is supported by the Botswana Minister for Commerce and Industry. 
At a conference held in Gaborone in July 1999, the Minister stated that, 'these fears have been 
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confirmed by a number of studies, the most comprehensive of which was the one commissioned by 
the EU and undertaken by BIDPA' (Kgoroba, 1999,5). 
It is more difficult to assess the impact of the remainder of studies on the TDCA process. 
Indeed, many of those interviewed did not see these reports as having a significant role or 
influence; thus, arguably they have been largely ignored. The Imani report (1997), commissioned, 
researched, and published before the negotiations began, has been largely neglected because the 
research was undertaken before the details of the EU and South African Mandates were known. 
The joint UNCTAD/TIPS (Jachia and Te1jeur, 1998) report for the DTI was commissioned 
specifically for its negotiations with the EU over the free trade area part of the agreement. The 
SMART simulation programme employed was used by many countries in preparation for the 
Uruguay Round and was therefore influential in previous decision-making procedures. The report 
contends that, 'both the European Union delegation and South Africa have utilised it in the context 
of current negotiations' (Jachia and Te1jeur, 1998,37). However, it is debatable whether this report 
had a significant influence over the TDCA, though two of its conclusions have certainly been 
reflected in rhetorical concerns expressed by the South African goverrunent on the potential 
agricultural benefits of the TDCA and its possible detrimental effect on the BLNS. It is difficult to 
establish whether these concerns would have been addressed by the negotiators had it not been for 
the report. A leading negotiator on the South African side asserted that quantitative reports, such as 
that produced by the Trade and Industry Policy Secretariat (TIPS) and UNCTAD, had virtually no 
impact on the governmental apparatus during the discussions. It is difficult to assess the remaining 
reports as the decision-makers interviewed expressed no comment on them. Furthermore, many of 
these reports were published after the main negotiating process had finished, and many researchers 
did not publish their analyses with the intention of influencing the TDCA decision-making process. 
III Disseminating Information 
Detached observers disseminated details of the agreement, either via reports, the media or by 
conferences. Both the literature and interviewees have argued that the media has been responsible 
for not only disseminating information, but also, as a result, influenced the climate in which the 
TDCA has been negotiated. For example an ILRIG report (1998) claimed that the media was 
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influential in arguing the case for neo-liberalism. Indeed, a Business Day editorial (23 July 1997) 
opined that the 'greater our interaction with the rest of the world and the greater our own markets' 
openness, the better for the entire country's future'. Conversely, Michael Laidler, the EU 
ambassador to South Africa, contended that the South African media ignored the potential benefits 
of the agreement (quoted in Wadula, 31 March 2000). Martin Vi1joen, a senior representative of the 
textile industry, and interviewed in 2001, argued that 80% of communication between government 
and big business takes place in the media, and that the media should be taken very seriously as an 
actor when considering the decision-making process (#Viljoen, 2001). That this should be the main 
form of communication between these two actors, should be of concern to business and 
govemment officials. 
Conferences also contributed to disseminating information to a wide audience. At many of 
these conferences those involved in the negotiations presented papers explaining the progress of 
the agreement and its potential impacts. Table 4.2 lists some of the conferences that were organised, 
inside and outside South Africa. It was noted previously that the ERO conference had an impact on 
the decision-makers when South Africa applied for full Lom6 membership. The only other 
conference that seems to have influenced the TDCA decision-making process was the 1997 
Title of conference: Date Organised by: Subject: 
ERO Workshop 
South Africa's Relations 
with the EU 
European -Southern 
African Cooperation in a 
Globalising World 
Farewell to LomV The 
Impact of Neo-Liberal EU 
policies on the ACP 
countries 
1995 ERO The future of economic 
trading relationships with 
South Africa. Attended by 
negotiating group. 
1997 Foundation of 
Global 
Dialogue/Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung 
October European Network 
1998 for Information and 
Action (ENIASA) 
April 1999 Terre des 
hommes/Koordinat 
Ion Südisch Afrika/ 
Weed 
EU/SATDCA - Negotiation 
stances, Internal 
justification. and potential 
impact. 
Examines differing aspects 
of neo-liberal policies in a 
globalising world. 
Looks at different aspects 
of neo-liberal economic 
policies - including an 
account of Southern Africa. 
South African Business June 1999 Konrad-Adenauer- Business Perspectives of 
and the European Union Stiftung/Rand the EU/SA TDCA 
in the Context of the New Afrikaans 
Trade and Development University 
Agreement 
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Assessing the EU-SA 
Agreement 
Post-U=6 Convention 
Trade Regime: Implications 
for Southern Africa 
September South African 
1999 Institute for 
International 
Affairs (SAIIA) 
October Institute for Global 
1999 Dialogue 
Assesses different facets of 
the EU-SA TDCA. 
Will EU-SA TDCA be used 
as a blueprint for post- 
Lom6 trade? 
The European Union- 
South Africa Trade 
Agreement: Implications 
for Post-Lom6 Relations 
A Review of Regional 
Integration In Southern 
Africa 
March South African 
2000 Council of 
Churches 
June 2000 SAIIA/Nordic 
Council of 
Ministers/British 
High 
Commission/Konra 
d-Adenauer- 
Stiftung 
Paradigm shift in 
development thinking 
Trade liberalisation and its 
likely Impact on southern 
Africa 
The Cotonou Agreement: October Action South Africa An introduction to Cotonou 
opportunities and 2000 and a reflection on the EU- 
challenges for EU- SATDCA 
Southern African trade 
Table 4.2: Conferences focusing on aspects of the EU-SA TDCA 
Foundation for Global Dialogue (FGD) conference, in which the DTI decided that the Agreement 
between South Africa and the EU should have a strong developmental element to it (Foundation 
for Global Dialogue, 1997). The other conferences listed in Table 4.2 did not receive many 
comments from those interviewed. It is therefore difficult to assess their importance to the TDCA 
process. 
To summarise, the role of 'Detached Observers' (research organisations, the media and 
academia) in the TDCA decision-making process has varied. The media has been introduced as a 
further actor that should be considered in this assessment of the EU-SA TDCA policy formulation 
process. Conferences disseminated information to audiences that varied from those community 
stakeholders likely to have attended the March 2000 South African Council of Churches conference 
on the TDCA, to business representatives who were at the 1999 Rand Afrikaans University 
conference on how business may be affected by the TDCA. Furthermore some interviewees argued 
that detached observers did exert an influence on the formulation of the TDCA. For instance, 
conferences such as the FGD seminar in 1997 resulted in the TDCA having a strong developmental 
aspect towards it. The BIDPA report and ERO workshop with negotiators also had a profound 
influence on decision-makers. Additionally, others have claimed that the media has significantly 
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affected the climate in which the TDCA is discussed. However, many of the conference 
proceedings and reports tended to have a very limited influence on the TDCA. 
4.3.4 - Components of the Decision-Making Structure: 
D- The external environment 
As the. preceding dia grams and description has implied, the external environment is in important 
component in the South African TDCA policy formulation process. Although many external 
actors were involved in different aspects in formulating and influencing the agreement, this 
section charts how three groups of actors within the external environment affected the decision- 
Making process in South Africa. They were: 
1. The IMF/World Bank/WTO 
2. The European Union 
3. Neighbouring States. 
I IMF/WIFO/Wodd Bank 
Some argue that these IFIs have dictated that the South African government's macroeconomic 
policy he based mainly on neo-classical economic thinking. For instance, Bond (2000,156) argued 
that the World Bank has influenced both ideology and poticy, particularly towards socio- 
economic policies and international trade relations. A number of inLerviewees supported this 
view. A government bureaucrat involved with the transitional government, who attended the 
Marrakesh trade discussions in 1992, noted that 'the presence of the ANC stalwarts [at this 
meeting] was ... an eye-opener as to the process of 
liberatisation and that [they were told] there is 
no way back [to old ANC economic policies]' (#43,1999). Furthermore, wben Mandela 
attended the World Economic Forum he was repeatedly informed that macroeconomic 
policy had to be based on liberalisation, not ndtionalisation (#43,1999). A leading 
figure within the business community noted that the IMF and World Bank arrived in 
South Africa swiftly during the dismantlement of the apartheid legislation. Their intention, he 
declares, was 'to brainwash! They had very sizeable staffs, and the ANC were very quickly 
brought into the worldview of an IMF or World Bank... way of thinking' (#24,1999). Such 
opinions were confirmed by leading members of the ANC. Writing in 1994, Tito 
110 
Chapter Four: lbe South African TDCA decision -making process 
Mboweni (then Deputy Head of the Department of Econon-dc Planning, now Chairman of the South 
African Reserve Bank) noted that 'the IMF and the World Bank are ... determined to influence the 
policy agenda in South Africa. The IMF visits South Africa every year ... Their Article IV papers are 
highly influential in government policy circles, ... [and] the Bank's research results have made a big 
impact in South Africa' (Mboweni, 1994,73). 
It should be noted however that not all analysts within South Africa subscribe to the opinion 
that the WTO, IMF, and the World Bank were the main catalysts for trade liberalisation in South 
Africa. Cassim (1998, no page number), for example, states 'there was already a consensus among 
policy-makers to such a process'. Haroon Bhorat, director of the DPRU, interviewed in 2001, 
concurred with this viewpoint. He argued that: 
I think it is probably wrong to say that the World Bank brought their mission into 
South Africa and got all the top dogs and said, listen, you toe the line, because I 
don't think that it the way that the world works generally. There is no doubt that 
intelligent thinking, pragmatic people, ANC is very pragmatic, and the economic 
policies lent themselves to that kind of thinking... 
Indeed, as soon as the industrialised governments, which has been anti-apartheid 
supporters sort of lent an ear to the thinking of Mandela and those below him, it 
became very clear to the new South African government that look, there was no 
way we can pursue these policies. And we can't underestimate the degree to what 
happened in the Soviet Union actually influenced events (#Bhorat, 2001). 
Furthermore, the WTO is also seen by some as an organisation that can be utilised to South Africa's 
advantage, rather than an institution that dictates South African trade policy. A senior official from 
NEDLAC provides an example, arguing that 'South Africa is hopeful that it might win certain 
things at the WTO level that they might not have won [with the EU] at a bilateral level' (#22,1999). ' 
11 The EU 
As the description of the statal process implies, the EU, not surprisingly, was a most important 
player in the South African TDCA decision-making structure. For instance, the EU dictated to an 
extent the parameters of what could be agreed. Before the agreement, constraints were placed on 
South Africa's pursual of alternatives to a free trade agreement. Following the EU's refusal to grant 
South Africa full Lom6 status, the South African government had little choice but to accept the 
9 Such as ruling on the use of Traditional Expressions like port, sherry, grappa and ouzo. 
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TDCA. A leading DTI bureaucrat protested 'we did not have a choice of partner' (#20,1999), even 
though other trading partners might have been preferable. Furthermore, a source from the DFA 
queried the argument used by the EU that the VVTO would not allow any further Lom6-type 
agreements. He argues that with an increasing number of developing countries becoming involved 
in the WTO, such (Lom6-type) agreements might be permitted in the future (#43,1999). On this 
basis, he insisted that the EU used this perception to persuade South Africa to pursue the TDCA; 
'One does feel that it is an instrument to make us toe the line... to delimit the parameters of the ... 
discussions' (#43,1999). 
During negotiations, the South African decision-makers interviewed noted that the experience and 
huge bureaucratic capacity of the EU, along with a restrictive EU mandate, meant that the 
European Union wielded much influence throughout the negotiations. A DFA official felt that the 
EU presented the mandate as an insurmountable barrier and that the European 
Council did well in not prescribing too much. But we were absolutely floored by 
the fact that... Council had decided this is the mandate, there is no way in which 
you can persuade Council differently. And we insisted that they go back to 
Council... drop the linkage - we do not accept it (#43,1999). 
He also argued that South African inexperience in negotiations was a factor (#43,1999), 
commenting: 
we haven't had anything to do with negotiations, it was being thrown in at the 
deep end... and that's where we were - we were guided by the European Union... 
through the texts that they had... through their negotiating skills and tactics and 
whatever (#43,1999). 
One South African negotiator expressed that it was evident that EU negotiators had no 
political agenda, 'so it was virtually impossible to cash in on any of the political statements of 
goodwill' (#20,1999) expressed by politicians at the time of the demise of apartheid legislation. 
Indeed, South African negotiators claimed they witnessed few signs of promised goodwill. 
Individual EU member states resisted the agreement (especially over agriculture, fisheries, and 
wine and spirits). A DFA representative commented that 'it hurt. That one country - Spain - could 
go and sway the whole relationship that we envisaged as being good and giving it a sour note' (#43, 
1999). The sentiment was echoed by a senior representative of business, who argued that Spain's 
objections to the agreement hid another agenda: 
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it would not have any agreement unless we agreed to grant fishing rights... and we 
wondered if that was really true... which I doubted, or whether Spain had any 
alternative objectives. And they had alternative objectives, and one of them was 
that they wanted an EU agreement with Mexico which others were resisting... and 
so they were holding out against South Africa in order to ... curry favour in Mexico 
(#11,1999). 
Officials from the EU denied that there were any hidden agendas, or that Mediterranean states 
had conspired to reject the agreement (#39; 40,1999). Philip Lowe (Director-General for the then 
DGVIII of the EU) argued at the 1999 SAIIA conference in South Africa that the TDCA was actually 
'delivered' by these countries as they compromised or relented over issues of contention, despite 
much domestic opposition. 
Furthermore, there is lack of agreement amongst those questioned about how insurmountable 
the EU mandate was. For example, an MP close to the negotiations commented that South Africa's 
negotiators were successful in preventing the EU mandate totally guiding the negotiating process. 
He noted that in standard negotiations with the EU, '95% of negotiation takes place in the 
Commission, and only 5% outside' (#57,1999). However, in the EU-SA TDCA 'I think that the 
ratios were a bit different in our case... I think we were [a] more active negotiating partner' (#57, 
1999). 
The EU also influenced the negotiations via its involvement in relations between the BLNS and 
South Africa. A source from the DFA relayed his disbelief when the EU treated SACU as if it did 
not exist or was a sham (#43,1999). The academic Dot Keet (1997a, 284-294) asserted that the EU 
played on the inherited problems between South Africa and the BLNS, and proposed that the BLNS 
would benefit from free trade since it would end the price-raising effects of South Africa's Customs 
Union-related protective tariffs. Keet also argued that 'Europe will undoubtedly use its influence 
and put pressure on the weaker and more vulnerable governments in Southern Africa, and on more 
cautious elements, old and new, within the South African government to counter any alternative 
approach and further alliances' (Keet, 1997a, 293). 
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III South Africa's neighbours 
SACU/BLNS 
The SACU influenced the TDCA decision-making process in two ways. Firstly, Article 19 of the 
SACU treaty states that trade negotiations with a third party have to include all SACU members 
(this was waived during the negotiations). Furthermore, as stated above, any agreement signed has 
to have the concurrence of SACU. Secondly, those South African negotiators interviewed claimed 
that they lobbied successfully to protect the BINS sensitive industries (#43; #20,1999). Indeed a 
negotiator from the DTI noted that, 'I think that in many cases it was a very defensive tool to use... 
because the EU never pushed us on any areas that we... proved to be sensitive to the BLNS' (#20, 
1999). However, some argue that those in South Africa used the 'BLNS-card' in order to protect 
South African industries. A senior economist for a Johannesburg based business claimed that some 
businesses in South Africa also used this in order to protect their own industry (#24,1999). 
SADC 
Analysts of the southern African region have argued that the post-1994 South African government 
have aimed to improve development in not only South Africa, but also the southern African region, 
and in particular the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Simon, 1998a; Horton, 
1999). Two interviewees noted that this consideration made an impact on the TDCA negotiations. 
An adviser to the Swaziland government argued that South Africa pushed for a SADC trade deal to 
be implemented before SEF17A was, in order to avoid the EU having more beneficial access to South 
Africa than the southern African region would. A negotiator from the DTI confirmed that SADC 
interests were considered in the process; 'we also had to take into account the SADC negotiations, 
and there was a commitment to ... the SADC offer would be asymmetrical in favour of SADC' (#20, 
1999). 
Lom6 
The current Lom6 convention based on non-reciprocal trade is currently being renegotiated 
between the EU and the ACP under the Cotonou Agreement (2000). Some of those interviewed 
argued that the EU-SA TDCA would be a blueprint for these renegotiations (#4,1999). Indeed, a 
source from business stated that he informed one of the South African negotiators that: 
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if you fuck it [the EU-SA TDCA] up for South Africa, you fuck it up for tile entire 
Lom6 as well because... they [the EU] they are going to use what concessions they 
can out of South Africa (#11,1999). 
This section details the perceived influence of financial institutions, the FU and, to a ICSSer 
extent, South Africa's neighbours on the decision-making process in South Africa. One analyst close 
to the EU-SA TDCA negotiations did not think that South Africa was greatly influenced by external 
actors (#4,1999). However, evidence from those close to the decision- ma kin g process suggests 
otherwise. Indeed, when regarding the role played by IFIs, it is difficult to assess where their 
influence ends. However, unlike the statal component, external institutions are not shackled by tile 
responsibility to include South African stakeholders in their decisions. It is clear, therefore, that this 
component of the decision-making process has a powerful impact on the filial agreement, yet 
simultaneously may well be the least inclusive all four components. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has described the structure supporting the South African side of the TDCA decision- 
making system. This has been done by placing the TDCA policy formulation process within a 
descriptive model, as suggested by the literature reviewed in Chapter Two (2.5.1). The model used 
here has established and examined the decision-making framework through an analysis of the 
interviews conducted with South African decision-makers close to the TDCA formulation process 
and related literature. The model was useful in that it provided a basis for a structured evaluation 
of the key actors and components involved in shaping the TDCA. As the literature review warned, 
models describing clecision-making structures have limitations. For example, the model used here 
tended to suggest that decisions were made 'in neatly-compartmentalised and autonomous spheres. 
Despite this, the model has enabled an interpretation of the South African TDCA policy 
formulation process. It has assisted a description of the process and conveyed its complexity. The 
major findings that have emerged from this clescription are as follows: 
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First, the model helped in identifying that decisions concerning the TDCA took place at many 
different levels, from between the EU and South African negotiating teams to within South African 
trades union movements and industrial sectors. 
Second, in describing the role each of the four components and numerous actors played in 
shaping the South African TDCA formulation process, the model assisted in portraying the subtle 
interactions not only between components and actors, but also within each component and actor 
category. This demonstrated that a number of tensions existed, particularly within the internal 
environment where disagreement over the direction of the South African government's 
macroeconomic policy has mirrored the polarised debate surrounding the global debate. In one 
camp, largely supportive of neo-liberalism, are many government officials, economists, big 
business and the financial press. In the other are NGOs, civil society and academics. They are joined 
by two organisations that form government - COSATU and the SAM The refusal of the South 
African government to consider alternatives to the partial neo-classical policies already 
implemented may well reflect the dominant influence of neo-liberalism as discussed in Chapter 
Two. 
Moreover, tensions were also evident between the internal and external components. This 
occurred over concerns by some South African actors that neo-liberal economic approaches were 
being imposed by multilateral institutions such as the IMF and World Bank and also over the 
feeling that, to an extent, the EU controlled the TDCA negotiating process, to the detriment of 
South African interests. Indeed, it appears as if the South African government were intent on 
pursuing a macro-development policy that was not entirely linked to neo-liberalism. when they 
asked to become full Lom6 members. This was rejected by the EU. 
Third, the model has begun to assist an assessment of the influence that each component had 
in shaping how the TDCA was formulated. Calculating the degree of influence exactly is incredibly 
difficult and probably impossible to do. Therefore, a further limitation of the model is that it fails to 
adequately explain the power relations between various components and actors. However, it does 
not prevent an analysis of interviewee perceptions of how important different components and 
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actors were. For instance in section 4.3.3 interviewees noted that some detached observers 
influenced government policy, particularly over trade issues. Yet it was the external environment 
that most interviewees noted had a strong bearing over the climate in which the TDCA was 
discussed. In terms of direct influence on the formulation of the TDCA, interviewees identified that 
the EU, not surprisingly, due to its role as a major player in international relations and bilateral 
trade arrangements, exercised a great deal of control on the South African side of the TDCA 
decision-making process. This control inevitably provoked criticism from some interviewees, not 
only, as one would expect, from academia and NGOs, but also government officials, who implied 
that the degree of influence exercised by the EU would result in South Africa experiencing more 
'losers' than 'winners' from the impact of the agreement. The extent to which this might be the case 
is considered further in Chapters Five to Eight. 
Fourth, the picture described in this chapter suggests that in theory the South African TDCA 
decision-making structure appears to have permitted the inclusion of a diverse range of actors in 
South and southern Africa. This is particularly so within the statal component which, despite 
lacking a fully comprehensive description of how each actor related to each other, appeared to 
allow participation from all sections of southern African society. The South African parliament and 
NEDLAC seem to be most inclusive. Furthermore, the South African agricultural sector, along with 
some industries such as textiles and motors, were specifically identified by interviewees as having 
had a lot of access to the TDCA decision-making structure. Was this inclusion surprising 
considering that both industries had been identified in the literature review as being likely to be 
marginalised economically from the impact of neo-liberalism? In some ways it was unanticipated 
given that a conclusion drawn from Chapter Two was that those marginalised by neo-classical 
economic policies tend to be excluded for the policy formulation process. However, as both 
industries have large workforces their participation, particularly in the knowledge that a neo-liberal 
agreement might be to their detriment, should not be too unexpected. Women and n-dgrants, also 
identified in Chapter Two as likely to be marginalised and excluded from decision-making, 
received no comments from those interviewees who provided a description of the South African 
TDCA decision-making process. Their inclusion into the structure, in theory, would be the same as 
any civil society group identified section F of 4.3.2 in this chapter. 
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One probable reason why the South African TDCA structure was depicted as being inclusive 
was that those interviewees who could provide a descriptive account tended to be restricted to 
being either South African government officials or those very close to the TDCA negotiations. It is 
in their own interests to portray the TDCA policy formulation process as being inclusive, 
particularly in the context of the polarised debate surrounding neo-liberalism in Chapter Two. 
The following chapter operationalises the model and in so doing evaluates the inclusiveness 
and exclusiveness of the South African TDCA decision-making process, whilst also attempting to 
further assess the level of influence that each component and actor played. 
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5.1 Introduction 
A description emerged from the previous chapter of the South African side of the TDCA decision- 
making structure. This chapter builds on this by exploring, from an analysis of interviewee 
responses and related literature, how inclusive the process was regarded. It documents 
perceptions from government, business, labour, civil society, the BLNS, detached/un-detached 
observers, and Europe, who commented on the level of inclusivity of the South African TDCA 
structure. An evaluation of how each of the six 'actor' categories listed in Chapter Four allowed 
for inclusion and the extent of their influence in shaping the TDCA (already begun in Chapter 
Four) is presented in sections 5.2 to 5.7 below. 
5.2 The inclusiveness of statal/governmental actors 
A description of the 'staLal' process, outlined in Chapter Four (4.3.2), indicated that the South 
African government provided a most inclusive framework. Many of those interviewed, especially 
representatives from business and government close to the negotiations, tended to agree with this 
assessment. For example, a representative from the DTI noted: 
... it has been a very 
long process. Everyone has been consulted. The document 
has been released for public consumption. And everybody with an interest has 
boenable to comment on it (#20,1999). 
Furthermore, a senior business representative firmly argued that the 'new' South African statal 
system allows for an amazingly high level of participation: 
What we have toddy, at least in national structures... is very much a consensus 
seeking way of doing, things, and it has come from the history of what has gone 
on in the last 20 years in South Africa... the need to talk to all stakeholders on all 
issues is something that has developed almost organically in South Africa, almost 
more than anywhere else. It is quite an astounding process... very unusual for 
people who haven't experienced it (#11,1999). 
A Idbour movement sociologist agreed, noting that one of the leading South African negotiators, 
Alvc Erwin, '(-dm(, out of the trade union movement where they have. operated on the principle of 
, wcounLability and report back... and it is supposed to be done in quite an open, transparent way' 
(#8,1999). 
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However, the interviewee then argued that the TDCA was not negotiated in that manner, 
suggesting that they would conform to more 'conventional' decision-making processes linked to 
trade agreements, which tend to have a high level of 'closed' decisions. Those who argued that the 
statal process limited participation mainly emanated from NGOs with close links to civil society. 
One senior representative of a Cape Town NGO, who participated occasionally in the Development 
Chamber of NEDLAC, argued that civil society was marginalised from NEDLAC'because it is: 
basically a tri-partite kind of structure. COSATU and NACTU send their leadership - 
it is technical expertise on who gets there... it is representative democracy, not a 
participatory one. The way the thing is structured and the issues that are dealt with, it 
would not make sense to send a shop steward there to discuss the EU/SA trade deal, 
because they wouldn't have come from a kind of process where they would be able to 
input into that type of structure. I'm not saying that workers don't have views on 
those types of things, they should be listened to, but I mean... if they go to NEDLAC 
they would be silenced. I think that it is good that they are represented, but it is also 
at the same time... it's a way of silencing them, or bringing them into a structure for 
which they are not actually prepared to participate in. We just sat there [in the 
NEDLAC Development Chamber] in silence because we were not able to 
[participate]... so we might respond to one tiny little peripheral issue... but we were 
not able to participate as an equal, and yet... someone could come in and do a study 
of that and write it up in the newspapers as it being a decision supported by civil 
society (#51,1999). 
Moreover, NEDLAC and parliament, lauded in Chapter Four for their extraordinary inclusiveness, 
have had question marks raised regarding such an assessment. Some interviewees argued that the 
importance of NEDLAC as a debating chamber is diminishing, thus reducing the capacity of the 
organisation to coherently represent various stakeholder groups that discuss policy within its 
chambers (#11; #20,1999). A NEDLAC official unsurprisingly dismissed NEDLAC's waning 
influence, arguing that: 
I think certainly NEDLAC's influence is not as big in the society wide way than it 
was in the first period of the ANC government... that's for obvious reasons - that 
first period is when all the big policy issues were tackled. We were re-writing an 
the laws - that is not going to happen for ever, so NEDLAC had a very special role 
to play in that... There is a whole lot of problems within the constituencies that 
leads people to conclude, that well, NEDLAC does not have an important role any 
more. I don't think that that is true. There is a culture in this society that I think is 
entrenched... one of consultation of engaging, of having dialogue in order to reach 
[decisions]. [For) new government bureaucrats - NEDLAC [was also] important for 
experience - to gain confidence to act decisively - perhaps they no longer need 
NEDLAC for that purpose. [Furthermore], I don't think the BTT speaking directly 
to industry associations is bypassing NEDLAC by any means. I think the strength 
' NEDLAC is included here because it is mainly an statal institution, having been established under 
parliamentary law. 
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of aU this stuff has been the fact that ... there are 
different avenues opening in order 
to gather information and make judgements (#22,1999). 
However, it was not only stakeholder groups who were identified as being largely excluded 
from the South African TDCA decision-making process. For example, a clothing sector 
representative argued that both clothing and textiles were sidelined for the first few years in the 
policy formulation process by the negotiating team, as they were overshadowed by negotiations of 
agricultural products (#29,1999). 
The South African parliamentary process was also criticised for not translating any discontent 
that was felt by parliamentarians, or stakeholders, towards the exclusive nature that the South 
African government treated the EU-SA TDCA decision-making process. One senior trade unionist 
claimed that: 
From what I understand, at the [parliaments] public hearing when COSATU gave 
its representation, the members of the [select parliamentary] committee [were] 
rather concerned about the cavalier attitude of government in concluding this 
damn thing [the agreement], but then what happens is that they [the select 
committeel cannot fall over backwards themselves and say that our trade 
negotiators have done a good deal, a good job here (#21,2001). 
Furthermore, representatives for civil society have claimed that gaining access to information 
relating to the agreement was more difficult than the picture presented by DTI officials in the 
previous chapter (#45; #51,1999). For example, Government Gazette [where details of the TDCA 
appeared] has a very exclusive and limited circulation. A senior labour representative claimed that 
the DTI was concerned by this and are exploring other avenues in attempts to disseminate 
information to a wider audience (#52,1999). 
Interviewees closer to the TDCA negotiations also argued that the system was exclusive and 
that 'closed' decisions were often made. A senior labour representative noted that everyone within 
the NEDLAC process represented their own interests, without really considering all aspects of 
society (#52,1999). He added that 'meaningful' participation tended mainly to be with industrial 
sectors. In addition, a senior BTT official commented that the DTI consulted with sectors and 
through NEDLAC, yet, 'when it comes to putting the final thing together you cannot really consult, 
particularly when the Minister became involved. In the end there were a few amendments without 
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[any] consultation' (#16,1999). Furthermore, there were tensions between departments, notably the 
DTI and NDA. An interviewee who attended both NEDLAC and TESELICO meetings noted that 
relations between the tri-partite members of NEDLAC (where communication was often rowdy) 
was better than relations between these government departments (#22,1999). Although the DTI is 
said to have criticised the NDA for being too conservative, the NDA cultivated good relations with 
those in business who were interviewed. A labour representative noted that the NDA did a 
thorough job in keeping agriculture informed (#19,1999). Furthermore, a senior business 
representative claimed that the DTI sometimes failed to respond to queries from the business 
community, questioning whether the DTI was as accessible in practice as it is in theory (#21,1999). 
To summarise, despite external constraints on the statal process, as noted in 4.3.4, it is evident 
that many interviewees, particularly government officials, believed that because the agreement was 
publicly available (tariff proposals were published in the Government Gazette) and there were high 
levels of communication, notably between business, labour and government, the South African side 
of the TDCA policy formulation process was therefore highly inclusive. Indeed, for sectoral 
representatives, who received Government Gazette, attended regular meetings with the DTI, 
Agricultural Trade Forum, or within NEDLAC, this might have been the case. However, 
representatives of civil society argue that their participation in the decision-making structure was 
limited. More importantly, government officials noted that decisions related to the TDCA were 
often closed to any participation or influence, outside of the executive level. Ultimately any 
judgement concerning the inclusiveness of the statal decision-making structure depends on 'who 
you are. Some would say yes [it is inclusive], and some no. It depends on whether they were 
consulted or not, and how integrated they were... in the national organisations that represented 
them' (#22,1999). 
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5.3 The inclusiveness of non-statal actors - Detached Observers and Researchers 
It has alreddv been noted that detached observers were involved to varied extents in the TDCA 
negotiations. For organisations; such as the DPRU and TIPS, their link with government was 
strong. Horaan Bhorat (director of the DPRU) notes that: 
... the engagement 
between the research community and the policy-makers is 
dclually very strong because, as you well know, Alan Hirsch has leapt from the 
research environment into the DTI. David Lewis, who was the previous director 
[at DPRU] has left here and is now chair of the Competition tribunal... Alastair 
Ruiters, [d DG at the DTIJ and Alec Erwin worked here in the economic trends 
group, which was the forerunner of the DPRU. It is partly a reflection of skills 
shortages and also I think a positive reflection of links between the research 
community and policy-makers (#Bhorat 2(X)1). 
Many organisations however had far less access into the decision-making process. Solne 
interviewees argued that this was particularly the case for 'local' (non-Western) and African 
researchers. Bothma (30 September 1999) noted that these 'Western' observers influenced policy 
more than 'local' advisers did. My personal experiences in gaining information in South Africa 
(noted in Chapter Three) tend to confirm this impression. Analysts have commented that such 
preference to overseas white and Western advisers or researchers over Africans is contrary to the 
spirit of Ubitntit detailed in section 4.3.2 (#10,1999). Vincent Williams, an official for the South 
African Migration Project (SAMP) argued that 'there is clearly t disconnectedness between South 
Africa and the rest of the continent. In many ways we are much more familiar with people coming 
from North America and from Europe and from the UK (#Williams, 2001). This is one reason why 
some interviewees regard the decision-making process dS largely excluding Africans whose 
nationality was not South African. 
A further concern surrounding detached observers role in the South African TDCA process 
relates to the exclusive nature of some conferences examining the EU-SA TDCA. Instead of 
encouraging debate amongst d broad range of stakeholders, interviewees claimed that they 
Lended to espouse narrow ideological positions. Two observers who attended the 1999 SAIIA 
conference noted this as an example. One, a leading politician, claimed that the debate was stifled 
(#57,1999); the other, from an NGO in Cape Town, argued that the conference: 
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becdnie a bdck-sldpping exercise - not looking at who would be adversvIN, 
affected; it's like free trade is a triumph for humanity and everyone should 
celebrate... At a supposedly academic conference there was no critique (#51, 
1999). 
It should Ix- noted that Mdnv of these. criticisms were only dpplied to detached obst, rvers, rdther 
than researchers connected with marginalised groups (such as civil society or the BLNS). However, 
insufficient information was obtained to ascertain completely the level Of participation accorded to 
different groups in this category. As the description of non-statal detached observers in the previous 
chapter concluded, the South African side of the TDCA policy formulation process did permit a degree 
of participation by very few, and select, detached observer groups (such as TIPS and DPRU). Aside 
from these close links, it appears as if Other researchers, particularly close to civil society, were more 
excluded from the process. Furthermorel some conferences organised by detached observers failed to 
address issues of those stakeholders outside of the tri-partite arena. 
5.4 The inclusiveness of business and industrial sectors 
II 
As d(x-umvntvd in Chapter Four (4.3.2), when indUStridl sectors lobbied the statdi dv6sion-making 
process, both hibour dnd business representdtives were usudlly included within the Sdrne tearn. This 
section though documents only the sectoral dnd business perceptions of the TDCA, whilst the 
following s"-tion (5.5) outlines specific labour reldtionships with the decision-ma king process. 
Cimpter Four d(, s(-riiv. d thdt business representatives, especially large conipdnies, hdd 
excellent access to the TDCA decision- nia king process. Responses from business and sectordl officials 
indicate that in general the l-)USiness comniunity was content with their access to the TDCA policy 
formulation pr(x-ess. An official from SACOB argued that government was 'very transparent... it' 
anybody [sdid]... they didn't know [about the agree-ment] ... we said that YOU were given the 
opportunity. It WdS there' (#21,1999). The sectors identified as having most access to the decision- 
making pr(x(, ss were agriculture, and contrary to findings from the literature review, the clothing, 
teXtileS and motor industries (#20,1999). An agricultural representative insisted that there was close 
cooperation between agriculture and government, noting 'I believe we [agriculture] were in a 
more informed position than the rest of the economy. We really collaborated ... very closely 
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with government' (#19,1999). An economic analyst argued that the strongest lobbyists were those 
with the most to lose (such as textiles, #5,1999). Officials close to the internal (South African) 
negotiations argued that these potential 'losers' employed a largely 'defensive' lobbying strategy in 
an attempt 'not to open up their markets' (#20,1999) (this applied to the textile, clothing and motor 
industries). A Department of Finance representative claimed that although these industries are not 
facing insurmountable tariff reductions, 'they are the most protected industries, certainly from a 
labour perspective. That's where the biggest noise is, and is always going to be' (#15,1999). 
Conversely, an 'offensive' strategy was adopted by those with most to gain (identified by a DTI 
representative as fruit and vegetables -Capespan made a strong representation (#20,1999)). 
However, other interviewees argued that business should have had more access to the statal 
structure. Although a senior source for the clothing sector gave the decision-making process his 
qualified support (there had been consultation), he stated that 'I certainly would have liked to be a 
hell of a lot closer to the negotiations table' (#29,1999). A senior businessperson from Johannesburg 
went further, noting: 
to a large extent I think that business was excluded in the NEDLAC process. 
Effectively the final agreement that emerged was something that, while we were 
involved in the process, we weren't properly involved in the process (#11,1999). 
Some business sources contrasted the South Africa TDCA policy formulation process with 
previous South African trade negotiations. A senior representative of the steel sector argued that in 
the 1994 WTO negotiations 'nobody knew what they were doing and we worked closely together... 
we didn't hide anything'. However, 'In the EU negotiations... a lot of things were done behind our 
backs' (#11,1999). This opinion supports the view that a number of 'closed' decisions were made. 
Interviewees close to the business world noted that the TDCA decision-making process 
highlighted a number of inherent problems with the internal structure of business/sectoral 
representation. These included tensions between businesses separated along black/white lines, ' the 
lack of dissemination of information relating to the agreement (from business representatives to 
2 That said, SACOB (representing mainly white businesses) and NAFCOC (for black empowerment) have 
formed a joint non-profit company intent on unifying the two organisations, in order to improve relations 
between the two sides (Wadula, 13 November 2000). 
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smaller businesses, particularly SMMEs), and the lack of comprehensive sectoral representation in 
the process. A senior NEDLAC official observed that business at NEDLAC was represented by 
'broad-based umbrella' organisations. Their policy was also broad-based, resulting in the following 
problem: 
you are sitting in a NEDLAC meeting and business has five people in it. One of them 
is Bess Robertson [representing SACOB], one is say Michael McDonald [representing 
steel]... right? So Don Botha used to work for the steel corporation, so guess what the 
protocol that business made? Steel. And the clothing and textiles person was here, so 
we had a protocol for that. We didn't have anybody here from the plastics industry, 
so we didn't have a plastics protocol (#22,1999). 
'Representation was an important thing' (#22,1999), therefore, and some sectors were excluded 
from being represented: 
The way in which business is organised was exposed ... Does Business South Africa 
really represent the interests of all business? And it's meant to be... but if the 
person they have sent to the meeting is from the steel industry, then that person 
will by and large represent the steel industry (#22,1999). 
The description of the access business had to the TDCA decision-making process in Chapter 
Four showed that business representatives, in theory, were included in the structure to a 
remarkable degree. However, the perceptions presented here suggest a more complex and varied 
picture. In practice, this section can conclude that senior business representatives had considerable 
access to the decision-making process, particularly if their sector was represented at NEDLAC. 
Sectors with most input tended to be those adopting a defensive (textiles, motors) or offensive 
(agriculture) stance. Those associated with agriculture (remembering that only three senior 
representatives were interviewed) felt that it had benefited most from access to the decision- 
making process. However, the question of whether all sections of the business community, 
particularly SMMEs, had an equal amount of access, or much influence in the final outcome, has to 
be raised. It is impossible to assess if business significantly influenced the final outcome of the 
TDCA. Interviewees have remarked on whether they felt included, oreven if they influenced the 
process, yet it is not possible to know what their exact impact was on the'making of the TDCA. 
Furthermore, it is likely that many businesses had little knowledge of the TDCA and had no 
motivation in participating in the negotiating process. 
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5.5 The inclusiveness of employee organisations 
The South African Idbour movement Was seen by Bdrchiesi (1999,21) as d 'source of stdbilisation in a 
context marked by macroeconomic free-market orthodoxy'. However it faced difficulties from 1994 
onwards which, interviewees argued, impeded its role in the TDCA decision-making process. First, 
there was an exodus of leadership into the government. This resulted in less experienced officials 
participating in the TDCA policy formulation process. Second, few lal-K)ur representatives were 
familiar with trade issues, therefore only a handful became involved in the process. Moreover, ldbour 
did not represent agricultural sectors until the later stages of the agreement. Even then it is unclear 
from the interviews whether the main union responsible (the Food and Allied Workers Union - FAWU) 
covered (or had the capacity to represent) every agricultural sector. Furthermore, labour 
representatives complained of a lack of resources available to enable them to assess the agreement. 
Third, analysis have observed that gaps are emerging between the union leaderships and their 
members. This is a situation that is said to have been exacerbated by increasing international 
competition - as deemed necessary by neo-classical economic theory. Indeed, 'the challenge that faces 
union leadership is to maintain the support of rank and file members while working with management 
to COMPCt(' at d 11,10bdi leveT (Louw, 29 January 2001). 
As a result of these factors, few interviewees felt that labour were as fully incorporated into the 
EU-SA TDCA process as business Was, or as much as labour had been included in the 1994 WTO talks. 
This view was outlined by a senior Idbour negotiator: 
Labour has been involved in the formulation of South African trade policy in the past. 
I think the real, big and key intervention that was made by labour ... led to the signing 
of the Marrakesh agreement. So Idbour was involved in that, and ironically Alec 
Erwin was one of Idbour's representatives in that. So there is a kind of involvement. I 
was not involved in that process, but what I... have gathered is that the extent and the 
amount of documentation that was made available to the SA negotiators... was far 
superior hi respect to what we were given with the EU [agreement] (#47,1999). 
This negotiator cited d number Of Occasions when he was denied reports relating to the agreement 
which others had access to; 'I know for d fact that the IDC had [reports]. I asked for this and I was 
told no you can't have it! ' (#47,1999). When information was supplied, it was done so at the last 
minute 'when it is impossible to get proper and rational discussion' (#47,1999). In general, 'The 
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issue is that government has got significant resources... but I was very unhappy with the provision 
of information' (#47,1999). He felt that one possible reason for lack of government co-operation was 
that the 'Government was scared that we were going to come and have a clearly ultra-protectionist 
line... and clearly any information in our hands would actually help' (#47,1999). Other members of 
the labour movement echoed this criticism of the statal process. COSATU for instance, in its 
submission to parliament on its observation of the TDCA negotiating process, argued that: 
These processes were inadequate for COSATU to input substantively and 
continuously into the negotiations process. At many stages insufficient information 
was available. An additional source of frustration to labour was that at some points 
during the negotiation government engaged in bilateral sectoral meetings with 
employers but did not extend this arrangement to include labour (COSATU, 1999). 
Furthermore, an interviewee argued that government did not heed opposition from labour 
and business about changes on tariff lines (notably metals) (#52,1999). When asked why their 
requests were being ignored, they were told it was because the Minister had said so (that decision 
therefore was a closed one). The same source noted that government decisions were frequently not 
based on the tri-partite NEDLAC process. As far as the final mandate was concerned, this 
representative noted that the final agreement was dissimilar to the labour (and business) proposal 
drafted in 1997. He argued that the only protocol South Africa ended up with was on hemp in 
textiles and clothing, but that was not requested by labour negotiators. All concessions made on 
clothing and textiles products were done so by the DTI (#52,1999). 
However this statement is not supported from the summary of the TDCA, and its protocols, in 
Chapter Two (2.2), as wine and fishing, along with protocols on trade liberalisation are 
documented. Indeed, another senior labour representative present at the TESELICO negotiations, 
who asserted that the final agreement was fairly close to this tariff proposal, contested this view. 
Those countering the alleged lack of inclusion refer to an offer by the South African government 
(after two years of lobbying by the social partners) for both labour and business to join government 
in the negotiating team in face-to-face talks with the EU. However, Ebrahim Patel (General 
Secretary of SACTWU) rejected this for reasons unknown, despite other labour officials clamouring 
to be included (#52,1999). 
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The articulation of these perceptions point to a picture of the labour leadership being 
represented in many organs of the statal process, but they were poorly supported in terms of 
resources and were excluded from making any substantial influence on policy formulation. 
Indeed, one labour negotiator remarked, 'My understanding is that in the end we made very little 
impact' (#47,1999). 
5.6 Civil society and inclusivity 
1--- -771 
When looking at criticisms of neo-classical economic development perspectives in Chapter Two 
(2.3.3), one debate suggested that those most likely to be peripherahsed or excluded by such 
policies were women and migrants, as well as South African industrial sectors. Section 2.5.2 of the 
same chapter suggested that the South African decision-making process may well be inclusive, 
but warned of the detrimental impact of neo-bberalism, particularly on NGOs representing civil 
society. In Chapter Four, although civil society in general were portrayed as being on the 
periphery of the South African TDCA decision-making structure, community representatives 
were given the opportunity in theory to discuss the TDCA. Indeed, Alec Erwin gave presentations 
on the EU-SA TDCA to the Executive Council of NEDLAC. Furthermore, an open debate on the 
EU-SA TDCA was orgdnised by the South African parliament. Although most decision-makers 
interviewed did not identify civil society, let along women and mi gants groups, as being 
included or excluded from the decision-making structure (individual industrial sectors and trade 
products were more frequently selected as being marginahsed), those that did voice their 
perceptions can be divided into one of two groups. 
In the first were those that tended to agree with COSATU's observation, given during their 
submission to the open parliamentary debate prior to ratification of the TDCA. They stated that 
the 'fact that so few stakeholders are making submissions today, despite the huge effects the 
Agreement will have, is an indication of the disempowerment of broader society in this process' 
(COSATU, 1999,7). Women were seen as especially excluded (COSATU, 1999,13). According to a 
leading representative for civil society, at NEDLAC there were few reafistic opportunities to 
discuss the concerns held by stakeholders (#45,1999). Indeed, as described in 4.3.2, there are five 
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groups that represent South African civil society at NEDLAC - the South African National Civics 
Organisation (SANCO), which represented aspects of civil society, women, rural, the disabled, and 
youth. This grouping therefore excludes sections of South African society - particularly the 
unemployed, consumer groups, or migrants. Furthermore, the TDCA was only extensively 
discussed in NEDLAC's Trade and Industry chamber, where civil society is not included. The only 
chamber within NEDLAC that permits civil society inclusion is the Development chamber - and 
even though the agreement clearly has developmental aspects, it was not discussed in that 
chamber. An official representative for civil society, talking specifically about the EU-SA TDCA, 
argued that the perception was that South Africa has an advanced, transparent and inclusive tri- 
partite decision-making process, which requires little input for South African communities. 
However: 
in terms of this EU trade thing... people think in their minds that it's only the tri- 
partite group that needs to be there, but what they forget is that the end user... at 
the end of the day comes from civil society... it is us (#45,1999). 
This representative added that: 
government [were] elected [by] the people, but there are certain major issues 
where we must get the views of the people so, ... if we say tomorrow we do not 
want this thing, what are [government] going to do? [They] cannot do anything! 
We may have said it but unfortunately we... lack information about this EU trade 
(#45,1999). 
Those interviewees in the second group argued that civil society was not detrimentally barred 
from participating. Some either believed that all aspects of southern African society were included 
(#ý20, #42,1999) or that the inclusion of civil society was not feasible (#16, #22,1999) and should be 
limited to tri-partite actors. Firstly, some officials from the DTI noted that any individual who 
wanted to 'have their say' could do by contacting the BTT (#20,1999). This, they argued, meant that 
the process was open to input from all sections of civil society. This is obviously a very broad 
definition of what access means, and one that many within civil society may have trouble agreeing 
with, for the reasons implied above. Secondly, the dominant message from those directly involved 
in the negotiation process was that many community organisations; are either too weak and/or 
disorganised to participate in the talks (such as #11,1999). An official from NEDLAC, who 
observed the representation of community within the Development Chamber, argued that there 
were vast problems with obtaining a mandate from such disparate, heterogeneous groups (#22, 
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1999). He noted that whilst there is a claim for more inclusion (particularly for those groups 
excluded from the development chamber - such as the unemployed or consumer groups): 
... we've had a fair amount of problems with that constituency. They are represented by women, by youth, you know, and, in the current period in South Africa, a lot of 
those mass based organisations have been experiencing problems. They are certainly 
not as effective as they have been in the previous period. Most of the attention in 
South Africa focuses on delivery by the government, whereas in the previous period 
it was resistance politics played out by coloured non-governmental community type 
groups. So, when one looks, and why the community has not participated in this, part 
of it has to do with the problems they were experiencing as a constituency in 
organising themselves, and this was just an additional thing that they didn't have... 
sufficient experience and capacity to deal with (#22,1999). 
In addition, Horaan Bhorat, director of DPRU, noted that official CBOs are generally 'under- 
resourced, poorly staffed - they are small, they are desperate, and you can see it in NEDLAC. And 
if you go into it even more deep, at say under the macro NEDLAC level, at a sectoral level, it is 
even worse' (#Bhorat, 2001). Furthermore, the NEDLAC official commented that civil society had 
more pressing developmental needs - such as attaining health care, education, welfare, running 
water, and electricity. Therefore the relevancy of this agreement to civil society was somewhat lost 
when compared to the struggle for these basic amenities (#22,1999). 
To conclude, many decision-makers interviewed failed to identify civil society as being 
detrimentally excluded from the TDCA decision-making structure. No group (women, migrants) 
were specifically highlighted, and therefore the analysis has concentrated upon civil society in 
general. It is indicative of the interviewees' position within the decision-making process that they 
focused their responses mostly on industrial sectors rather than civil society groups. This should 
not be surprising considering that the free trade aspect of agreement concentrated mainly upon 
such sectors and individual products. However, those who did express an opinion on the inclusion 
or otherwise of civil society in the TDCA policy formulation process were grouped in one of two 
categories. This reflects the rather polarised understanding of the general South African decision- 
making process outlined in Chapter Two (2.5.2). 
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5.7 External actors and inclusivity 
The description of the external environment in Chapter Four (4.3.4) has already documented the 
extent to which external actors, such as IFIs and the EU, purportedly free from the pressures of 
having to include stakeholders, have influenced the South African side of the TDCA decision- 
making structure. The perceptions of interviewees; on the impact of external actors are quoted 
throughout this thesis (particularly in Chapters Seven and Eight). In particular, the 'closed' and 
exclusive nature of the EU has attracted much criticism. An international lawyer who specialises 
in global trade, argues that the EU 'rigged' the TDCA decision-making process 'so that it (-, in 
regularly apply leverage to win fresh concessions from Pretoria' (Fraser, 21 June 2W1). 
Furthermore, some commentators argued that the inclusion of the 'carrot of development' in the 
TDCA was d ploy that could be 'used to secure a more advantageous trade agreement for the EU' 
(Business Day (anon. ), 7 March 2MI). President Thabo Mbeki also lambasted the EU, saying that 
the 'nice words' expressed in promising a beneficial deal for South Africa were 'laid to waste' by 
the detrimental influence the EU exerted over the negotiations (Xako, 12 February 2MI). 
Furthermore, some analysts and inLerviewees throughout the southern African region 
claimed that southern African states and stakeholders were excluded. Indeed, the BLNS, as noted 
in section 4.3.2, were not allowed to participate directly in the TDCA negotiations process. One 
group of interviewees (who tended to be from either Botswana, Lesotho, Namibid or Swaziland) 
agreed that this meant that the BLNS were effectively excluded from the process (#54; #38; #36, 
1999). Many of those questioned in Botswana felt that South Africa should have included BLNS to 
a far greater extent than they did in the talks, particularly as South Africa in some ways used the 
BLNS to obtain more concessions from the EU for themselves (as alleged in Chapter Four, 4.3.4). 
The feeling that BLNS should have been included in the talks was epitomised in two interviews. 
The first was with an official from the Botswanan Commerce Ministry, who commented that: 
The initial position of the BLNS was they wanted to get involved in the 
negotiations- and South Africa also wanted them to get involved. It was the EU 
that did not agree... The EU were saying, look, you are already members of the 
Lom6 convention. We did want to get involved -I do not understand how we 
could benefit from not participating. We should have been involved (#38,1999). 
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The second was with a senior Botswanan trade unionist: 
there was not much consultation between the South African government and other 
member states of SACU. That's why some states were worried about the impact. 
South Africa is gaining from Botswana - we put a lot of money in South Africa. So 
when they do trade deals with other regions, they should consult with the BLNS 
(#33,1999). 
The feeling of resentment at being excluded was embodied by an academic who closely 
observed the negotiations. He noted: 
what came out of that [the agreement], in my assessment was that the South 
Africans were strategically using the BLNS to put even more pressure to extract as 
many concessions as possible from the EU. But as to whether they did deliver for 
the BLNS countries -I doubt it very much .. South Africa acted as big brother... 
they were very arrogant (#37,1999). 
Furthermore, a senior researcher from Namibia, argued that: 
South Africa has always taken unilateral decisions and it has really not come to 
that time that they have to do things differently. It [SACU] still is a South African 
administered unilateral decision-making arrangement. SACU normally receives... 
what South Africa has decided, not what its about to decide (#54,1999). 
He added, in relation to the EU-SA TDCA: 
South Africa sort of started to negotiate with the EU without informing its 
partners... That is a debatable issue, even between the BLNS and South Africa 
people are debating that South Africa has not really told them, accept what has 
happened... but there has not really been a serious attempt [to] involve the BLNS 
in the negotiations (#54,1999). 
Other forms of exclusion were recorded within the BINS, as business and labour 
representatives claimed they were not informed of the details or the proposed impact of the 
agreement. For example, many business representatives in Botswana criticised the Bots wanan 
government for its lack of communication in relation to the potential impact of the deal and not 
even asking for feedback from business and labour. One business representative noted that we 
'have not met much on this. Last month ffuly 1999] we had a meeting in Gaborone for SACU 
members. That is where we got the information. Before that we knew very little' (#36,1999). 
Indeed, one interviewee with extensive knowledge of the Botswanan political system opined that 
the government 'had very successfully dialogued, and responded to big business, but medium and 
small scale business ... thought they were 
being neglected and let down' (#35,1999). He concluded 
that he felt that the Botswanan public knew little of the agreement, whilst also noting that there was 
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poor communication between government departments, so senior officials in one department 
would not know the official Botswanan position in relation to the EU-SA TDCA; 'Part of the 
problem here is that ... the process tends to get concentrated in few, few hands... ' (#35,1999). 
However, a second group of interviewees (mainly those close to the South African 
govenu-nent) claimed that the BLNS were effectively included because the South African 
negotiators safeguarded their interests, and that both South Africa and the EU regularly consulted 
them throughout the entire process (#43; #50; #41,1999). A senior source at the DFA asserted that: 
... one of the first things I said to the EU negotiators was, as a member of the team, 
we cannot go into this alone. We have to either get the EU to accept SACU as co- 
negotiators, to have a SACU-EU agreement, region-to-region, or we will have to 
talk to the SACU countries and get their permission to actually waive article 19 
[the 1969 SACU treaty] for the time being... and let us negotiate an agreement on 
their behalf too, because it is going to influence them, and then obtain their views, 
and sanction going ahead with it... 
[However] the EU flatly refused. They said it would create a tremendous dilemma, 
they are all Lom6 members. The closest that we got to a solution in that regard was 
to invite, during one round of negotiations... their [BLNS] ambassadors as 
observers. So we invited them, and it happened for one round... for the rest we 
had to brief them and there were double briefings, which also led to [a] certain 
tension... The BLNS actually responded positively. Again, you do respond 
positively to somebody who pays your bread and butter. Unfortunately... I'm not 
sure whether it came from the heart, whether it was motivated by practical 
considerations (#43,1999). 
An MP close to the negotiations commented that BLNS interests were protected because 'they 
had an opportunity to... put sectors and industries that were of concern to them' (#57,1999). 
Moreover, the South African negotiators 'tried to anticipate the impact [on the BLNS] and make 
their own assessments' (#57,1999). This perception was confirmed by an economic adviser to the 
Swazi government, who noted that the BLNS were not excluded and even received some 
information before the EU did (#50,1999). 
Of the two perspectives, the first is supported by less evidence, as those interviewees arguing 
that the BLNS were marginalised tended to be on the periphery of the negotiating process and 
therefore had little knowledge of the policy formulation structure. The second set of perspectives 
were espoused by interviewees with much closer access to the TDCA decision-making structure. 
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However, a third perspective was provided by very senior source in Botswana's Foreign Ministry 
who noted that Botswana did not even want to participate because: 
in the negotiations, whatever the EU and South Atrica agreed on, if you are part of 
that, those things are going to bind you. Whereas, if you were outside, you could 
always say to the EU, by the way, we have this agreement... (#31,1999). 
A close observer of these negotiations agreed with this opinion, noting: 
I think the truth may lie somewhere closer to those who say that they were asked 
to come on board and they were reluctant. I tend to agree with those who [say] 
that you have been a bit lax here in Botswana, partly because some of our people 
think we are rich because... there is so much money stashed away in foreigii 
reserve [and] partly because the officials are over-extended... -just a narrow circle 
of people who are dealing with these issues (#37,1999). 
This section builds on an overview of this environment in Chapter Four (4.3.4), and on the 
influence that external actors - the BLNS - had on the TDCA. There appears to be a paradox, in that 
there is little doubt that the external environment exerts considerable influence over the South 
African TDCA decision-making structure, and yet external actors - the BLNS - may well have been 
excluded from South Africa's policy formulation process, even though the TDCA will automatically 
affect the whole of SACU. 
5.8 Conclusion 
The description of the structure supporting the South African TDCA decision-making system in 
Chapter Four suggested that the process was, in theory, remarkably inclusive. However this 
chapter has examined the perceptions of those interviewed and shows that in practice the degree of 
ýnclusion in the decision-making process is more subtle and complicated than that presented in the 
previous chapter. 
The first key issue that has emerged here is that although the structure is still inclusive, access 
to it varied depending on which actor category was considered. For example, senior business 
representatives, particularly in the agricultural or textile and motors industries, or certain tabour 
representatives, had more resources and more chance to participate than SMMEs or a member of a 
traditionally marginalised corrimunity. Indeed, agriculture, motors and textile representatives were 
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all perceived as being influential during the process. This finding therefore supports the conclusion 
made in Chapter Four where these industries were identified as having been included, in theory, in 
the South African TDCA decision-making structure. Furthermore, access differed within categories. 
For example, within industrial sectors participation varied considerably. The case studies in 
Chapters Seven and Eight gauge further this finding. A related conclusion is that, when 
interviewees had been asked who they perceived to have been included and excluded, the majority 
identified industries rather than sections of South Africa's civil society, such as women and 
n-dgrants. 
Second, many of the decisions made in the South African TDCA policy formulation process 
were 'closed', as in the manner described in the literature review (2.5.1) meaning that certain 
decisions taken throughout the policy formulation stages were limited to senior decision-makers. 
With the TDCA including innumerable 'closed' decisions, the chances of gauging accurately the 
influence of the majority of actors listed here is made more difficult. One of the possible reasons 
why access was limited was because 'decision-makers' felt that equal and optimal participation for 
all could well have resulted in the South African TDCA policy formulation process being hindered 
by inertia. As discussed in Chapter Two 'full' participation is viewed by some analysts as not being 
feasible. One interviewee noted that when a diverse cross-section of civil society have become 
involved in the decision-making process in South Africa the result has been 'chaotic' (#11,1999). 
Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Four (4.3.2), the TDCA negotiations were different from 'normal' 
negotiations on South African economic and labour issues. It has been argued that a degree of 
secrecy was necessary in order to withhold from the EU South Africa's negotiating stance as it 
would have denied the South African negotiators any 'flexibility' in negotiations with their EU 
counterparts (#22,1999). 
That a different picture has been portrayed is not surprising. The number of interviewees who 
could provide information describing the decision-making process was restricted in Chapter Four 
to those closest to the decision-making process, as they alone had a close and intimate knowledge 
of it. However many more interviewees representing a broader spectrum were able to comment on 
their perceptions of the inclusiveness of the TDCA policy formulation structure. That some of those 
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interviewed argued that the South African TDCA policy formulation process was exclusive could 
be due to their high expectations of access to decision-making in the post-apartheid era. 
This chapter also adds to the evaluation initiated in Chapter Four on the tensions that exist 
between and within components and actors who comprised the South African TDCA decision- 
making structure. Examples have been provided here that illustrate the tensions that existed within 
government departments as well as in business and trade unions. This finding highlights both the 
benefits and limitations of the model introduced in Chapter Four. It has provided a foundation to 
enable the evaluation of the TDCA process and explore the interaction and tensions between 
components and actors. However, the model promotes a tendency for actors to be categorised as if 
they were homogenous. The interview perceptions shown here though, noting the tensions within 
categories, have suggested that actors and components display a high level of heterogeneity. 
The following chapter will identify, from interview responses, who is likely to benefit from the 
agreement. Thus the analysis seeks to explore the relationship between access to policy formulation 
and the perceived impact of the agreement. Furthermore the chapter also selects two case studies 
for an in-depth micro-scale study of the issues raised, to now, and cast more light on aspects of the 
TDCA that have been difficult to grasp at a macro-level, such as assessing the influence of various 
components and actors, notably in the external environment. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Literature reviewed in Chapter Two suggested a polarised debate exists, where either 'losers' or 
'winners' result from the implementation of trade and economic development agreements based 
on neo-classical economic thinking. Furthermore, those defined traditionally as 'losers' were 
shown to be marginalised or excluded from the decision-makiiig process that surround sucil 
agreements. However, the description of the South African TDCA clecision-making process in 
Chapter Four suggested that the policy formulation structure was remarkably inclusive. The 
analysis of this in Chapter Five presented a more complex picture where generallv many had tile 
chance to be included, yet many obstacles hindered realistic chances of stakeholder to participate. 
This chapter challenges the clear-cut, polarised picture of there being 'winners' and 'losers' as a 
result of the TDCA, as what materialises from interviewee perceptions concerning the potential 
economic impact of the TDCA is a picture as complex as that portrayed on the degree of 
inclusiveness in Chapter Five. 
The chapter is divided into five parts. The first two (6.2 and 6.3) document broad concerns and 
benefits; the second two (6.4 and 6.5) examine specific stakeholder groups or industrial sectors that 
have been identified as potential 'winners' and 'losers'; the fifth (6.6) considers the impact of the 
TDCA on southern Africa (the BLNS, SADC, or other ACP members within Lom6). The final 
section (6.7) summarises this analysis and indicates why the wine and textile sectors were chosen 
as case studies to provide a deeper understanding of the dimensions of the TDCA under 
examination. To assist this analysis, table 6.1 below has been devised from the interviewee 
responses, indicating the areas that are likely to benefit or lose out from the agreement. The table 
has been divided into three categories that reflect the disparate groups selected; general comments, 
specific identification; and the impact of the TDCA on southern Africa. Table 6.1 is useful for 
summarising this interview 'data' but omits other information. It reduces interviewee responses to 
a number, thus obscuring both the interviewee's relationships to the TDCA, and properly defining 
the context in which a 'category' was selected. For example, a claim that the textile industry in 
Botswana is likely to be adversely affected by the agreement is counted in the table as being 
detrimental to textiles and the BLNS. 
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Name of category Identified as: Perceived as benefiting Perceived as not 
from the TDCA: benefiting from the 
TDCA: 
GENERAL - Criticism of EU - denied full access to Lomd 8 
Concern over Dispute resolution mechanism 3 
Lack of governmental industrial policy 13 
Burden on capacity and infrastructure of 
businesses 
Global recognition/integration globally/platform 10 
for stability 
Experience in negotiations 4 
Total 15 15 
SPECIFIC: 
Agriculture -General 10 4 
General (concern over the CAP) 6 
Wine 7 1 
Wine - concern over Port & Sherry 2 
Seasonal agricultural products I 
Livestock (Dairy, Pigs) 1 
Fruit 4 
Fruit - Canned Peaches 1 
Proteas I 
Cut Flowers 2 
Cut flowers - tulips I 
Vegetables I 
Vegetables - Asparagus I 
Fruitjuices 1 
Cheese I 
Tobacco 1 
Total 30 16 
Fisheries I 
Industry -General 2 2 
General - disinvestment and deindustrialisation 3 
Textiles 14 
Clothing 1 7 
Motors 9 
Shoe I 
Electronics I 
Total 3 37 
Society -Small businesses/farmers 3 4 
Big business 1 
Skilled workers 1 
Unskilled workers 3 
Unemployed/prospect of unemployment 10 
Inclusion of social clause 1 
Consumers I 
Investors 4 
Public - reduction in taxation 1 
Civil society 2 
Women 2 
Migrants (including comments on xenophobia in 10 
South Africa) 
Total 12 31 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 
BLNS (due to revenue loss/ threat of competition) 10 
SADC 4 
Lorn4 8 
No opinion given/ or asked for/ non-committal 78 
Table 6.1: Identification of categories (sectors, communitiest and neighbouring regions) 
perceived to be affected by the TDCA 
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6.2 General 'Losers' 
Criticisms of trade developmental policies that are based on neo-classical economic thinking were 
documented in Chapter Two (2.3.3 and 2.4). Within South Africa similar concerns have surrounded 
the government's acceptance of a mainly neo-liberal economic and developmental framework, 
which has been enshrined in GEAR (see Chapter Four, 4.3.1). Taken together, these concerns have 
indicated that the TDCA and trade liberalisation might exacerbate unemployment and poverty, 
whilst also hinder economic restructuring. As a result, those most likely to 'lose' Would be tile 
unskilled workforce and women (Jansen, April 2000). 
Some interviewees agreed with these broad findings from the literature. Two South African 
academics commented that the SEFTA (trade liberalisation) element of the TDCA would initially 
intensify levels of inequality (#4; #5,1999). One stated that his general concern was about 
liberalisation and the pace that it is going: 
You are taking an ideological position of accelerated trade liberalisation and in the 
meantime the economy has more than 30%, unemployed... what do you have [as 
a] guarantee, beside textbook economics? That it is going to do the job? Because 
some old theory said, liberalise and everybody will benefit? Do you realise how 
many books have been written criticising that framework? Even the mainstream 
has abandoned that approach! (#5,1999). 
He also noted, along with an official from the Department of Finance that unemployment would 
most likely be created in such labour-intensive industrial sectors as shoes, textiles or motors (#5; 
#43,1999). This view was supported by an NGO representative who affirmed that 'clearly free 
trade policies have an impact on lobs and certain industries' (#51,1999). 
Table 6.1 shows that eight interviewees criticised the choice of the EU as a trading partner. An 
academic opposed the TDCA because it was 'not cognisant of the challenges facing the South 
African economy and government' (#5,1999). Of these eight, some argued that industrial sectors 
will not be able to compete effectively because of non-tariff barriers to trade (#11,1999) and doubt 
the potential effectiveness of the dispute resolution/ safeguard mechanism that was included in the 
agreement to protect areas of the economy under threat from such barriers (#47,1999). 
Interviewees also argued that the TDCA could also be detrimental because of customs control 
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inefficiency. A leading trade unionist declared that customs officials had little training, poor pay, 
and only previously checked three per cent of imported goods (452,1999). 
These concerns were compounded by the lack of a clear government industrial policy. Some 
viewed this as a hindrance in selecting sectors that could benefit from the TDCA. One economist 
links the lack of policy with trade liberalisation: 
I do not believe that accelerated tariff liberalisation is a good thing, especially 
when you do not even have a industrial policy... it's not there! Not only me - 
every one is saying. We are starting to have trade policy of tariff liberalisation 
before we are having an industry policy, and I think that it [should be] the other 
way round. You got to know where you want your industries to be ... what 
industries you want to be strategic whatever and you use your trade policies to 
achieve them (#5,1999). 
Similar criticisms were expressed in two interviews. A senior official at NEDLAC opined that this 
was a 'shortcoming with the [negotiation] process', and believed that there should have been more 
sector-based thinking (#22,1999). A leading negotiator for labour lamented not identifying sectors, 
particularly infant industries that require protection until strong enough to compete with EU firms 
(#52,1999). 
The inaccuracy of impact studies that have considered the potential affects of the TDCA has 
also been viewed as compounding the criticisms voiced by interviewees. One argues that impact 
studies failed to take into account the impact of neo-liberalism on employment prospects and civil 
society (#5,1999). From the literature, Adelzadeh noted: 
Underlying the results presented in GEAR is a modelling exercise which is 
fundamentally problematic because the Reserve Bank model that was used has 
never been made public and thus has never been the subject of independent and 
rigorous debate by professional economists. Moreover, according to GEAR the 
model cannot provide information on the income distribution effects of policies..., 
(Adelzadeh, 1996). 
An academic analyst supports this view, noting that impact studies 'are tricky because they are not 
very good at showing welfare. They can show a bit of welfare impacts... and this is what the 
modellers themselves admit to' (#6,1999). 
From both the interview responses and the literature, a number of broad concerns were 
outlined relating to the tariff liberalisation aspects of the TDCA. It has been suggested that the 
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likely 'losers' from these concerns will be the workforce, through job losses, especially in labour- 
related industries (such as textiles) and part-time women workers. It should be noted that those 
interviewees who tended to express these general concerns main1v emanated from academia. 
However, as table 6.1 demonstrates, other interviewees also identified that general benefits will 
accrue from the TDCA. These are discussed in the following section. 
6.3 General Benefits 
For all the criticisms expressed above, much of the literature in South Africa (primarily the 
financial press) and many of those interviewed (especially business and government 
representatives) argued that the agreement would be broadly beneficial for South Africa. In tile 
South African financial press for example, immediately following the signing of the main 
agreement, The Citizc)i heralded the TDCA as a trade deal that will 'significantly boost Foreigii 
Direct Investment in South Africa' (The Citizen (anon. ), 20 October 1999). Furthermore, Cap(, 
Business Ne7vs argued that: 
... this agreement we probably got the 
best deal possibly at this time... In many 
ways, the SA/EU agreement was good practice for the more formidable challenge 
of the WTO negotiations which are expected to carry on for the next three years... 
For now, the SA/EU trade agreement forms the basis of a reasonable and reliable 
structure for doing business with Europe (Cape Business News (anon. ) November 
1999). 
Furthermore, Busitiess Day, reflecting 18 months after the TDCA was implemented, observed that 
iii the year following the operation of the agreement South African exports to the EU increased by 
35'Y,,. ' This compared with a 20% increase in the preceding year (Wadula, 11 June 2001). This 
increase may also have been caused by other, non-TDCA inspired, factors, such as the weakening 
Rand, which makes South African goods more competitive in the international market. 
Governn-tent officials have argued that the TDCA will generally benefit the South African 
economy. Alec Erwin for instance asserted that the agreement makes 'unique inroads' into the EU's 
agricultural market (Erwin, 2000, vii). Rob Davies MP, argues that the TDCA will also provide 
opportunities for manufacturing industries (Davies, 2000,10). 
EU exports to South Africa rose by 20%. 
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Many interviewees who thought that the agreement would be beneficial reflected these 
comments from government or the media. Business representatives suggested that the TDCA will 
generate a climate of policy credibility and therefore improve the potential for an increase in 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (#11; #23,1999). Indeed, as table 6.1 illustrates, ten interviewees 
stressed that the major benefits are symbolic; the TDCA will bring South Africa more prominently 
into the global market. A senior EU official affirmed that the TDCA would create opportunities, 
especially for business, which will broadly 'develop' the South African economy: 
The general belief is that FTA will help SA integrate into world markets, into the 
global world economy. [It] will force South African producers to become 
internationally competitive to survive and by so doing will provide a platform for 
more solid, sustainable economic growth and development over the long term 
(British government official, #14,1999). 
Furthermore, interviewees, mainly from the business community tended to challenge the view 
expressed above (6.2) that trade liberalisation exacerbates unemployment. A leading business 
representative claimed that many job losses had been in gold mining, an industry that has nothing 
to do with tariff reductions (#23,1999). An economist commented that unemployment in South 
Africa tended to occur because of protective, inward-looking economic policies, rather than tariff 
liberalisation (#3,1999). Indeed, Horaan Bhorat, director of the DPRU, argued that from his 
statistical calculations, trade liberalisation will result in job creation in South Africa (#Bhorat, 2001). 
It was not only the financial press or government and business representatives who had praise 
for the agreement. Labour representatives for example heralded the inclusion of the social clause, 
noting it was the first of its kind in these types of agreements (#47,1999). 
To summarise this section on the broader identification of likely 'winners' and 'losers' of the 
TDCA, those interviewees critical of the TDCA tended to be on the periphery of the decision- 
making process (for example academics, NGO representatives). They expressed concern that 
particularly the SEFTA aspect of the TDCA would be to the general detriment of the South African 
economy. Interviewees closer to the government (as well as the financial press) tended to disagree 
with such identifications, and noted that the deal will provide stability, thus improving the 
economic climate in which South African industrial sectors participate. The following section 
discusses which specific categories interviewees predicted will win or lose from the TDCA. 
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Section 6.2 above detailed broad concerns relating to the potential impact of the TDCA. Tile 
literature and interviewees also highlighted certain aspects of society, or industrial sectors who 
might be detrimentally affected by the implementation of the agreement. Therefore this section is 
divided into two. The first part considers industries and businesses, whilst the second documents 
the potential impact on South African society. 
I Industrial sectors in the South African econorny 
Table 6.1, identified the following industrial sectors as being likely 'losers': 
" Textile 
" Clothing 
" Motors 
" Shoe 
" Flectronics 
" Agriculture 
Of these, table 6.1 illustrates that agriculture (selected with 16 references), textiles (14 references) 
and motors (selected with 9) would be the economic sectors most likely to be detrimentally effected 
by the economic impact of the TDCA. 
Although Alec Erwin identified that agriculture could make inroads into the European 
market, some interviewees have argued that the TDCA has not increased the limited access for 
agricultural products entering the EU market. The failure of the agreement to tackle South African 
agriculturists' concern over EU subsidies (the Common Agricultural Policy was viewed as giving 
EU agricultural firms an unfair advantage, particularly in canned peaches) has exacerbated such 
limited access. Interviewees were also critical over the EU's insistence that the South African wine 
industry change the names of its port, sherry, ouzo and grappa products (#43,1999). Such concerns 
have been supported by a few articles in South Africa's financial press. For example, Busbicss Day 
suggested that the 'balance of the agricultural dispositions of the agreement does reveal, to some 
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bernusement, that SA made more concessions in the agricultural sector to the EU', despite 
impressions given by the South African and EU negotiators that the TDCA would open up the EU 
agricultural market (Fraser, 21 June 2001). 
In connection to the two major industrial sectors identified (textiles and motors) an official 
from the Department of Finance commented that both motors and textiles were equally likely to 
lose out from the TDCA (#15,1999). Indeed, a business representative claimed that during 
negotiations the DTI convinced the motor industry that it could not protect all its jobs in the wake 
of trade liberalisation (#21,1999). Furthermore, an official from the BTT was disappointed with the 
agreement for textiles (and clothing), remarking that 'we are giving away more than we are 
getting' (#20,1999). This identification of textiles and motors as a likely 'losing' sector, contrasts 
somewhat with a finding that emerged from Chapter Five (5.4), that motors and textiles did have 
good access to the TDCA process (although their issues might have been sidelined) and were 
regarded as highly effective lobbyists. This would seem to suggest that despite access to the South 
African structures supporting the TDCA decision-making process, the 'defensive' lobbying 
strategy employed by these sectors failed to translate into what interviewees perceived to have 
been a beneficial agreement. 
Small businesses and previously disadvantages (i. e. black) farmers - in all sections of the 
South African economy - were also identified as potential 'losers'. A prominent South African 
politician argued that the agreement entailed an increase in documentation and change in practice 
which small businesses had a lack of capacity and experience to deal with (#57,1999). A senior 
economist also stated that the 'lack of specificity and certainty [surrounding the agreement] will 
not do any good for small businesses' (#10,1999). A Ntsika report (2000,3) suggests that the TDCA 
poses a threat to Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) because they will be opened up 
to extremely competitive EU practices. 
Small-scale farmers have specifically been identified as losers. A director at the DTI argued 
that if any group might be disadvantaged from the agreement it would be black farmers (Cook, 13 
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September 2000). An academic who has analysed the farming situation in South Africa contended 
that: 
... small farmers are not going to be part of this agro-export drive. If the EU [agreement] means that we are going to get better access to European markets, the 
beneficiaries [will be] big agribusiness... [For] small scale, black farmers, it is going 
to be very hard, but that should not be surprising, because they are not part of it in 
Chile, they are not part of it in Mexico, and other agro-exporting countries. By de- 
regulating agriculture, you really stuff small-scale farmers. Whether it leads to a 
big increase in people employed on farms, ... in proper jobs, is, I think, a little bit in doubt. Whether it leads to massive numbers of small farmers as part of this 
export-drive is, I think, very much in doubt (#6,1999). 
The situation of small farmers was compounded when an agricultural negotiator claimed that they 
(black farmers) contributed so little to the economy that they are of little relevance to the trade deal 
(#58,1999). 
II Society 
An analysis of table 6.1 illustrates that decision-makers tended to identify industrial sectors of the 
South African economy as winners or losers more often than sections of South African civil society. 
That said, previously disadvantaged 'black farmers' have been identified above as a 'losing' 
community. Some interviewees, mainly on the periphery of the decision-making process, did 
however identify sections of society as being adversely affected by the TDCA (as well as by trade 
liberalisation in general). For example, a senior representative of SANCO argued that the 
agreement would be to the detriment of civil society - especially the unemployed, unskilled and 
part-time (women) workers (#45,1999). 
Women, although selected in the literature (2.4) as being excluded by such neo-liberal trade 
policies as the TDCA were only identified in two interviews as likely 'losers' (#51, #56,1999). The 
exclusion of migrants was more extensively detailed during interviews. A Cape Town NGO 
researcher was critical of the 1999 'Buy South African' campaigný for its anti-migrant rhetoric: 
I think that that [the campaign] is problematic because if you push a... 
protectionist, nationalist, kind of approach to consumerism ... what does that say 
about workers in other countries? For instance, if you look at the Clothing and 
Textiles Union, their position, at least [Ebrahim] Patel's position, is that there is no 
longer a place in the world for national unions, we need global unions... So the 
South African Clothing and Textiles Union is organising workers in Lesotho to 
2A trade union campaign in 1999 which undertook to protect South African jobs in the clothing and textiles 
sectors, seen by some as a backlash against the affects of trade liberalisation. 
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join in their union, but at same time they are pushing a 'Buy South Africa' 
campaign! Now, what do you say to the workers in Lesotho about the products 
that are coming out of the places where they are employed? (#51,1999). 
Furthermore, an agricultural analyst argued that if the expected growth in agriculture (as a result 
of the TDCA) occurs: 
... that worries me about agricultural exports is that they rely on foreign workers, 
women, and children... and they pay them badly. So, the victims of competitive 
agriculture, in Chile, Argentina, Brazil... farmers turn to very vulnerable sectors of 
the work force to get things going and that is happening in South Africa; Not a 
direct affect of trade liberalisation, it might increase. From a regional point of view 
that might not be a very bad thing, but from the point of view of hiring an 
extremely vulnerable workforce, given that South Africa has a very kind of 
xenophobic migration policy right now, is not great (#6,1999). 
The xenophobia directed against migrants questions the understanding and application of 
Ubuntu and the African Renaissance, outlined in Chapter Four (4-2.1). Indeed a business 
representative from Johannesburg opined that: 
don't talk to Africans - the rest of Africa - about black South Africans because they 
will tell you that they are more racist than any other nation that they have come 
across. Why are they not welcome in South Africa? They are not seen as being able 
to contribute to the South African economy? No! Ubuntu is South Africans and we 
will accept Botswanans and Namibians, Lesotho and Swaziland, [but] we won't 
accept Mozambicans and others (#30,1999). 
Indeed, an interviewee from Namibia declared that the rhetoric surrounding the TDCA implied 
that 'we can do better things than Africa' (#54,1999). 
That these civil society groups and industrial sectors have been identified as potential losers 
comes as no surprise as the literature review in Chapter Two indicated that peripheralised 
industries and 'traditionally marginalised' elements of society do not benefit from economic, trade 
or development policies based on neo-classical economic perspectives. This raises the question - do 
these interviewee views reflect their own opinions, or do they illustrate the influence of the 
literature? Many of those who have identified specific 'losers' are from academia, NGOs, or civil 
society - in other words those associated with the critical side of the polarised debate on neo- 
liberalism. However, as the quotations above demonstrate, government officials, business 
representatives and the financial press (i. e. the 'other' side) have also specified potential 'losers'. 
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6.5 Specifics: Benefits 
The literature review of the positive aspects of neo-liberalism revealed that any benefits identified 
tended to be broad and lacked precision. Table 6.1 though illustrates that many interviewees 
selected specific industries and parts of society as likely to 'win' under the terms of the TDCA. 
However, the identification of 'winners' emanating from society by intervievvees has remained 
vague. 'Small farmers', consumers and investors are the civil society groups that elicited 'votes' 
from the interviewees. Comments on how they would benefit, or requests for more precisiori were 
not forthcoming. Therefore, this section focuses exclusively ori the many positive perceptions of the 
agreement for South African industrial and agricultural sectors. 
Table 6.1 notes that in 1999, before the agreement was signed, only three interviewees 'voted' 
that the TDCA might actually benefit industry. An NDA official felt that for industry, tile TDCA 
was not 'seen as something that will make them rich overnight' (#44,1999). A senior clothing 
representative, although expressing concerns, was the only interviewee from industry who noted 
that his sector would actually benefit from the agreement, commenting: 
what we're picking up already is that there's very strong interest in the market 
place already, ... 
from the EU buyers, and South Africa manufacturers are highly 
active already, and they are highly desperate ... to get this thing going. Even the 
first, marginal cut is spelling promise, although it didn't seem like a lot to us... I 
suppose because of high interest rates, we are less sensitive to P% of our protective 
levels. It is already starting to have an impact... there is a buyer on Cape Town 
who is already making strong waves, and they are planning everything (#29, 
1999). 
However, a year after the agreement was signed, the South African M11 Rob Davies attested that 
manufacturing industries, particularly steel, were perhaps best placed to take advantage of the 
TDCA (Davies, 2000). 
The literature, and 23 interviewees who identified agriculture as the likeliest beneficiary frorn 
the TDCA, numerically dwarf those arguing that industry will be the main winner. An agricultural 
union official commented 'agriculture was of fundamental importance to the agreement', stating 
that the governmental position was: 
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if we do not have a satisfactory agricultural agreement then they are not interested 
in a FTA at all. That was the position of [government]... and eventually that was 
also the position of parliament (#19,1999). 
One business representative who participated in TESELICO described the deal as 'enormously 
advantageous' for agriculture (#11,1999). An analyst from an NGO, supporting free trade reform, 
suggested that even small farmers could benefit, provided that they specialise in niche markets 
(such as tulips, cut flowers, and asparagus) (#27,1999). Two officials with past and present 
positions in the NDA argued that quotas have assisted in the perception that agriculture (especially 
small businesses) will benefit from the TDCA (#44; #58,1999). However, the positive assessment of 
the quotas system has been criticised extensively since the interviews were conducted. As Chapter 
Seven observes, much resentment exists in the wine industry in relation to the wine quotas. Even 
those in the cut flowers business have complained that any benefits they could have accrued were 
hampered due to lengthy bureaucratic procedures introduced by the South African government 
(Willson, 12 February 2001). 
That said, the two largest winners within the agriculture sector have been identified as the 
wine (7 references) and fruit (four references) industries. Certainly, both, but particularly wine, 
were highlighted in the media as likely to benefit from the agreement (see for example, Dludlu, 12 
April 1999 and Business Day (anon. ) 28 June 2000). Indeed, export figures for both industries have 
increased dramatically since the main agreement was signed. Fruit juice exports rose by 53%; wine 
by 23%. However, as the wine agreement has still to be resolved, the increase in wine sales could 
not possibly be as a direct result of the TDCA (Wadula, 11 June 2001) 
As with textiles and motors, officials from the DTI recorded that the fruit industry, 
particularly CapeSpan, made very strong representations during the agreement. However, the 
agricultural lobby tended to argue for the reduction of tariffs, and as the TDCA is a trade 
liberalising creature, it is not surprising that those lobbying (offensively) for liberalisation would 
benefit from the agreement, whilst those arguing (defensively) for limited reductions (such as 
labour-intensive industries) would not benefit. 
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6.6 Southern Africa 
Interviewees also identified states that neighbOUr South Africa, as potential winners and losers of 
the agreement. This includes the BINS, SADC, and other ACP countries. The first section details 
the potential losses, and the second potential benefits, of the TDCA for the southern African region. 
I Southern Africa -'Losers' 
As table 6.1 shows, ten of those interviewed suggested that the potential economic impact on flic 
BLNS will be detrimental. There are a variety of reasons for this. The first 'group' of concerns relate 
to the lack of BLNS expertise in being able to deal with the tariff liberalisation process (#43,1999). 
A senior politician who had been part of the negotiations with the NDA contended that BINS will 
have difficulties grasping complex issues associated with the TDCA, noting that these issues were 
rarely discussed within SACU (#58,1999). 
The second 'group' identifies the serious economic implications of the trade aspect of tile 
TDCA, either from the threat of competition from cheaper EU goods or the likely dramatic 
reduction of the SACU customs revenue pool, because of the reduction and eradication of tariffs on 
most EU goods. These concerns were identified in the literature and briefly discussed in Chapters 
Two and Four. For example, Paul Goodison from the European Research Office (ERO) argued that 
over 50 products produced bv the BLNS primarily for the South African market will now be 
threatened by the EU goods entering under the TDCA (Goodison, 1999,41). Many interviewees 
reflected this apprehension over both increased protection and the reduction in the customs pool. 
For example, a Botswanan government official argued that cheaper EU goods will displace BLNS 
goods in the SACU market and therefore threaten BINS manufacturers (#38,1999). Other 
interviewees contend that those industries most at risk are the textiles, motors, fridge, canned 
pineapple and infant industries (#33; #37; #50,1999). Furthermore, an official from the South 
African Department of Finance estimated that BLNS revenue raised on tariffs of products entering 
SACU would be reduced by half - from six billion Rand to three billion Rand. This is likely to have 
a dramatic effect on the BLNS. In 1995/6, this source of revenue accounted for over 50%, of the 
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Lesotho and Swazi state's income. The figure was 30% for Namibia and 16.3% for Botswana 
(Goodison, 1999,40). 
Misgivings about the impacts of the TDCA on SADC member states have also been noted 
within the literature(see in particular Business Day (anon. ) 7 March 2001) and by interviewees. The 
July 1999 edition of SADC Today stated that the 'FTA is ... seen by many as a further complication 
to negotiations on the SADC Trade Protocol' (Madakufamba, 1999,4). Nathan Shamuyarira, 
Zimbabwe"s Industry and Commerce Minister echoed such a view; 'The SA-EU agreement has 
grave implications for the region. The agreement was signed at a time when we were calling for 
more trade within SADC' (quoted in SADC Today (anon. ), 1999,4). In terms of the potential impact 
of the agreement on SADC, some interviewees (such as #43,1999) predicted that products from the 
EU could well enter the SADC without paying duties, as the monitoring of exports would almost 
be impossible for national custom controls. Perhaps of far more importance, as noted throughout 
this thesis (particularly in Chapter Four, 4.3.4) is that some analysts view the EU-South Africa 
TDCA as being important to SADC countries' future trading relations with the EU because 'the 
establishment of a SADC FTA area implies that any future EU-South Africa TDCA, [will] de facto 
become the determining basis for future EU-southern Africa trade arrangements' (Goodison, 1999, 
42). This means that SADC (and other ACP member states) will have to negotiate reciprocal 
trading agreements in the future with the EU, rather than non-reciprocal ones. Interviewees have 
argued that if TDCA-style agreements were replicated for other ACP members this could cause de- 
industrialisation, trade diversion and regional fragmentation (#50,1999; CIDSE, 2000). A senior 
South African trade unionist lamented that South Africa sometimes forgot that they had 
responsibility for future trade agreements for these ACP members (#52,1999). 
A further detrimental affect of the TDCA on ACP countries was identified by a South African 
government official at the DFA who was concerned that the EU would compensate BLNS' loss of 
revenue by using Lom6 funds (#43,1999). The official claimed that it does 'not mean that the EU is 
playing a fair game. It means that they are robbing people to pay off [the BLNS revenue loss]'. 
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II Southern Africa: Benefits 
Those more closely involved in the TDCA decision-making process were more inclined to argue 
that BLNS had been included, and therefore tended to reject the argument that BLNS will suffer as 
a result of the TDCA. Five interviewees argued that complaints concerning SACU revenue loss 
were exaggerated as the pool has already decreased as WTO agreements have reduced tariffs 
globally anyway. Moreover, BLNS are currently in a beneficial position because they 'have got the 
advantage of actually claiming compensation [from the EU] for too fast a reduction of the pool' 
(DFA official, #43,1999). This interviewee also argued that BLNS had few industries that would 
have to compete with the EU companies as safeguards included in the agreement will protect those 
that might suffer. Furthermore, he notes that the TDCA will be beneficial to the BLNS as it will 
give 'them the rationale to... accept that hberalisation is on them and they have to change'. 
Two other interviewees very close to the decision-making process affirmed that the agreement 
would not harm the BLNS. A Swazi government adviser said that both South Africa and the EU 
took into account BLNS requests to exclude certain products in the talks, particularly sugar and 
beef (#50,1999). A senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Botswana argued that 
BLNS would ultimately benefit from the deal, as cheaper imports would assist businesses and 
consumers, whilst also ensuring access to international markets (#31,1999). 
In summary, this section presents mixed views from interviewees on the potential impact of 
the agreement. This finding is not unusual. The literature cannot agree on who will win or lose 
from neo-classical economic development policies. However, this section though suggests that 
gauging the potential impact of an agreement is far more complex than the rather clear-cut 
impression that the polarised debate in the literature implies. Furthermore, it is interesting to note 
that interviewees who opined that the BLNS had limited opportunities to participate in the TDCA 
decision-making process (in Chapter Five, 5-7) also tended to argue that they will 'lose out' under 
the terms of the agreement. Similarly, those more involved in the negotiations, and who argued 
that the BLNS were included, claim that they will end up benefiting. 
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6.7 - Summary and Identification of Case Studies 
This identification of potential 'winners' and 'losers' from the perceptions based Oll future 
economic impacts of the TDCA has produced results that slightly differ from those identified ill the 
review of the literature relating to neo-classical developmental trade perspectives in Chapter Two 
(2.3.3 and 2-4). Whilst sections of civil society were identified as potential 'losers' iii the literature, 
the predominant view amongst those interviewed was that either a region (the BINS), seell as 
peripheral to the TDCA decision-making process, or industrial sectors (irrespective of their 
participation in the policy formulation structure) were more likely to be identified. This concurs 
with some of the conclusions drawn in Chapter Two. This selection is not surprising, as those 
interviewed were often decision-makers close to the SEFTA aspect of negotiations and therefore 
tended to concentrate solely on agricultural and industrial tariff lines. However, those who viewed 
the TDCA in a broader context (such as economic analysts, academics, and researchers from 
NGOs) also identified aspects of civil society (women, unskilled labourers, migrants), small 
businesses, and the BLNS as being impacted by the agreement. The major contrast between the 
image presented by the interviewees and the general literature is that the interviewee portrayal is 
far more complicated than the rather clear-cut arguments drawn by the opposing camps in the 
literature review. 
A more detailed reflection of these results suggest that although the agricultural sector of the 
South African economy had sixteen references listing it as a potential 'loser', twenty-three regarded 
it as likely to benefit from the agreement. Indeed, Alec Erwin, one of the chief decision-makers who 
oversaw the negotiation process, particularly highlighted agriculture as the main beneficiary - 
provided that agricultural industries made the most of the quotas, and small farmers move into 
niche markets. Wine and fruit were the specific products selected as being the most likely sectors to 
take advantage. This is somewhat surprising considering that the most contentious issue of the 
agreement related to the wine and spirits protocol (which still has to be agreed - see section 2.2)' 
and that the EU has excluded many agricultural products from being liberalised. 
ý' However, the most controversial aspects of the protocol had yet to be fully realised when interviews were 
conducted in 1999. 
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Conversely, at the time the interviews were conducted, in 1999, only three decision-makers 
suggested that the TDCA would benefit industry, whilst thirty-nine identified the TDCA as being 
detrimental, particularly to labour-intensive sectors. This is despite virtually all South African 
industrial products being accorded duty-free access within the first few years of the TDCA being in 
operation. This ratio was redressed slightly by Rob Davies (2000), who reflected that industry was 
more likely to benefit from the agreement than agriculture. 
The previous chapter outlined that although the policy formulation process was theoretically 
inclusive, it was more so for sectoral representation (of large business and labour) than it was for 
the BLNS, small businesses (SMMEs) or for other sections of South Africa's stakeholders (women, 
migrants and the unemployed). This chapter has illustrated that sectors who had fairly good access 
to goverm-nental decision-makers (such as Capespan and agriculture in general), and those who 
adopted an 'offensive' negotiating strategy, calling for the opening up of markets, are the potential 
winners. However this was not the case for motors and textiles, which were 'defensive lobbyists' 
and argued for caution in tariff liberalisation. Whilst they might have been extremely efficient in 
presenting their concerns to the DTI (if not in NEDLAC), they were perceived not to have benefited 
from the agreement. 
The next stage in the research process is the selection of case studies in order to examine in 
further detail the potential economic impact of the agreement and the South African side of the 
TDCA decision-making structure. In identifying case studies to choose, one possible route to 
follow would be to interview representatives of different societal groups identified in Chapter Two 
as most likely to be excluded (such as women or migrants) or included, in order to record their 
experiences and perceptions of the EU-SA TDCA. However such a selection is problematic, being 
too broad in scope and not supported in quantifiable or qualitative means from the interview data 
detailed in the last three chapters. A clearer focus should be obtained by examining and comparing 
the experiences of groups of actors within the industrial sectors identified as being likely winners 
or losers of the agreement. The sectors will inevitably include a cross-section of South African 
society. Therefore, an analysis of the industrial sector selected will also provide a chance to reflect 
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on the inclusion and exclusion of societal groups, such as skilled and unskilled labour, women and 
migrant workers, and large and small scale firms. An analysis of both table 6.1 and interviewee 
comments reveals that, of the perceived beneficiaries, either the wine or fruit industries are suitable 
for analysis. For the 'losers' either the textiles or motor industries are apt for examination. 
From the 'loser' category, the textile sector was selected for the following reasons. First, 
textiles has been more consistently identified in both the literature surveyed, and by interviewees, 
as a 'losing' sector than has the motor industry. Second, the potential impact on textiles is 
considered greater than in motors. For example, textiles claim that from 1994 to 1999,500,000 lost 
their jobs as a result of trade liberalisation in South Africa (Business Day (anon. ), 23 February 2001). 
Third, an interviewee claimed that textiles employs many women and unskilled workers, thus 
providing a useful link with the conclusions of the literature review on the marginalisation of these 
groups. 
There is less to separate the wine and fruit industries. Both were identified by similar amounts 
(seven references made relating to wine, four to fruit). Both are also seen as important politically to 
the potential success of the agreement, with wine (16%) being South Africa's single largest 
agricultural export and fruit the combined largest (in excess of 44%) (Statistics South Africa, 2000). 
Research on the impact of trade liberalisation on the fruit industry has already been conducted 
(Turok, 1998; Head, 1998), mainly from the perspective that trade liberalisation has been 
detrimental to the sector. The South African wine sector has therefore been selected for three 
reasons. First, in comparison to fruit, the South African wine sector has received less analysis in 
respect to trade liberalisation. Second, the fruit industry is more diverse than the wine industry. 
Therefore a range of external factors, such as different fruit markets, would complicate research in 
this area. Third, during the interview process, one senior decision-maker -noted that the wine 
company, KWV, was itself investing 477 million Rand in promoting the social development of 
South African society (#58,2001). This developmental assistance would be interesting to compare 
with the perceived developmental impact of the TDCA on the wine industry. 
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6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed interviewee perceptions of the potential impact of the E. U-SA TDCA, 
primarily its trade component, and its major finding is that 'winners' have been identified as often 
as 'losers' have. This differs to the literature reviewed in Chapter Two, which suggested that 
specific 'losers' were more likely to result from trade and development agreements similar to the 
EU-SA TDCA. When 'winners' were identified in the literature review, they tended to be rather 
vague and unspecific. One possible reason for this discrepancy is that there are differences between 
what the literature analysed - policies already in operation, based on neo-liberalisi-ri, where the 
impact could be measured, and the perceptions articulated in this chapter - on an agreement that 
was only signed in October 1999 and implementation began in January 2000. A fully 
comprehensive assessment of the agreement can only be conducted in years to come. 
The second finding, which supports conclusions made in Chapter Two, is that those 
identifying more 'winners' than 'losers' tended to be government officials and those who identified 
more 'losers' were often CBO representatives, NGO officials and academics with a record of 
contesting neo-liberalism. In view of the 'ever-widening chasm' between the two camps and the 
vested interests that accompany them, it should come as no surprise that governmental officials 
and those closely involved in the negotiations were more reticent in selecting 'losers' and were far 
more willing to identify potential winners. Likewise, academics and NGO officials are under 
similar influences to highlight more 'losers' than 'winners'. Therefore, one has to consider if the 
literature may have influenced the perceptions of those interviewed. The contrasting ideological 
baggage that accompanies this polarised debate could well mean that arguments presented by 
interviewees might not necessarily have been 'objective'. Certainly the picture that has emerged in 
the chapter is made more complex by the influence exerted by whichever side of the ideological 
debate that each interviewee is on. Despite this, a further finding is that of the categories 
highlighted in Chapter Two as being the most likely to be detrimentally effected by neo-liberal 
trade and development agreements and policies, only industrial sectors have been identified to any 
great extent. This is followed by peripheralised regions, such as SADC, BLNS and ACP states, and 
then, to a lesser degree, communities, such as women and migrants. 
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Another key issue that emerges from this chapter is the exploration of a linkage between those 
identified as 'winners' and 'losers' and their access to South African TDCA decision-making 
process. Just as it is difficult to accurately assess the influence that each component and actor has 
on the formulation of the TDCA, so to is it difficult to correlate clear patterns suggesting that 
perceived 'winners' are included more in the decision-makers process than likely 'losers'. The 
clearer correlation seems to be that those employing 'defensive' strategies (and by definition more 
likely to view themselves as likely 'losers') attempting to resist the tide of trade liberalisation had 
less influence on the TDCA than those 'offensive' lobbyists who wanted to reduce tariffs. This is 
not surprising, given that the TDCA is a trade liberalising agreement and those lobbying for tariffs 
to be reduced would more likely succeed than those who did not. 
A further conclusion is the identification from the interviews of two industrial sectors to look 
at the issues raised in chapters Four to Six in more detail. One is a perceived 'loser' of the TDCA 
and the other a likely 'winner'. It is hoped that the in-depth study on the wine and textile sectors 
will provide a clearer picture on the complex and difficult issues raised in the previous three 
chapters on the description and examination of the TDCA and the South African side of the TDCA 
decision-making process. To recap, these are: 
m The linkage between offensive and defensive lobbyists and the influence exerted on the TDCA 
formulation 
0 To gauge the influence that different components and actors had on the South African 
decision-making process 
.0 The extent to which decision-makers are consciously or subconsciously influenced by the 
external envirorunents general acceptance of neo-liberalism 
d The extent to which the influence of external actors makes the agreement detrimental to South 
Africa. 
The micro-studies should also provide more insight into the following: 
0 The accurate identification of 'winners' and 'losers' 
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0 To gauge further the issue of inclusion and exclusion in the South African TDCA decision- 
making structure 
z To evaluate how accurate the description of the TDCA policy formulation process was in 
Chapter Four. 
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This chapter follows the identification by decision-makers in the last cliapter that the wine industry 
could be a potential 'winner' from the TDCA, and that wine (being part of agriculture) had 
considerable access to the South African TDCA decision-making process. This analysis considers 
the extent to which the perceptions of those interviewed in 1999, who were outside tile wille 
industry, are actually representative of feelings in the South African wine industry. Indeed frorli the 
South African media's reporting of the wine aspect of the TDCA there is a suspicioll that, due to 
lengthy and contentious proposals under discussion in the wine and spirits protocol, issues 
surrounding the TDCA would not be well received within the wine sector. The main aim of this 
chapter is to gauge how a micro-scale analysis of one aspect of the TDCA can furtlier all 
understanding of the issues raised in the preceding chapters. The picture presented here is a 
complex one. This is evident from an outline of the industry in the following sectioll (7.2) that 
presents an overview. From this debate it is apparent that the wine industry is, oil tile one hand, a 
mirror that reflects the much-criticised past of apartheid South Africa - such as the harsh treatment 
of labourers and the implementation of apartheid policies (Keenan, 1998). It is therefore a sector, 
perhaps more than any other, which is sensitive to analysis. However, on tile other hand, the wine 
industry in 2001 illustrates the potential for the future prosperity of South Africa with exports 
booming and tourism growing. Following this overview, the chapter then describes the wine 
industry's organisational structure and relationship between different 'actors' in the wine industry 
TDCA decision-making process (7.3). Section 7.4 re-considers the perceptions of the wine sector 
towards the EU-SA TDCA, and section 7.5 documents views considering the inclusivity of the wine 
TDCA decision-making structure. 
7.1 Outline of the South African Wine sector 
In order to contextualise the discussion on the South African wine sector in the TDCA decision- 
making process, it is necessary to outline defining characteristics of the wine industry. This details 
firstly the location of the wine producing areas in South Africa. Secondly, the political history of 
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South African viticulture, from 1900 to 1990 is examined. Thirdly, the contemporary economic 
scene is portrayed, along with a discussion of contemporary economic and political concerns. 
Before describing the industry, it must be noted that some statistics relating to the wine 
industry, both during and after the apartheid era (particularly when referring to levels of 
employment), are considered by many to be inaccurate (Capt, Bushiess Ncvvs, May 1998; Bolin, 5 
September 2001). Nevertheless, this report has included an array of statistical information, but only 
for rough approximations so as to indicate the levels of exports', employment etceteras. 
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Figure 7.1: South Africa's wine producing regions 
' However, some interviews noted that export figures are aniong the most accurate in the world (# De Klerk, 
2001). 
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7.2.1 Location 
Approximately 950 million litres of wine are produced annually in South Africa, for both domestic 
and international consumption (Wines of South Africa, 2000). 90% of this emanates from the 
Western Cape (US Department of Commerce, 1999), which is considered the best grape-growing 
area in South Africa (Walton, 1997,130). Within the Western Cape, there are twelve wine- 
producing areas. These are fisted in figure 7.1 above. New wine producing areas are being 
established in other regions, including near the Orange River in the Northern Cape and in the Free 
State. 
7.2.2 Political Histo? y - 1900-1990 
The political history of the wine trade in South Africa in the twentieth century is characterised by 
three main themes. First, the growing importance of the Kooperatiewe Wijnbouwers Vereniging 
(KWV) company. Since its formation in 1917 KWV's quasi-statutory powers resulted in it having 
very close connections with apartheid governments. Second, appalling labour conditions for wine 
employees. Third, consumer boycotts and economic sanctions. 
I Importance of KWV 
The KWV was formed following the collapse of South African exports caused by disease to the 
local wine crop and the effects of British free trade policies! As the wine lakes grew, KWV was 
established to 'end the chaos and wastage within the industry' (Walton, 1997,130). From the 
Control Act of 1923 to the Wine and Spirit Control Act of 1970, KWV was entrusted with legal 
powers in terms of the production and sales of wine in South Africa. It therefore possessed certain 
statutory or quasi-statutory authority. Michael Fridjhon, of the South African Wine Industry Trust 
(SAWIT) notes that KWV was 'firstly and foremostly a farming co-operative. It was like a favoured 
trade union. It was a trade union, but it had powers entrenched in it by act of parliament' 
(#Fridjhon, 2001). By 1990 KWV controlled virtually the entire wine sector, having supervisory 
powers over all exports (Walton, 1997). Due to its position within the wine industry it is not 
surprising that KWV and other large players in the sector (Distillers for example) always had 
2 High transportation costs meant that South Africa's highly reputed dessert wines were no longer competitive 
in European markets that it dominated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
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excellent access to successive apartheid governments (G. Williams, 1999). Some wine analysts argue 
that throughout this era, KWV controlled the industry to such an extent that it was nicknamed 'the 
Mafia' (Ashurst, 1997). 
Appalling labour conditions 
By any standards, working and living conditions generally for labourers in the wine industry were 
bad, although there were exceptions where some farmers treated their workers well. Gavin 
Williams (1999) notes that ever since slavery was abolished in 1838, wine owners have searched for 
cheap and expendable labour. For instance, in the 1960s prisoners were often used as labourers. 
Furthermore, permanent and temporary wine employees were low paid (frequently by the 'tot' 
systern), and housed in poor accommodation (Ewert and Hammann, 1999,214). 
Segregation along 'ethnic' lines was also implemented. The introduction of the Coloured 
Labour Preference Policy in 1954 led to a mainly 'coloured' workforce. However, during the 1970s 
labour shortages induced an influx of 'migrant' African workers from the Eastern Cape, as well as 
increasing numbers of women labourers. Ewert and Hammann (1999,212) argue that the n-dxture of 
African and Coloured workers resulted in 'racial tension', the residue of which continues to the 
present day. Indeed, the pressure to limit any influx of 'African' workers was immense and 
resulted in an increase in women employees. " Many authors argued that women were the most 
'powerless' category of workers (Ewert and Hammann, 1999; Hill-Lanz and O'Grady, 1997). 
Pressure was brought to bear on male employees to ensure their wives/sisters co-operation in the 
workforce, often resulting in violence against women workers (Hill-Lanz and O'Grady, 1997,111). 
Throughout the apartheid era, successive governments, in a close relationship with wine 
company owners, kept quiet on the issue of these conditions (Crush, undated). Ewert and 
Hammann (1999) have argued that this labour system, particularly before 1989, was one of 
'despotic paternalism'. However, during the 1980s reforms, initiated not by workers resistance, but 
by NGOs (such as the Rural Foundation (RF) that had close links to government, farmers, and 
3 The 'tot' system means payment by alcohol. 
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conservative overseas donore) began to dilute this paternalistic relationship. The reforms were 
introduced however to promote social stability and therefore increase productivity. For example, in 
1982, the RF introduced programmes, to reduce the fertility rate, teenage pregnancies, and infant 
mortality rate, that were closely linked to moden-dsation theory, (Ewert and Hammann, 1999,209) 
as outlined in Chapter Two (2.3.1). 
III Consumer boycotts/sanctions 
Due in part to these labour conditions, but also because of apartheid policies in general, consumer 
boycotts against South African produce, and limited economic sanctions, were introduced from the 
1970s and were removed by 1994. The impact of these sanctions have been contested. Firstly, the 
boycotts were never wholly effective; 'the longer they persist, the more holes are punched in them 
by those determined to make money where others refuse to tread' (Walton, 1997,131). 6 However, 
Walton also noted that consumer boycotts crippled the wine industry by reducing wine sales and 
dissuading outside expertise to enter the South African wine sector (Walton, 1997,131). 
By 1990 the industry had a tarnished image, it was dominated by the KWV, and labour 
conditions, with few exceptions, were extremely bad. Consumer boycotts along with sanctions also 
effected the sector. Gavin Williams (2000) has argued that those in control of wine were 
conservative and reactionary. Indeed, Erica Platter (quoted in Williams, 1999) allegedly contended 
that 'the wine industry was run by people who would have preferred to keep Mandela in prison for 
another twenty years! The ill feeling towards the 'wine establishment' was so strong that some 
called for KWV to be summoned to answer before the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) 
(Mail and Guardian, 13 June 1997). In the early 1990s, as sanctions were lifted, the wine industry 
had to face up to a number of dramatic shifts in the political and socio-economic landscape. 
4 Hill-Lanz and O'Grady argued that 'it is the farmers' need for cost-saving and productivity, coupled with 
the racial legislation intent on keeping numbers of African workers down, that resulted in women's increased 
employment' (Hill-Lanz and O'Grady, 1997,112). 
5 Please note that although the RF might have been considered an organisation that helped disadvantaged 
peoples, interviewees suggested it was not a Community-Based Organisation in the true sense as it did not 
emerge from the community - it was formed by government, farmer and external actors (#Ewert, 2001). 
6 One of those interviewed, Johann Krige noted that only countries that Scandinavian countries, Canada and 
the US imposed official sanctions against the South African wine industry. Indirect boycotts by consumers 
and companies throughout many other European states (#Krige, 2001). 
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7.2.3 Political and economic concerns 
The outline of the wine sector proceeds by detailing the contemporary economic situation of the 
industry. It then considers four themes central to understanding the current politico-economic 
situation within the wine sector. They are: 
" Employment issues 
" Empowerment 
" Government policies 
" Trade liberalisation 
I The contemporary economic situation 
Wine contributes about 1.6% to the South African Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 1% to total 
employment, and 1.3% to total exports (IDC, 1999b, 1). The contemporary economic climate since 
the ending of sanctions has been characterised, not surprisingly, by a dramatic expansion in 
exports. Between 1991 and 2000 wine exports have increased by 504% (Mateme, 31 August 2001). 
Export wines now account for over 20% of the local crop (#Fridjhon, 2001). This boom has been 
sustained and fuelled by the falling exchange rate for the South African Rand (Ewert and 
Hammann, 1999). The main beneficiaries have been those who built a reputation for quality wines 
(Ewert and Hammann, 1996). The largest international market is the UK, which account for 40% of 
South Africa's exports. Sales to other Western European countries amount to 36% of sales. 
However, the domestic scene has remained largely stagnant. Sales have stayed at 400 million litres 
a year. Domestic wine is sold via boxes, or throwaway containers, and not in bottles (the ratio is 
80/20), thus indicating that the quality of domestic wine sold is not high (Cape Business News 
(anon. ), July 1999). 
7 The Erica Platter affair relates to an interview by Erica Platter, wife of well-known wine writer, John Platter, 
with the UK media. She stated that if it were up to wine farmers then Mandela would still be in prison. This 
provoked a major storm within the industry (#Ewert, 2001). 
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11 Employment Issues 
Many, although not all, parts of the wine industry are labour-intensive (Ewert and Hammann, 
1999). 8 The numbers of those directly or indirectly employed in the wine sector is estimated to be 
3,300 cellar staff (Wines of South Africa, 2000). The number of permanent employees ranges from 
60,000 (Ewert, 13 October 2000, private correspondence) to 98,857 (KWV report, 1997) with a 
majority of these being male. The number of total workers, incorporating temporary seasonal 
workers, ranges from 100,000 (Ewert, 13 October 2000, private correspondence) to 345,000 (Wines of 
South Africa, 2000). The majority of seasonal workers are believed to be female. The structure of the 
workforce is divided into hierarchies, often based on either 'ethnic' background or type of 
employment. A workforce profile schedule of five large wine-producing companies prepared by 
the South African Wine and Spirit Industry Employers' Association illustrates clearly that 'white 
males' dominate the more skilled occupational levels. African and Coloured people predominate in 
the un-skilled 'elementary' occupations (South African Wine and Spirit Industry Employers' 
Association, 2000). Furthermore, an analysis of the wine industry by Ewert and Hammann (1999) 
revealed that the labour force is geographically and ethnically localised. 75% of the permanent 
workforce originated from near the farm, and most were coloured and Afrikaans speakers. 
However, since 1994 there has been a substantial Africanisation of the Western Cape. Although 
migrants from outside of South Africa comprise no more than five per cent of the wine workforce 
(Ewert, 13 October 2000, private correspondence), population movement from within South Africa, 
to the Western Cape, is considered the major form of migration. 
Poor labour conditions were identified as a major characteristic of the wine industry before 
1990. The issue is still of major concern although some interviewees argued that the situation is 
improving. Having examined issues relating to the development of traditionally disadvantaged 
peoples in South Africa (2.3.2), it would be fair to expect that previously disadvantaged workers 
would have their economic status improved by policies of the new government. Indeed, 
government has introduced legislation that were designed to empower the workforce and improve 
8 The wine industry is probably more capital intensive than is believed. Although the primary agriculture 
portion of the wine industry is 'relatively labour intensive, the other portions of the industry (i. e. Co-operative 
cellars and refining) is very capital intensive. On average this is on the same level as the economy as a whole' 
(KWV report, 1997, no page number). 
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working conditions. For instance, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (1993) provided the 
workforce with the right to collective bargaining. Article 66 of the 1995 Labour Relations Act 
established the Commission for Conciliation and Arbitration (CCMA), which is an independent 
dispute resolution body. The 1998 Employment Equity Act was introduced to reduce the wage gap 
between highest and lowest-paid employees, as well as to improve labour representation in 
companies with 50 or more employees (IDC, 1999b). FAWU representative Katishi Masemola 
agrees that such policies have assisted previously marginalised labourers; (#Masemola, 2001). 
However, in terms of representation there are very few union members amongst the wine 
workforce. Ewert (4 May 2001, private correspondence), estimates that no more than 71/o of the 
workforce is unionised. There is however a non-union body, Plaaswerkersvereniging (Farm 
Workers Association) who claim to represent 90% of the wine workforce (#JG Le Roux, 2001; #Hall, 
2001). 
Furthermore the Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI), established to promote better working 
conditions, promoted partially by UK supermarkets, involves input from all comers of the wine 
industry, from CBOs (such as the Centre for Rural Legal Studies), development bodies (such as the 
South African Wine Industry Trust) and wine producers (Kanonkop, Diemersfontein). 
Those who argue that labour conditions within the wine industry have improved immensely 
tend to emanate from the 'old establishment'. For instance, in 1998 KWV argued that there was 
'excellent rapport and liaison between KWV's management and personnel', despite there being no 
salary increase in that year (KWV, 2000). This perception was conveyed during interviews with 
representatives for wine farmer organisations. Sakkie Van Der Vyver, of one of the co-operatives 
representative bodies, KWK (Co-operative Wine Cellars Committee), claimed 'I think that the good 
will that exists between the labour force within the wine industry and the farmer is better than 
what you would find in big corporations with a mono [labourl population' (#Van der Vyver, 2001). 
Likewise Johann Krige, manager of Kanonkop vineyard, noted: 
We don't have any labour problems - they work 24 hours a day sometimes, which 
is totally illegal, but that is the way they work, and that is the loyalty that they 
have. I haven't got any unions, I have no problems because I look after them 
because I try to create wealth and the wealth I get I will channel it down to the 
lower echelons... they have a netball court, soccer pitches... I think it is the only 
part of the world that has an electrified fence around my labourers; cottages... The 
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set up on a farm level is just so different. I work here as a family. People live here 
on my property, I have to look after them - they are my responsibility (#Krige, 
2001). 
Fridjhon notes that there are two pressures on wine farmers, particularly exporters, to improve the 
conditions of their workers. He states: 
as South African wineries acquire a profile in their own right, they recognise that 
they have to pay their workers properly. They recognise two reasons for that. One 
is that you can hardly have a brand name in the UK and then be caught out paying 
appalling wages. But, it is much more positive than that - they recognise that the 
type of input they need from their labourers, every level, through their project, 
requires, skills. They need to train these people. So, as people become responsible 
for their final product, the general conditions of employment tend to improve 
(#Fridjhon, 2001). 
For all the 'progress', other analysts argue that labour conditions have not improved enough. 
For example, the Minister of Labour, Mdladlana, stated at an address given to the wine conference 
in 1999 that 'all is not well... down on the farm, with 'abusive behaviour continuing towards 
labourers, lack of cooperation from farmers to let inspectors inspect farms, and the lack of increase 
in pay for 'elementary' occupations (Department of Labour, 1999). Ewert and Hammann (1999,202) 
note that since 1990 'neither export revenues, not democratization or pro-worker legislation have 
fundamentally changed the labour regime on South African wine farms'. The situation, they argue, 
remains 'imbued with the spirit of paternalism', particularly in the less 'high-profile' wine growing 
areas (such as to the north and east of Worcester). Farmers still determine the working rules, wages 
and accommodation. Often profits made from exports are invested in new plantings, cellar 
upgrades and private consumption, not on improving labour conditions (Ewert and Hammann, 
1999). The 'tot' system also still occurs although not to such a large extent. Ruth Hall (Centre for 
Rural Legal Studies) contends that: 
it has taken on different forms. So, although now you may not be forcibly paid in 
alcohol, somebody who is paid very little money but has access to a farm shop and 
doesn't have easy access to town to buy groceries gets into perpetual debt and if 
you are in perpetual debt you have large deductions made off your cash wages 
every week... you then end up with no cash but access to the shop where you can 
get the alcohol. So, it is a cyclical thing. (#Hall, 2001). 
Furthermore, as the low unionisation figures imply, farm workers have not succeeded in 
building an effective bargaining power. Hall states that labour interests within the wine sector are 
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'seen as a vulnerable sector because it [the industry] does not have a bargaining councif and it will 
not have one for the foreseeable future. It does not have the level of unionisation that is necessary' 
(#HaR, 2001). 
The status of women workers in particular is noted as being poor. Hill-Lanz and O'Grady 
(1997,111) argue that womens 'current relationship to employment, housing and land is a result of 
a system of paternalism and patriarchy interacting to keep women dependent' and that women 
rarely participate in decision-making processes associated with the wine sector. Indeed, Ewert 
contends that 'the situation generally is that most women on farms are dependent for their 
livelihood, for their shelter, on the position of men... On very few farms do women enjoy a separate 
contract, a written contract from their partners. And that says it all' (#Ewert, 2001). 
III Empowerment issues 
An examination of perceptions into the issues of inclusion in the South African wine industry 
demands an investigation into policies designed to 'empower' traditionally disadvantaged groups, 
both politically and economically. Many interviewees discussed at length their opinions on 
empowerment. Some queried what empowerment actually meant and others noted the benefits and 
problems associated with empowerment policies. 
A few interviewees probed the rationale and reasons for empowerment, noting that its 
definition was essential before the development of policies for the development of traditionally 
marginalised peoples could be enacted. These perceptions were epitornised by David Sonenberg of 
Diernersfontein Farm. He argued that: 
I think that is really one of the most challenging things that we grapple with - 
what is the meaning of genuine empowerment? What is cosmetic? What are real, 
life-changing actions within an employer organisation that allows somebody to 
become 'empowered'? ... and it is not necessarily about you know, giving an extra 
R10 a week, or bonuses or profit share of whatever - not necessarily an equity 
scheme... because all these things, whilst they have their merits, they should be 
part of something - something more holistic - that you pay attention to what goes 
on in the workplace - how people get opportunities to training and to develop 
themselves- that seems to be the thing that is more honest at the end of the day! 
9 Bargaining councils bring together employer and employee representatives to agree collective decisions. 
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To suddenly say to a farm worker you are a shareholder, it kind of doesn't fit. And 
that feels cosmetic and out of desperation to do things which are going to have an 
impact rather than something that you can sit back and face yourself in the cold 
light of day, and say have I been honest about what is a legitimate expectation to 
someone's development as opposed to a wish to be seen to be doing something. 
Those are the hard issues to face because the latter has less glamour, less 
newspaper publicity but you might actually be producing change. 
There is indeed a debate surrounding the best approach to follow in order to initiate 
empowerment, particularly in development agencies linked with the wine industry, such as 
DEVCO and New Farmers who believe that wealth creation is the answer, usually via 'marketing 
products' or providing more responsibility to traditionally marginalised peoples. An example of 
development assistance was provided by a source close to New Farmers: 
We came to the conclusion [that] the way we must position ourselves is to 
successfully implement so-called farm worker equity schemes, where farm 
workers, many of them illiterate people, on farms, get an ownership stake in that 
farm... Their representatives serve on the board of directors on that farm... their 
children grow up in a different atmosphere where workers are aware of what is 
our turnover, our cost structures, and maybe out of that the next generation will 
be different people. We also implement on those farms what we call a 
development agenda. A people-oriented development agenda... Within these 
projects they develop in certain areas... We focus on financial, on decision- 
making, skills and social (#2,2001). 
This idea has support from some producers. Krige notes that 'if you create wealth all other things 
[helping the poor for instance] will just come by itself' (#Krige, 2001). 
A range of empowerment initiatives (such as the legislation noted above) have been promoted 
to 'uplift' previously disadvantaged workers. These range from Wines of South Africa (WOSA) 
assistance (#Krige, 2001) to development agency programmes (such as the Land Reform Credit 
Facility operated by Khula enterprises)" and private farm policies. 
Perhaps surprisingly (in view of the history of the wine sector) traditional wine leaders go as 
far as to say that social 'empowerment' has always been one of their major concerns. KWV, for 
example, proclaims that the company has 'a proud record of empowerment and social 
responsibility involvement in the wine industry extending over the past 30 years' (KWV, 2000, no 
page number). KWV have also won awards for social responsibility, and was a founder member of 
the New Farmers development company. Ewert and Hammann (1999) however have noted that co- 
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operatives (particularly those who export) made most effort to adapt to the new economic and 
political environment. This view was supported by a South African Agricultural Union 
representative who argued that many co-operative cellars, in the past and present, have provided 
ample opportunities for developing farmers (Huyssteen, 1999). Indeed, Nelson Mandela also 
commended the wine sector: 
We are aware of imaginative initiatives launched in this industry to help those 
who have previously been denied access, to acquire land and shares in existing 
enterprises. In these initiatives there is a great deal of promise for progress. The 
same applies to your commitment to the promotion of human resource 
development and of labour relations, which fits in with the spirit of our new 
democracy. (Paarl Town Hall, April 24,1996, quoted in US Department of 
Commerce, 1999, no page number). 
Despite such praise many analysts have criticised empowerment initiatives. One obvious 
problem (as discussed above) is the lack of any clear definition of the term empowerment. 
Marthinus Saunderson notes that 'we have various empowerment [initiatives] in the Western Cape. 
And now you can define empowerment how you like. We don't have a proper definition... even 
Ramaphosa" cannot give a definition - it is a problem - if you don't have a definition you can't 
really measure whatever is happening within the marketplace' (#Saunderson, 2001). Others have 
argued that new/disadvantaged farmers tended to have a lack of understanding of the business of 
the wine industry, whilst there is a general lack of commitment from private companies to the 
process of empowerment (IDC report, 1999b, 17). A more damning indictment has been detailed by 
the US Chamber of Commerce in their report on the South African wine sector. It states that: 
Economic empowerment is still limited to too few instances and still narrowly 
focused. The process at this stage is focused on a small number of individuals who 
were in any event relatively better off than the average historically disadvantaged 
person is (US Department of Commerce, 1999, no page number). 
Indeed, an official close to a major development agency also noted that the majority of farmers 
going to them for 'empowerment' were not previously disadvantaged peoples or new entrants, but 
usually-white farmers in financial difficulties (#2,2001). 
10 Operated with the Department of Land Affairs. Established to finance 'commercially viable land transfer 
projects to previously disadvantaged people' (Khula, 200 1). 
11 Cyril Ramaphosa is a leading authority on black empowerment. 
173 
Chapter Seven: 71-ic South African Wine Industry 
This examination has focused on many viewpoints relating to empowerment issues. There is 
an obvious link between them and contemporary labour conditions within the wine sector. They 
have both aroused tensions between government and the industry. 
IV Govemment policies 
Relations between the established order in the wine sector and government have been characterised 
as being tense, due in part, to the perceived support of the wine establishment of the pre-1994 
apartheid government and, as noted above, concern within government over labour conditions and 
the alleged slow pace of private-led empowerment initiatives. These relations were further strained 
by the proposed deregulation of KWV into a private company in 1997. A lengthy court case ensued. 
Senior industry officials, outside of KWV, were concerned that this would damage the wine sector. 
Riaan Kruger of the Cape wine and Spirits Institute (CWSI) claimed that: 
We said there were no ways that [KWV] can be a referee and a player. You want 
to become a company fine, become a company but then all your statutory powers 
must collapse. That led to a very unpleasant year in the industry ... we believe that 
it is so short-sighted to go into court battle with your own government and to fight 
them - we just thought that they [KWVI positioned themselves totally incorrectly. 
(#Kruger, 2001). 
The result of the demutualisation of KWV meant that many of its statutory powers passed to 
institutions such as South African Wine Information Services (SAWIS). " Furthermore, KWV also 
financed the establishment of SAWIT and will fund its maintenance until 2009. Government-KWV 
relations were worsened by increasing excise duties on wine and spirits. Lourens Jenker, the KWV 
chairperson, claimed that government received R2 billion per annum from the wine industry, 
whereas wine producer's total income was R1.45 billion. This he claimed was unfair treatment 
against the wine sector (Huyssteen, 1999). 
V Trade liberalisation 
The issue of trade liberalisation was a further concern for those interviewed. Many argued that its 
impact on South Africa was detrimental. The first complaint, one that tends to unite producers 
from new world wine producing areas is the continued subsidisation of EU farmers. Joubert 
12 Under the 1998 amendment to the 1970 Wine and Spirit Control Act and 1996 Agricultural Marketing 
Control Act. 
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provided figures which suggested that the EU indirectly subsidised farmers to the value of R7 
billion in 1998. This represents 45% of EU wine farmers total income (#Joubert, 2001). This 
compares to 4% for South African wine farmers (KWK, undated). Indeed, two officials from KWK 
perceived that the contemporary level in tariffs on wine entering the South African market to be 
virtually nil; Kobus joubert noted that: 
there is a tariff but no restrictions. I mean we are now the most capitalistic country 
in the world as far as that is concerned. I mean anybody can come in here and bring 
whatever he likes. There is no limitation - anyone can market wine in South Africa 
(#Joubert, 2001). 
Joubert adds that wine from France now sells for a little as 10 Rands (less than; El) - which is less 
than it costs South African firms to produce and transport wine. No corroborating information was 
found to support this latter assertion. 
Representatives of traditionally disadvantaged communities also cast doubt on the 
developmental benefits of trade liberalisation, with one representative arguing that the reduction in 
tariffs has enhanced economic apartheid; 'the 'haves' - their positions were strengthened because 
new markets were opened up' (#Adams, 2001). 
Not all viewed trade liberalisation detrimentally. For example, some analysts have contended 
that the 2001 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), signed between sub-Saharan African 
govenunents and the US government, provides easier access to the US market for South African 
wine (Africa Magazine, February 2001). " 
As noted in the contemporary economic situation, wine exports to the EU are by far the largest 
export destination of South African wine. According to SAWIS (South African Wine Industry 
Information and Systems, 2000) in 1999,99 million litres were exported to the EU, out of a total of 
129.9 million. Therefore any negotiations with the EU are of great interest to South African wine 
exporters. Discussions on an EU-SA wine agreement began in 1993. Negotiations first took place 
directly between wine industry representatives and the EU. In 1994 the South African side of the 
wine negotiations was put under the control of the NDA. Although the main SEFrA discussions 
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finished in 1999, negotiations concerning the wine aspect of the TDCA are still being debated. " 
Due to the protracted nature of the discussions, some negotiators doubted whether the agreement 
would ever be reached (#Kruger, 2001). 
Although the wine agreement is shrouded in secrecy" an analysis of the provisional protocol 
(mentioned in 2.2), media reports and interviewee responses, suggests that there appear to be three 
major areas of the TDCA that relate to the wine sector. The first, a wine quota of 32 million litres to 
be exported duty-free (but liable for excise) to the EU each year, is part of the main trade 
agreement. Details of the quota are listed under Section C, Articles 14 and 15 of the main 
agreement. Notice 20584 of 1999, from the NDA website, details that 90% of the quota, which is for 
bottled wine and sparkling wine (not bulk), is to be divided amongst traditional exporters. 
According to NDA official Gunter MillIer, the quota amount available to each exporter is based on 
the level of exports from 1994 to 1996. Ten per cent of the quota is reserved for new entrants - 
defined as previously disadvantaged farmers or those who have never exported (#Milller, 2001). 
The EU have a reciprocal quota allowing EU wine producers access into the South African market. 
NDA officials note that this quota is currently in operation, yet, despite the NDA allocating South 
African quotas for exports in 2000, the EU blocked the implementation of this quota until 
agreement had been reached on the outstanding wine agreement. This prompted Milller to exclaim 
that: 
We are of the opinion that the EU are not fulfilling their commitment under the 
agreement by delaying, by not implementing the wine quotas. That is in the 
TDCA and all other provisions of the TDCA have been implemented! (MillIer, 
2001). 
Many questions have been raised about the quota allocation. For example, Marthinus 
Saunderson of SAWIT has queried whether new entrant farmers would be able to export 10% of the 
quota as they will not have enough wine (#Saunderson, 2001). Furthermore, the use of 1994-1996 
export figures is to the benefit of 'KWV-style' groupings, who have seen their market share decline 
since 1996 (#20,2001). 
13 Indeed, African wine can now be exported without tariffs applying. Wine from other continents have a 22 
US cents per litre levy (Panafrican News Agency (anon. ), 15 February 2001). 
14 Wadula (17 September 2001) notes that the wine agreement should be concluded 'any day'. 
15 Those involved in negotiations, from the wine industry, were asked to sign a secrecy agreement one week 
before I arrived to interview them, forbidding any disclosures concerning the content of the wine protocol. 
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The other areas of interest for the wine industry surround Annex IV - the wine protocol aspect 
of the agreement. As Bahle Sibisi, a prominent South African negotiator noted, this had very little to 
do with actually eliminating tariffs or generating free trade (Sibisi, 1999). An issue that has received 
most attention concerns the EU's insistence that South African producers cease to use the names 
sherry, port, grappa and ouzo within five years. "' This has aroused much controversy in the wine 
sector (see section 7.4 below). At the time of writing the South African and EU negotiators have still 
to reach a conclusive agreement on this matter. Indeed, one area of contention relates to when the 
five-year period should commence. MUller notes that in 2000, the EU 'proposed that the phasing 
out period [is part of] the TDCA agreement and the clock should start when the TDCA was 
implemented' (Wiffler, 2001). The South African side opine that it should begin when the wine 
agreement has been concluded. 
In order to overcome any difficulties in the re-naming of these spirits, the EU will provide E15 
million as a means of compensation". or, depending on definition, development of the wine 
industry. However, the use of this funding, still to be paid by the EU, is vague. There is a debate 
within the industry as to how best this money be used. Miffler states that the formulation indicates 
that it is for development of the wine and spirits industry (#MiAller, 2001). However, Kobus Joubert 
feels that 'we have problems with sherry and port and we must support the sherry and port 
farmers to get on their feet again! ' (#Joubert, 2001). 
This outline has examined the location, history and political economy of the wine industry in 
South Africa. The wine sector before 1990 was characterised by a close connection between 
established wine producers and apartheid governments, the domination of the sector by KWV, 
generally very poor labour conditions and the mixed effects of a consumer boycott and sanctions. 
In 2000, the picture has altered, as exports are booming and some legislation has improved 
16 Fridjhon (#2001) has asserted that it is useful to distinguish between terms such as Port and Sherry, which 
are generic descriptions associated originally with areas of origin, and Grappa and Ouzo which are beverages 
of no particular origin. 
17 Again there is a debate as to the length of time that the compensation will be paid over. Wadula (17 
September 2001) has noted that the EU propose compensation be paid over a twelve year period. 
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conditions for traditionally disadvantaged wine labourers. The wine industry is very important to 
the whole South African economy, both for the employment it provides and the income it 
generates. Some argue that the wine sector is crucial importance to South Africa's economic 
survival (KWV report, 1997). This section has also outlined where wine fits into tile TDCA 
agreement. Although the wine protocol and negotiations has been well documented ill the South 
African media, wine represents only a small proportion of the entire agreement. By focusing orl this 
one aspect the following sections of this chapter can make a more detailed exploration of tile 
themes raised in the preceding chapters. This analysis continues by describing the ctirrctit 
organisational structure of the wine sector, noting how the established wine producers, 
government, and new 'actors' relate to each other. In so doing further detail will hopefully be 
added to the description of the TDCA decision-making process, as Outlined in Chapter Four. 
7.3 Current organisation 
In some ways the changing status of KWV, from quasi-statutory organisation to private company, 
transformed the organisational structure of the wine industry. As already noted above, 'statutory' 
powers were transferred to the government and other institutions. New 'bodies' have also emerged 
from the financial settlement imposed with the dernutualisation of KWV in 1997. This section 
identifies 'actors' within the wine industry and highlights those institutions and 
179 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
CATEGORY ONE: CATEGORY TNN70: 
STATUTORY BODIES INDUSTRY'RESEARCH BODIES 
Crovernment, 'Negotiating Team Wines of SouthAfrica (NVOSA) 
SouthAftican Wine Industrv Information 
Agricultural Trade Forum and Systems (SANOS) 
New Farmers Development Company 
Wine and spirit board Agricultural Research Council 
Wesgro 
Land Bank 
Other research (such as Institute for Wine 
KWV (to 1997) Biotechnology) 
t'.. SAwrr (from 1999) 
X x 
tv 
> 
t, 
CATEGORY FOUR CATEGORY THREE e! 
EMPLOYEES PRODUCERS AND 
REPRESENTATIVE BODIES 
7 
Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU) Exl)orter-, distributors, wholesalers, co- 
operative cellars, estate cellars, non-estate 
Farm and Rural Workers Union of South (private) cellars 
Africa (FRWUSA) 
Representative bodies: 
VinPro (SA)ý South Affican Agricultural 
Union. KWKý South African Port 
Producers Association (SAPA)ý National 
Affican Farmers t Tnion (NAFI I)-, BAASA 
5- CIVIL SOCIETY 
South African Migration Project I 
Centre for Legal Rural Studies (CLRS) 
BAWSI 
Women on Farms Project (WFP) 
r---------------------------------------- 
'SlaLuLory' bodies m 
2 'Non'-Statutory bodies 
a. Development agencies 
b. Research institutions 
C. Miscellaneous 
3 producers and their representative bodies 
4 Employee organisations 
5 Civil Societyand Community Based OrganisdLions 
External Environment IM 
Figure 7.2: Categories of organisations involved in the Wine industry 
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Figure 7.3: The interaction of 'actors' in the wine aspect of the TDCA decision-making process. 
individudIs who were (and are) central to the wine aspects of the South African TDCA decision- 
making process. At the same time the relationship between these different actors is detailed and 
'previously disadvantaged' communities identified. In order to detail these groups and their 
interaction, two diagrams are introduced. Figure 7.2 categorises the different actors into the six 
colour-coded categories, introduced in Chapter Four (4.3.2). Figure 7.3 notes the confirmed and 
tenuous links between the different players in the wine TDCA decision-making structure. These 
diagrams are derived mainly from the information coflated during the interview process and 
complemented by an analysis of wine-industry related literature. It must be noted that these 
diagrams are not taken from any of this literature. Indeed, organisational diagrams for the South 
African wine industry are few and far between. 
There are obvious problems in placing different institutions into simplistic groupings. The 
categorisaLion for instance suggests that it is possible to demarcate clearly between each category. 
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In 'reality' certain organisations could be located in more than one group. For instance, the Centre 
for Rural Legal Studies (CRLS) focuses predominantly on labour standards and could be placed in 
category four. However, as it is classified a Community Based Organisation, it has been located in 
category five, under civil society. Furthermore, the categories might suggest that little interaction 
can occur between categories. This is not the case. WOSA, positioned as d non-sLatutory industry 
body, could, instead of being placed in category two, be placed in category three, as the 
organisation has strong ties with many wine producing comparties. 
1. 'Statutory' Organisations II 
Five 'bodies' have been listed here as 'statutory' bodies. 'Statutory' includes those organisations 
with 'quasi-statutory' powers. The inclusion of SAWIT here is a contentious one, with SAWIT 
officials arguing that it does not, as yet, possess any statutory powers. However, some analysts 
have argued that SAWIT was established to 'evolve into a statutory organ that will regulate the 
wine and spirit business in a sort of sectoral NEDLAC' (Enterprise, anon., December 1997). Table 
7.1 below provides a brief summary of each 'body'. Of these 'statutory' organ-isations, only the 
government, ATF, KWV and SAWIT are listed in figure 7.2 above. 
As described in Chapters Four and Five, govermnenL departments played a major role in the 
TDCA policy formulation process. The NDA was the primary department that considered the 
wine aspects of the agreement, although the DTI was involved at crucial times and had overall 
control of the negotiations. Figure 7.2 also illustrates that there were wine negotiating task teams 
and this comprised representatives of KWV, CWSI, Vinpro, Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery (SFW) 
and the Wine and Spirit Board, as well as the NDA and other government departments (#Mfifler, 
2(-X)I). Towards the end of 2(X)O this team was dissolved and replaced by a wine and spirits 
'implementation task team'. This met on a regular basis to effectively implement and conclude the 
agreement (#Miffler, 2(X)1). This group has a similar composition to the previous task teams and 
, overnment officials claim 
that DEVCO is represented (#3,2001). p 
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'Body' Overview 
Goverriment (1) - National Department of Agriculture (NDA) 
(ii) - Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
(III) - Nego attrig team 
Land Bank Provides finance for empowerment policies. 
For the first nine months of 1999, the Land Bank lent R171.5 
million to 'previously disadvantaged Individuals' (Streek, 9 
December 1999). 
Wine and Spirits Board Administers the appellation system. Members include the 
NDA, Agricultural Research Council, and the 
producer/wholesaler representative groups, Vinpro (SA), and 
CWSI. 
KWV (to 1997) Possessed 'quasi-statutory' powers until 1997. 
Agricultural Trade Forum Meet once a month. Two representatives from the Wine 
(ATF) Industry. Willie De Klerk from KVvTV and Riaan Kruger of Cape 
Wine and Spirits Institute (CWSI). For further details see 
chapter five. 
South African Wine Established - 1999 following the conversion of KWV to 
Industry Trust (SAWIT) company status in December 1997. KWV is sole contributor 
(from 1999) to the Trust, which will total R337 million by 2009. 
SAWIT has control over two Article 21 companies. 
The first - Wine Industry Business Support Company of 
South Africa (BUSCO): -Involved In the promotion of South 
African wine overseas. 
The second - Wine Industry Development Company of South 
Africa (DEVCO): - Responsible for implementing 
empowerment policies, or the 'social upliftment of the 
disadvantaged of the wine industry' (Wynboer Magazine 
(anon. ), 1999). 
Table 7.1: Summary of 'Statutory' institutions. 
At the ATF matters surrounding the EU-SA TDCA were often discussed in the forum. Two 
wine representatives, from KWV and CWSI, represented the wine industry on this forum along 
with representatives of the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU). The NDA took many TDCA- 
related issues to the ATF for discussion, such as the quotas that many agricultural products were 
offered. 
Within the South African TDCA policy formulation process SAWIT had virtually no role as the 
Trust was only established towards the latter stages of negotiations, in 1999. However, it has been 
included in the diagram because, since its formation, it has gained a high degree of importance. A 
source from the NDA stated that a member of DEVCO, a black business person, involved with 
Small, Medium, and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) also participated on the implementation task team 
(further details below). However, their involvement was not known by Marthinus Saunderson, the 
chairperson of DEVCO. 18 In addition, a senior member of SAWIT was used as an unofficial adviser, 
18 He notes that 'If there was a DEVCO member he had no mandate from DEVCO - it was never discussed at 
a level. It was never discussed at DEVCO level - there is no DEVCO mandate! There is no DEVCO position, 
specifically on the agreement' (#Saunderson, 2001). 
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occasionally on issues relating to the wine agreement, to the previous NDA Minister, Derek 
Hdnekom. 
2. Non-Statutory/Industr3yResearch Bodies 
The second category is an eclectic array of associations that have been divided between 
development agencies, research institutions/ individuals, and miscellaneous industry 
organisations. These are discussed separately below. 
Devc1opment agencies 
Table 7.2 below lists a number of 'development agencies' that assist in developing the agriculLura I 
industry, especially the wine sector, and in particular previously disadvantaged farmers. This is 
by no means a comprehensive list of all development bodies. Figure 7.3 indicates that these 
agencies have confirmed links with wine producers such as KWV, as well as historically 
marginalised groups. 
Name Description 
New Farmers KVvT was the founder member of this company. 
Development Company Aim is to 'empower disadvantaged farmers', yet also make a 
prof-it. 
V#rESGRO Western Cape Development Agency. 
Attempts to attract foreign investors into a diversity of 
industries (including wine) into the Western Cape region. They 
currently have 27 projects - worth R1.5 billion in the pipeline. 
In last financial year they received R1.3 billion in foreign 
investment, which provided 1,000 jobs (Cape Times (anon. ), 30 
January 2001). Particularly promotes SMME growth. 
Khula Enterprise Finance Established to support traditionally marginalised communities. 
Limited A majority shareholder is the DTI. 
Table 7.2: Development agencies 
Research 
It has been estimated that in the agricultural field there are 4,000 researchers. One of the major 
tasks for these orgdnisations is to promote the empowerment of indigenous/ disadvantaged 
farmers. The most important of these groups are listed in table 7.3 below. No evidence has been 
uncovered that suggests these organisations had any significant role in formulating the EU-SA 
TDCA. However, SAWIS probably provided data on the wine industry for negotiators. 
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Names Details 
South African Wine 
Industry Information 
and Systems (SAWIS) 
Responsible for producing statistics and disseminating 
information on the wine industry. This includes producing an 
annual Wine Directory. This is a role taken over from KWV. 
Winetech Wine Industry Network for Expertise and Technology 
Established in 1996 to co-ordinate research on the wine industry, 
and is responsible for constructing a strategic study for the whole 
industry (Ewert, 13 October 2000, private correspondence). 
Programme for Land This research organisation, within the Government School at the 
and Agrarian Studies University of the Western Cape (UWC), examines labour 
(PLAAS) processes, agrarian and land reform within the agricultural 
environs. 
Table 7.3: Research institutions 
Non-statittory inditstry bodies 
Figure 7.3 notes just one institution in this sub-category, but it is perhaps the most important 
organisations in this category, notably in terms of influence that they possess within the wille 
sector. WOSA, previously named the South African Wine and Spirit Exporters Association 
(SAWSEA), WdS established in 1978 and is dominated by major wholesalers such as KWV, 
Distillers, SLeflenbosch Farmers Winery, Gilbeys and Douglas Green Bellingham. WOSA currently 
has 103 members and its main responsibility is for the promotion of export opportunities. It is an 
affiliate to the wholesaler's represenLa Live organisation, CWSI. These wholesalers account for 80% 
of WOSA exports, l" although co-operative exporters are gaining a wider base. As is evident from 
figure 7.3, WOSA has close. links with these producers and wholesalers. Furthermore, it is also 
'related' to SAWIT as it receives substantive funding from BUSCO. According to Chief Officer, Su 
Birch, WOSA is hoping, to become an official, governmenL-sponsored export council (#Birch, 
2001). 
3. Producer organisations, employers and representative bodies I 
This category includes some 300 wholesalers, produces, exporters, and farmers, both 'established' 
as well as'new entrants' or Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs), who are involved in 
exports. In order to clarify this category further three tables are introduced. The first, table 7.4, 
charts the types of wine producers - ranging from exporters to private cellars. The second, table 
7.5, details the numerical division of these producers. The third, table 7.6, lists the representative 
orr, dnisdtions. 
Which is 70% of current wine exports (#Birch. 200 1). 
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Types Details 
Exporters/ Firms include Vinimark, which distributes exports for 30 producers 
Distributors in the Western Cape. 
In the UK market, four merchants (including Raisin Social and 
Tesco) have been highlighted as being involved In not only exporting 
wine, but also offering advice on marketing (such as suggesting an 
improvement of labour conditions). 
Wholesalers Includes KWV, Distillers, and Stellenbosch Farmers Winery. 
Co-operatives Traditionally smaller producers. 
Many have been praised for their 'progressive' and modern 
practices. Co-operative firms include Stmonsig (a large exporter), 
Vredendal, and Swartland. 
Estates Big names include Fairview, Glen Carlou, Warwick, Paul Sauer, 
Wildekrans and ZandvIiet estates. The Fairview estate Is 
'representative of the modem South African outloole (Walton, 1997, 
134). 
Private Cellars 
Table 7A Wine Producers: Types of organisation 
The wine production process involves the growing of grapes, 2) which are then passed on to cellars 
for the pressing of grapes into wine. As table 7.5 illustrates, there are 4,664 growers, 295 cellars, and 56 
bulk wine buyers. " Those growing grapes are dominated by a large majority of small 
TYPES OF PRODUCERS NUMBERS 
Primary Wine Producers Tons of Grapes Pressed Nos. 
1-100 2345 
100 -500 1653 
Soo -1000 470 
1000- 5000 194 
5000 -10000 2 
Total 4664 
Wine cellars which crush grape Coops 69 
Private Wine Cellars - Estates 79 
Private Wine Cellars -Non-Estates 139 
Producing Wholesalers 8 
Total 295 
Number of bulk wine buyers Wholesalers 46 
Exporters 10 
Total 56 
Table 7.5: Wine Industry Structure (Source: IDC, 1999) 
farms that produce less than 500 tons of grapes per annum. They can sell these to any cellar and face 
much competition to do so (IDC, 1999b, 42). Of the cellars, 69 are termed co-operative, 79 are private 
estates, and 139 are labelled 'non-estate'/private cellars. A further eight wholesalers also produce wine. 
The figures for these categories are constantly changing as many new cellars are being formed, and 
20 It must be remembered that wine farmers are often also fruit farmers (Cape Business News (anon. ), May 
1998). Ewert and Hammann (1996,153) argue that this was due to stagnant domestic markets, where many 
wine farmers were forced to diversify (often into fruit). 
21 Wines of South Africa (2000) puts the figure for cellars at 315. 
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there is a trend for co-operatives to change into estates or limited company status (Cape Business News, 
October 1997). Co-operatives produce about 75% of South Africa's wine. " In 1996,59 co-operatives 
produced 864,291 tons of wine grapes, with the average co- 
Representative Details 
KWV Also a spokesbody for primary producers - wine farmers and 
co-operatives. Have representatives on many forums, 
including wine Industry task teams, and ATF. 
CWSI Established - 1967. 
Represents interests of producing and distributing 
wholesalers of wines, spirits and liqueurs. Members include: 
Stellenbosch Farmers Winery; Distillers Corporation, 
Gilbeys; Douglas Green Bellingham; Seagram of South 
Africa; Jonkheer; Mooiuitsig Wineries. 
Represented on statutory bodies (Wine and Spirit Board), 
non-statutory bodies (Winetech), and at the EU-SA TDCA 
discussions with government (represented by director Riaan 
Kruger). 
South African Wine and Riaan Kruger is also chair of this organisation. 
Spirit Employers 
Association (SAWSEA) 
Vinpro South African wine farmers' representative organisation for 
wine producers. It also produces services as directed by 
KWV (Huyssteen, 8 January 1999). 
KWX Established 1949 to represent co-operative wine cellars. In 
1998 its members produced an estimated 75% of wine sold 
In South Africa. It now also represents wine producers and 
one estate, not only co-operatives. 
SA Agricultural Union Independent producer and voluntary trade organisation. 
(SAAU). Comprises provincial agricultural unions, commodity 
Now called SA Agric organisations and businesses owned by farmers (such as co- 
operatives). SAAU were represented at the Agricultural Trade 
Forum during the EU-SA TDCA negotiations. 
Cape Estate Wine Producers' Formed - 1968. Represents wine estate makers that 
Association (CEWPA) produce their own wine. 
South African Port 
Producers' Association 
(SAPPA): 
National African Farmers This union, established for black (previously excluded) 
Union (NAFU) farmers in 1991, has been funded by the NDA and the US 
department of agriculture. Known as the black counterpart 
to Agric SA. 
Black Agricultural Represent qualified black agriculturalists. 
Association for South Africa 
(BAASA) 
Table 7.6: Producer representative organisations 
operative amounting to 14,649 tons. However, these cellars are diverse, ranging from the dedicated 
producer of wine only (producing 100,000 tons) to one that produces a few thousand and also deals 
with fruit and tobacco. These producers also have a large array of representatives, which to some 
analysts conveys the perception that the industry is fragmented and divided. These representatives 
are listed in table 7.6 (above). Three of these representative bodies participated in the wine aspect of 
22 Furthermore, one third of co-operatives produce two-thirds of the crop. However, numbers are blurred, 
because some co-ops buy grapes and bulk wine from each other or from outside growers. 
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the EU-SA TDCA discussions. One of those, SA Agric, was involved in the general details of 
discussions, as noted in Chapter Four, via participation in the ATF and in having a special adviser 
to the previous Agriculture Minister, Derek Hanekom. However, they were only involved on the 
fringes of the wine TDCA debate. From the information gathered two actors, KWV and CWSI 
appear to represent the industry on most issues, 3particularly the EU-SA TDCA. They are not the 
only representatives but the impression obtained from their representation on many wine forums is 
that they dominate the wine industry representative process. " Indeed, the chairman of KWV 
added weight to this impression when he implied that KWV and CWSI were the main 
representatives of the industry in the EU free trade talks when, in an address to KWV shareholders, 
he stated that in relation to the EU-SA TDCA negotiations, the: 
KWV, in conjunction with CWSI and the Departments of Agriculture and Trade 
and Industry, will still attempt to serve the best interests of wine and spirits 
producers (KWV, 2001). 
Despite the reining in of KWV powers, they remain immensely influential, as they fund 
SAWIT, helped establish New Farmers, and effectively run VinPro (ItFridjhon, 2001). The table also 
illustrates that the representative 'membership' for these organisations; tends to overlap (such as 
KWK, KWV and CWSI)- It could be claimed that the industry has too many representative bodies 
and that their creation is the result of a fragmentation of the representation within the industry. It is 
clear that no one group speaks as a unified voice for the sector. The dominance of these white 
representatives and the continuation of mainly wine farm owners, has led some to claim that 'South 
Africa is in a state of economic apartheid... and it is perfectly clear in the South African wine 
industry. The ownership of the majority of mainly wine farms, six years on from 1994, is still white' 
(#Adams, 2001). 
23 KWV and CWSI, mainly through their representatives, Willie De Klerk and Riaan Kruger respectively, 
also sit on a numerous wine and agricultural industry forums, ranging from Winetech, the ATF, New World 
Wine Producers Forum, and SAWIT. 
24 De Klerk (#2001) remarked that he and Riaan Kruger 'were members of the broader negotiation team at all 
times, but only a selection of people from that team participated in the actual negotiations. Only on one 
occasion were we part of the latter although we were always present at meetings of the broader team that did 
all strategising for the actual negotiations. The negotiating team had several task teams to do research into 
issues such as oenological practices, intellectual property rights, viticulture, etc. These were made up of the 
relevant specialists. We have also been members of the Wine Agreement Implementation Task Team, 
appointed also by the Minister for Agriculture, advising on implementation and the text of the Agreement, but 
have to wait until all outstanding issues have been resolved before we will be able to finish our work in this 
regard'. 
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4. Employee Organisations/Representatives I 
As noted above, few wine farm workers belong to a trade union. Despite the low uiiiollisatioll 
rate, the number of trade unions associated directly or indirectly with the wine sector proliferate. 
Ruth Hall estimates that 16 unaffiliated unions exist (#Hall, 2(X)]). Of the affiliated unions, the 
FAWU and the Farm and Rural Workers Union of South Africa (FRWUSA) are best known. Ewert 
and Hammann (1999) rate FAWU (affiliated to COSATU) as the strongest union amongst co- 
operative cellarS25 and large estates. According to FAWU's bargaining secretary, Kdtishi 
Masemola, the union became involved in the EU-SA TDCA by convening a summit which 
included companies from the wine sector, as well other sectors (red meat, dairy) and lobbied 
parliaMel-IL. 2n 
Although unionised labour represents a small percentage of overall Idbour in wine production, 
many wine farm owners interviewed claimed that there is a farm workers association, called 
Plaaswerkersvereniging, which represents 90% of wine farm Idbourers on the Western Cape. JG 
Le Roux for instance notes that 95% of his workforce belong to this orgailisation. However, as 
section 7.5 elaborates, the accuracy of these figures is open to debate. Therefore, the relationship 
between Plaas and traditionally marginalised peoples is contested, and this is displayed in the 
contested relationship (tenuous link) between Plaas and 'disadvantaged' Idbourers; in figure 7.3. 
This figure also appears to demonstrate that the. only input that labour representatives had in the 
South African TDCA structure was via the Agricultural Trade Forum and informal discussions 
with advisers of the previous Agricultural Minister, Derek Hanekom (#Goldbldtt, 2001). 
5. Community Based Organisations (CBOs) 
CBC)s and NGOs in the wine sector before the end of apartheid l0giSldtion Lended to act as dnti- 
apartheid organisations, forming one side of a very polarised debate in South Africa until 1990 
(#Ewert, 2001). The other side were the established wine sector outlined above. Ewert maintains 
that the camps are just as polarised in 2001, but the issue of contention is the current political state 
2' Ewer( and Hammarm (1999) note that in co-operative Nvine cellars union densitv is 95% (75% of these are 
African workers). 
26 Particularly the Agricultural and Trade and Industry Chambers. 
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and structure of the wine industry (#Ewert, 2MI). These organisdtions are also indirectly 
involved in representing interests in the wine communities. Two of these, Women on Farms 
Project (WFP) and CRLS are based in Stellenbosch. WFP 'strives to strengthen the capacity of 
women who live and work on farms to claim their rights and fulfil their needs' (Women on Farms 
Project, 2001), and are aware of the exclusion that women have historically faced in wine decision- 
making structures. The CRLS, established in 1991, 'dedicates itself to the equitable distribution of 
power and resources in the rural areas of South Africa' (Centre for Rural Legal Studies, 2MI). 
Input into the CRLS emanates from trade unions, other CBOs, rural advice officers and farm 
worker forums (#Hall, 2(M). 
A further group, the Black Association for the Wine and Spirits Industry (BAWSI), has been 
established for previously disadvantaged peoples in the wine industry, primarily 'non-white' 
labourers, in order to initiate the transformation of the industry. Included are representatives of 
CBOs, NGOs and trade unions. The organisation aims for the facilitation of black ownership and 
representation of farm labourer rights. 
As figure 7.3 displays, these groups are on the periphery of the South African structure 
supporting, the TDCA decision-making process - the main link appears to be via SAWIT, who 
were not directly involved in the negotiations, and an ambiguous link via the NDA negotiating 
Leam. 
6. External environment 
The influence of external actors has already been referred to in the previous section, especially 
comments that referred to EU subsidisaLion, which affects the climate that South African firms 
market their wine. Obviously the EU is d major 'actor' that cannot be ignored when considering 
the wine aspect of the TDCA decision-making process. So too are supermarkets who, apart from 
exerting pressure on farms to raise labour standards, also sell a vast quantity of exported South 
African wine. It must also not be forgotten that external actors played a central role in sanctions 
and boycotts that impacted upon the South African wine industry before 1990. 
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Summary 
This section has furthered the description of the TDCA decision-making structure by considering 
how the wine industry was incorporated into the TDCA policy formulation process by detailing the 
'players' involved in TDCA decision-making processes within the wine sector. Wine has no single 
body that represents the industry and it can be argued that the sector appears to be highly 
fragmented. Established actors such as KWV still possess much influence. From this description, 
and taking into account the conclusions drawn from Chapters Four and Five, four groups seem to 
have had a significant influence on the formulation of the wine part of the TDCA. They are as 
follows: 
" The first is at the statal level where government ministers and senior director-generals within 
departments decide on policy. 
" The second, at a more operational level, is the negotiating team. 
" The third are the large companies and individuals that represent them, who are included in the 
various task teams and industry forums (such as KWV and CWSI). 
" The fourth are those actors in the external environment. 
As noted in previous chapters, it is difficult to calibrate the extent of influence that each actor 
played in shaping the wine aspect of the TDCA. However, it appears from this micro-study that 
those representing the wine industry had considerable opportunities to present their case to the 
NDA negotiating team. In addition, this section suggests that in negotiations surrounding the wine 
protocol of the TDCA, 'established' institutions are virtually the sole representatives of the wine 
industry. For instance, KWV and CWSI have had (and have) participated on various negotiating 
task teams and the Agricultural Trade Forum. These established actors represent some of the large 
businesses and producers in the wine sector. Many of the other actors appear to be on the fringes of 
the TDCA decision-making structure. However, labour and black business representatives are 
becoming increasingly incorporated. Evidence has been presented that suggests that the NDA 
implementation task team for instance has included a member of DEVCO (though not in that 
capacity) - perceived to be a representative of a previously marginalised community. Furthermore, 
in the wider wine industry context, institutions such as SAWIT provide (albeit very recent and 
limited) opportunities for members from 'the community. The extent to which all stakeholders 
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from categories one to five have felt included into the decision-making process is detailed iii sectioii 
7.5 below. Prior to that, section 7.4 records the wine sectors perception of the impact of the TDCA. 
7.4 Perceptions of the EU-SA TDCA 
Criticism of the agreement emanated from virtually all of the wine industry and coiitradicted 
'decision-makers' views articulated in Chapter Six that stated the sector was likely to benefit froin 
the FTA. One wine industry interviewee, with very close links to government, suggested that those 
who said that wine will benefit 'do not know what they are talking about' (#3,2001). Only five of 
the twenty-one interviewee's withiii the wine industry Could identify anything positive about the 
agreement. Even these comments lacked lucidity and detail. For example, SaLmderson, without 
elaborating, stated 'I think it [the agreement] will have a positive impact oii the industry' 
(#Saunderson, 2001). Hall noted that those producing for 'niche' markets would be the 'big 
winners', although her comments were mainly reserved for fruit farmers - not wine producers. 
Fridjhon argues that: 
I think that there will be general benefits for South Africa and for the EU. In other 
words I see the agreement as for all its hiccups producing an improvement in trade 
flow which would be beneficial to both sides. I don't see the agreement as bringing 
particularly enhanced benefits for the wine industry. I think that it is true that we 
will be able to export more wine and under certain circumstances take benefit from 
the duty deal, but the reality is that purchasers in the EU are not buying wines on 
the basis of trade deals... The wine farms will get more money in Rand terms, but 
the collapsing Rand is giving them more money in Rand terms anyway (#Fridjhon, 
2001). 
Finally, Ewert views the agreement as potentially empowering, stating that it 'could potentially 
promote 'empowerment' by giving preferential access [when allocating quotas] to farmers and 
cellars that are socially 'progressive" (Ewert, 13 October 2000, private correspondence). 
Concerns and criticisms relating to the agreement can be grouped into six categories. These are: 
1. Fear of unemployment 
2. Lack of development perspective 
3. Anger over traditional expressions 
4. Ambiguity of the financial 'compensation' package 
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5. The likely impact of the quota to be minuscule 
6. Antipathy towards the EU 
The potential for unemployment is a fear expressed by the FAWU representatives interviewed. 
Masemola for instance argues that the 2,000 jobs lost (20% of the overall workforce) from the 
merger between SFW and Distillers was mainly due to pressures of trade liberalisation, which the 
EU-SA TDCA induces (4tMasemola, 2001). 
Two interviewees (Saunderson and Goldblatt) argued that in terms of the trade aspect of the 
TDCA, 'development' of traditionally marginalised peoples in the wine industry was not being 
advanced. Goldblatt for instance asserted that: 
... black empowerment initiatives, I don't think are benefiting from the trade 
agreement. I think what they are benefiting from is good marketing and good 
marketing is able to bypass any trade agreement and trade treaty... I would be 
very surprised if the SA-EU trade agreement to date has any direct benefit on 
black empowerment groups. (#Goldblatt, 2001). 
The furore surrounding 'port and sherry' negotiations provoked the most criticism, 
particularly from the 'established order'. Kruger detailed his objections thus: 
obviously my people are fanatical trademark people. That is their whole 
livelihoods. So, from that you can understand that they have been very nervous, 
about possible implications from this agreement... We are petrified, Intellectual 
Property Rights are becoming more and more important and we are very 
uncertain even at this late stage on how exactly the wording would read. I 
personally think that when we in our naivet6 went into these negotiations we 
thought that it is going to improve the flow of products - imports and exports - we 
are going to recognise each others oenological and viticulture practices. We are 
going to have one form instead of ten forms... the irony is that there is a technical 
side to the agreement, but the EU pushed it away ... their focus all along has been 
intellectual property rights... our official position is that South Africa's industry is 
giving more that we are getting. (#Kruger, 2001). 
However, the extent of the detrimental impact on the port and sherry industry has been 
queried by Fridjhon who argues that: 
The reality is that the smart end of the sherry market is tiny anyway. South 
African sherry at that level is not an export product. Trade to the EU is only 10,20, 
30,000 cases... such a small amount should not have endangered the agreement... 
The vagueness surrounding the E15 million financial package to 'develop' the wine industry 
has also caused consternation, with Kruger noting: 
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there is uncertainty - who should get it, who shouldn't get it, will it be paid, you 
know, on the one hand they say it is not directly linked to the phasing out of port 
and sherry. On the other hand, they say they will pay it in instalments as we phase 
out port and sherry. Speaking as a lawyer, I throw my hands up in the airl 
(#Kruger, 2001). 
Moreover, Krige asks: 
... how would that [compensation] get channelled back into the wine industry? Would a government that we all know has got financial problems etceteras and 
you have got all the has-beens; [sic] in the country... and wouldn't that money end 
up in a big black hole somewhere? Any funds that do get channelled back to South 
Africa... should get channelled back through the industry and not through the 
government because through government it is just going to disappear. (#Krige, 
2001). 
The delay in the implementation of the quota (which is outside the wine agreement) has also 
provoked criticism. It is the only area of the main trade agreement that still has to be initiated. 
Kruger notes: 
... that's actually where I think a lot of 
frustration from my side of the industry 
comes from [because] there seems to be a lot of contradiction in terms. Yes, there is 
the quota which is part of the Free Trade Agreement, but it has not been 
implemented yet. We believe for the simple reason that they say the wine 
agreement has not been finalised yet and we haven't started phasing out port and 
sherry. (#Kruger, 2001). 
However there is widespread belief within the wine sector that the impact of the quota, 
despite amounting to a significant proportion of overall exports to the EU, will be minuscule. For 
instance, Birch comments that 'I don't think it is going to make a radical difference and one of the 
things that really scares me about it is as I understand it the money does not go to us, the money 
goes to the importer in the form of a rebate, it is not a reduction, it is a rebate' (4tBirch, 2001). 
Furthermore, JG Le Roux feels that the quota is 'a move in the right direction, but it doesn't mean 
much. It would probably [earn] more or less 25 cents a litre... so, the benefits are very small' UG Le 
Roux, 2001). Indeed, Kruger argues that the quota is almost worthless when arguing: 
I am telling you, industry, the section that I speak for... we can actually live 
without this agreement! We don't see so many benefits! Our intellectual property 
rights are much more important to us than 32m million duty-free quota which 
works out ... at R27 million... It's negligible when you start looking at the prices, 
you know. 
... it isn't as if there is going to be a cash incentive of R27m. It just doesn't work 
that way! I mean, sure you sit down with your agent and you try to slash prices 
but I mean it works out at 65 South African cents! That is the price difference -5 
pence! On a bottle of wine which retails for E3.99! It's nothing! ... I can tell you that is one thing that irritated us no end the last 18 months or so because we kept on 
reading in our own newspapers, and we know it was leaked or initiated by the EU 
[that] South Africa are dragging their heels, and they are losing this incredible 
duty-free quota, which would increase their exports by ... double it... so really! So, 
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as for as the quota is concerned, it is not nothing, but it is negligible. (#Kruger, 
2001). 
The debate surrounding port/sherry traditional expressions, ambiguity over financial 
assistance to develop the industry, and the non-implementation of the quotas have all contributed 
towards a feeling of antipathy towards the EU. Saunderson reflects this perception when stating, 
'we have an EU agreement which is more in favour of the EU people once again than in terms of 
South Africa' (#Saunderson. 2001). Anger at EU practices was voiced by many, including De Klerk 
who asserted that: 
I believe that the concepts of the European Union are completely outlasted and 
outdated. And I believe that the European Union will have to have a very in depth 
and a very serious look at the strategies at the agreements that they signed... I do 
not believe that the European Union is upholding its WTO obligations. This will 
bring serious conflict with the rest of the world. (#De Klerk, 2001). 
A source within the agricultural sector added that, 'As far as we are concerned ... let me put it 
very bluntly - we have got no faith in that agreement. Because in some or other way we know the 
status quo will be maintained and we will have to enter the market as the situation is now' (#2, 
2001). This source adds that no matter what happens, the EU will provide subsidies in order to 
negate any benefits that might have a detrimental impact on EU farmers. This antipathy is not only 
directed at the EU, but also non-statal EU actors, such as UK supermarkets. Birch contended that: 
we have increasingly now, this consolidation of supermarket buying power and the 
ability of those guys to really screw you and what happens every time there is a 
depreciation of the Rand they try to screw you on that, and now that there is a 
reduction in tariffs they will try and screw you on that! So the only people that are 
going to win in my opinion are the buyers! They have such power, the 
supermarkets and the pressure on them to deliver a profit... There is quite a lot of 
buying power in the hands of very few people. (#Birch, 2001). 
The result of these overwhelmingly negative perceptions has led some within the sector to ask 
if the agreement has any potential benefits. No stakeholders, from previously disadvantaged 
labourer to established producers, appear to be positively affected by the TDCA. A senior figure 
close to the wine industry and goverrunent negotiators comments: 
I must honestly say... my perception is, via interaction with people who are very close 
to the whole process, is it really to our benefit? Is it really so dramatic that it is going 
to change agriculture in South Africa or make a substantial contribution to really 
change things? Overall I detect scepticism amongst people who were very, very close 
to the process. (#2,2001). 
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This scepticism has led to a great deal of uncertainty about the agreement. Goldblatt notes this 
when stating: 
... the thing about all these trade agreements and trade regii-nes 
is that (, very 
country reserves escape clauses and escape provisions... wllicll theoretically has 
the potential to make an absolute nonsense of any trade agreement. And tilell tile 
other thing that is very, very seldom considered is the powers of government and 
quasi-government agencies to influence what consumers actually look for and are 
concerned about. So, for example, while there is nothing iii the F'U trade 
agreement about say labour practise, all that You need is for writers and tile good 
in Hampstead to stand up and say South Africa practices bad labour practice on 
its farms, and there goes half the market, so the physical act of actually signing a 
treaty is subject to both political vagaries and social vagaries whicli are capable of 
manipulation. (#Goldblatt, 2001). 
The previous section noted that those representing the wine industry at the negotiating task- 
teams had considerable opportunity to represent the interests of the wine sector. From the 
conclusion drawn in Chapter Six it would appear that the 'offeiisive' strategy noted to have beeii 
employed by the wine representatives in reducing tariffs had succeeded as the industry had been 
identified a potential 'winner' from the agreement. However, the views articulated here tend to 
contradict these earlier findings. The overwhelming majority of comments made on the potential 
impact of the TDCA were critical. From these perceptions one could argue that the agreement 
appears not to have the wine industry's best interests at heart. If this is the case then the influence 
that wine representatives had on the policy formulation process is therefore limited. Instead, some 
of these comments imply that the actors deerried to be more influential are external ones. This 
applies particularly to the EU, with interviewees arguing that it will be the people of the EU that 
will benefit from the agreement, to the detriment of those in South Africa. The influence of different 
actors within the wine sector and external actors is discussed more fully in the following section. 
7.5 Perceptions of the TDCA decision-making process 
The description and examination of the wine industry's decision-making process in section 7.3 
suggested that four groupings had most access and influence in the wine aspects of the TDCA 
policy formulation process. At the same time it noted that the wine industry's structure was 
fragmented and that the sector lacked a single voice representing all the sector. The section also 
suggested that access to wine decision-making structures for previously disadvantaged peoples 
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was gradually happening, but at a very slow pace. Most traditionally margindlised stakeholders 
and representatives appeared, at best, to be on the peripheries of the TDCA decision-ma king 
process. The previous section, 7.4, illustrated that all categories of the win(, industry were 
dissatisfied with the. TDCA, either in terms of the potential access it would have or on the 
proposed articles within the wine protocol. This section provides an account from all sides of how 
inclusive the wine TDCA decision-making process was regarded. These perspectives often 
compete and contradict each other, but the aim is to allow an vqudl articulation of all viewpoints. 
The section is divided into six parts, following the categories as laid down in figure 7.2. 
'Statutory' Organisations II 
This examination deals with the three main 'actors' that were identified by inLerviewees as beirq; 
the most important 'statutory' groups associated to the wine decision-making process in general, 
and the TDCA process in particular. These are governmenL/NDA, the negotiating team, and 
SAWIT. 
1. GovernmentINDA 
There has been much publicity about tense relations between goverrument and the wine industry 
since 1994. This was discussed briefly in section 7.2 above. Indeed, many wine establishment 
figures felt that the ANC government were hostile towards the wine industry. For instance, Su 
Birch of WOSA remarked that: 
I think there is this big schism between ourselves and Pretoria. This feeling that 
you know of all these rich, white people, makes, sitting on their beautiful Cape 
Dutch estates. The don't give a fuck about Idbour, thev don't care about y 
government, they are all anti-ANC, etceteras, etceteras. So it is a huge problem. 
(#Birch, 2001). 
Indeed, some feel that such hostility has resulted in the wine industry being discriminated against 
by the national government. Kobus Joubert of KWK contends that: 
A very big problem for us on the producer side is research. They [the national 
government] should allocate to the Western Cape, R86() million for research and 
they [have] cut it down to R68 million - only for the Western Cape! And I am 
talking politics now, but [this occurs] because the Western Cape is the only 
province of the country that is not ANO! (#Joubert, 2001). 
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Many of the producers interviewed felt excluded to some degree by the present Minister for 
Agriculture because of the lack of time that the minister was prepared to grant to see leading 
figures within the wine industry, and indeed the farming community in general. joubert and Sakkie 
Van der Vyver complained that: 
the minister of Agriculture - we cannot get hold of her! The KWV cannot get hold 
of her!... They do not even answer the phone! There is contact on a social level [at] 
wine functions and etceteras... but if you want to make an appointment there is no 
hope. (#Joubert, 2001). 
KWV is perceived to [be the main wine representative] and ... so they are the only [company] that can get access to the Minister, but it was publicly stated a few 
weeks ago by the chairman of the KWV, that after 44 phone calls there was no 
reply! (# Van der Vyver, 2001) 
Despite such comments some industry representatives praised the NDA and DTI for the access 
allowed for the few wine industry representatives. One of these, Willie De Klerk (#2001) contended: 
They [the government] have done more in being participative and being 
transparent in the process of negotiating a possible agreement with the European 
Union on wine... than any other country in the world... So, we are very, very 
happy and very fortunate and it is gratifying to have that situation. 
The other, Riaan Kruger (CWSI) adds: 
We have no quarrel with him [Erwin] - no fight. In actual fact we wrote to him, 
even when he gave up port and sherry and said thanks a lot, that you held out so 
long... I must say 10 out of 10 for our goverrunent. (#Kruger, 2001). 
That De Klerk and Kruger praised the NDA for its inclusiveness is not surprising since both 
participated on the TDCA wine taskteams and, as Goldblatt notes below, the organisations they 
represent have regular contact with some NDA officials. What is more surprising is that FAWU 
union representative Katishi Masemola, who was not involved in the wine taskteams, still argued 
that 'we were very happy with the representation [accorded, particularly] the fact that we were 
allowed to be there [at the ATF]' (#Masemola, 2001). Furthermore, NDA civil servants also felt that 
communication between 'industry' and government was good. Gunter Milller noted that 'there is 
an open discussion on all issues relevant to trade'. Steven Goldblatt, who was a special adviser to 
ex-NDA Minister Derek Hanekom, explained that efforts were made to include representatives 
from many groups, including labour. He contended that: 
Various attempts were made to contact organised labour from the Ministry... not 
necessarily to bring them on board but to inform them, and I was involved in 30 
such telephone calls, including one to the union to the labour representative at 
NEDLAC, and the end of the day it was quite clear that the farm worker union... 
were engaged in internecine warfare and in battles of survival (#Goldblatt, 2001). 
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Therefore, although attempts were made to contact labour and establish their views on issues 
relating to the wine agreement, their focus was blinded somewhat by internal struggles. 
Despite such attempts interviewees were also critical of the statal process. De Klerk (#2001) 
argued that government has not taken all of their concerns on board. Furthermore, FAWU 
representatives were not happy with the 'limited information disclosure by government officials' 
(#Masemola, 2001) Likewise, KWK officials were not content with the secrecy surrounding the wine 
negotiations: 
... everything was kept below the blanket - that was the problem for us! We got little feed back... they decided that this agreement is very sensitive and they 
cannot let anything out ... but nothing has happened yet! And that is our problem - 
we don't know where we are, we don't know what is going on and even the KWV 
cannot answer me! (#Joubert, 2001). 
A further issue that was identified concerned the apparent 'split' within the NDA, particularly 
when Hanekom was minister, as under his tenure 'the NDA did not deal with any of Hanekom's 
representatives because the department was absolutely in conflict with the Minister... what you 
landed up with was people [siding] with the old [established] institutions' (#20,2001). This link 
between the NDA and KWV/CWSI was also highlighted by Goldblatt (#2001) who argued that 
'most of the people from the NDA received their intelligence, and therefore their perceptions from 
CWSI and KWV'. 
2. Negotiating task-teams 
The various task teams comprised of individuals representing the NDA and industry. Some felt 
that these forums were representative. For example, MUller thought that: 
what emerged in our negotiations team, and now in the task team, is fairly 
representative of what was going on in wine... of course there are detailed 
differences, that will always happen. I think one thing the wine industry obviously 
did not want to give up the names port and sherry... but as these negotiations 
teams we are only an advisory capacity to the Minister and the Minister makes a 
decision. On port and sherry it was ruled to be in the national interest to give it 
up. Obviously the wine industry was not very happy with that. (#Milller, 2001). 
MiIller also argued that he did not believe that the team should be representative, as the main 
requirement of each team member was for their knowledge and experience of the industry; 'these 
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people are not really representing. They have been appointed by the Minister for their expertise. 
They are not formally appointed for representing anybody (#Miiller, 2001). 
However, Johann Krige (Kanonkop), when asked if this team was unified, said: 
No. The guys that were looking at the system and the structure and dealings and 
what not are all lawyers - legal trained people - not practising law per se but being 
involved in legal activities as legal consultants, but they have no sense about what 
is going on in the market place - zi1ch! How do you structure something like that if 
you have got a lot of legal eagles sitting there trying to work something out? From 
my point of view one must look at the promotional activities and those funds 
come back, how is it going to be spent? It must be spent on promoting the 
industry and to get lawyer trained people to do that is impossible. (#Krige, 2001). 
Furthermore, De Klerk contended that the taskteams did influence the outcome of the wine aspect 
of the TDCA: 
... someone like Minister Erwin and the minister of Agriculture, certainly paid a hell of a lot of attention to what was recommended. The exception I think is the 
well-publicised situation surrounding port and sherry (#De Klerk, 2001). 
3. SAWIT 
It has been argued by some senior figures in government that the Trust might be able to act as an 
official voice for the wine industry in the form of a 'wine cabinet', ensuring more representation, 
and alleviate the perceived fractious organisational structure of the wine industry (#20,2001). One 
interviewee suggested that KWV opposed such a move (#20,2001). Whatever the 'truth', some 
SAWIT officials felt that they should have played a role in the negotiations. Marthinus Saunderson 
(#2001) argued that: 
I don't think there was proper development representation. Obviously, I didn't 
doubt for one moment... when any government official, when they talk about the 
agreement that they have South African interests and development interests on 
their heart, but I would like to see that [development is] really given an 
opportunity to have direct input. 
However, De Klerk (KWV) argues that SAWIT's status precludes them from representative 
duties. He notes: 
Let's put this thing in perspective. The Wine Industry Trust is a trust that has been 
set up by KWV and government. The money comes from this company and the idea 
behind DEVCO [and BUSCO and SAWITI... is to render services... It does not make 
them a role player. It certainly does not make role players with any regard to any 
international agreements because they are not going to produce grapes, they are not 
going to produce wine, they are not going to produce brandy or anything of the 
sort. Quite frankly, I don't see any need for DEVCO to be present, because who 
does it actually represent? 
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Question marks also relate to SAWIT's internal decision-niaking process and composition. 
The ambiguous and relatively secret nature of NDA's appointment of Trustees has led some to 
believe that the appointment process is'shady' (#20,2()()1). Furthermore, the inclusiveness of farni 
worker representative groups was also queried. JG Le Roux asks why unions are represented as 
DEVCO, yet Plaaswerkersverei-dging is not. 
Non-Statutory/Indusft3yResearch Bodies M- 
- 
The only group that was commented on from this category was WC6A. As with SAWIT, those 
linked with WOSA hope that this organisaLion will have more influence in the wine decision- 
making process in the future. This view is exemplified by Krig(ý who argues that: 
I happen to be on the board of WOSA so I am biased already, but to my mind 
WOSA would probably become one of the most important bodies in this country 
in the wine industry, without any doubt... I don't think a lot of people 
understand the importance of exports to the industry. A lot of people have not 
got to grips with it really... So, WOSA should be a major player in activities such 
as these... [Furthermore] it is now quite representative - they have got a 
constitution (AceLeras, they have got people from SAWIT on their board, they are 
transparent, they look after the so-called 'has-beens' in the country, so it is a very 
transparent organisaLion. 
Producer organisation and representatives I 
The majority of perceptions under this category surround the continuing representation of the 
whole wine industry by CWSI and particularly KWV. KWV representatives justified their 
representative status. JG Le Roux (#2(X)l) noted that: 
There is definitely one [representative] that is supported 98% by the farmers and 
that is the KWV co-operative. Not the group, not the commercial side, but the co- 
operative... It is very representative of all the farmers here - they have political 
representatives in that sense in every district, which is voted to by the farmers... 
So, if someone is to talk to for the farmers side it really should be the KWV co- 
operative. OG Le Roux, 2001). 
However, many interviewees questioned, to varying degrees, KWV's (and to a lessor extent) 
CWSI's prominent role as industry representatives. Criticism emanated from KWK officials who 
noted that: 
in the past KWV was the sole player. But it is not anymore so. But the problem is, 
I don't have any problems with the KWV representing us, but there is, as far as I 
am concerned, problems between the KWV and the government because of the 
court case and in the process everybody is suffering at the moment and that is a 
problem for us and the government they are stiff necked about it and they have 
decided that we will do whatever we want to do and that is that. (#Joubert, 2001) 
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I think we need to resolve the issue about KWV having sole representation... 
they are the only recognised body representing the wine industry from the I primary producing side... a couple of out members always felt that, you know, 
why can't we have direct access to parliament or whatever constitution? (#Vdn 
der Vyver, 2001). 
More critical comments have been made by other individuals within the industry. For 
example, Krige (#2001) argues that the wine industry was not unified in the negotiations. He and 
Birch (#2(X)l) asserted that KWV and CWSI are not representative of the whole industry. Kruger 
also notes specific concern over the situation of KWV, stating: 
... there is still a 
lot of bad feelings and vibes between KWV and government 
that is true. And that worries us. Because it is not Food for the induitry to have a 
situation like that and no matter how hard we try to position ourselves ill a lot of 
instances we are still sort of painted with the same brush. That industry -a bunch 
of Afrikaners... people who do not want to adapt to the now South Africa ... I 
must say [that what] has happened over the last 2/3 years since that court case ... 
is that government departments, and I am not talking NDA, or DTI, I am talking 
finance. and others as well, they have been increasingly speaking and liasing with 
CWSI, as opposed to KWV. (#Kruger, 2MI). 
The most damning critique of the continuation of KWV and CWSI's representation of the 
wine industry emanates from a very senior and experienced source within the wine industry. He 
noLvs: 
... all of the wine industry negotiations with the EU... have been characterised by 
KWV's domination of the negotiating process - even at the time when they were 
in conflict with the Minister... I mean I was outraged to discover that people in 
the Department of Agriculture, who were basically old lawyers, who had been 
dealing with KWV prior to 1994 continued to work with KWV - and what Willie 
De Klerk and Riaan Kruger were doing in those negotiations is anybody's 
question... it is the old boys! So, even though it was post-94, when they came to 
those negotiations, the NDA went to KWV, KWV ... these were the people who 
represented South Africa's interests exactly as they have in the past. So, they 
were coherent as a group, they were not representative, they did not represent 
even the new ministers advisers... they [KWV] are hugely more influential than 
most people realise. They have just a great re-invenLion of themselves, they are 
chameleons. They have created organisations which they say are at arm's length 
but aren't (#20,2001). 
Employee Organisations/Representatives II 
Comments relating the inclusion of labour interests has already been referred to in category one 
above, where FAWU representatives felt they had been included in the process, yet received scant 
information about the progress of the agreement. The low level of unionisation within the industry 
indicates that labourers may well be peripheralised from the wine TDCA decision-making 
structure. Indeed, it is unclear exactly how effective Plaaswerkersvereniging are in orgdnising and 
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representing the views of its members, and the exact size of its membership is vague. Ewert (4 May 
2001, private correspondence) notes that this: 
Association was initiated 'from above' by former white employees of the Western 
Cape Agricultural Union (i. e. farmers)... In liberal/left/oppositional circles this is 
regarded as a 'sweetheart union'. There is no proof they have the (signed up or 
otherwise) support of 90% of the farm workers in the region [as they claim]. In fact, 
nobody knows what the extent of their support is. 
Therefore, labour representation in terms of participation in the EU-SA TDCA process was likely to 
have been negligible. When FAWU representatives were present at ATF forum meetings, their 
main focus was on the potential for avoiding job losses. In this vein, FAWU organised a cross- 
agricultural protest to parliament to campaign against the agricultural terms of the agreement. This 
included not only labour representatives but also farmers and producers. Furthermore, 
interviewees also argued that the gap between leadership and membership meant that workers 
interests were hardly articulated. This view was endorsed by Masemola (#2001) who stated: 
you know there is a gap between leadership and membership, maybe because of 
financial constraints; unions do not have the resources, human and financial, to 
regularly convene meetings where we report back to our members where we 
explain to them the dynamics of the EU/SA trade negotiations... So, in terms of 
the EU/SA trade negotiations our interaction with membership was virtually nil. 
However, Masemola. justifies the lack of discussion by arguing that very few labourers actually 
understand issues relating to the EU/SA TDCA. 
Aside from the 'gap' between workers and union officials, trade unions like FAWU suffer 
from financial resource problems. When asked how much time he devoted to analysing the wine 
section of the TDCA, Masemola reflected that 'I had a limited time to be honest because I must do 
others things apart for this. It is not like I am a full-time researcher for the union (#Masemola, 2001). 
Furthermore, infighting has resulted in the ineffective representation of workers. Goldblatt (#2001) 
argues that: 
I think that one needs to very seriously place the position of agricultural labour in 
its correct context, particularly in on the farms in the Western Cape. I don't think 
that they are, or were, very organised... farm worker unions were engaged in 
internecine warfare and in battles for survival of one kind or another and this was 
not their priority... What you might find now is that 100,000 workers on the wine 
farms say we were not consulted -I certainly would not attempt to gainsay that 
and the truth of the matter is that they were not consulted. Having said that, very 
serious attempts were made to contact the ostensible union leaders who have since 
been deposed four times over (#Goldblatt, 2001). 
202 
Chapter Seven: The South African Wine li)clusti-v 
One further problem in terms of effective representation of farm labourers concerns the 
culture that still exists of workers' unblinking acceptance of the 'bosses rules'. This was 
highlighted by Anzill Adams and Joachim Ewert. Adams (#2(X)I) commented that: 
what is happening in the wine industry is that, particularly the vulnerable 
groups, like the farm workers associations, they are still very much entrenched in 
the culture where the white owners are still the boss. What he says is rule. 
Community Based Organisations (CBOs) I 
Section 7.3 illustrated that traditionally disadvantaged communities, iii the shape of civil society 
and C130s, are very much on the margins of the wine industry decision-making process. 
However, some interviewees suggested such an impression is incorrect. For instance, Gunter 
Willer (#2001) contended that all government policy is guided by assisting and developing all 
stakeholder communities. 
Other wine industry sources admitted that they did not know whether civil society had been 
included. Fridihon (#2(X)l) stated that, 'I have no idea to what extent they were canvassed over 
trade negotiations'. Riaan Kruger and Su Birch though felt that the previously disadvantaged 
remain excluded from the decision-mdking process. Kruger for example reflects that 'the answer 
is quite straightforward and simple. That is they [civil society] aren't represented. One can say the 
pace of change is too slow and we have d feeling, this is a CWSI view, that change is still too slow' 
(#Kruger, AM). 
De Klerk challenges the definition of disadvantaged groups and argues that previously 
disadvantaged communities have been included in the wine agreement process when contending; 
If it (definition of marginalised groups) is not made a colour issue, which I pray it 
is not, it cannot be said that these groups are not represented. But even if that 
was the case, it cannot be claimed that white representation was overwhelming 
in the compilation of the Implementation Task Team. I regard the Task Team as 
one that purely of people in Government and industry who have the required 
expertis(ý to bring about in practice what the Minister wants. Secondly in my 
view the different stakeholders are fully or at least satisfactorily represented. 
That is why it is disturbing to hear allegations that only one person represents 
DEVCO on the team! DEVCO is something that we (KWV and Government) 
formed and at least foux/five members of the Task Team are also involved in the 
representative structures of SAWIT, DEVCO and BUSCO. Why are no questions 
raised regarding Busco representatives? 
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Goldblatt (#2001) meanwhile notes that the NDA did try to include representatives of different 
previously disadvantaged communities. He felt that: 
... the problem in what you are trying to do is there were no organised women Is 
groups in the Western Cape on farms two years ago, or they might have been. 
I'm sorry there might well have been, but they were not flying flags and toddy 
they are flying flags and what they will say to you... is sure, we were here and 
nobody came to speak to us. I'm not that sure how evident they were at th(ý time. 
Furthermore, two interviewees argued that in broadening participation to include CBOs and 
individual stakeholders could result in the inertia of the decision-making system (Wrige, 2001). 
For example, Goldblatt (#2001) argues: 
It would be very nice if goverrurnent was negotiating anything... speaks to 
everybody that could possibly be effected by the outcome. But governments do 
not work like that, they can't work hke Lhai and in fact [otherwise they would 
risk] procrastinating and turning things into absolute slurry. (#Goldblatt, 2(X)1). 
External environment 
I 
As category six in section 7.3 noLed, 'external' a(Lors have influen(ed many aspe(Ls ol - the 
contemporary wine industry, particularly in relation to the Ethical Trade Irdtiative and the Idbour 
conditions. III feeling towards the EU and supermarkets was illustrated by interviewee comments 
in section 7.4. Some interviewees opined that the South African government had little choice but 
to agree to the conditions imposed by the EU negotiators (#GoldblatL, 2(X)1) due to the overriding 
imperative of re-joining the international Community. Likewise, Rjaan Kruger (#2(X)I) argued that 
the EU used the 
Free Trade Agreement to clobber Alec Erwin over the head... they were holding 
hini ransom with the whole free trade agreement and eventually what is port and 
sherry in the bigger context of things? My gripe is with the way the EU have 
been acting. They... like talking principles but where are the principles about 
grappa and ouzo? ... We are still upset with the EU - we 
don't trust them! 
This section has added substantidUy to the analysis of the inclusivity of the South African 
TDCA decision-making process as outlined in Chapter Five. The description of the wine TDCA 
policy formulation process (in section 7.3) differed to the description of the TDCA structure (in 
Chapter Four) in that it highlighted in theory that although wine representatives had considerable 
access to the decision-making process they were not particularly inclusive. Perhaps such an image. 
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was expected given the reputation that the wine industry had, as detailed in section 7.2, of being a 
sector that has been reactionary and conservative and occasionally in conflict with tile new ANC- 
led government. Such an image is difficult to erase. In practice, the perceptions articulated here 
support what has been described in theory. Although other industry representatives are 
incorporated, access to the various decision-making forums appears to be mainly in tile hands of 
just two organisations, KWV and CWSL These two have long represented the industry oil countless 
forums, particularly the wine taskteams. Therefore the industry appears not to be fully 
representative during the TDCA negotiating process. That is not to say that some NDA officials did 
not strive for the inclusion (in terms of consultation if not access) of a broader cross-section of wine 
stakeholders. The factional state of the farm workers unions has not helped labour representation. 
Furthermore, two interviewees argued that it is not feasible for a high level of participation as it 
may result in hindering the operation of the policy-making process. This links in with similar 
arguments stated in Chapters Two and Five. Further evidence is also presented that the climate in 
which the wine TDCA is formulated is predetermined to an extent by decisions made by tile EU. 
This is particularly the case with EU subsidisation. 
The established representative structure is however being threatened. Wine farmers, many of 
whom have been traditional supporters of KWV, have started to suggest that they should have 
more input into the general decision-making process. New institutions, such as SAWIT and WOSA, 
are setting their sights on being influential decision-makers in the future. This gives the impression 
that the wine industry decision-making process, long regarded as fragmented, will continue to be 
so in the future. 
This case study provided a micro-analysis of one small part of the overall EU-SA TDCA. The 
central aim of the chapter was to further an analysis of the potential impact of the TDCA and 
improve the description and analysis of the South African TDCA decision-making structure. In a 
number of ways it has succeeded in doing this. 
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First, the analysis of potential winners in Chapter Six has been queried by the analysis of wine 
interviewees perceptions of the TDCA in section 7.4. The overwhelming view contested Chapter 
Six's identification of the wine industry as a potential 'winner' from SEFTA. There are a number of 
possible reasons for this contradiction. Perhaps the most obvious is that the wine interviewees grew 
critical of the agreement due to the prevarication over negotiations and the resentment caused by 
the EU stipulation that names such as port, sherry, ouzo and grappa be changed. That such 
antipathy was caused is supported by the many quotations included in section 7.4 above. However, 
at a general level, for those interviewees whose comments formed the basis for chapters Four, Five 
and Six, the wine industry would seem to be a potential winner for a variety of reasons. Agriculture 
was perceived to have been extremely well presented in the negotiations and the EU's relaxation of 
tariffs on agricultural products was heralded as a first - something that South Africa could well 
capitalise on. Furthermore wine received a tariff quota of 32 million litres and a E15 million 
'compensation' package. However, as the comments above testify, wine interviewees regard this as 
minuscule. 
Second, the analysis of the wine TDCA decision-making process demonstrated that the 
industry did not speak with a homogenous voice. KWV and CWSL although joined occasionally by 
representatives of other organisations, tended to represent the whole sector in the TDCA wine 
negotiations. Many wine interviewees, whether from labour, CBOs, academics or even farm 
owners, criticised, to varying degrees, the level of inclusivity that the wine TDCA policy 
formulation process provided. There is something ironic about KWV's voice not being heard by the 
Minister for Agriculture. How many times have the voices of the 'nobodies' and 'has-beens' within 
the wine industry, particularly in the apartheid era, been ignored? However, the continuing 
influence of these 'traditional' representatives in the TDCA decision-making process reflects the 
power relations inherent within the industry, which has been white-dominated throughout the 
course of the history of the South African wine industry. Therefore, given the tensions that have 
existed between this power bloc and the higher echelons of the post-1994 South African 
governinent, it is surprising that KWV is still one of the most dominant voices in the wine decision- 
making process. However, as section 7.5 has noted, these traditional representatives of the wine 
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industry have maintained good relations with some NDA officials. They had influence during the 
negotiations; those with little power in the wine industry were unsurprisingly not included in the 
TDCA wine negotiations although some interviewees argued that attempts were made to consult 
representatives from a broad spectrum of the sector. Apart from the power structure within the 
wine sector, other possible reasons that groups were excluded is that their inclusion may have 
resulted in hindering the TDCA decision-making process, or that some representative groups 
(notably trade unions) were beset by internal divisions which may have diverted their focus away 
from the TDCA negotiations. 
Third, this analysis explores further the perception of the influence of external actors. As has 
been noted throughout the thesis the actual influence that external players have on the process is 
impossible to accurately calibrate. However, as was evident in section 7.4 some interviewees felt 
that the EU influenced the negotiations to such an extent that they viewed the TDCA as being 
mainly for the benefit of the EU. From these negative comments one might expect to have seen 
much criticism by wine interviewees to the decision-making procedures that accepted such a deal. 
Indeed, there were critical comments directed towards the government, negotiating team and the 
wine representatives, yet many perceptions were favourable. 
Fourth, this chapter has added to the general description of the South African TDCA decision- 
making structure. Section 7.3 used aspects of the model introduced in Chapter Four (such as the 
statal component, detached observers and external environment) to devise a diagram to describe 
the organisation of the wine sector. The description of the wine TDCA decision-making structure 
has increased the detail on some of the actors in the general TDCA policy formulation process. For 
instance, the NDA can now be viewed as a more complex actor, as some MDA officials maintained 
links with KWV; other NDA representatives claimed they attempted to broaden the decision- 
making structure, whilst the current ministerial level at the NDA appears to have little contact with 
any groups in the wine industry. 
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8.1 Introduction 
The South African textile sector displays features that suggest it can be characterised as a 
stereotypical 'peripheralised industry', as set out in Chapter Two (2.4). Indeed, in Chapter Six, the 
South African textile industry was identified as an industrial sector that was likely 'lose Out' fl-0111 
the EU-SA TDCA, despite the general perception that textile representatives had considerable 
opportunities to influence TDCA's formulation. Following the interviewing of twelve 
representatives of the South African textile industry, and an analysis of related literature, this 
chapter examines issues raised in preceding chapters and furthers three objectives central to this 
research. It explores the potential impact of the TDCA, as well as describing and analysing tile 
South African TDCA decision-making process. In order to do this the chapter is structured as 
follows. Part one (section 8.2) starts by providing a brief outline of the geography, history, politics 
and economics of the industry. Part two (8.3) describes the organisational structure of the South 
African textile sector, identifying key actors and institutions as well as their roles within the textile 
TDCA decision-making process. The third part (8.4) re-visits perceptions of the impact of the EU- 
SA TDCA on textiles by providing an in-depth articulation of views from within the industry. The 
fourth part (8.5) examines textile decision-making processes and scrutinises the avenues open to 
textile representatives. 
8.2 An overview of the South African textile sector 
This overview is divided into three sections. The first outlines the location of the South African 
textile sector. The second documents its contemporary history. The third considers economic and 
political concerns affecting South African textiles. 
A note of warning precedes this examination of the textile industry. Firstly, as with wines, 
statistics are notoriously inaccurate and vary considerably. Secondly, literature surrounding the 
industry often fails to provide a clear definition of textiles, frequently blurring distinctions between 
fibres, fabrics and clothing. However, some refer to a textiles 'pipeline' which is comprised of three 
broad industries (Salinger et al, 1999; IDC, 1999c). The first are those producers of fibres (such as 
wool, cotton, mohair, sisal and synthetics). The second stage of the pipeline involves yanis (which 
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includes silk, filament, wool, vegetable, cotton, and spun synthetics) and fiabrics. The final stage is 
apparels, made up textiles (bed linen, towels, blankets etceteras) and industrial textiles. Textiles 
relates primarily to the first two stages of the pipeline, yet in order to obtain an accurate portrayal 
of the industry, the clothing and footwear sectors cannot be completely ignored from this research. 
South African clothing manufacturen; are major consumers of South African textile products and 
many companie-, are classified as being both textile and clothing manufacturers. For example, 
SFARDYI v, the l, irv(-, t clothins, and textile company in South Africa. 
8? II ocall. -pl 
Therv are in v%limated IM-Irk) textile manufacturers in South Africa and thev are "Pread from the 
Wv%lern ( apt, In the south-weM to the Northern Province in the north-east (Mbendi, 2(XX); Wartill 
Vilpwfl, "/%Ill( 
, 
'IN)]) JwktIj(-% Arc IcN, , pahallv , om entralled than the vvinc indti-Ar N', vvt cluters 
do vxpA 14,1 ý, pnximed main1v In the Va,, tern ( ape. ( otton iý more diverse, 
Iving grown around North Wt, %t(, m Province, Mpunlal, 111g. 11 alld Kv%,, izulLi Natal (Textile 
h-deralion, 2(XX), 7-8) Mam, (if the largest textile manufacturer-, are bawd near the ports. of 
thirlian, Fast London, Port Flizak-th and Cape lown liennie Bmwer (Cotton South Africa) 
estiniates that of the industry I,, located in clusters around Cape Town and Durban (#Bruwer, 
2M] ), I he map in ligure 8.1 (alxwe) highlights them- provincv,, and citiv%, 
210 
Figure MA: Map of "AmIll \fllý a" 1)1()% 111( k-S and 111,11m l(. xlIlc-pI()dIIi Ing 1()%% lis 
Chapter Eight: The South African Textile Industry 
8.2.2 Textilesftom 1900-1990 
The creation, existence and maintenance of a textile industry in South Africa has been considered 
to be extremely important. Salinger et al., (1999) suggest that industries such as textiles can assist 
moves towards the modernisation of South African society, in that it allows for 'developing areas' 
to be weaned off their dependence on agriculture. Thys Loubser, from the South African Textile 
Industry Export Council (SATIEC), concurs: 
The starting point of any industrialised nation has been a yam and textile 
industry. These will create sustainable job opportunities and empower African 
people to establish a service industry that can grow (Business Day, (anon. ), 18 
February 2000). 
Before 1945 the South African textile sector was minuscule, employing fewer than 3,500 
workers, principally manufacturing rugs, blankets and sheeting (Textile Federation, 2000,2). The 
industry rapidly expanded after 1945, with demand for fabrics increasing 150% between 1949 and 
1981. By 1960,19 firms were producing knitted fabrics and 46 mills produced cotton-based yams 
and woven fabrics (Textile Federation, 2000,3). The increase in South African textiles was also due 
to direct intervention by the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa (IDC) who 
constructed many aspects of the sector in the 1950s (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996,166-168), and the 
introduction of an import substitution policy (ISI), which stemmed the tide of imports from East 
Asia (Textile Federation, 2000,3). 
Such protectionism characterised the global trade of textiles in the era that the South African 
textile sector was expanding. From 1960 the global industry was regulated, particularly following 
the introduction of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) in 1974. This agreement, which was 
supposed to be temporary, ' exempted the textiles and clothing trade from GATT disciplines. It 
allowed industrial countries to place quotas on imports of various textile and clothing products, 
thus giving 'producers in the North time to restructure and adapt to competition from cheaper 
imports from the South' (Friends of the Earth, 2001). Therefore, the MFA limited the potential for 
growth in the newer (lesser developed) producing textile areas. One textile analyst argued that due 
to the MFA, the international environment in which South African textiles entered in 1990 was one 
that 'exploited the textile and clothing manufacturing industries of the poorer countries' (Jansen, 
1 The MFA was renewed five times until 1990. 
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December 1999,2). From the 1970s ISI was also criticised for making the South African textiles and 
clothing sector largely non-competitive (US Department of Commerce, 1998) and being detrimental 
to domestic producers (outside of textiles), particularly those in the clothing sector that required 
fabrics and fibres from other areas of the world (Salinger et al., 1999). Despite these protectionist 
measures, Williams and Hanival (1999,72) noted that the geographical distribution in the textile, 
clothing and footwear industries has 'changed dramatically in the past 25 years. This has resulted 
in sizeable employment losses in Europe and North America and employment gains in Asia and 
other developing countries', whereby 'developed' states relocated some labour intensive aspects of 
the industry to 'developing' areas. Indeed, the global trend in the production of textiles in the 
twentieth century has been away from the previously dominant producing areas of the UK, USA 
and Japan, towards developing/lower cost states (Salinger et al., 1999), such as South Africa. 
By 1990, the South African textile industry partially reflected the growth in trade and 
protectionist regime. In many ways the industry was also characterised in similar ways to that of 
the wine industry. There were pronounced differences in pay between 'ethnic groupings' within 
the textile workforce. In the early 1990's African employees were paid 27.2% of white wages 
(Salinger et al., 1999). However, the treatment of labourers was not considered as harsh as 
conditions described in the previous chapter. Of more concern were boycotts of, and sanctions on, 
South African goods, particularly as domestic consumption decreased as consumers requested 
higher quality and more varied goods from 'foreign' sources (Textile Federation, 2000,2). As in the 
wine industry, some textile companies managed to successfully navigate around these constraints 
on trade and opened an export lifeline. A representative for one large textile company noted that 
his company started exporting when sanctions were in place (#33,2001). Sanctions were though 
one of the causes for the poor state of the industry in 1990. Brian Brink (executive director of the 
Textile Federation - Texfed) reflects that this caused foreign and local disinvestment in the textile 
industry. This meant that operators were 'just not putting anything into their... machinery at all' 
(#Brink, 2001). When apartheid legislation began to be dismantled after 1990, and high tariff 
barriers were being reduced, many textile manufacturers came to realise that new technology was 
required in order to compete (#Brink, 2001). 
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8.2.3 Political and Economic concerns 
The move towards automation was identified in both the literature and from interviews as one of 
six major issues that has affected the South African textile sector after 1990. The other issues were: 
" Employment concerns 
" Illegal imports 
" Dependence on exports 
" Second-hand clothing 
" Tariff liberalisation and trade agreements 
It is important to note however that these themes do not comprehensively document all issues 
that affect textiles. Although subjects such as the strikes of 1996 and 1999 did have an impact upon 
the sector, and environmental concerns are increasingly important, this section primarily reflects 
upon those issues deemed important by the interviewees. Therefore, this analysis proceeds by 
documenting the economic significance of textiles to the South African economy and then 
discusses these issues in relation to contemporary politico-economic concerns in the industry. 
I Economic situation 
Textiles contributed R13 billion to South Africa's balance of payments in 1999. This represents 1.5% 
of the Gross Domestic Product, ' although another estimate is that the spinning and weaving 
section of textiles has contributed 2.2%. ' Furthermore, textiles is the sixth largest manufacturing 
industry, contributing 3.6% towards total manufacturing production (Cape Media, undated). 
Domestic textile sales reached R9.8 billion and exports R2.6 billion in 1999, whilst legal imports 
were R4.03 billion (Textile Federation, 2000,7). The tables in figure 8.2 demonstrate that from 1995 
to 1999 both legal imports and exports have risen in all textile areas apart from the importation of 
fibres. In terms of exports, textiles is the eleventh largest exporter of manufactured goods. This is 
the equivalent to one third of total agricultural exports (Textile Federation, 2000,2). The major 
export destinations are Mozambique, UK, USA, Zimbabwe, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Cape Media, 
2 This figure emanates from the Textile Federation, 2000,7-8. 
3 According to an IDC report, 1999c, 1. 
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Textile Exports, 1995-1999 
(Source: Textile Federation, 2000,25) 
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Figure 8.2: Export and Imports of Textiles 
undated). Legal imports have increased from R3.36 billion in 1995 to its current figure of R4 billion 
in 1999. Many imports originate from East Asia, Australia, New Zealand, China, Eastern European 
states, Uruguay and Argentina, whilst major African importers are Malawi, MozAmbique, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. 4 Illegal imports, a huge concern for the industry (see further details below) are 
also estimated to have risen dramatically. The current rate of imports from the EU stands at R1.14 
billion (20% of total imports). Exports meanwhile represent R1.47 billion in 1999 (36% of total 
The last three are huge exporters of cotton. 
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South African exports) (Textile Federation, 2(XX)). 5 The EU-SA TDCA is therefore an agreemeiit 
that has considerable potential to impact the South African textile sector. 
III Employment issues 
As with wine, textiles has been considered a tabour intensive industry, although with an increase 
in automation, the sector is becoming more capital intensive. It is also an industry that employs 
many who fall under the category 'traditionally marginalised'. The workforce is mainly comprised 
of black, mdle, South African workers, who are employed as unskilled or semi-skilled tabour (IDC, 
1999c, 14). Figure 8.3, detailing the composition based on ethnicity, shows that in 1993,91 % of the 
textile workforce derived from previously disadvantaged 'ethnic' groups. Contemporary figures 
based on ethnicity are no longer published but anecdotal evidence suggests that the majority of the 
current tabour force are 'non-white' (#Jansen, 2001). However, skilled/technicdI/managemenL 
personnel tend to be employed from Europe or East Asia. This is one of the few areas, according to 
those interviewed, where mi gation is experienced within the textile industry. Where such'skilled' 
migration largely is accepted, 'non-skilled' migration is not, and is a far more contentious issue. 
- ----------- 
9% 
6.3% 
M "Asian" 
0 "Black African" 
27.8% 
56.9% 0 "Coloured" 
0 "White" 
Figure 8.3: 'Ethnic' composition of the Textile workforce, 1986- 
1993 (Source: Salinger et al., 1999). 
There are no official figures for the number of migrants in the industry, but like the wine sector, 
less that 5-10% of the workforce is believed to be non-'South African'. Most migration occurs along 
South Africa's borders with Mozambique and Zimbabwe (#23,2001). The issue of employing, 
These figures only include 12 of the 15 EU member states. 
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mainly undocumented migrants, is a contentious one. A very senior textile source, when asked 
how many n-dgrants there were in the industry, stated that: 
I guess that is one of the questions that I should not answer. I think there are... 
occasionally some employers might, in order to get around the Labour Relations 
Act - bring in temps... I am sure that the buggers do that (#22,2001). 
Interestingly, two other forms of migration were referred to during the interviews. Helga 
Jansen (ILRIG) noted that 'there have always been migratory patterns from agricultural areas into 
the city and now more than ever. The second, more prevalent migration, occurs with textile and 
clothing firms relocating to neighbouring states, such as Malawi and Mozambique, to take 
advantage of lower labour costs, different labour conditions and lower levels of social protection 
(Horton, 1999,47; #Jansen, 2001). 
A further marginalised group, identified in chapters two and five - women - comprise 32% of 
the textile workforce (#Bennett, 2001). This compares to a national average of 33% and in the 
clothing sector close to 80% (Salinger et al., 1999)). Yet, there are some areas of the industry where 
the proportion of female workers is high. For instance, the Cotton Industry employs more female 
6 
than male employees during harvest time. 
Statistics for the total number of employees vary wildly, ranging from 37,500 to 450,000. The 
lower figure (for October 1998) emanates from the Textile Industry Training Board (Smith, 1999, 
12). The Textile Federation estimates that 68,0007 (57,000 in textiles and 11,700 in knitting) are 
directly employed in textiles (Textile Federation, 2000,5). Statistics South Africa places the figure 
nearer 75,700 (Smith, 1999,12). A report for the US Department of Commerce claimed that textiles 
directly employs 250,000, with 200,000 indirectly employed in dependent industries such as 
transportation and packaging (US Department of Commerce, 1998). Furthermore, the IDC asserts 
that for every textile worker, another 2.5 employees are, created in related industries (Textile 
Federation, 2000,5). 
6 Male employees dominate the permanent workforce though. 
7 And 80,000 work on cotton farms. 
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Figure 8.4: Textile employment, 1995-1999 
(Source: Textile Federation, 2000,11) 
That the number of 'formal' workers is declining rapidly, however, is rarely contested. Figure 
8.4 clearly illustrates that employment levels have decreased from 98,000 in 1996 to approximately 
68, M) in 1999,11 representing d loss of 31 % in just four years. Brink states that unemployment has 
affected all aspects of the textile pipeline. The debate over unemployment is clearly one of the most 
striking, characteristics of the contemporary textile scene. But what factors are to blame for this? 
From the interviews conducted and the literature analysed these are deemed to be: 
- The impact of illegal imports (Netshitomboni, 2000,68). 
- Labour inflexibility (Lace, 2000). 
- AuLomdtion. 
Trade liberalisation and accompanying policies (reduction in ISI) (Smith, 1999,12). 
The collapse of Asian economies Oapan and Taiwan are South Africa's two largest trade and 
investment partners (Textile Federation, 2WO, 8-9)). 
The volatility of the global financial markets (US Department of Commerce, 1998). 
The oversupply of international markets (IDC, 1999c, 6). 
Second-hand clothing (Delorme, 2(X)O). 
Nelshitomboni (2000) argues that 1996 employment figures are distorted because employment in that year 
(which showed an increase across all sectors) was a reflection of the inclusion of former 'Bantustan' 
employment statistics for the first time. This conceals that continual decline in employment since 1990. 
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It must be noted however that these figures for unemployment fail to show the levels of 
informal (non-contracted) employment in textiles. Indeed, Horaan Bhorat (DPRU) has argued that 
employment has been generated in every industrial sector, including clothing and textiles, 
commenting that: 
If you look at the Clothing industry, even though... you may have found that 
factories have closed down, but in fact, I mean it is not necessarily in every single 
workers case, but what has happened is that [they have moved] to informal 
production (#Bhorat, 2001). 
This view is supported by two DTI officials, Augustine Williams and Stephen Hanival, who note 
that: 
... far from being helpless and disempowered, many of these retrenched workers 
rapidly become entrepreneurs or sub-contractors in the informal sector. In 
addition, others find employment with these informal sub-contractors (Williams 
and Hanival, 2000,74). 
Whatever the correct figures for retrenchment levels, textiles still employs over 2.2% of the 
total official, formal workforce (IDC, 1999c, 1) and is between the fourth and sixth largest employer 
in South Africa (Textile Federation, 2000,5). There is also growing opinion that the sector has 
'turned the comer' and official employment will increase. Evidence from some interviewees 
supports this viewpoint. One trade union official, Monroe Kalipi from SA Fine Worsteds, provides 
an overview of the employment history at the company since the late 1980's: 
Let me be specific on SA Fines... Let me start in the 80s. It was a very stable 
company with a workforce of about 900 to a 1000 and now since the beginning of 
the 90s we see a decline, a sort of downslump in the industry where jobs were 
being lost [from 1000 to 560]. The management structure has been constantly 
changing since the early 1990's. We are now seeing a positive trend from the 
management - in terms of trying to secure jobs for this place. [They] had been 
disillusioned in the past... a sinking feeling... but now [there] is change. Now a 
feeling that they can make it work. 
Some interviewee comments, supported by selected literature, suggest that despite decreasing 
uncertainty over job security, labour conditions within textiles generally improved since 1990. 
Figure 8.5 illustrates that wage levels have risen throughout the industry from 1995 to 1999 
(between 1997 and 1998 they increased by 18%). Government Acts (such as the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995, outlined in Chapter Seven) have also benefited employees to some extent. Interviewees 
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with links to textile workers noted that the establishment of Bargaininý, Councils and Industry 
Education Boards should further improve labour standards, particularly in training. ' 
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Figure 8.5: Pay levels in the textile sector, 1995-1999 
(Source: Textile Federation, 2000,11) 
Aspects of 'labotir-friendly' government legislation have been (TiLicised by clothing and textile 
reprewntatives. Paul Theron (Clofed) argues that: 
Due to the labour intensive nature of our industry, we are more severely 
impacted than most other industries... Our ultimate competition and threats 
come from countries having more Idbour flexibility, and wages substantially 
lower than ourselves... Although good intenLioned, labour-friendly legislation 
results in a reluctance by employers to employ more people, it entrenches 
existing jobs and will not lead to employment growth (quoted in Richards, 1999, 
3). 
Furthermore, some textile employers oppose the 1997 Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 
because of its provisions for compulsory paid maternity leave. In an industry where one third of 
workers are women, industry leaders claim that job losses will result (Sahnger et al., 1999). 
Non-governmental empowerment initiatives, seeking to improve the economic status of 
traditionally marginalised peoples, are also affecting labour conditioms within textiles. For 
example, Cotton South Africa encourage the growth of, what they term, emerging smallholders in 
the cotton industry. Hennie Bruwer (#2001), Cotton SA's Chief Executive Officer explains that: 
9 Industrv Education Boards are overseen by the Sectoral Education Training Authority (SETA). By April 
2001 employees had to contribute 1% of the overall wage bill to a general training fund. This was established 
under the Skills Development Levies Act. 1999. 
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... we set ourselves a goal a couple of years ago that by 2005 we would very much like to be in a position where the smallholder contribution is 30%. But whether we 
will achieve that, I doubt it because there are certain macro factors that are working 
against our initiatives [such as the slow process of land restitution]. '" 
Despite such perceived improvement in working conditions there are those who argue that 
the benefits stated above are overshadowed by a fear of unemployment and being transferred from 
full-time to part-time (often informal) contracts. For instance, Horton (1999) noted that up to 53% of 
full-time clothing workers in SA are on short-time contracts and earn below the collective 
bargaining wage agreement. At the same time some employers move sub-contracted 'Cut, Make 
and Trim (CMT)' (labour intensive) work to Malawi or Mozambique. Jansen (#2001) remarks that 
'the work is no longer secure... there is a big growth in home work and informal work'. The 
problem that such contracts cause has been discussed by Pape and Jansen (October 2000,3) who 
argue that this work 'can never replace the stability and security which formal, permanent 
employment brings. The informal and SMME 'sweatshop' is a dangerous cycle of unemployment'. 
Women workers tend to be those who suffer most from such employment as they: 
... not only have to struggle [with] the loss of jobs, 
but they also have to deal with 
cuts in Welfare budgets such as the cuts in the New Child Support Grant. They 
also have to support children, elderly parents and unemployed husbands and 
partners. This situation together with rising crime, violence against women and 
unemployment increases their economic and financial responsibilities (Jansen and 
Pape, October 2000,1). 
Indeed, gender discrimination in terms of wage levels has been noted by Jarvis (1997,21-22) who 
documents that women in the textile industry receive an average of R288 a week. This is R50 less 
than the average for men. Reflecting on the government policies and the worsening working 
conditions for women, Helga Jansen remarks: 
So, the conditions are deteriorating and that is the contradiction. There are all 
these sophisticated labour laws... and it is not recognising that the reality is that 
women are prostituting themselves; economically prostituting themselves 
(#Jansen, 2001). 
The description of these textile employment issues shows that the workforce in 2001 is 
comprised mainly of 'traditionally marginalised' peoples. Since 1994 conditions under which they 
work have improved for those who remain in formal, permanent, full time employment. However, 
10 Furthermore, governmental and non-governmental agencies (such as Wesgro, Clotex and Ntsika) have 
established funds and programmes to assist SMMEs. 
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the movement towards informal, part-time work and the huge reduction in the formal workforce 
has resulted in a growing sense of insecurity for these previously disadvantaged groups. The 
following four contemporary politico-economic features to affect the textile sector have received far 
less attention than the issues that surround employment. However, many interviewees claim that 
they have had a significant impact on the textile sector. 
III Automation/Competitiveness 
One interviewee argued that increased automation and technological change 'seem to be the 
strongest determinant of employment shifts' (#Bhorat, 2001). In 1996 Cape Business News reported 
that the decline of the textile industry was partly due to South African textile firms being 'less 
innovative' than international competitors (Cape Business News, (anon. ) December 1996). Indeed, 
some analysts argued that new machinery was essential in making the textile sector internationally 
competitive (IDC, 1999c, 1). Lace (2000) estimates that four billion Rand has been invested by the 
industry into technological improvements since 1990. However, Walter Simeoni, of the Frame 
Group, argues that another two billion Rand will be required to make the textile sector 
internationally competitive (Business Day (anon. ), 23 February 2001). 
IV Illegal Imports 
Many interviewees commented on the sudden increase in illegal imports that have accompanied 
the dismantling of tariff barriers in South Africa. Analysts estimate that illegal imports may 
contribute to 11% of textile industry sales (IDC, 1999c, 43) and approximately 50% of clothing sales 
(Smith, 1999,12). The South Africa-Malawian trade agreement is seen as a major culprit in allowing 
goods that originate in 'the East' to enter Malawi and then pass into South Africa without paying 
tariffs. This is exacerbated by inefficient custom control checks. Illegal imports are blamed for 
increasing unemployment and it is regarded by some analysts to be the 'biggest single problem to 
hit the industry' (Smith, 1999,12). 
v Dependence on Exports 
Figures suggest that the clothing and textile industries are becoming more dependent on exports. 
The largest clothing and textile company in South Africa, SEARDEL, increased their exports by 
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42% from 1999 to 2000 (representing R229 million) (Business Day (anon. ), 23 February 2001). 
Furthermore, Monroe Kalipi (#2001) remarked that SA Fine Worsteds is mainly selling 
internationally, where in the past most sales were to domestic markets. In addition, Brian Brink (# 
2001) noted that 'the domestic economy is extremely depressed at this point... so the salvation is 
get out there and export'. 
VI Second-hand clothing 
The influx of second hand clothing from 'developed' regions of the world is an issue that 
predominantly affects the clothing sector, but has ramifications for textiles. Despite the obvious 
good intentions of the second hand market, the 'massive introduction of second-hand clothes 
competes with local production and de-structures the economy. As a result, tens of thousands of 
workers lose their jobs (Delorme, 2000,22). Indeed, Bernard Richards argues that: 
... where second hand clothing is allowed in, like in Zambia or wherever, the local industry collapses. The do-gooders of the first world think that by donating their 
used clothing they are helping people, they are actually not. They are not helping 
people if they are not getting jobs. 
VII Tariff liberalisation and trading arrangements 
Past, present and future trade liberalising arrangements have attracted considerable attention. As 
the literature surveyed in Chapter Two (2.4) demonstrates many analysts claim that neo-fiberal, 
tariff-liberalising policies have resulted in the textile industry being marginalised globally. Articles 
in South Africa's financial press reinforce this impression (see especially Radebe, in Business Day, 
26 February 2001). For example, Business Day estimated that tariff reductions have led to 172 
factories being closed and 34,000 people being made unemployed in the textile and clothing 
industries since 1999 (Jenvey, 2001). " 
The phase down of tariff import levels into South Africa (see table 8.1 below), agreed by the 
South African government in 1993, means that the textile sector has to cut tariffs to an agreed rate 
by 2003, rather than 2007, as GATT regulations advise (Michie and Padayachee, 1997). Although 
the table illustrates that clothing goods have experienced most reduction (from 90% to 40%), 
The figure has been put at 115,000 since 1995. 
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synthetic fibres, yams and fabrics will see their tariffs reduced by more than half their 1994 rates by 
the end of 2002. 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Synthetic Fibre 25% 23% 21% 19% 17% 15% 13% 11% 7.5% 
Yarn 32% 30% 28% 26% 24% 22% 29% 18% 15% 
Fabric 45% 42% 39% 36% 33% 30% 27% 24% 22% 
Clothing 90% 84% 78% 72% 66% 60% 54% 47% 40% 
Household made- 55% 52% 49% 46% 43% 40% 37% 34% 30% 
un textiles 
Table 8.1: Tariff phase down of textile imports to 2002 (Source: US Department of Commerce, 
1998). 
Aside from the EU-SA TDCA, South Africa also has entered into tariff liberalising trade 
agreements with other states and regional trading blocs (with more on the way). This includes 
bilateral agreements with for example, Zimbabwe, Malawi and the EU. A multilateral arrangement 
has been agreed with SADC and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was 
unilaterally introduced by the USA. 
Under the EU-SA TDCA, the phase down of textile (along with clothing and footwear) 
products is located in Title II (Trade) under Industrial Products (some textile products, such as 
cotton, are also fisted under Agricultural products). The details for each product's tariff rate, and 
the rate of reduction, is under Industrial Products as listed under Annexes II and III (elimination of 
European Community and South African tariff barriers). Tariff phase down levels for most textile 
products to enter the EU occurs after six years (see article 11, EU/SA TDCA, 1999). For South 
African tariffs, the reduction takes place over eight years (Article 12, EU/SA TDCA, 1999), and falls 
to 50% of South Africa's Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff levels (Textile Federation, 2000,4). 
There are other provisions within the agreement that might affect the textile trade. For instance, 
Anti-dumping (Article 23) and Rules of Origin (Article 28 and Protocol 1) could result in non-tariff 
barriers to trade (as outlined in Chapters One and Five). The prevention of illegal imports should 
be assisted by Article 48 that promotes co-operation between EU and South African customs 
officials. 
223 
Chapter Eight: The SOLIth African Textile Industry 
These trade liberalising agreements have attracted both praise (US-Africa Bill) and criticism 
(Malawi, SADC) from textile interviewees. The trade agreement between South Africa and Malawi 
for example has been scathingly attacked. This is a non-reciprocal trade deal, whereby Malawian 
goods pay no tariff charges. This has resulted in South African textile firms relocating to Malawi in 
order to escape the South African duty structure (IDC, 1999c, 41) and consequently textile imports 
to South Africa have grown 'excessively' (Richards, 1999,4). Analysts argue that low quality East 
Asian goods illegally enter South Africa as re-exports from Malawi (IDC, 1999c, 41). Consequently: 
Malawi [has] superseded China as the largest exporter of clothing to South 
Africa, and surpassed Pakistan as the largest exporter of bed linen to South 
Africa. This is clear evidence of massive country of origin fraud being exploited 
under the agreement (IDC, 1999c, 41). 
The forthcoming SADC FTA, although with the potential to provide South African firms with 
cheaper raw materials (Smith, 1999,13), has also been criticised. The agreement 'is likely to 
accelerate the inflow of illegal imports, and even lead to a substantial relocation of SA clothing 
manufacturers [the main domestic consumers of yam and material]' (IDC, 1999c, 6). The Textile 
Federation is particularly concerned about the agreement. Brian Brink stated that he 'feared it as 
much as I fear illegal imports' (Orink, 2001). Malcolm Hughes, also of Texfed, adds that: 
With little or no consultation with business and labour, government is set to 
railroad through a SADC FTA which will lead to the wholesale destruction of 
industrial sectors and jobs, not only in South Africa, but throughout the entire 
SADC region (Smith, 1999.13). 
Other trade arrangements are viewed as being more beneficial to the textile industry. Despite 
criticisms levelled against tariff liberalisation, the Textile Federation stated that 'The textile 
industry has embraced the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs and the philosophy of trade 
liberalisation' (Textile Federation, 2000,4). Also, although identified by interviewees in Chapter Six 
as likely to lose out from the EU-SA TDCA, 12 this FTA has been viewed by some within textiles as 
being a factor in enticing some companies to South Africa. For example, Business Day reported that 
Ramatex Group from Malaysia has been attracted to South Africa by both the EU FTA and the US 
13 African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Business Day, anon., 3 November 2000). The US 
bill, which takes effect from 1 October 2000 to 30 September 2008, has been received with wide 
12 Paul Theron has argued that 'the uncertainty over the EU agreement and the interpretation thereof has had 
a restraining effect' on both the clothing and textile sectors (Theron, 2000,3). 
13 Ramatex are anticipated to create 10,000jobs. 
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acclaim throughout the clothing and textile industry. Paul Theron (Clofed) estimates that the Act 
14 
will create an additional 150,000 jobs (quoted in Jenvey, 2000). Martin Vi1joen, hopes that AGOA 
could double or treble present exports, and remarks that it: 
is like a gift. I mean it is not [strictly] a trade [liberalising] agreement, it is 
unilateral. We have got access... If that does not give the industry an unbelievable 
push... then one has to start thinking whether South Africa is actually a textile... 
enviroru-nent... (#Viljoen, 2001). 
Emerging from this brief overview of the textile sector is an outline of the changing economic 
and political dimensions of the industry, particularly since 1990. The last ten years have seen much 
transformation. The workforce has been dramatically reduced; legal and illegal imports, as well as 
exports, have risen, sometimes dramatically; tariff levels have fallen at a quicker rate than directed 
under the Marrakesh (GATT) Agreement, which has generated a volley of criticism from the 
unions; and new trading arrangements have created both apprehension and raised expectations. 
These economic and political concerns indicate that the textile sector in 2001 continues to confront 
difficulties, some of which have been inherited from goverrunental and international policies and 
events prior to 1990. Business Day (anon., 23 February 2001) presents a rather bleak future as the 
industry faces: 
... a myriad of obstacles as it seeks to transform itself from a protected, inward- looking sector focused on import substitution, into one exposed to international 
competition in both imports and exports. Fabric and yam imports have risen 
dramatically. Harry Pearce, CE of Da Gama Textiles in East London, estimates that 
imports now account for half of all textile consumption in SA, up from 20%-25% a 
decade ago. The effects of falling international prices and declining local customs 
duties have been exacerbated by customs fraud... 
President Thabo Mbeki singled out textiles in his state of the nation address as one 
of SA's most promising sectors for export-led growth and job creation. Talk to any 
textiles executive, however, and the emphasis is somewhat different: exports do 
not so much offer a promising future for the industry as its only hope. SA's textile 
industry is in dire straights. Seven factories, among them Waverley Blankets and 
Mooi River Textiles, have closed their doors over the past two years, throwing 
3500 people out of work. At the same time, more than 40 clothing manufacturers, 
the textile producers' main customers have gone to the wan. Far from creating 
jobs, employment in the industry has shrunk by almost 30% since 1996. 
Furthermore, the loss of long-term formal-contracted employment, allied to union concerns over 
lack of adequate protection against the ill-effects of trade liberalisation policies, means that 
14 It should be noted that the agreement is a reciprocal trade deal. Duval Smith (25 May 2001) noted that in 
the first three months of 2001, African trade to the US rose by 24%. At the same time, US exports to Africa 
increased by 23%. 
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conditions for those 'traditionally marginalised' workers, the majority of the workforce, have not 
yet been significantly improved. 
Some analysts however predict a brighter future. For iiistancel Texfed notes that: 
The South African textile industry has restructured itself in order to Survive 
within the objectives and parameters of the government's economic policy in 
order to become a modern, dynamic, value-adding, job-creating, exporting, 
manufacturing sector. It appears as if the industry has reached the turning point 
and is back on the road to recovery and eventual growth (Textile Federation, 2000, 
7). 
This section has also outlined that the textile component of SEFTA, as with wine, only 
comprises a small part of the entire agreement. Analysis of the textile aspect of the TDCA M sectiori 
8.4 should provide a more in-depth analysis of the issues raised iri preceding chapters. The 
overview outlined above provides the context into which an analysis of the perceived implications 
of the EU-SA TDCA, and the decision-making structure that Surrounds it, can be placed. The next 
section describes the organisational structure of the textile sector and the role actors played iri the 
textile TDCA policy formulatioti process. 
8.3 Organisation of the Textiles sector 
Since 1990 the institutional structure of the textile sector has undergone drastic transformation. 
Some major South African companies have been bought by competitors, both domestic and global. 
The number of Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs), mostly specialising in 'niche 
products', has risen along with those entering the South African domestic scene from the 'Far East' 
(Taiwan, South Korea, China etceteras). Furthermore, with the South African government changing 
from National Party to an ANC-led tripartite coalition, personnel within the DTI, responsible for 
clothing and textiles, have altered (as noted in Chapter Four). In addition, many research institutes, 
consultants, industry bodies and NGOs have been formed since 1990. Trade bodies such as the 
South African Textile Industry Export Council (SATIEC) only emerged in 1999. The organisational 
structure therefore boasts a myriad of new 'actors', representing a diverse array of interests. 
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Figure 8.6: The current organisational structure of the Textiles Sector 
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A diagram (see figure 8.6 above), similar to that constructed for the analysis of the wine 
industry, has been devised from an analysis of the literature and interview data. As far as I am 
aware, this is the first organisational structure produced to portray and categorise the components 
of the textile sector. Although the diagram has identical caveats to the wine organisation diagram 
(it fails to highlight fully the complexities of how the textile sector is structured) it is useful to this 
study. It permits clarification of the bodies and actors within textiles, not just those involved in the 
EU-SA TDCA decision-making process, and assists in identifying those interviewees whose 
opinions are central to this case study. The structure is divided along similar lines to the wine 
diagram, with one difference. The box termed trade bodies, which includes industrial federations 
and export councils that some argue collate and represent the views of (to some extent) the 
industry. This is categorised as under category three, but is distinct from the producer employer 
organisations normally associated with the category. Aside from this, all other bodies fit into 
categories one to six, as outlined in Chapter Four. Therefore, the first category details statutory and 
governmental bodies; the second, an eclectic collection of consultants, academic institutions, and 
non-statutory industry bodies. This category exemplifies one of the pitfalls of the diagram as some 
of these organisations overlap with other groups. For example, the Trades Union Research Project 
(TURP) directs research on behalf of COSATU, which SACTWU (category four) is affiliated to. 
Also, Cotton South Africa views itself as a forum for the cotton industry, mainly representing 
employers, so could conceivably be included in category three. The third category documents both 
employers and employer organisations; the fourth details employee organisations. The fifth 
category seeks to place traditionally marginalised groups of civil society in relation to the textile 
sector. However, the previously disadvantaged are also located in category four, where SMMEs are 
included. To place the internal organisational structure into a global perspective, the domestic 
institutional framework of the South African textile sector is surrounded by the external 
environment (category six). This section proceeds by firstly listing the institutions/actors in each 
category and then describing the roles they played in the decision-making process. Figure 8.7 
assists in providing an overview of how each institution/body fed into the overall TDCA decision- 
making process. This figure also highlights how other categories of actors within textiles were 
integrated (or not) into the TDCA structure. 
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Figure 8.7: Textile sector and the EU-SA TDCA decision-making process 
1. Statutory/Govemmental actors I 
The statdl decision-ma king process has been described in sorne detail in Chapter Four. However, in 
terms of textiles' access to this statal process, the pertinent 'actors' and bodies within the textile 
decision-making structure are. hsLed in table 8.2 below. 
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Body Overview 
Department of The DT1 has a clothing and textile directorate, which presently Is staffed by 
Trade and two full-time officials, and is therefore very stretched for resources. The 
Industry (DTI) Department also has a Small Business Promotion Directorate, that liases 
with SMMEs. 
Board of Tariff 
and Trade 
(BTT) 
Department of Due to the disparate nature of the textile sector, some primary products, 
Agriculture such as cotton, come under the NDA: s sphere of influence. Also, cotton 
(NDA) textile manufacturers are represented at the ATF. 
Agricultural 
Trade Foram 
(ATF) 
NEDIAC Brian Brink, the executive director of Texfed, represented the textile (and 
TESELICO for some time clothing and footwear) at TESELICO. 
Table 8.2: Statutory/Govemmental actors 
The textile and clothing directorate of the DTI, in preparing offers on tariffs for South African 
textile products, negotiated with labour and business representatives within the industry to 
develop strategy and position papers (#Van der Wal, 2001). Labour representatives have argued 
that DTI officials contacted senior business representatives more often than labour officials. Such 
contact, Mark Bennett (SACTWU) argues, was outside the tripartite, TESELICO process. However, 
representatives of the largest textile companies denied that this was the case (#Viljoen, 2001; 
#Richards, 2001). Sake van der Wal, an official at the clothing and textile directorate, accepted that 
regular consultation with big business did take place regularly outside of the TESELICO process, 
yet similar consultation also occurred with the major textile union - SACTWU. He also noted that 
SMMEs also had access to the directorate, albeit in an indirect and informal manner. Van der Wal 
also noted that CBOs had no voice through the DTL and that Texfed are seen by the DTI as 
perhaps the most important representative within the textile industry. 
Following the conclusion of the textile TDCA negotiations, clothing and textile sectoral 
summits, to discuss issues of concern within the industry, were established, and included 
representatives from Texfed, SACTWU, large companies and SMMEs. This form of decision- 
making appears to include more actors than those who participated under the TDCA process, and 
therefore might be perceived as being more inclusive. 
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This section details d diverse Set Of 'dctors', which listed together form d category ol- 'LleLat lied 
observers' or research bodies and non-governmenLal industry institutions. In order to more 
accurately define and describe this category it is further divided into two sections. Two tables assist 
in this process. The first (table 8.3) lists research, consultancy and investment bodies that have an 
interest in the textile sector. Then second (table 8.4) identifies those organisations that have a much 
closer affiliation to textiles. Indeed, for most, the textile and clothing sectors are their sole focus. 
_Bodv 
Overview 
VVESGRO Promotes foreign investment in the Western Cape, particularly SMMEs. 
Textile and clothing sector included. For full details see Wesgro entry in 
Chapter Seven. 
Development Based at the University of Cape Town, the DPRU research many issues 
Policy Research of importance to the South African economy. Was originally established 
Unit: by the ANC. 
_ Individual These are academics that are often paid to act as consultants to 
academic government over themes that relate to the textile industry. Examples 
consultants include Miriam Altman (University of Witwatersrand) and Johann 
Maree (University of Cape Town). 
TIPS See entry under Chapter Four. 
_ Ebony Assists the development of empowerment initiatives, particularly for 
Consultancy SMMEs. 
_ Ntsika Established in 1996. 
Support small businesses, and run the Trade and Development 
Programme (TIDP), which is funded by the EU. They are 'assisted' in 
the implementation by a consortium of local and European consultants 
and overseen by the Imani group. As noted in Chapter Four (4.3.3), 
Ntsika commissioned a report looking at the potential impact of the 
agreement on SMMEs (Ntsika, 2000). 
Isandla Devises decision-making tools to empower civil society organisations 
_ Trade Union A NGO research unit for trade unions. Founded 1986. Primarily 
Research Project focuses on economic, work organisation and gender issues. In 1997 
(TURP) commissioned a survey of women workers in the textile and clothing 
sectors (see Jarvis, 1997). 
Table 8.3: Non-Govemmental research and consultancy bodies 
As noted in Chapter Five both the DPRU and TIPS exert significant influence within the DTI. 
In relation to Lextiles, the DPRU has conducted research on the sector in southern Africa. 
Individual acddemics, along with the private company, MPCS, (see below) were. also employed to 
provide an analysis of the textile industry for government. 
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Body Overview 
Textile Industry To develop empowerment in terms of skills for working in the textile 
Training Board industry. 
TexWeb SA An information organisation for the entire pipeline of the textile sector. 
Government financed. 
CSIR - Textiles A research and information organisation. One of Texteks objectives is 
(Textek) to create national employment by encouraging SMMEs in rural and 
economic development (Lace, 2000). 
MPCS A private sector consulting service for business. 
Frequently used by the Dn for consultancy work. During the SADC 
negotiations, MPCS consulted both the South African and SADC 
governments on textiles. 
Cotton South Cotton SA Is an organisation that views itself as a forum for the 
Africa industry. Its main tasks are to collate information and co-ordinate 
research to promote and Improve the cotton Industry. 
Wool South Africa Research /information organisatton. 
Clothing and Aims to facilitate access to information, advice, trade contacts and 
Textile Service training opportunities and offers counselling for SMMEs, particularly 
Centre (Clotex) 'disadvantaged entrepreneurs'. 
Textile Institute of 
South Africa 
Table 8.4: Non-Govemmental Industry actors 
During the interview stage one representative of Cotton SA was interviewed. A description of 
this organisation follows, providing a flavour of the nature of a non-governmental textile body. 
Although other similar organisations could have been selected, Cotton SA illustrates the diversity 
of the industry and the complexity of the textile decision-making process. Cotton SA view 
themselves as a forum for the cotton sector. Figure 8.8 portrays their decision-making process. It is 
evident from this that its structure allows for the representation of many groups within South 
African society, with consumers, small farmers and trade unionists sitting alongside more 
established cotton producers. Due to cotton being included under agricultural products in the 
agreement, Cotton SA tended to be represented at the ATF and NDA through the negotiations. 
Cotton was also indirectly represented also by Texfed at TESELICO. 
CLOFED CLOTHING PROVINCIAL UNIONI 
SECTOR 
PRODUCER ---- 10'. REGIONAL COMMITME 
SACTWU ............... ABOUR 
F-G-I ý ýR ] ...... ........ 
NATIONAL SPINýýI] ............................. ............ 
CONSUMERS CONSUMERS 
FORUM 
I 
L 
COTTON li iF 
SA I- 
NA&FU 
Figure 8.8: Organisational Structure of Cotton SA (Source: Cotton South Africa, undated). 
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a: Trade Bodies 
The first category, trade bodies, includes orgdnisdtions that view themselves as promoters of trade, 
research facilitators, and representatives for some of the wide ranging groups within the textile 
sector. Table 8.5 (below) provides a summary of the two main textile 'trade bodies' -Texfed and 
SATIEC. Both presently have close relationships with their clothing counterparts (the Clothing 
Federation - Clofed - and the South African Clothing Industry Export Council - SACIEC). 
Body Overview 
Textile Federation Founded - 1976. 
(Tezfed) Amalgamation of the Cotton Textile Manufacturers' Association 
(SACTMA), National Fabric Knitters'Trade Association (NFKTA) and the 
SA Worsted Manufacturers' Trade Association (SAWMTA). 15 Includes 
individual trade associations and corporate members who represent 
fibre suppliers (such as the SA Wool Board, SANS Fibres and Hoechst 
Trevira). Individual companies are represented. These are all relatively 
large companies. Also acts to market the industry and provides 
statistics and information. 
South African Established October 1999 by Alex Erwin, to 'facilitate the export of 
Textile Industry South African textiles to world markets' (SATIEC, 2001). 16 Formed to 
Export Council 'instil sustainable export culture within the industry... and become a 
(SATIEC) spokesperson for its members regarding export matters' (Salinger et al., 
19991. 
Table 8.5: Trade Bodies 
As figure 8.7 (the textile sector and the EU-SA TDCA decision-making process) demonstrates, 
of the two, Texfed was far more involved in the TDCA process, having links with government, 
through meetings over details with the DTI and face-to-face meetings with the negotiating team at 
TESELICO. Furthermore, Texfed links in with its clothing counterpart, Clofed, and the clothing 
and textile union, SACTWU. The Federation worked closely with SACTWU in presenting what 
Brink called a 'unified' voice for the textile industry. He notes that feedback between the groups 
happened, yet'we tended not to caucus with unions prior to [TESELIC01 meetings' (#Brink, 2001). 
Texfed also links in with categories two (non-governmental textile bodies such as Cotton South 
Africa) and, because its membership comprises of large business, four. Texfed advertises itself as 
being recognised by the DTI as an organisation seeking to be the official representative of the entire 
textile pipeline (Textile Federation, undated). It represents the industry at governmental level (such 
as at the EU-SA TDCA talks) and acts as a negotiating forum within the sector. The filtering of 
15 These associations continue to exist. 
'6 Envin formed the National Export Advisory Council and this includes many industries. Textiles is one of 
them. 
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TDCA information occurred within Texfed's executive structure, via a trade and tariff steering 
committee. " Brink (#, 2001) notes that: 
There was certainly consultation within the federation, within its executive 
structure... We have got these three trade associations. From the cotton side there 
are five representatives on my steering body; from the wool sector there are two 
and from knitters there are two. So from those representatives of the entire 
membership I was getting their direct feedback. Err... people like SANS would 
have made direct ... I was feeding information and positions back to them. 
The Federation represents 98.5% of businesses in the cotton industry, 100% of wool worsteds 
and 55-60% of knitting operators (#Brink, 2001). There is no link between Texfed and SMMEs, or 
previously disadvantaged groups in general because, as Brink (#, 2001) emphasises, 'none have 
entered into the membership of Texfed'. 
As SATIEC was formed in October 1999 it took no direct part in the negotiations. However 
they became involved in the TDCA Rules of Origin workshops organised by the DTI. They were 
I 
also extensively involved in the AGOA process. " Their organisational structure incorporates many 
aspects of the textile export sector, including Fibre and Yam, Home textiles, handcrafted textiles, 
technical textiles, Wool and mohair textiles, and Apparel textiles. Many businesses, small and 
large, have an input into the SATIEC decision-making process, as do Texfed. However, labour and 
civil society (or CBOs) have no representation. Although close to Texfed, SATIEC is not part of the 
Federation. One reason for that is SATIEC is trying to entice non-traditional Texfed members 
(#Viljoen, 2001). These are mainly new companies, either SMMEs, or from the 'Far East' (such as 
Taiwan, South Korea, China). Therefore, SATIEC could be regarded as an institution that is 
creating greater interaction between government and the textile sector. Indeed, one of the reasons 
why export councils were set up was to try and initiate a form of representation of the industry's 
commitment to export. Part of Viljoen's job is to outline how to 'actually align the export and 
decision-making, investment, local industry development and exports' (#Viljoen, 2001). 
17 This looked at all trade matters, not just the EU-SA TDCA. 
18 Viljoen (SATIEC) notes that there were striking contrasts between the two agreements: 'AGOA was 
totally opposite. AGOA was totally driven by the industry, with very little interaction or support or lobbying 
by the government, with its Foreign Affairs or Trade and Industry. [That] is for some very specific reasons... 
a country with a high profile within the WTO. Erwin has got a certain direction that he is following regarding 
WTO developing countries, so it was considered to now get too closely with this ... sort of one-way benefit kind of [agreement]. 
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b Employer's and Employer/Producer Organisations 
It is in this part of the organisation of the textile sector that most change has occurred since 1990. 
Many firms have either been taken over or closed down or have relocated to neighbouring states. 
For example, Anglovaal Textiles was purchased in 1998 by De Gama Textiles. Da Gama was in turn 
sold by owners South African Breweries to Claus Daum et Cie. A list of the major companies and 
their producer/representative organisations are listed below in table 8.6. Note that in November 
2000 SEARDEL, South Africa's largest textile group, took over Frame Textiles, the largest textile 
manufacturer (Radebe, 8 November 2000). 
Major Companies 
" Frame Textiles 
" Da Gama (see note about take-over at the start of this section) 
* De Nim 
" Union Spinning Mills 
" Industex 
" Anglovaal Textiles (see introduction to this section) 
" Claus Daum et Cie 
" SEARDEL 
" SANS Fibres 
Table 8.6: Major Textile companies 
Also included under this section are Small, Medium and Micro sized enterprises. Viljoen 
estimates that 50 of the 350 textile companies in South Africa are SMMEs. These firms have little 
formal representation, although one interviewee noted that Business Partners (formerly the Small 
Business Development Corporation) provided limited assistance to small and new entrant firms. 
There are also a number of organisations that represent the diverse elements of the textile 
trade, from mohair to fibres, yams to cotton. Some of these have been listed above as being non- 
statutory (such as Cotton SA, seen as a representative of the cotton industry). They predominantly 
reflect the interests of large employers (such as SACTPEA)). Furthermore, many of these 
companies are also represented by the Textile Federation. There is also a specific body that 
represents employers interests across all industries - the Confederation of Employers of South 
Africa (COFESA). This organisation has been criticised as being: 
the kind of bosses organisation which strives to employ workers outside of the 
scope of the bargaining councils and unions thereby leaving workers unprotected 
and ready for exploitation Gansen, April 2000,7). 
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FigUre 8.7 illusLraLes thaL large employers are on Lhe ouLside of Lhe TDCA process. However, 
the diagram is misleading for large companies are represented by Texfe. d and probably had close 
contacts with the DTI. SMMEs also have a directorate within the DTI to whom liaison is possible. 
4. Employee Organisations and employee representatives I 
* South African Clothing and Textiles Workers Union (SACTWU) 
Labour is mainly represented by SACTWU, which was formed foHowinp, a merger between the 
traditionally militant (male dominated) textile union and the fernale-dominated clothing union. 
One interviewee with close connections to SACTWU noted that tensions have existed within the 
union, Mainly relating to divisions over the degree of militancy within the uniori movement (#25, 
2001). Figure 8.7 indicates that SACTWU have been one of the main agencies in the TDCA textile 
decision-md king process. As noted above, SACTWU has close links, with Texfe. d throughout the 
negotiations. Furthermore SACTWU made representations to TESELICO and occasionally to the 
negotiating team (#Bennett, 2001). 
* ILRIG 
A Cape Town based NGO who research the textile, clothing and footwear industries, pdrticularly 
from a (f(-mdle) workers perspective. However, they were very much on the periphery of the 
TDCA decision-i-ndking structure having no direct access to the main organs of the policy 
formulation process. 
5. Civil Society 
Unlike the wine industry, there are no CBOs within the textile and clothing sector. Jansen suggests 
that this might be because. textiles is a really conventional, traditional industry, whereas there 'is a 
whole culLurearound wine. Generations of people living and working on the same plot of ground' 
(#Jansen, 2W1). Therefore, many stakeholders in civil society seem not to have been represented or 
included in the TDCA textile decision-making process. Indeed, figure 8.7 infers that these groups 
appear to be on the periphery of the process. However, civil society (and the previously 
disadvantaged) does seem to have had indirect representation through labour links with the union 
movement (category four) and Cotton South Africa (where consumers are represented). 
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Additionally, as illustrated in chapter four, domestic (such as Isandld) and 'external' NGOs lobby 
on behalf of civil society communities. 
6. External Envirorument I 
The major players in the external environment (such as the EU, WTO, IMF) and the roles they play 
in the. South African TDCA decision-making process have already been noted in ChdpLer Four. 
Their influence is documented in Chapter Five. In terms of the textile industry most actots are 
acutely aware of the influence that the extemal environment plays. Textile manufacturers are 
constantly being exhorted to enter the 'global stage'; the reduction in import tdriff levels exposes 
many firms to international competition; the industry is becoming dependent on exports. Mdny of 
the institutions listed in the categories above therefore interact regularly with the external 
environment - whether it is links between government and the World Bank say, or between the 
International Labour Organisation and SACTWU, or 'western' based NGC)s and previously 
disadvantaged communities. The external environment's role in the textile decision-making 
process was discussed occasionally by interviewees and is articulated in the analysis below (see 
section 8.4). 
The outlining of the actors within the textile sector and the role they played in the textile part 
of the TDCA policy formulation process has provided further detail on the South African TDCA 
decision-making structure. There are three bodies from the organisdtional structure presented 
above that can be considered the major actors in formulating textiles position in the EU-SA TDCA 
decision-making process. They are the textile and clothing directorate within the DTI, the Textile 
Federation and SAC`TWU. Indeed, from this organisdLional structure the textile industry appears to 
operate mostly on a tripartite level, where business (vid Texfed), labour (SACTWU) and 
government frequently met to discuss the TDCA agreement. Even though they are on the 
periphery, SMMEs and representatives of previously disadvantaged groups Lend to be indirectly 
included. Therefore, the impression gained from this description is that the textile TDCA decision- 
making structure is highly inclusive. The extent to which all stakeholders were perceived to have 
been included, based on the interviewing of twelve 'representatives' from various components 
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within the textile sector, is discussed in section 8.5 (below). The following section analyses the 
perception of the potential impact of the TDCA on the South African textile sector. 
8.4 Perceptions of the agreement 
This section proceeds by articulating those opinions from within the industry who viewed the 
TDCA as a potentially damaging agreement. This is followed by an arialvsis of more positive 
perceptions. 
A detrinicntal agreenient? 
Many of these negative perceptions support comments made in Chapter Six that tile agreement 
will have a detrimental impact. For instance, Brian Brink noted three 'disappointing' aspects of the 
agreement: 
1. The lengthy negotiating period 
2. That clothing and textiles were one of the few products in the deal which were not granted 
asymmetrical status 
3. That the future accession of eastern European states to the FU has not been properly 
considered in the context of the agreement (# Brink, 2001). 
Furthermore, Bernard Richards (SEARDEL) (#2001) criticised EU tactics: 
... we believed that South Africa 
had been treated unfairly. We had the promises 
having been made politically to South Africa to Nelson Mandela and we saw the 
European Union as ... trying to renege. 
The use of subsidies in the EU has also been attacked. Hennie Bruwer (Cotton SA) observed 
that: 
... one of the big concerns in the world today, for a country like South Africa, 
where we produce a very small percentage of cotton compared to the rest of the 
world, is the huge amounts of money made available for subsidisation of farmers. 
The subsidy portion to an average EU cotton farmer was more than 30% of our 
local price... (#Bruwer, 2001). 
This restrains South African farmers competing on the world market as subsidies have depressed 
world prices and prompts Bruwer's assertion that subsidies could 'kill-off' the South African 
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cotton industry (#Bruwer, 2001). This would suggest that South African textile companies continue 
to operate in an international environment that exploits textile industries within LDRs. 
Moreover, Mark Bennett (SACTWU) (#2001) argues that the agreement will not empower 
traditionally marginalised groups, stating that: 
... there has been no empirical analysis saying that jobs are going to be lost, we have been fed the line, the South African government has been fed the line, that 
this agreement is going to create jobs. Bollocks! I can't see jobs being created as a 
consequence of this agreement. I mean we have not taken any proactive measures 
to take advantage of this agreement. None. So, I just don't see where we are going 
to create. 
'Neutral'Ibeneficial? 
Comments were also made stating that the agreement will be far from detrimental. Brink noted 
that the TDCA should not harm the industry, arguing that with tariff 'phase-downs' on products 
being over eight years for South Africa and six for the EU, the agreement was 'hardly dramatic.... 
It's not exciting is it? I'm a great proponent of things being phased and gradual, but this is taking it 
to the ultimate extreme [laughing]' (Orink, 2001). Moreover, Richards (SEARDEL) felt that the 
overall 'perceptions are positive. We, as an industry, rightly or wrongly, do not see a major threat 
from European clothing, because it is already fairly expensive"' (#Richards, 2001). Sake van der 
Wal, states that the deal will 'strengthen our export position', and develop 'other possible areas of 
co-operation within the sector' (#Van der Wal, 2001). Bhorat adds that the agreement should 
benefit niche markets, hoping that this development will 'provide that gap or space for firms to 
grow and just reposition themselves' (#Bhorat, 2001). 
Many interviewees not linked to textiles in Chapter Six identified the South African textile 
sector as being a likely 'loser' from SEFTA. This supports findings from the literature review in 
Chapter Two (2.4), which noted that industries such as textiles are likely to suffer from 
development policies based on neo-classical economic thinking. The outline of the textile sector at 
the start of this chapter supports this finding, as large number of job losses in South Africa have 
been partially attributed to the impact of tariff liberalisation measures since 1993. Therefore, taking 
into account these figures and literature it is not surprising that the interviewees in Chapter Six 
19 Therefore EU goods will not compete with cheap South African domestic products. 
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identified textiles as ill industry lik(Ay to lose out from the terms of SEFTA. However, as textile 
inLerviewees have arguod, thoy are far more con(erned with trade liberalisaLion from areas where 
textiles aro producod at a( heaper level than ill South Afrit a (su( h as SADC or Malawi, as noWd ill 
8.23), rather than all arva like Europe where textiles are more exl-wnsive. This Lolls us that nvo- 
liberalism should perhaps not be treated as a one-headvd beast, as the IiLeraLure might filiply and 
rather see it instead as being more complex and differenfiaLed. 
8.5 Perceiving the inclusiveness of the decision-nia king processes 
Simply des(ribfiig this sLriwWre of de(ision-makiiig oifly provides a otic-dimensional . 1((omIt of 
110%N' ill(ILIsive the dv(ision-makiiig process was. This section prosetiLs a series of views, ofteti 
confliaiiig, from Lhose iiiterviewed within the indtistry, com-eming how iii(ILisive both the internal 
Loxhle, md 'govommonLal' decisioii-makmg process worv. The responsos are grotiped armind Lhe 
six (aLegories inLroduk ed in ChapLer Four. 
'Statutoty' Bodies 
Goucrnnictit 
Relations between the LexUle industry and government have often bven turbulent aolws, 1996, 
For example, in March 1994, a Lri-partisan group was formed, the Swart Panel (t omprising of 
government, manufacturers, and labour representatives) produced a report on fuLure industrial 
planning for the textiles and clothing se(lors. This (reated tension bvLween Lextiles, government 
and Clofed as Trevor Manuel, then the DTI NlinisLer, rejecLed many of the reporLs proposals and 
sLaLvd that the DTI alono would be the sole arbitrator in determining the future of Lhose secLors 
Oones, 19%, 
. 
18). This unstable and (ontradictory process of Lri-partisan consultation and auto( raLi( 
behaviour is reflected in pen-eptions of governments role in the texhle/TDCA decision-making 
process. There are those who view the pro(ess as inclusive and others who argue that the 
, I, Jones mentions that bctNNeen 1994 and 1996 relationships beween clothing and textile industries 
Aluctuated betN%cen outright connict and attempts to co-operate' (Jones. 1996.18). This NNas maink because 
CLOFED suggested that there should be a rapid phase down period on tariffs for textile. NNlulst keeping ten 
ý car pliasc clc, Ný n for clothing. 
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consultation process is 'insincere', with the DTI particularly taking decisions irrespective of other 
textile actors' views. Both sets of perceptions are articulated below. 
Interviewees from across the textiles spectrum declared that the goverrimental process is fairly 
open and consultative. Bernard Richards (#2001) states that in contrast to the previous (NP) 
administration, where 'nobody in the DTI really understood the industry', access to government is 
much improved. He notes that the ANC-led government is 'receptive and easy to approach'. 
Furthermore, Brink (Texfed) suggests that the DTI did consult with its tripartite partners: 
the feedback from guys like Bahle and his team in terms of the SA-EU negotiations 
was good and, relative to the SADC negotiations, was downright bloody excellent. 
But I think it was personalities. Bahle and his team were open, were consulting us, 
were at least half listening to us (#Brink, 2001). 
The NDA was also praised. Hennie Bruwer commented that Cotton SA provided regular inputs 
into the ATF. Bennett also remarked that the NDA: 
... were very good. Their work was professional, it was done on time, they knew 
what they were doing. Of course, they were only focusing on 22/23 tariff chapters, 
but they did their stuff and they did it very, very well (#Bennett, 2001). 
Bennett contrasts the NDA process with the DTI: 
Whereas with the DTI I think they just wanted to get to an end result... with as 
little interference as possible. So what it did was, ... the number of organisations it 
consulted with was [a]... small amount. What they would do from time to time is 
that we knew that they would go off and meet with individual employers. So, 
Keran House [former Director of textiles at the DTI) would phone up companies 
... it kind of created a situation whereby you did not know what you were doing 
sometimes (#Bennett, 2001). 
Bennett also criticised the DTI's consultation process, reflecting: 
If I had to stand back and look at the TESELICO process... As far as the bodies 
who were really involved, there is a difference between, if you had to use the 
word "consultatiorV... because government was consulting us and said they 
wanted our feedback on things. The problem is that in reality... if we gave them 
feedback, I think governments view is we gave them views that they did not 
particularly like and they saw our views as being protectionist, not in the national 
interest, avoiding the broader benefits of the agreement, all of that kind of stuff... 
In reality, while they had a number of interactions with us, they did not consult us 
properly and did not take our views into account properly... 
We had meetings, we called them policy sessions at NEDLAC with the Minister 
for Trade and Policy and ever single one of those sessions raises the problem of 
the way that the DTI behaves, its officials behaves itself. ... At every single one of them!... Joint cry from business and labour! 
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Another textile interviewee argued that the DTI were autocratic with decisions, 
adding that textile producers particularly would have liked more input into the process. 
There follows an abstract from the transcribed interview (#29,2(X)I): 
The DTI ran very tightly with... Alec Erwin driven interaction. I think what you 
would find, ten-to-one, is all the decisions were made there, with little input from 
the industry, or key industries. 
Question: What is your perception of how the textile industry felt by their incorporation in 
the decision-making process? Would they have liked more access? 
Answer: I would have said a lot more input into the process. 
This section presents the DTI as a decision-making actor that is, in part, accessible and, as 
section 8.3 points out, promotes consultation, which is increasingly being spread to previously 
disadvantaged communities, such as SMMEs (who have been invited to attend sectordl summits). 
One SMME interviewee however stressed that attendance at these meetings was difficult due to 
work commitments and financial resources. He notes, 'I am aware of the forum, we have been 
invited but in general, I am too busy running my business to discuss the issues' (#31, AM). Such 
considerations, including the lack of resources, was highlighted in Chapter Five as a hindrance to a 
fufly consultative and inclusive decision-making process. 
Research/Non-statutory bodies F_ 
Ordy two organisations were identified here as being involved in the textile sphere of the EU-SA 
TDCA decision-ma king process. The first of these, DPRU, as discussed in Chapter Five, has a great 
deal of influence within DTI circles. Two DPRU researchers have analysed the textile sector iii 
southern Africa. The second organisation is Cotton SA. An outline of their decision-making process 
suggests that the structure appears highly inclusive, with a number of interested parties being, 
consulted and participating in decisions made. An in-depth analysis of Cotton SA's decision- 
making process was not possible due to practical difficulties, so, although in theory inclusive, it 
was difficult to comment on the extent of inclusivity in reality. When questioned on whether any 
other community groups could be represented, Hennie Bruwer, Cotton SA's representative, 
answered: 
Well let me tell you. I think that at the end of the day we sat down and we said 
listen, holding such a forum costs a lot - to have a structure like that is very 
expensive. To have people from all over the country, it is costing a lot of money, 
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so we tried to be specific and say lets try to have representa Lion of this sector in 
the textile part (#Bruwer, 2001). 
Employers Organisations 
A- Textile Federation 
Texfed is viewed as a very important voice within the textile sector. It portrays itself as in 
orgdnisdtion that is representative of the whole industry. Certainly within Texfed there appears to 
be a relatively inclusive structure. Indeed, Bennett notes that: 
Brian [Brink]... has a really good relationship with his members. So he is quite 
confident that if he says something then his members will back it up. He will 
phone around and check it out with his president and a couple of guys [from 
within the industry] (#Bennett, AM). 
There are however question marks over how much of the textile sector it represents. Van der 
Wal (DTI) noted above that the Federation ortly represents large companies. Brink stated that 
Texfe. d had no small or new entranLs (Brink, correspondence, 5 March 2WI). Wben asked if civil 
society interesLs were included, Brink replied: 
I certainly did not consult with them. No one questioned that they were not there 
or anything like that... I certainly did not consult with those guys and I consulted 
with my membership and then the other two industries that were allied to us 
[clothing and footwear]. I do not feel guilty about it at all. I think that, to their 
defence, I think the union in the texts, the aid components, ... made some input 
but my ears were closed at that stage. I had no interest in that. 
Indeed, Texfe. d does not have 100% representation for all the textile industries it consults. One 
industry insider noted that: 
You know, Texfe. d is an organisdLion that's unfortunately got a member bias 
[towards cotton]. It is purely, I think you must not point fingers. If someone is the 
only voice in an audience how can you listen to the rest? The dynamic is driven by 
very few individuals, because most people allow it to happen, and then they are 
very critical afterwards because it happened that way. And unless you acLuallý 
represent and you support it... I have never been to a Texfed meeting with more 
than about 12-15 people. (#29,2001). 
CLOFED 
The Clothing Federation in contrast denies that it represents all clothing interests. Richards notes 
that more than half the clothing industry is not represented, and that attempts to include 
traditionally disadvantaged groups have failed. Therefore, Clofed presents themselves as lobbying, 
only for the interests of its members. Richards explains that: 
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The clothing industry employs about 150,000 people directly. Of that 55,000 are 
employed by the organised urban industry people of the Cape, Natal, Transvaal, 
then there about another 14,000 or 15,000 people who work in the decentralised 
areas - Northern Natal or whatever and they are not part of the organised 
industry. The other 80,000 are SMMEs and they are not represented by anybody to 
my knowledge. We as a clothing federation ran an SMME desk for a number of 
years to try and represent interest other than our, direct interest of our members 
and we got nowhere. We couldn't attract enough attention or we were 
unsuccessful in enticing SMMEs into our ranks. So I would suggest that at this 
point in time we represent ourselves. 
... In fact we are restructuring CloFed to say that from now on we will only talk for 
ourselves. We will not talk, we will no longer pretend to be representative of the 
industry because the government never saw us as representative of the industry 
anyway although we believe that we were talking on behalf of the industry. 
Richards has also noted that apart from SMMEs, new investors entering the clothing and textile 
sector, such as those from East Asia, which do a lot of business in South Africa, are also not 
represented in the structures outlined in this analysis. 
SATIEC 
SATIEC is included here, not because of the limited role it played in the EU-SA TDCA, but for its 
attempts at including SMMEs in the SATIEC decision-making process. Martin Vi1joen lists 
SATIEC's efforts and the problems faced: 
I have tried to identify the most capable SMME person if you can call it that... In 
each area we tried to get somebody who could represent and then get them 
involved. Now, I met some very capable [SMMEs] in the UK in May... I identified 
a woman who could potentially be somebody that you could like champion to 
motivate ... she said that she had no money to travel... some of them are not on 
email... I would say it is close to impossible to get an interactive involvement 
going with them. That does not mean that it shouldn't... 
There are a lot of People riding on SMMEs - we have had meetings, Jack Kipling 
[clothing counterpart] and myself where some of the SNIMEs have been very 
vocal, or very aggressive, they have been not listening and saying, we know best, I 
will in the end export my stuff and I don't care. They are mostly run by women, 
with previously disadvantaged women as well; some of them are very clued up 
because they run very successful businesses, but they just, it is totally different to 
take on an onus of exporting on you own, to handle the whole process and then, 
and to even get involved with some of the processes. So, to cut a long story short, 
we have not been able to. See, they are not unionised... they don't want to be 
unionised, so they are not part of that support structure, ... but at the same time I do my best to sort of keep a few of them informed... but we have never been able 
to pull them in, because firstly, they say will you support some of our costs if you 
want us to get involved, and it has not worked' (#Viljoen, 2001). 
Despite these concerns with SMMEs ethics, the attempt to insert smaH and emerging producers 
into the SATIEC decision-making process has been approved by some. Nick Murgatroyd 
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(AfricaNova) states that, 'We have recently become more involved with SATIEC who appear to be 
doing an excellent job in representing small textile firms on aii export level' (#Mu rgatroyd, 2(X)1). 
B Producers/Employers 
In 1996, the Industrial Democracy Rezfiezv Uones, 1996), a Idbour related journal, suggested that 
employers and manufacturers threatened the potential success of the textile tripartite system. Jones 
(1996,39) remarked that: 
... the glue which holds tripartite institutions together in SA is very weak and a 
major cause for that weakness is the inability of business orgra nisa lions to 
represent broad business concerns instead of narrow factional interests. 
An anonymous industry source claims that the business sphere of the industry is still divided, 
noting that: 
Now, the industry is fragmented. I would say that 80% of the industry sits in 
two/three hands, and that is between Claus et cie, Frame Group, which is now 
owned by SEARDEL, and SANS Fibres ... If those three guys could actually get 
around to having an interactive type of relationship ... they can turn the industry 
around (#29,2(X)1). 
This assertion has been noted previously within the industry. A number of problems have 
hampered access to industry information in the past. This has been due in some ways to the lack of 
co-operation between manufacturers (IDC, 1999c, 14). 
Employees/Unions F- 
SACTWU tend to represent those traditionally excluded from society, the low paid, and 
particularly women (who are the majority within the union). Brian Brink (Texfed) has already 
noted that he believes SACTWU consulted at least some of these disadvantaged groups, including 
civil society. Despite representing employees in many areas, there appears to be a 'gap' between 
the majority of the workforce and the SACIWU 'elite' who represented the union in the TDCA 
decision-ma king process. Already outlined is the extent to which the unions and producers 
(Texfed) formed a common front in negotiations with government. Bennett (SACTWU) felt that 
there were no tensions between these two actors. However, Brink (Te)cfed) states that this unified 
position was strained on a few occasions, particularly over the inclusion of wording relating to 
social clauses and in terms of the unions perceived protectionist stance. 
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The perceived 'gap' between union leadership and workers has already been reflected upon in 
the previous chapter. Within the textile sector Bennett asserts that: 
Let me put it to you this way. We certainly did not go down and take it down to 
shop steward level ... only three people in SACTWU would be able to tell me [what the TDCA is about] No-one would know. But people do know that tariffs 
affect them. So it wasn't done at that kind of level within SACTWU. It was really 
done at a leadership level. The other issue is I do not think that you can mobilise 
workers on the basis of a trade agreement on clothing and textiles. You are not 
going to be able to mobilise them around those kind of issues. You can mobilise 
them around wages... and jobs (#Bennett, 2001). 
Helga Jansen of ILRIG supports the view that although the workforce was not consulted 
widely over the TDCA it did not mean that a gap was developing between leadership and shop 
floor. She observes that there is a move towards corporatisation in SACTWU, but TDCA 
negotiations are 'not close to the realities of workers'. Indeed on matters of more relevance to 
workers, 'the unions have mechanisms which are put into place to ensure that workers are part of 
every decision-making', and 'there are also ways in which information is filtered down... that 
makes workers feel as if they are participating, and as if the decision that they make at branch level 
does impact on national direction, you know? '. 
That said, there are two issues around which SACTWU have been accused of excluding the 
interests of disadvantaged peoples. Firstly, despite SACTWU being dominated by women, when 
asked if SACTWU took into account womens interests in the EU-SA TDCA negotiations, Mark 
Bennett replied that they did not. Furthermore, two interviewees (such as Chirindza) from SA Fine 
Worsteds argue that traditional management culture excludes women. Very few are in 
management positions within the textile sector. 
The second issue of concern within SACTWU relates to xenophobia, an issue already 
addressed in connection to clothing and textiles in Chapter Five. The SACTWU campaign in 1999 
to 'Buy South African' was viewed in two ways. These are summarised by Vincent Williams 
(SAMP): 
I suppose the first interpretation would be anti-foreigners, anti-immigrants 
whatever... just the way in which they have conducted their campaign, that is 
certainly what comes across - we don't want foreign workers, or competition from 
foreign workers at the end of the day. Now, we were quite concerned with that as 
well. Even with COSATU they have made statements about the situation about 
foreign workers, saying that South African workers must come first... 
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When you talk to them about the Idbour difference they say, they are not directing 
the campaign against the foreign workers, they are directing it against the 
employers, so they are saying that employers should not employ people without 
their docuTnents or whatever else. So that the argument becomes a lot more 
sophisticated, because iLn principle I actually agree with it. They say that 
employers should not take advantage of peoples statuses and therefore pay them 
less. So their argument is that they are not against foreign workers they are against 
exploitative practices of employers. 
But of course if you look at the placards and look at the statements they make 
that's not what they are saying. They are saying, we don't want foreign workers. 
They are very clear, this is that ... a worker is d worker is a worker. They keep 
emphasising this. But this is what the leadership says. The way the rdnk and file 
interprets the placards I think is entirely different. We don't want foreign workers. 
We come first. South Africans come first. 
0741 Society I 
As figure 8.7 demonstrates, civil society representatives were clearly on the periphery of the TDCA 
decision-making process. However, SAC`TWU argues that 'civil society' claims are addressed 
generally by the union. Consumer groups were also included via Cotton SA. Yet, the extent to 
which this 'representation' of civil society had any influence within Cotton SA is difficult to assess. 
Furthermore, Cotton SA was on the very fringes of the TDCA decision-making structure. Despite 
their remoteness, civil society and the traditionally marginalised have been referred to throughout 
this analysis. Texfed stated that they did not consult with them. The government was criticised for 
failing to resource an effective representation of SMMEs (#Murgatroyd, 2001). More worrying are 
the comments of Richards that more than 50% of clothing employees (working in the informal 
sector) have no representation whatsoever. 
Extemal Environment 
As chapters Four, Five and Seven discussed, there are those inLerviewees who feel that the internal 
South African decision-ma king system is virtually powerless, as decisions made in the external 
environment dictate what happens to policy in South Africa. This perception was again articulated 
by a few interviewees associated with the textile and clothing sector. For example, Jansen argued: 
... it 
doesn't matter whether if the government sets up all kinds of small business 
development corporations... and job creation initiatives, when the quality of those 
jobs are being impacted by ... trade agreements and liberalisation. and 
by 
multinationals coming in and basically raping our workers and moving on... 
[Goveniment legislation] speaks of positivity but it gets negated by what is 
happening outside, it is negated when our President and our Minister of 
Finance... have to basically go to bed with the likes of the World Trade 
Organisation. 
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Summary 
This analysis of the textile TDCA decision-making process parallels findings drawn in Chapters 
Four and Five in that the inclusive portrayal of the policy formulation process, presented in section 
8.3, is challenged by the perceptions of those interviewed. Those who perceived that the structure 
was inclusive tended to be closely involved with government in the textile side of the negotiations 
(such as the Textile Federation representative, Brian Brink). Those that argued that the textile 
TDCA decision-making process was not inclusive were more likely to be on the periphery of the 
main negotiations. However, the labour representative Mark Bennett who had considerable access 
to the formulation process, was also critical of the government structure. He argued that 'there was 
no proper consultation on the EU [agreement] ... they really span us a line... the line was a pretence 
of consultation' (#Bennett, 2001). Access to the EU-SA TDCA decision-making process has been 
limited to the tripartite partners. SMME representatives, which usually comprise traditionally 
marginalised peoples, perceive that there is a gap between themselves and government, and feel 
excluded from the Textile Federation, an organisation that government views as being 
representative of the whole textile sector. Interviewees noted that SMMEs, which constitute at least 
50% of the clothing sector, have access to very little or no representation. 
However, there are views expressed here that illustrate that the situation for all stakeholders 
has been greatly improved since 1990 and the future seems to promise greater inclusiveness. 
Walter Simeoni, from Frame Group, notes that Alec Erwin has promised that the textile industry 
will be more thoroughly involved in future trade negotiations (Simeoni, Cotton SA journal, 2000,6). 
Additionally, the textile and clothing forums held by the DTI are open to a wide array of 
stakeholders. Tripartite negotiations, despite tensions, are happening on a regular basis. Labour 
and producers have closely collaborated over the TDCA. Furthermore other groups traditionally 
outside of this tripartite process are beginning to be included within decision-making systems. 
Even some of the traditionally disadvantaged have access to the overall textile decision-making 
structure in 2001. Notably, SMMEs have increased access via the DTI and SATIEC. Civil society is 
included in the cotton decision-making structure and trade unions, in theory at least, take into 
account the views of different sections of the community. However, it must still be noted that 
marginalised groups cannot be considered as a homogenous unit. The label 'previously 
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disadvantaged' can be applied to an eclectic collection of groups and individuals. Despite these 
perceived 'advances' in inclusion in the decision-making process, access is still limited to a few 
SMME. s that have the resources and time to be able to attend summit forums. Furthermore, manv 
workers still employed in the sector are affected by chronic job insecurities. 
This analysis of the textile side of the TDCA has provided micro-scale detail of the South African 
decision - making structure, its degree of inclusiveness and perceptions of the potential impact of 
the agreement. 
The first finding to emerge is that the study has added to the description of the TDCA policy 
formulation process and noted %imilarities with the general description presented in Chapter Four. 
In theory, stakeholder,. from across the textile spectrum had the opportunity to participate. It 
appear% that the NDA provides a better service, and allows more representation, than the DTI. This 
di%, crg(-% somewhat from the conclusions made in Chapter Seven. To some extent this conclusion is 
%urpn%ing a% the overview of the industry in section 8.2 showed that the sector has been in decline 
and fhereforv would probably tend to exclude rather than include stakeholders. 
Tht, MICOnd finding, . 1% Was the caw in Chapter Five, i,. that in practice obstacles restricted 
to the textile TlX*A deci%ion-making process, aside from the tripartite actors - government, 
labour and bu%ines% repi-t-sentative, - SMMF repre,, entativeN in particular have argued that they felt 
unrepre-wnted, particulark- bN, Texfed. A,, SMMl: % constitlite a significant proportion of the textile 
sector their vxclu%ion v. an important one. However, aside from the textile TDCA process, the 
degrev of indusivitv i% high, and the chances of greater inclusion art- promising. Uven some 
traditionally niarginali%ed peoples (who should not be treated as a monolithic unit) have some 
at ( v, -% It t the general textile decision-making process. 
I hird, thi% chapter also considcred aspects of tht- influence different actors had in the decision- 
making pri x t-%-, I-or example, mam inter\ it-wees commented on the FU and F, uropean actors as 
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influential 'players' in the TDCA process. However, they did not express many opinions about the 
general acceptance to the neo-classical economic climate which some accepted with little criticism. 
Indeed the Textile Federation proclaimed its support for it. Perhaps this is a case of being 
subconsciously influenced by the dominance of neo-liberalism in the external environment. 
However, NGO officials, particularly Helga Jensen found acceptance of intergovernmental 
financial institutions edicts difficult to stomach. 
A fourth finding teased out from this overview is that the South African textile sector has 
become marginalised economically with the end of ISI and the introduction of tariff liberalisation 
on imports (as well as illegal imports). The EU-SA TDCA joins GATT and the SADC trade 
agreement (amongst others) have facilitated such import tariff reduction. Trade liberalisation is at 
least partially responsible for technological transformation and the influx of illegal imports that 
have resulted in retrenching a large section of the textile labour force and/or replacing long-term 
working contracts with short-term, part-time employment. Despite this, trade liberalising policies 
have been accepted by some within the industry (particularly Texfed and SATIEC). Other voices 
are more critical (labour, ILRIG). In addition, SEFI7A is seen to be less threatening than the SADC 
FI7A and not as beneficial as AGOA. 
Fifth, this chapter has questioned further the conclusions in Chapter Six, which selected wine 
as a winner and textiles as a loser. The previous chapter reflected an overwhelming articulation 
from wine actors that they did not believe that the wine industry would benefit from the 
agreement, despite being selected as a winning sector. Textile interviewees did not entirely 
contradict the textile selection as a losing sector but many did not see the agreement as being 
totally bad. Of far more concern to them was the SADC free trade agreement. 
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The European Union-South Africa Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement, altliougli 
similar to other neo-liberal trading arrangements, is important, both nationally and internationally, 
for a number of reasons. Some interviewees argued that the TDCA is the most significant macro- 
economic international agreement that South Africa has ever undertaken (#22,1999; #4,1999) as it 
represented the acceptance of the South African state in the 'global community' (#12,1999). The 
TDCA is also important at a micro-level as the agreement impacts upon the Soutil African public. 
As Jansen and Pape explain: 
When we speak of the WTO and trade agreements, Such as the I"Uropean 
Union/South African Trade Agreement, they seem far away processes negotiated 
by government officials. But in reality there is a direct link between trade and our 
working environment. Trade agreements have changed the wav in wliicli workers 
produce goods and the manner in which they are sold. This often results in some 
workers losing their jobs as industries move away or transform (Jansen and Pape, 
October 2000,3). 
Furthermore, the TDCA epitomises the dominance of economic neo-classical thinking. If the ANC, 
with its historic commitment to nationalisation and socialist policies, can accept and employ policies 
based on neo-liberalism, this says much about neo-classicalism's influence on the South African and 
global economic climate. Additionally, a number of analysts and interviewees commented that the 
implementation of this agreement sets an international precedent for the future wave of neo-liberal 
trade and development arrangements being negotiated between the EU and ACP following the 
Cotonou Agreement (Cape Business News (anon. ), November 1999). Assessing the TDCA is 
therefore not only relevant to South Africa, but also to the 'developing world' (#22,1999). 
This thesis had two central aims; first, to evaluate critically the South African decision-making 
process which underpinned the TDCA negotiations and, second, to assess the potential economic 
impact of the agreement on South Africa. Four objectives were associated with these aims: to 
describe and model the South African TDCA decision-making structure; to evaluate how inclusive 
this structure was; to assess the potential economic impacts of the agreement; and, finally, to 
examine on a micro scale the decision-making and economic impact implications of the agreement, 
and to evaluate their nuances, through an assessment of the TDCA on the South African wine and 
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textile industries. This chapter is structured to reflect on the results linked to these objectives, whilst 
also debating issues that arise from them. Section 9.2 examines conclusions drawn from the 
literature review. One of the principle findings was that the neo-liberal approach dominates 
contemporary development discourse, and that there is a polarised debate surrounding the impact 
of neo-liberalism. Section 9.3 then assesses the main findings relating to the description of the South 
African TDCA decision-making structure. The portrayal of the EU-SA TDCA formulation process 
was derived mainly from those interviewees who were involved in establishing the structure of the 
decision-making system. This information was placed in the context of a model that was developed 
from the literature review. The model identifies the EU-SA TDCA as being inclusive in theory, yet 
also alludes to the high degree of influence that the external environment had on the formulation 
and outcome of the TDCA. Arising from the description are two issues that the section debates 
further. The first links to the growing belief that access to these processes, for 'stakeholders', is close 
to being considered a fundamental human right. Second, the high degree of EU influence over the 
agreement also generates concern for ACP states who are negotiating similar trade agreements with 
the EU. 
Section 9.4 evaluates issues that emerged from perceptions of interviewees on the inclusivity of 
the TDCA policy formulation process. These perceptions noted that the TDCA decision-making 
process appeared less inclusive than the description suggested. However, an issue that arises from 
this is the difficulty of actually defining what participation means. The findings indicate that 
expectations on the level of participation may well have been excessively high. The section also 
ponders whether the global neo-classical system generates a climate where collective decision- 
making is hindered. Section 9.5 follows on from this analysis by examining the main conclusions of 
the potential economic impacts of the agreement on South Africa, drawn from the perspectives of 
those interviewed who were close to the TDCA decision-making process, as well as those within 
the wine and textile industries. This 'selection' process proved to be extremely difficult, as it was 
almost impossible to find agreement on who would 'win' or 'lose'. 
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9.2 Findings from the literature 
The literature review surveyed a rarige of debates surrounding the objectives stated above. In so 
doing it formed the theoretical basis for the empirical chapters (four to eight). This inCILIdCd a 
review of the key elements of economic development thinking since 1945, and highlighted neo- 
liberalism as the hegemonic philosophy that underpins most contemporary perspectives oil 
development philosophy and macroeconomic policy. One of the central characteristics of neo- 
classical economic development is the prornotion of free market economic,, where barriers 
surrounding trade are reduced or eliminated. The EU-SA TDCA has many neo-liberal dimensions, 
the most important of which is the liberalisation of tariffs. Second, the benefits and detrinients of 
neo-classicalism were discussed. This formed the basis for considering the potential 'winners' and 
'losers' that might result from the TDCA in Chapter Six. One of the major criticism,, of neo- 
liberalism is that decision-making processes that accompany neo-classical trade and developirient 
agreements tend to exclude many stakeholders (despite these agreements having a commitment to 
'democratic' principles). The literature review therefore also explored work concerning 
participation in political decision-making systems and suggested the use of a model by which to 
assist describing and assessing the inclusiveness of the South African TDCA decision-making 
process. 
Perhaps the major issue that emerged from the literature survey was evidence of an 
increasingly polarised debate on the merits and demerits of neo-liberalism. The first group, mostly 
governments and intergovernmental financial institutions (IFI's) (such as the IMF and World Bank), 
claim that significantly more people, particularly in LDRs, would 'win' rather than 'lose' from trade 
and development policies based on neo-liberalism. Conversely, the opposing camp (NGOs, C130s, 
and academics) identified more losers. Although people from both groups occasionally soften their 
stance (for instance Mike Moore of the WTO recently acknowledged that the 'benefits' of neo- 
liberalism have 'bypassed many') very few occupy the 'middle ground'. Indeed, there seems to be a 
division between those in positions of power, who advocate a neo-liberal viewpoirit, and those 
most disadvantaged (or representing the marginalised) in global society, and thus peripheralised 
from the organs of power, many of whom have protested (with other stakeholders) against 
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economic neo-classical policies. A growing number of 'populist movements' and NGOs campaign 
against aspects of neo-classical economics. Simpson (2001) notes that over three million people from 
over 20 countries have protested in the last year (to August 2001). The 'battle' between the two 
camps has been symbolised by the protests coinciding with WTO, World Bank and G7 meetings at 
Seattle in 1999, and Gothenburg and Genoa in 2001. Some analysts claim that anti-economic 
globalisation protesters emanate only from 'privileged' 'Western' backgrounds and that by 
protesting against neo-liberalism they are hindering policies that are designed to alleviate poverty 
and global inequalities (Sen, 19 July 2001). However, at the time of writing, protests have recently 
taken place against neo-liberalism in Ecuador, Brazil and Argentina. Furthermore, this research has 
suggested that many in South Africa are critical of neo-classical economic policy. This is not only at 
an academic or NGO level. Between July and September 1999 tens of thousands of people from the 
Clothing and Textile Workers Union protested against economic globalisation in Pretoria, Durban, 
Port Elizabeth and Cape Town (Hlangani, 20 July 1999). These protests show that what appears to 
be an abstract and theoretical academic debate on development perspectives is relevant to, and 
makes an impact on, the 'everyday' lives of the population globally. This conclusion is important to 
this thesis because the impact of this polarised debate could influence the views of those 
interviewed, especially in their identification of likely 'winners' and 'losers' and their thoughts on 
issues of inclusivity in relation to the EU-SA TDCA decision-making structure. 
Is this neo-classical dominance simply a reflection of the paucity of credible alternatives to neo- 
liberalism, or is there perhaps a deliberate attempt at what Connolly (1983) refers to as a 'closure of 
discourse', where other development philosophies are denied a hearing because of the powerful 
position accorded to neo-classical economic thinking? Some argue that the hegemonic status of neo- 
liberalism has resulted in the de-legitimatisation of alternatives to economic neo-classicalism 
(Williams and Taylor, 2000,21). ' If this is the case, ff the supporters of neo-liberalism have closed 
off the 'threat' posed by alternatives, and if many accept that the present neo-liberal situation is 
'reality', then some argue that 'the march of [econon-dc] globalisation [and all that it entails] seems 
inevitable' (Daniels and Macfarlane, 16-22 February 2001). This polarised situation poses a dilemma 
1 Such as the African Alternative to Structural Adjustment Programmes (Williams and Taylor, 2000,22), or 
post-structural and post-traditionalist perspectives (see Simon, 1997 and 1998b). 
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for governments striving for economic development as they appear to have little choice Nit to 
implement policies premised on neo-liberalism. Some, facing growing protems from the 
population, against 'economic globalisatioil' Might Well Want tO pIII-SLIC all IltC1'11atiVC to 11VO- 
liberalism. However, after the collapse of the last viable alternative ('Coln In Un iSln'), pursLial of 
alternatives would appear to be a huge gamble, and indeed infeasible as it would probably L1111cash 
the wrath of IFFs and banishment from the 'international community'. Indeed, tlie Taiizaiiiaii 
government, although critical of neo-liberalism, have argued that 'fighting against globalisatioii 
[neo-liberalism] is rather like fighting against the metric system. You may not like it, but the costs of 
being outside it far outweigh any of the disadvantages of being in'. (Jones, 29 January 2001). 
9.3 Decision-making: Description 
The description of the TDCA was facilitated thrOLIgh the development of a model (see figures 
4.1 to 4.3) that simplified what proved to be a highly complex decision-making system. This model 
described the overall South African TDCA formulation process and introduced four central 
components - internal environment, external environments, the statal process and detached 
observers - that comprised the decision-making structure. The model allowed for an identification 
of 'actors' that played a part in forming the TDCA. Some of these categories were difficult to 
delineate. For instance, the detached and Lin-detached observer categories were vague and not 
exclusive categories and their contribution to the process difficult to gauge precisely. Many of the 
components and actors introduced by the model in Chapter Four were also used in the wine and 
textiles organisational diagrams and figures portraying their respective TDCA clecision-ma king 
structures. The portrayal of the decision-making processes emanated from descriptions provided 
by government officials, as well as business and tabour representatives who were very close to the 
negotiations. Relatively few interviewees had a complete and intimate knowledge of the TDCA 
policy formulation processes. From these descriptions a clearer picture of the TDCA decision- 
making process emerged. The central finding was that, in theory, the South African statal TDCA 
decision-making structure was highly inclusive. All the main actors had at least some access to the 
policy formulation structure. Not only were business and tabour included, but so too were those 
identified in Chapter Two as most likely to be excluded, such as civil society, the traditionally 
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disadvantaged, and peripheralised regions and industries. Indeed, one industry, textiles, identified 
in the literature survey as being marginalised by the global economy seemed to enjoy a significant 
amount of access. Large textile business interests appear to have had most opportunity to 
participate, yet labour were also included. Furthermore civil society also had access to the TDCA 
decision-making process, although such representation was generally through indirect channels. 
One example of this is the Cotton South Africa decision-making process that included consumer 
representatives in its general decision-making structure. Cotton SA then had its own 
representatives involved on the fringes of the TDCA policy formulation process. Conversely, the 
wine case study suggested that its TDCA decision-making process was not particularly inclusive. A 
few institutions had excellent access but many within the industry had few opportunities to 
participate. That is not to say that some government officials did not attempt to include a broader 
cross-section of the wine industry's interests. However the reluctance of the traditional wine elite to 
change, and the fragmented nature of 'alternative actors' in the wine sector, appear to be reasons 
why opportunities to participate were limited. These two case studies illustrate how complex the 
description of the TDCA decision-making process was. 
Why was an analysis of decision-making, and varying actors/stakeholders access to it, so 
important? First, in the South African context, before 1994 access to decision-making structures that 
shaped the majority of the populations lives was extremely limited. Seven years after the election of 
the first democratically elected government seems an appropriate enough juncture to gauge South 
African perceptions of how they have been included in the statal political decision-making 
structure. Second, there appears to be a growing expectation that more access should be granted to 
the public, in political, particularly statal, decision-making structures (Beetham, 1999), especially as 
the state, along with multi-national corporations, increasingly influence, and even dictate, peoples 
lives globally (Smith and Naim, 2000). Indeed, participation by the public in statal decision-making 
processes is almost seen as a fundamental human right. For example, a recent United Nations 
Commission for Human Rights Resolution stated that 'transparent, responsible, accountable and 
participatory government, responsive to the needs of people, is the foundation upon which good 
governance rests' (Robinson, 2000). It could be argued that the growing number of mass protests 
against aspects of the global neo-liberal economic system is an outward manifestation of some 
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peoples' desire either to participate or influence a decision-making environment that they are seen 
to be marginalised from. 
The model also indicated that actors from the external environment significantly influenced the 
shaping and formulation of the TDCA. IFFs may well have established a climate wherein the South 
African government had few real alternatives to the pursuit of neo-classical economics if it wanted 
to integrate into the world economy. The EU only provided South Africa with one choice -a 
Regional Trading Agreement (RTA) - which had to be compatible with WTO regulations. In other 
words, a neo-liberal trading arrangement which would be largely reciprocal and eliminate tariffs on 
'substantially [believed to be 90%] all trade' (Stevens and McQueen, 1999). Such external influence 
on the South African government presents an interesting dilemma for the South African president 
Thabo Mbeki. Under his plans for an 'African Renaissance' (see Chapter Four, 4.3.1), Mbeki urges 
African leaders to assume leadership of their economy and economic development (Mail & 
Guardian (anon. ) 2-8 February 2001). However, the macroeconomic and development policies that 
are being implemented are based on World Bank, WTO, IMF and European Union prescriptions, 
and premised on an ideology that can be considered to be 'Western. 
This influence once again raises the question as to whether the hegemony of neo-hberalism 
influences, or even dominates, the climate in which trade and development agreements are 
formulated, and result in the exclusion of potential alternatives. Certainly in the South African 
internal environment, those opposing the neo-classical macroeconomic policies of the South African 
government felt they had few alternatives to turn to. One interviewee, admittedly sympathetic 
towards neo-liberalism, argued: 
looking at the [internal and external] environment in which we found ourselves 
[South African government] operating we had no alternative but to go for this deal. 
There was no alternative on the table (#12,1999). 
The ideological polarisation of economic thinking before 1990 completely changed after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, as both Chapters Two and Four demonstrated, debates on 
the ideological direction of South African development and trade policy continue to persist. Those 
opposing neo-liberal macroeconomic policy are sometimes criticised for living in the past, and by 
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association being tainted with the spectre of apartheid. A senior South African economist critical of 
neo-liberalism supports this argument. He argued that: 
Even with globalisation... we still have to look at how we want to liberalise, and 
how... our capital account, you know... our financial market liberalisation. We 
have to... have some control over the pace and sequence... but using these words 
makes you a protectionist! (#5,1999). 
The EU also exerted significant control over the TDCA negotiating process. The South African 
government had been interested in an alternative development framework, requesting full 
membership of the Lom6 Convention. However the EU rejected this for a variety of, primarily neo- 
classical, reasons (see 4.3.4). That, and the EU influence exerted over the TDCA decision-making 
process, resulted in a number of tensions between them and South Africa. Numerous quotations 
throughout this thesis from interviewees have demonstrated this tension. Thabo Mbeki (1999b) has 
supported some of the interviewee arguments, when in a speech promoting his idea of African 
Renaissance, he argued that: 
The difficulty we will face with regard to the task [of persuading the West to help 
in the African Renaissance] is illustrated by the problem we are facing even as we 
stand here, of arriving at the point when we can conclude the bilateral agreement 
between our country and the European Union. Stripped of all pretence, what has 
raised the question whether the agreement can be signed today or not, is the reality 
that many among the developed countries of the North have lost all sense of the 
noble idea of human solidarity. What seems to predominate is the question, in its 
narrowest and most naked meaning... what is in it for me? and all this with 
absolutely no apology or sense of shame [about the exploitation of Africa by 
European powers in the past]. 
Furthermore, a senior South African TDCA negotiator, Bahle Sibisi (1999), reflected that 'The 
impression arising out of the talks... is that the developed world has not yet embraced the notion of 
a fair deal for the developing world'. 
Such sentiments do not bode well for the trade agreements being negotiated between the EU 
and ACP states in the wake of the Cotonou Agreement as some interviewees have argued that the 
TDCA provides a blueprint for future trading agreements between the EU and the 'developing' 
world. Indeed, Cape Business News argued that 'It is widely believed that the SA/EU agreement 
was always meant to be a model for Europe's future negotiations with the ACP and other 
developing countries' (Cape Business News (anon. ), November 1999). Some analysts have stated 
that the TDCA represents a major change, or paradigm shift, in the EU's approach to trade relations 
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between the EU and the 'developing world' (South African Council of Churches, 2000). I'llc 
principle of non-reciprocity under Lom6, where ACP states were given nore access to 1: U inarkct. s 
than the EU have in the ACP, will be altered. The EIU recognised that Loin6 was iiicoiiipatible witli 
WTO rules. The trading arrangements that will follow Cotonou will be based inore oil tile prii)ciple 
of reciprocity. Many commentators from NGOs, in tile group opposing 11co-liberalisill, fail to scc 
how such RTAs could benefit LDRs, because it will lead to 'trade diversion, dv-indUStri, IliSltiOn 
and regional fragmentation [happening]. Nor is it possible to see how such arrailgeinents caii 
function unless and until the European Union is prepared to reforiii and transforin its trade policies 
as they affect sensitive [particularly agricultural] products' (CIDSE, 2000). Indeed, Mike Moore 
(Director-General of the WTO) has criticised developed region's lack of willingness to reducc tariffs 
on agricultural goods, arguing that this reduces tile potential benefits available to LDRs (see 2.4). 
9.4 Decisions-making: judging participation and inclusivity 
Whereas the description of the TDCA was provided by those with an inthiiate knowledge of the 
policy formulation process, perceptions of the degree of inclusiveness permitted by the decision- 
making structure emanated from a broad cross-section of South African society. The findings 
drawn, and debated above, were based not on perceptions as such but on a 'factual' description Of 
the process. It would be logical to expect that these interviewees, especially government officials, 
would argue that the structure was inclusive, particularly if the polarised debate surrounding neo- 
liberalism and participation is taken into account. 
One of the central conclusions to emerge from interviewees' perceptions was that although the 
TDCA was still considered by some (particularly government officials) to be inclusive, the general 
consensus was that the TDCA policy formulation process did not provide as much Iccc,,, -,, to the 
decision-making process as the description implied. Actors in all categories criticised the lack of 
participation and access to decision-making structures. UIISUrprisingly, most of those defined as 
traditionally marginalised, particularly civil society and SMMEs, felt most excluded. The extent of 
participation varied witlibi as well as between categories. For instance, access to the South African 
TDCA decision-making structure fluctuated within trade unions, government departments, 
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businesses and industrial sectors. Representation in the wine industry, for example, was mainly 
restricted to two organisations who characterise the old, traditional, powerful elite. The picture 
from textiles is rather different. Labour and business worked very closely together and in many 
ways had considerable access to the textile TDCA policy-making structure. However, the textile 
representative, Mark Bennett, argued that this inclusion was a 'pretence', as the textile sector failed 
significantly to influence the outcome of the TDCA. Furthermore, access to the textile TDCA 
process was mainly restricted to the tripartite partners. SMME representatives interviewed were 
critical of this exclusion. That said, the overall decision-making process throughout South African 
society has become vastly more inclusive since 1994. This is particularly evident with the creation of 
NEDLAC, its quad-partite development chamber, the inclusion of unions, consumer groups, and 
also CBOs and traditionally marginalised peoples. 
The varying perceptions articulated by interviewees indicate that gauging what constitutes 
participation is very subjective. What for one interviewee appears to be an inclusive process is for 
another the opposite. For instance, on the one hand, some government officials argued that the 
statal process was inclusive because businesses, unions, and detached observers were consulted, 
advice was sought at NEDLAC, and the 'public' had an opportunity to 'engage' with government 
via communication with the Board of Tariffs and Trade. On the other hand, for a member of civil 
society, the lack of resources, knowledge of the TDCA, and access to formal representation, limited 
their opportunity to participate. However, as was evident in Chapter Two (2.5.2) and Chapter Five, 
the idea that all sections of society and all stakeholders be permitted to participate in political 
policy formulation processes is hotly debated, especially around development policies that have a 
direct impact on the community. Some writers and interviewees have said that too high a level of 
inclusion could create inertia in the policy formulation process (see 2.5.2). Others argue that 
communities should be more involved in development policies that will impact their lives 
(Hoddinott et al., 1999). Perhaps the selective inclusion of a limited number of officials who 
represent large businesses, unions and industrial sectors can be justified because they employ 
hundreds of thousands of workers and therefore should have more access than individual 
stakeholders or SMMEs who employ less. That said, the combined contribution of SMMEs 
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constitutes a significant part of the South African economy. Indeed, the majority of clothing and 
textile employees work in small and medium sized firms. 
There is also an argument to be made that the general increase in access to the South African 
statal decision-making process since 1994 may have excessively raised expectations of 
inclusiveness and of the capacity of the South African government to provide access for many 
stakeholders to decision-making structures. Indeed, the national government is sometimes viewed 
as the 'only organ' in making decisions that impact upon South African lives (Mathiane, 20 
February 2001). However, this is of course far from reality. Government cannot dictate the levels of 
inclusion in all company, industry or trade union decision-making systems. This thesis has 
suggested that there are gaps between labour representatives and those they represent. 
Interviewees have also indicated divisions between black and white businesses. It could be argued 
that the main task of companies is to deliver a profit, not to ensure equal access to all workers in 
decision-making structures. Indeed, the exploration of the wine and textile industry decision- 
making processes demonstrates the lack of control that government exercises in these respective 
industrial sectors. The wine industry appears to have made little progress in broadening access to 
its decision-making structures. On the other hand the textile sector, although still with exclusive 
tendencies, has enabled many traditionally marginalised peoples to have a say in a variety of 
textile forums, such as SATIEC. 
That the EU accorded the South African government no choice as to which trade and 
development agreement could be considered raises a further problem in defining what is meant by 
participation as the TDCA was negotiated in a climate in which many decisions had already been 
predetermined by external actors. This shows that levels of inclusion and exclusion can also be 
gauged according to which scale (domestic, external) participation is measured on. Therefore, it 
could be asked, what is the point of being concerned about being included in the domestic TDCA 
decision-making process if most of the decisions have already been made? 
A further issue raised by these findings is that, despite concluding that measuring the influence 
of each actor and category cannot be reliably calibrated, this thesis has provided an indication of 
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how interviewees have perceived the control that actors and categories have had on the TDCA 
policy formulation process. A finding drawn from analysing perceptions relating to the internal 
envirom-nent suggested that the influence exerted by actors within South Africa on the TDCA 
policy formulation process varied considerably. For instance, within the detached observer 
category, certain organisations, such as TIPS and the DPRU, who are supportive of neo-liberalism 
and appear to have been influential in shaping the government's neo-liberal macroeconomic policy. 
However, other actors in this category, particularly those associated with NGOs and C130s, had 
virtually no influence over the TDCA decision-making process. This might indicate a correlation 
between the polarised debate identified in Chapter Two, where those in power espouse neo- 
classical economics, and those outside power, are peripheralised. 
The operationalisation. of the model also highlighted many tensions within the TDCA decision- 
making process. The previous section noted the uneasy climate that existed between internal South 
African actors and those in the external environment. However, tensions also existed between 
actors in the internal environment. For instance, relations between government departments, 
notably the National Department of Agriculture (NDA) and the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI), were often tense. Strains were also apparent within the NDA itself, as 'divisions' existed 
between officials and ministers. 
There is some evidence to suggest that despite neo-classical economic trade agreements having 
a commitment to 'good governance', the global neo-liberal economic system provides a climate 
where tension between actors is inherent. Sociologists of neo-liberalism, such as cultural theorist 
Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1998), argue that neo-liberalism 'destroys' representative organisations 
based on collective co-operation (such as trade unions and political systems) and encourages the 
'production' of a rational individual, free to work and consume in a free market system (Dufour, 
2001). Williams and Taylor (2000) add that this tension is due to the belief that neo-classical 
economics acts on the basis of rationality, whereas political decision-making processes are 
governed by irrational processes. They argue that 'for [neo] liberals, the market (if left free from 
unnecessary state/political/irrational intervention) represents the primary mechanism [above 
democratic decision-making processes] to resolve policy problems at both the domestic and 
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international level' (Williams and Taylor, 2000,23). I-xaniples of this tension within collective 
organisations include trade unions who face a dilernma caused by increased competition as a result 
of the reduction in tariff liberalisation. They are increasingly torn between tile need to support 
companies that feel they have to become more competitive (which may result in joh loss(,..,, iii the 
short-term but save an industry in the long-term), to SUI-ViVC in tile glObill market place, md flic 
need to keep the support of members who are being affected by the transformation of the ecoiiomic 
climate (i. e. job losses and insecure employment) (Louw, 29 Januarv 2001). Problems of a diffcreilt 
nature are affecting NGOs in South Africa, as funds from within and outside the countrv have becii 
cut. Habib and Taylor (1999,79) argue that this is partly due to 'the obsession with IMF/World 
Bank structural adjustment [that] means financial cutbacks which are cutting swathes througli 
NGOs'. 2 A result of these 'tensions', communities wishing to resist policies they see as detrimental 
might be further excluded from free market economy decision-making systems. 
9.5 Potential economic 'winners' and 'losers' 
The main conclusion to be drawn from the interviewee perceptions on the potential economic 
impact of the agreement was that it is incredibly difficult to identify accurately likely 'winners' and 
'losers'. The case studies illustrate this well. Representatives of the wine industry, which was 
selected by many interviewees in 1999 as a likely beneficiary of the TDCA, were almost unanimous 
in their opinion that the agreement will do little for their sector. This finding was probably due to 
the ill-feeling that pervaded the industry following the controversial negotiations (particularly since 
1999) and the demands made by EU negotiators. Of notable concern was the decision to change the 
names of South African brandy, port, sherry and ouzo. Conversely, the textile industry was 
identified by 'general interviewees' as an industrial sector that would be cletrin-ientally affected by 
the TDCA. This conforms to the expectations raised in Chapter Two, as textiles was classified as a 
peripheralised industrial sector. Moreover, the industry has been damaged since 1990 by reduced 
2 The demise ofthe 'battle against apartheid' may also be a further reason why NGOs (which used to oppose 
apartheid legislation) receive less money from donors. 
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tariffs and illegal imports. Therefore, interviewees might have anticipated that SEFTA, and its tariff 
liberalisation programme, would not benefit the sector. However, textile interviewees tended to 
disagree with this finding. Although no textile interviewee was enthusiastic about the TDCA, few 
thought that the agreement was too detrimental. Of far more concern was the SADC FTA (i. e. the 
intra-regional free trade agreement). The 'winning and losing' aspects of the agreement are not 
limited to industrial sectors. It was observed in Chapter Six that communities within civil society, 
or even states, could also 'win' or 'lose'. For example, many interviewees argued that the BLNS 
were unlikely to receive many benefits from the agreement. 
The "real" picture is therefore far more complicated than both sides of the polarised debate on 
neo-liberalism depicted, which mainly suggested that there are only winners or losers. The more 
accurate picture is that both winners and losers will result from the TDCA and many (such as the 
textile industry) will remain unaffected by the agreement. Yet, the situation is still more 
complicated than that. Those who will benefit or lose out from the agreement win vary not only 
between states, industrial sectors or community groups, but also within them as well. For example 
the wine industry, seen by some as a losing industry, but by others as a winner, will see some 
producers or vineyards benefiting from the agreement, whilst others will not. Even within these 
vineyards there will be winners and losers within the workforce. Therefore, the identification is 
incredibly difficult and depends to an extent at which scale the potential impacts are to be 
measured. If the largest scale is considered, the perception painted by those interviewed is that the 
European Union will benefit more from the agreement than South Africa. This view has been 
supported by some impact studies (see Chapter Five). For example, the UNCTAD report indicated 
that: 
while the EU should be able to make considerable inroads into South African 
markets... the impact of South Africa's exports to Europe will be somewhat less. 
The one area where South Africa could have made major inroads was in 
agricultural products... but that is where [South Africa] encountered the greatest 
hassles in the negotiations (Cape Business News (anon. ) November 1999). 
Mark Bennett encapsulated the general sentiment expressed by interviewees, arguing that: 
When you ask me the question if the agreement is going to be in our favour or not, 
I think that clearly getting into an agreement with the European Union is good; the 
potential is ... amazing, but the reality is that at the end of the day we could have 
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got a lot more from them; we could have got a lot more on agriculture. I think we 
missed our opportunities. On balance, South Africa missed out on opportunities, 
aside from the development cooperation sections... where perhaps there were 
some benefits... we may have exposed some of our industries to a lot more danger 
than was necessary (#Bennett, 2001). 
Although the agreement limited the extent of reciprocity by including the principle of asymmetry, 
some analysts rejected the idea that this would be to the benefit of South Africa. Brink argues that 
'we mistakenly believed that the much-vaunted asymmetry would be in South Africa's favour. In 
the case of textiles, clothing, motor vehicles, agriculture and a number of other sectors, this could 
not have been further from the truth' (Brink, 1999), as these parts of the agreement were virtually 
symmetrical between the EU and South Africa. 
There is a worry that if the TDCA fails to generate economic development that will "trickle- 
down" to the mass of the population who have been historically peripheralised (many remain so), 
this could result in serious social and political upheaval. Williams and Taylor (2000,37) believe that 
the signs are not good. They argue: 
adoption of neoliberal principles has exacerbated inequality and increased 
concentration of wealth into the hands of a privileged few. Apart from the ethically 
odious (and increasingly dangerous) prospect of living in one of the world's most 
unequal economies, such a polarised environment is fertile ground for social and 
political instability which will ultimately repel the very 'investors' GEAR was 
designed to attract. 
Indeed, some commentators fear that unless South Africa gains from such development agreements 
soon, the economic and social upheavals experienced in Zimbabwe could also be encountered in 
South Africa (McGreal, 26 July 2001). Many sociologists, as well as academic and non-academic 
analysts argue that there is a direct link between economic peripheralisation and social dislocation 
(see for example Cook, 1997 and Dennis, 1997). This is not a new or unique argument. It has been 
argued that throughout Africa one of the factors that has fuelled the 'breakdown' of civil societies, 
resulting in the words of Jeffrey Herbst (1996/7) the failure of states - has been the failure of 
Western-inspired development policies since 1945 (Escobar, 1988). Will policies associated with the 
new dominant development discourse - neo-liberal development perspectives - actually produce 
different results? Can the TDCA bring prosperity to South Africa? More importantly, will such 
prosperity be distributed across a broad spectrum of South African society and pacify the potential 
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fear of social unrest? Such judgements will take at least a few years to make. If it does not work, as 
some commentators in Chapter Two have predicted, what development perspectives of t1w futtirc 
might be used? Perhaps it might be possible to find a 'middle way' between the two callips ill t1le 
polarised neo-liberalism debate. Perhaps development perspectives based on neo-classicalisin caii 
be moulded to incorporate the different socio-political and economic characteristics that occur in 
different regions around the world. 
9.6 In Conclusion: Reflections, Limitations and future research ideas 
Perhaps the overriding message of this thesis is one of complexity. The complexity of describing, 
and gauging access to, political clecision-making structures; and the complexity of gauging the 
potential impact of neo-liberal developmental trade policies. These complexities contrast sharply 
with the rather clear-cut impressions that are derived from the literature reviewed in Chapter Two, 
particularly in relation to the polarised debate on the winner-, and losers of neo-liberalisin. 
Predicting 'winners' or 'losers' is far from easy. Perceptions obtained from the two case studies, 011C 
identified as a likely winner, the other a likely loser, demonstrate the depth of this complexity. 
Furthermore, a most confusing and contradictory picture emerged when interviewees' perception,,, 
of access and participation to the TDCA policy formulation process were analysed. Definitions of 
what it means to be inclusive vary considerably. There is such an arrav of actors, components, 
players, institutions and stakeholders that even a clear account of simply portraying the mechanics 
of the TDCA policy formulation process proved difficult. The model which was introduced, 
although simplifying the picture, still emphasises that the process of making decisions, and the 
avenues open to provide access to them, are both oblique and numerous. 
That such a state of confusion exists is not to be entirely unexpected. For example, 
interviewees in 1999 who identified potential winners and losers from the economic impact of the 
TDCA were confronted with an array of views with which to base their opinions. First, the 
polarised global debate surrounding the general benefits and detriments of neo-liberalism would 
have provided a broad canvass upon which influence may have been subconsciously exerted. The 
South African nature of the debate would also have introduced other influences, and factors such 
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as the ANC's historic support of more dependency-related development perspectives may well 
have been taken on board. Second, media reports (such as Dludlu, 12 April 1999; Patel, 10 
September 1999) on the success of the wine industry on the one hand, and dislocation of the textiles 
sector on the other, would have provided added factors in determining who interviewees selected. 
This thesis has also discovered that, using a model devised to enable a descriptive and 
evaluative account of the structures underpinning the South African TDCA decision-making 
process, policy formulation was structured to allow for a high degree of access and participation. In 
many ways the structure is very inclusive. Almost all stakeholders had an opportunity to 
participate in a number of forums, organisations, or debates on the TDCA. However such a 
portrayal obscures the complexities of the situation. The extent to which each different stakeholder 
group was actually included is virtually impossible to calibrate. The assessment of inclusivity has 
therefore been guided by perceptions derived from representatives of various stakeholder groups. 
Even within these groups interviewees often failed to achieve a consensus of opinion on the extent 
of access permitted into the TDCA decision-making structure. An analysis of the extent to which 
stakeholders exploited fully their chance to participate (or were denied doing so by resource 
limitations) complicates the picture still further. Therefore, the degree to which we understand 
decision-making depends on attempting to rationalise an often irrational process. As such, the way 
such terms as inclusion and participation are defined is of critical importance in understanding the 
processes that accompany policy formulation. 
The complex nature of these results also tends to highlight a number of limitations. Perhaps 
the most obvious is that in dealing with the complexities of decision-making and examining the 
perceived economic impacts of the TDCA, a number of aspects of this thesis have been simplified 
in order to understand a rather complicated set of pictures. For instance, criticism of the 
introduction of a model to assist in simplifying an understanding of the structures supporting the 
South African TDCA decision-making process have been well chronicled throughout this Ph. D. 
Likewise, for ease of description, certain actor categories (specifically the European Union and 
civil society) have been presented in an almost monolithic manner, when in 'reality' they comprised 
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disaggregated actors in a similar way to the players in the South African decision-making process. 
For example, in much academic work, civil society is defined as incorporating all non-government 
stakeholders, including labour and business. This research has excluded the hierarchies of business 
and labour as they have separate representatives in the tripartite decision-making processes and 
senior labour representatives also form part of the ANC-led government. In addition, the European 
Union has at times been presented monolithically, despite being an institution that possesses a 
multitude of actors and processes. 
Further limitations, of a philosophical and practical nature, revolve around methodological 
problems, and have already been alluded to in Chapter Three. On a practical level the conduct and 
analysis of interviews has illustrated the potential and real pitfalls that accompany the gathering of 
'data'. Although a plethora of likely problems listed in the literature were mainly avoided, other, 
expected and unexpected obstacles (chronicled in Chapter Three) presented themselves throughout 
the fieldwork in South Africa. In hindsight, the experience gained in conducting semi-structured 
interviews should preclude making these and other similar mistakes in the future. For example, 
better organisation and use of contacts already garnered should reduce the time and money spent 
in arranging interviews in South Africa from the UK. 
Despite care being taken in candidly reflecting on the positionality of the researcher obvious 
philosophical problems were confronted when undertaking the research process in South and 
southern Africa. For instance, power relations were obviously evident in organising and 
conducting semi-structured interviews, particularly with the so-called 'elite. That this researcher 
was given more access to those actors actively engaged in formulating policy surrounding the EU- 
SA TDCA, than to other academics with a different 'ethnic' background, was a source of great 
ethical. concern. The open reflection of this problem both here and in Chapter Three is only a partial 
remedy to such a concern. Further research into this problem will hopefully provoke a frank 
discussion among acaden-Lics into how to challenge such discrimination. 
Furthermore, from a philosophical standpoint, I would more clearly demonstrate the 
multiplicity and complexity of both civil society and the EU and stress further the post-structuralist 
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dimension of this work. Indeed, although many aspects of this research could be considered to 
emanate from a critical theoretical and post-structuralist perspective (due to the subtle 
deconstruction of power relations within the diverse decision-making structures examined), the 
theoretical approach has been described as being ultimately within the 'catch-all' pluralist 
perspective outlined in chapters Two (2.4.2) and Four (4.2). A more strident post- 
structuralist/critical theoretical approach could be undertaken in deconstructing further the 
decision-making processes that surround the formulation of neo-liberal trading arrangements. For 
instance, the original work of Robert Cox, Jurgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, or Antonio Gramsci 
could shed light on the dominant power structures that are inherent to the making of decisions. 
However, highlighting these limitations has illustrated potential opportunities for future 
research. There are two obvious areas that could be researched further, both of which appear to be 
relatively unexamined. First, there is scope to undertake an analysis that disaggregates the major 
actors within trading arrangements globally - such as the EU - using the model introduced in this 
thesis as a template. Such research could well contest the bulk of the literature on policy 
formulation within the EU, which fails to stress the complexity of the process, instead advocating 
that policy is somehow conjured up in a 'black-box' method of devising policies. 
This type of study would complement the second potential area for further research, an 
examination of the likely impact of the new reciprocal trade-liberalising agreements being 
negotiated between the EU and ACP states, under the terms of the Cotonou Agreement. 
Interviewees and commentators have been quoted throughout this thesis suggesting that far more 
research has to be conducted on this 'new paradigm' in trading relations between 'developed' and 
'developing' regions of the world. Indeed, comparative work could also be undertaken with the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), where the similarities and contradictions of both 
major trading agreements might be exan-dned. 
These two proposals for future research, taken together with the two other suggestions 
presented in preceding paragraphs (for more post-structural analyses and a more candid approach 
to discrimination in the research process), would not only provide more information on relatively 
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unexplored areas of academic research but would also allow for a valuable insight into dimensions 
of power between 'developed' and 'developing' regions of the world. All four suggestions provide 
a window through which such an examination is possible. Further exploration of global actors in 
the decision-making process and of trade agreements would provide a policy perspective of 'north- 
south' relations. A post-structuralist approach would dwell predominantly on the deconstruction of 
power structures associated with decision-making and the formulation of trading arrangements. 
Finally, a comparative account of the research process by 'first world' and 'third world' academics 
would illustrate the different experiences that confront 'developed' world and 'developing' world 
academics in researching similar research issues. 
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Table of confidential list of representatives interviewed in 
Under tcrins of confidentiality, tht, nallics and datc"; Ilan, bccn willillchl, but awn, "41owil to //Ic 
('XiIIIIIII(Ts. 
1 This is only submitted in the first edition for the purposes of the viva. Future editions will not hold this 
information for confidentiality reasons. 
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San I) Ic oI wim-', Htic It iicd in I ci %ww questions 
GI-OLIp A: - South Alrican clecision-makers. 
Introductiow. 
1. My name is Rooer Levermore. I am a researcher front the University of Plymouth (or Wils - which i. % //I(. 
best to use, or both ? 
2.1 arn a researcher from a European University, so my fOCIIS is front it l"Lli-OlVall I)CISpectivC. I aill 
undertaking research that explores the potential impact Ilial tile CLIIILII-C 011 free trade/fradc lilmalisation \Nill 
have on South Africa. Of primary importance it, this culture, is the recent signing ot tile South Afil(ýl 
European Union trade and development co-operation agreement. Cý 
3. The outcome of this analysis will he tile puhlication, in mainly Furopean-hased lotlinals, of boll) tile 
potential impact offreeing trade, its well as tile decislon-making process behind SIA-TA. I C7 
4. Your comments will be treated with Complete Confident 1,11 ity, with anorlyfulty assured 
QUeSt iOlIS: 
Introductory questions: 
a- What was your, and your departments, role in the SITTA negotiation process? 
h- Do you re-ard these neootiations a success? - alter this 
c- How accessible were the EU institutions' *I 
d- Which EU institutions (lid you feel you had to target'. ' Iiii relatimi to the complek t1ccision-making pren cs. ý 
ofthe EIJI. 
More detailed: 
e- It'you negotiated again, how would ou alter/improvc your lobbying" Lý L- y 
I' - Did the mandate significantly change thrOL101101.1t tile 11COOliation procc. ". 1,1,1*0111 d South Atlicall 
perspective. It'so, [low'? 
77tink about the ortler o/ questions - alter these! 
o- In the negotiations, how was South Africa's position constructed? What input did tile civil scr\icc 
provide, or consulting trade unions, business interests, lobby groups. acadenlics/thi Ilk tanks, or or"allisations Z, I C- Z, 
, such as the 
industrial Development Corporation ot'South Africa Limited. 
h- One of' tile ANC's declared goals was to deconstruct tile ou'llip0tellt grasp that Bw Business - fioni the 
protectionist days of' apartheid - had within South Al'rica. With tile introduction of' this free trade deal will) 
the EU, does this assist such a policy goal? L- 
i- What do you see as the biggest success in negotiations? 
and the bi-, cst t'ailures'! 
Further detail: More personal view: 
k- From a personal viewpoint, which aspects of South Affican society do you see as beriefitin, o from SF. FTA. 
and from increasing free trade'! Why do you think the deal is seen as beneficial to South Africa'! Have \, oil 
conducted (or acquired) any research that bolsters this view'., 
I- How did these -benefiting" III-01.1ps assist in the negotiation process'? 
in - Are you, or the department, critical ofthis move to a free trade agenda, particularly when the ANC had 
been against neo-liberalism in the past. 
n- In view of this, who does not really benefit by both tile SEFTA process, and by the neo-fibcral economic 
, the SEF-FA talks'? process'? Were they consulted at all cluriqg 
o-A great deal ol'criticism has been directed at tile BI-NS for not being included. How were the), informally 9- Cý 
included'? 
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lsýllllplc (d ', Cllll 1,11 HC1111 L, kl Intel \ lc\ý (111c"I Group B: - BLNS (primarily Botswa m and 
Iiitr0(I Ll Cti01V 
1. My name is Roger Levermore. I am it researcher fi-om the University of' Plymouth (oi Wits l0m h rN dit' 
best to use, or both? I 
2.1 ani a researcher from a European University, so lily focus is front it Furopcall pClspCClI\C. I aill 
undertaking research that explores the potential impact that the culture Of' I'lee fladchrade libelall"allon will L- 
have oil Southern Africa. Of primary importance in this culture, is the recent si-ning oI* file South AIIIL-a- tý L- 
European Union trade and development co-opcration agreement, and the elTcci this will have oil SACt 1. L- 
3. The outcome of' this analysis will be the publication, in mainly Furopean-hased journal,.,, of both tile 
potential impact of freeing trade, as well as the (1ccislon-making process behind SITTA, notably, the role of 
the BLNS in thi's process. 
4. Your comments will be treated with complete confidentialitv, with anonymity assured. 
Questions. 
Introductory questions: 
ý1 - WIWI I'S Your stance on the SE, FTA agreement? 
b- Do you regard these neootiations a success for Botswana/Swa/. Iland, and the 131, NS'. 1 - alici tlii. v. f 
c- What was Your role, it' any, in the process? Did you try to acces,, FU if'stitution. s. or South Al'i ica. and 
how accessible were they'? 
d- Which FU institutions did you feel you had to target? lin relatimi to Ilic comple. x deci. vion-makiiig 
ofthe E111. 
More detailed: 
e- lt'YOU Could alter agorcement, which aspects would you alter? 
f- Did the mandate significantly change 1111-0111111OLIt the 11COotiation process from a South African 
Perspective. If so, [low'! 
Think about the order ol'questiotis - alter these. 1 
g- How did you reach your view on both SEFTA and the prowing trcnd towards trade liberalisation? Whose 
advise did you seek'! Such as think-tanks, like Charles Harveys bunch'. ' 
Further detail: More personal view: 
h- From a personal viewpoint, which aspects of BLNS/Southcrn African SOCiCtV (10 You We WS hCrICfiIIII0 
from SEFTA, and froin increasing free trade'? Why do you think the deal is seen is beneficial to South 
Africa'? Have you conducted (or acquired) any research that bolsters this vieNv'? 
i- Are you, oi- the department, critical of this move to a free trade agenda'. 1 
l- In view ofthis. who does not really benefit by both the SEFFA process, and by the neo-liberai economic 
process'? 
k- Outline these sectors, and what compensation is likely it) be recei\cd to correct this Ithis can be 
suppleniciaed in the case ql'Swaziland with press artich, - copied - fhat saYs somc. /Orm 0.1'agreement has 
been reached with the EU - AND ASK THIS To the EU gigs in Southern Africa - do theY have an office in 
Swazi and Bots? I 
I- How does this move to free trade in general affect SACU. What talks are progressing with the FU to 
replace Lom6'? 
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Appendix D 
Sanip Ie of. wim u Lictuic (I mic, \ , %v questio I, s 
Group C: - South African lobby til-nis who gave advise to thc SA govt. 
Introducti'MV. 
1. My name is Roger Leverniore. I arn a researcher from the University ot Plyniouth (or Wit's which is the 
best to use, or both ?I 
2.1 am a researcher from a European University, so Illy focus Is from a [', 'III-ol)c; iil pcl"pcctlýc. I ain 
undertaking research that explores the potential impact that the culture Of frcc trade/nadc liherall"allon ýýIll 
have on South Africa. Of primary importance ill this Culture, is the ICCCIll signuip (it' the Souill AtrICJ 
European Union trade and development co-operation agreement. 
3. The Outcome of this analysis will be the publication, ill Inalilly I'All'OlVall-haled . 10UHMI", of 
hoill flic 
potential impact of freeing trade, as well as the decision-niaking proccss behind SFFTA. nolahlv, what role 
did non-governmental orgamsations play in this process'!. Z- 
4. Your comments will be treated with complete confidentiality, with anonymity assured. 
OLICStiOlIS: 
Ii ntroductory questions: 
-ee trade policies as heneficial to South Do you regard tile SEFFA negotiations a 'success, and View 
I'l Z, 
A fr ic a'? 
b- What kind of role did you play in the SEFTA negotiation process'. ' How did Von contrihule'. 1 Who did \ou 
, ontribute to'? (who was your contact'? ) 
c- Any research conducted that examines the potential inipact of free trade'! 
More detailed: 
(I - If you could alter any aspects of the agreement, what would that he? Z, 
Think about the order of questions - alter these! 
e -[include onýv is relevantl One of the ANC's 
declared 
goals was to 
deconstruct the oninipotent grasp that 
Big Business - from the protectionist days of apartheid - had within South Africa. With the introduction of 
this free trade deal with the EU, does this assist such a policy voal? 
i- What (to you see as the b goest success in negotiations? TL- 
and the higgest failures? 
Further detail: More personal view: 
k- From a personal viewpoint, which aspects of South African society do you see its benefiting from SFT-I'A, 
and from increasing free trade'? Why do you think the deal is seen as beneficial to South Africa'? Havc vou 
conducted (or acquired) any research that bolsters this view'? 
I- How did these "benefiting" groups assist in the negotiation process'? 
in - Are you, or the department, critical of this move to a 
free trade agenda. particularly when the ANC had 
been against neo-liheralisin in the past. 
n- In view ofthis, who does not really benefit by both the SEFTA process, and by the neo-liberal economic 
process'? Were they consulted at all during the SEFTA talk.,, '? 
o-A , reat deal of criticism has been directed at the BLNS for not being I ncluded. How were the\ int')rnially 
included'? - aher this! 
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Appendix E: 
SMIIPIC Of 'ýCIIII-', II"LlClllFCd 1111CI-VieW (Illellioll, 
Glotu)-D. - 'Slolitheill AfriCil lobby 
IntrOdUCHOll: 
1. My name is Roger Levermore. I ain a researcher from the Universitv AII IN, mouth (m Wit" ti /I it /1 6 1/11' 
best to use, or both? ] 
2.1 arn a researcher from a European University, so Illy 1, ()Cll,, is from a Ful-opean pci"pective. I ý1111 
undertaking, research that explores the potential impact that tile (: Lllttll. c of' free Iladc/fladc 11heralisallon ý\Ill 
have on Southern Africa. Of primary importance ill this Ctl]tLll'C, is tile recent S10111112 0I tile SOLIIII Atlica 
European Union trade and development co-operation 'lI'l-CClUCl1l. What (10 tile ll0n-00VCl-l111lCIll; ll MMIL-C', (d 
the BLNS regard the negotiations of this agreement. 
3. The outcome of this analysis will be the publication, III mainly Furopearl-ha"ed joumak, ()I hoill Ihc 
potential impact of freein. - trade, as well as the decision-makin, L, proccss behind S]"T"I'A. 
4. Your comments will be treated with complete confidentiality, with anom mily aswrcd. 
Qllestiolls: 
Introductory questions: 
I- a need here to combine section b, with some of section c 
a- What do you think of the SEFTA pi-ocess, and what is its likely impact oil the BIAS i-evion/ specific 
country'! 
b- What inforniation/opinion did you pi-ovide the BLNS with'? (not only i-e. SF, FFA but also t'l-ec ti-ildc ill 
general). Who (lid you contact? 
c- How would you amend the agreement? 
More detailed: 
d- What do you see as the biggest success in negotiations? Z- 
e- and the bi,,,, est failures? Lý L- 
Further detail: More personal view: 
f- From a personal viewpoint, which aspects of Southern African/11I. NS sot: ictý (10 NOU SCC &, hCnChtim-, 
from SEFTA, and from increasin2 free trade'? Why do you think the deal is seen its beneficial to South 
Africa'? Have you conducted (or acquired) any research that holsters this view'. 1 
g- Are you, critical ofthis move to a free trade agerida'? 
i- In view of this, who does not really benefit by both the SEFTA process. and by the nco-liberal economic 
process'? Were they consulted at all during the SEFTA talks'? 
What forni of compensation is the BLNS likely to receive. and will this assist the BLNS in both the short 
and lono terin'? 
k- Isorne question on post-Lom6 futurel. 
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Appendix F: 
SaIllpic (fl "CIIII 1,11 IlCl III L'd 1111cl 1(, %\ qlic,, Iwllý 
Group L: - 
Introduction: 
1. My narne is Roger Leverniore. I arn a researcher from the University of' Plymouth (or Wits which is illc tý - best to use, or both? 1 
2.1 arn a researcher from a European University, so lily focus is from a I"All-OlICall pClSpCC1l\C 01 11'NA St/C. S. S 
to academics ill South and Southern Aftica!!. ' I ani undertakill" research that explore. ', illc potclillal Impact 
that the culture of free trade/trade liberalisation will have on South Africa. Of primmy linportaricc in this 
culture, is the recent signing of the South Africa- I"Alropeall Union trade and developiliclit co-operation 
aureement. 
3. The outcome of this analysis will be numerous publications, of both the potential Impact of lladc, 
as well as the decision-making process behind SE1, `TA. 4- 
4. Your comments will be treated with cornpletc coil fident Ill itv. kvith anonymity assulcd - ogaill, to 
academics - they might well be used to that. ' 
Questions: 
Introductory questions: 
a- What was your role in the SEFTA neLgotiation process'? 
b Do you regard these negotiations a success'? - alter this. ' 
C Which EU institutions did you feet that SA had to target? [ill relation to ill(, complex decisimi-making Z_ 
process of I the E111. 
More detailed: 
d- Ifyou negotiated again, which aspects would you like to see altered? 
e -[include only if relevant] One of the ANC's declared goals was to deconstruct the 0111111potclit grasp that Cý 
Big Business - from the protectionist days of apartheid - had within South Africa. With the introduct loll of' 
this free trade deal with tile EU, does this assist such a policy goal? 
f- What do you see as tile biggest success in negotiations'? 
g- an(] the biggest failures? 
Further detail: More personal view: 
h- From a personal viewpoint, which aspects of South Aftican society do you see as benefiting from SF. FTA, 
and from increasing free trade'? Why do you think the deal is seen as beneficial to South Africa? Have You 
conducted (or acquired) any research that bolsters this view? 
i- How do you think these "benefiting- groups assist in the negotiation process? 
Are You critical of this move to a free trade agenda, particularly when the ANC had been against nco- 
liberalism in the past. - rather leading. " 
k- In view ofthis, who does not really benefit by both the SEFTA process, and by tile neo-liberal economic 
process'? Were they consulted at all during tile SEFTA talks'? 
279 
Appt-ndix ( 
Appendix Cr 
Sample of scim-oi ticim c(l mici \ w\\ (lucsi ion, 
Group F: - Miscel I aneous- (such as those outs I de 'Soull) All II cý I, ýct willull I lie 1)1. ()CC', ', , tic II as II 
delegation). 
11111-0(ILICtIOIV. 
1. My name is Rover Levermore. I arn if researcher from the University of 111villoull) (of Wits - 11-hich is 1/1(, 
hest to use, or both? 
2.1 am a researcher from a European University, -so niv focus is from a Furopeall perspective. I ; fill 
undertaking research that explores the potcritial impact that file Culture of 11-cc fradc/fladc will 
have oil South Africa. Of primary Importance in this CUltul-C, IS file iccent signing ot ilic South Attica- 
European Union trade and development co-operation aoicement. tý 
3. The outcome of this analysis will be tile publication, In mainly Europeall-hased journals, of' hoill 111C 
potential impact of freeing trade, as well as the decision-making, process behind SF, FTA. 
4. YOLII- comments will be treated with complete confidentiality, with anonymity assured 
Questions: 
Introductory questions: - alter depending on whorn seeing. 
a- What was your, mid your departivierits, role in the SEF-I'A ilegotiatiorl process'? 
b- Do vou revard these nevotiations a success'? - alter this! 
c- How successful were South Africa iii this negotiating process'! I- d- Which EU institutioris did you feel they had to target'? Iiii relatimi to the complek decisimi-makiii. Q 
process ofthe Ell]. Did they do this'? 
More detailed: 
c- It' negotiated again, how would you advise SA to alter/improve their lobbying" 
f- Did the mandate sionificantly change throuphout the negotiation process from a South Ahicall 
perspective. If so, how'? 
Think about the order qfquestions - alter these! 
Further detail: More personal view: 
g- From a personal viewpoint, which aspects of South African society do VOU SCC as 11CIIJItin, " from SF. FTA. 
and from increasing free trade'? Why do you think the deal is seen as beneficial to South Africa'? Have you 
conducted (or acquired) any research that bolsters this view'! 
li - How did these -benefiting- proups assist in the negotiation process" 
i- Are you, or the department, critical of this move to it free trade agenda'? 
J- In view of this, who does not really benefit by both the SEFTA process, and by the neo-libcral economic 
g the SEFTA talks'? process'! Were they consulted at all durin. - 
k-A great deal of criticism has been directed at the BLNS for not being, Included. How were they informally 
included'? How did the EU contact thern'? 
I- How do you see the BLNS in the post-Loin6 future. 
ni - What form of compensation are the 
BLNS likely to receive'! [use documentary evidell, 'c to Yupport this]. 
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Apjýwlldi\ 
Notes: 
1. A reoional adviser for the EC. 
2. Recorded - perhaps the worst interview In terms of' "Chenlistry" between IntcIvIewee and lllIcl-\Ic\VCl. 
There was one unfortunate instance, where xxx asked for the tape to be turned off'. and Illadc one ol two 
confidential points (see the two notes below). However in doing this lie made an off' the-cuff conimcni tllýll 
he was very impressed by the SA negotiators - this was not part of the coil fident ial point Wl "o I thout"Ill ). 
and on commencing the taped interview I Soll"Ilt to ohlaill Coll I'll-Inat Ion of tills which lilthel alllloýcd (lie 
interviewee. 
Notes made during the interview: 
SA - playing oft' two sides - SADC and the EU. Queries how committed SA is to sonilicrn Africa 
reolonal co-operation. 
South Africa - not as virtuous as the SA newspapers would have you bcllc\, cl 
Further action: 
1. Send thank you, and an update letter. 
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EXAMPLE OF CODING: 
119 -Q- But how about the SA-EU , fivo eireas most III/Cclell /7v thc WTO - 410101 1-chich"s (110 
FTA? textiles. Links-bito Southcm , Viica ýidc ol things. 
Emplovers thrcatciwd to go mi ytiikc ovci tc%tilcs re. 
A- Gettino there. propose(Isigning olSF-limbalmvc flmh' kill. 
Says that due to reciprocity, SE-EU FTA 
better than the reduction in tariffs under 
GATT. 
135 - Talks about outside AA - 
unhappiness in business. 
Much di, yclission oil till ti- du III/ lilig. I. s I/Icit, (111vt1lill ý ill dw 
(Ig rCeln eIII that would make c. xisting EI/ 1(111%v (1111, follgifiel. 
154 -Q- Trying to get back to AA. Non- 
tariff barriers to trade. How would it 
affect Anýjo? 
A- Have been affected by anti-clumpino 
in ternis of steel - by the USA. 
Discusses GEAR - 225 i. vh. 
225 - Discussing industrial policy in SA. 
230 - Saw the EU-SA aoreement as a 
sign that there was no going back. It 
would have helped us a lot to have the 
aoreenient in place a lot quicker. 
234 -Q Why do you think it took so 
lon for the agreement to be agreed' 
A-I think that there 'ust wasn't enouoh J L- 
interest in South Africa. They had their 
eyes on j. ust so many other things... new 
government, new people, that it was Just Discusses the change iii cabiliet persomliq - t,, vp. /it 1994 - 
very low on then- list of priorities. 1996. 
277 - Reputation of Manuel - brilliant 
minister. In terms of toughness. Won't 
yield. 
2nd tier al Ministry of Finance - ANC 
sympathies. 
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Appendix X: 
Table of confidential list of representatives interviewed in the wine industry 
2 This is only submitted in the first edition for the purposes of the viva. Future edition,,, will not hold this 
information for confidentiality reasons. 
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Appendix N 
Appendix W: 
Table of confidential list of representatives interviewed in the textile industry 
3 This is only submitted in the first edition for the purposes of the viva. Future editions will not hold this 
information for confidentiality reasons. 
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.. Appendix L: Example ofqmvstions asked to a representative from the wine indtistry 
Name: CONIADFATIA1. 
Status: CONFIDFNTIAI. 
Contact details: 
Emall: xxx 
Phone: xxx 
Fax: xxx 
Secretary details? Ms. Smit xxx 
Address: Main Road - Paarl 
Meeting: 14/2/2001 - 2.30 
Information: 
Followim, phone call with Pierre Loubser of CEWPA - lie notes that both Kruger and Dc Klerk are le, -, allv 
qualified to represent the two mkjor sections ofthe industry. Also, De Klerk represents VmPro SA as 
1997 - converted from co-operative to a group of companies. 
Has a number of empowerment initiatives... 
Long-standing - established - Astera -a personnel forum... this is included in the folder! With these 
interview notes. 
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Appendix L 
Ouestions: 
Introduction: 
A. My name is RL. Researcher from Plymouth. 
B. Research considers the perceived impact of the EU-SA TDCA on southern Africa and how the disparate 
grouping within South African played a role in its construction. 
C. Some research has been published - report for SAIIA after three-month spell in SA. Also articles in Business 
Times (anon. ) - reported as being rather critical of government. 
D. Operate confidentiality. Would you like your comments to be anonymous? 
Two thin2s to be in the back of my mind: 
How decisions were made 
How inclusive? 
1. How long have you been working in the SA wine industry? And for KWV? 
More detailed 
2. How is KWV now represented throughout the industry? I know it is represented on some statutory and 
non-statutory bodies. 
" But what about in dealings with government? 
" Do you speak at the department level, or with cabinet ministers/iNIPs? 
" Also, what sections of the industry are KWV involved with? 
3. Do you feel that KWV is adequately represented in the industry and in government? 
4. How could it be improved? 
5. And how about during the EU-SA TDCA negotiations? 
6. What are relations now like with the government? 
7. How does KWV see the wine industry developing in terms of empowerment initiatives? 
8. The in-house personnel forum - Astera - how long has that been operating? Have you any information 
on this? Who is represented? 
9. What kind of relations to you have with FAWU and other trade unions? What percentage of your 
workforce are unionised? 
Changing direction to the EU-SA TDCA 
10. Do you see the EU-SA TDCA as benefiting the industry? 
11. Particularly developing the industry? 
12. Will it assist KWV's empowerment initiatives? 
13. Who in the industry is more likely to benefit from the EU-SA TDCA? 
14. Who is likely not to benefit? 
Going back to decision-makin 
15. How is/was the sector organised in its decision-making apparatus? Can you comment on the diagram I 
have produced which aims to simplify the decision-making process 
16. Did the sector have a unified approach to negotiations? 
17. How were the 'community' incorporated into these processes? 
And to finish off 
18. What major issues face the sector today? (Including - has the agreement been successful? In the context 
of development, workers, the industry etceteras) 
How have empowerment and labour laws affected the wine industry? 
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Appendix M: Example of interview form for a representative ofthe textile sector 
Status: [ý, \Ccullvc Olrcclm - \\\ 
Contact details: 
Email: xxx 
Phone: xxx 
Fax: 
Secretary details? 
Address: xxx 
Meeting: 31.1.01 - 9.00am 
Information: 
Texfed - an industrial federation oftrade associations - promotes its mcnihcrs trade and tradc-1clated 
Proactively represents industry oil key issues. 
Founded - 1976. Incorporates the following trade associations - SA Worsted Manufacturers Assoclatlon: Nalional 
Fabric Knitters Association; SA Cotton Textile Manufacturers Association and corporate Incillhers I-cp1cwIllim-, 
fibre suppliers in SA - sucli as Cotton Board (dishanded accordliw to tile \vch searclics), SA \\'()()I Board, SANS 
Fihres, Hocclist Trevira -I need to question one other of these associations or Boards - either in 
Johannesburg or Cape Town. I arn interviewing a representathe for SANS Fibres. Will he meeting Brian (in 
the first day in South Africa - so can obtain further details from him then. So far, no other source has 
provided contact details and they are not on Nveb pages, or listed in Mhendi wel) site. 
Lists - Hoerclist SA - based in Joliannesburg. Contact - AJ Natliwani - tax 01 13 138428. tel: M13 138095 
There are otlicr members in the Western Cape - particularly at Paarl - see Berg, Riwr Textile,, , peak I() 
Robertson or Koeslag - 02 1 8692230. 
Says that it solves it problerns "in-liouse" - dirough negotiation and compromise. Z, 
Seen as the "official" voice of tile industry - government reco-niscs its representati\cIlcy, 
See also the accompany booklet on the state of the industry. 
Anotlier role ofTexfed - monitorin. - the effect ofinternational trade! III Order to dO till's it INIS IlItCraCtion \\]III file 
Board oil Tariffs and Trade (BTT) and DTI. 
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Otiestions: 
Introduction: 
A. My name is RL. Researcher from Plymouth. 
B. Research considers the perceived impact of the EU-SA TDCA on southern Africa and how the disparate 
grouping within South African played a role in its construction. 
C. Some research has been published - report for SAIIA after three-month spell in SA. Also articles in Business 
Times (anon. ) - reported as being rather critical of government. 
D. Operate confidentiality. Would you like your comments to be anonymous? 
Two thins to be in the back of my mind: 
How decisions were made 
How inclusive? 
Lead-in auestions: 
1. How long have you been working at Texfed? 
2. From the information that I have read, the textile industry has been transformed in some ways since the 
ending of sanctions. On the one hand there have been moves towards more automation and possibly 
beneficial trade deals with the US. On the other there have been massive levels or retrenchment, tariff 
liberalisation, and a surge in the level of illegal imports. In which ways is that a fair assessment? What 
would you add? 
More detailed - EU-SA TDCA 
So, how is the EU-SA TDCA viewed in this context, and within the trend for increased tariff 
liberalisation? 
4. In what ways nftht it benefit the sector? Who will "win"? 
5. In what ways might it cause problems for the sector? Who will "lose"? 
To decision-makini! processes 
6. How is/was the sector organised in its decision-making apparatus? 
7. Are you the official voice of the sector in negotiations with government? And also in terms of the EU-SA 
TDCA 
8. Did the sector have a unified approach to negotiations? 
9. Can you explain the decision-making process within the textile sector? 
0 Can you comment on the diagram I have produced which aims to simplify the decision-making process? 
10. How were the unionised interests incorporated? 
11. How were the 'community' incorporated into these processes? 
And to finish off 
What major issues face the sector today? (Including - has the agreement been successful? In the context of 
development, workers, the industry etceteras) 
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Appendix N: Example of coding from second set of' 
interviews 
265 - 0. - Undivil posilion. ' A, ii muv 
havi, been sonie disagreements. ' 
A: Yes there were. The ... unions 
position was that they would have argued 
for a much more intransigent and more 
er... position filvouring South Africa to a 
far greater extent. But that was a 
different on degree. 
Carries on in more detail on NI FN's 
'178 - ... on matter of' substance 
Micre 
the union alld ourselves differed was the 
wording and labour clauses within the 
texts of the whole arrangement. Over 
issues such as union right. v... Says that government siddiiied maný union positions 
aild that aggrieved labour lie feels. 
We did not support thern s1ron,, 1\ Cý . 
enough. It Wits I hit Of' it MO-ed"Cd C, 
sword. It would come back and hile it,, 
h1cl. But this is surely not representative of lite entire 
industry - one or two mullerings front others %%ithin 
textiles - such as Vil joen. Also. not e%en 100(( 300 Try Ito ask about how flit' ative of those front %sool, knitters and cotton. represent. 
community was integrated into fliv 
decision-making process within the 
tevile association... was the communit) 
ever thought of" when you wer 
discussm, the imreement? Who did yo 
construct your position with'? Did yo 
have remular mectirims with the unions'? 
A: No, we tended not to cauctN with 
unions prior to these sessions. There was 
report back and feCdhack... There was 
certainly consultation within the 
federation. within its executive structure. 
32 1: 0- Could you explain that? 
A: We have got these three trade 
associations. From tile cotton side there 
are five representatives on my steering 
hodyý froin the wool sector there are two 
and from knitters there are two. So from 
those representatives of the entire 
membership I was getting their direct 
feed bac k. 
289 
REFERENCES 
290 
References 
ACP-EU Joint Assembly and SACU Parliamentary Liaison Group, 1998, Responding to Regional 
Realities-The Regional Implications of the EU-South Africa Free Trade Area Negotiations, ACP-EU joint 
Assembly and SACU Parliamentary Liaison Group, Brussels and Windhoek, 32 pps. 
Adam, H., Van Zyl Slabbert, F., and Moodley, K., 1997, Comrades in Business - Post-Liberation Politics 
in South Africa, Tafelberg Publishers, Cape Town. 
Adelzadeh, A., 1996, 'From the RDP to GEAR; The Gradual Embracing of Neo-Liberalism in 
Economic Policy', available: www. niep. org. za/resartl. htm, accessed 14 July 2000. 
Adelzadeh, A., 1999, 'The Costs of Staying the Course', NCQO! An Economic Bulletin published by the 
National Institutefor Economic Policy, 1,1, June 1999,1-5. 
Africa Magazine (anon. ), 2001 (6 February), '2001 Comprehensive Report of the President of the 
United States on U. S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act', Africa Magazine, 1,5, Available at: 
www. marekinc. com/TradeUSA06020l. html, accessed, 3 April 2001. 
African journal of International and Comparative Law, 1993, 'African Legal Materials. African 
National Congress: Constitutional Principles for a Democratic South Africa', African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 5,1,225-237. 
Allison, G., 1971, Essence of Decision - Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Longman, London. 
An-dn, S., 1995, 'Migrations in Contemporary Africa', In: The Migration Experience in Africa (Baker, J., 
and Aina, T. A., editors. ), Nordiska Afrikainstitueet, Sweden, pp. 29-40. 
Amirahmadi, H., 1987, 'The non-capitalist way of development', Review of radical political economies, 
Spring, 19,22-46. 
Appleyard, R T., 1989, 'Migration and Development: Myths and Reality', International Migration 
Review, XXIII, 3,486-499. 
Araujo, L., 1995, 'Designing and Refining Hierarchical Coding Frames', In: Methods in Human 
Geography -A guide to students doing a research project (R. Flowerdew and D Martin editors. ), 
Addison Wesley Longman, Harlow, Essex, pp. 96-104. 
Ashurst, M., 1997 (28 February), 'South Africa uncorks wine cartel debate'. Financial Times (in 
South Africa), 5. 
Badurally Adam, M. S. A., and Darroch, M. A. G., 1997, 'Impact on South African Meat Demand of a 
possible free trade agreement with the European Union', Agrekon, 36,4,533-541. 
Balakrishnan, G., 1995, 'The National Imagination', New Left Review, 211, May/June, 56-69. 
Balassa, B., 1993, Policy Choicesfor the 1990s, MacMillan, London. 
Balassa, B., and Stoutjesdijk, A., 1975, 'Economic Integration among developing countries', journal 
of Common Market Studies, 14,1,37-55. 
Barchiesi, F., 1999, 'Economic Adjustment, Political Institutionalisation and Social Marginalisation: 
COSATU and the First Democratic Government (1994-99), Transformation, 38,20-47. 
Beattie, A., 2001 (31 January), 'New-look IMF, World Bank fail to silence critics', Business Day, 11. 
Beckman, B., 1993, 'The Liberation of Civil Society: Neo-Liberal Ideology and Political Theory', 
Review of African Political Economy, 58,2-33. 
Beetham, D., 1999, Democracy and human rights, Polity Press, Cambridge 
291 
References 
Beetham, D., and Boyle, K., 1995, Introducing Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Bell, D., 1976, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture into Social Forecasting, Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, Middx, UK. 
Bertelsmann-Scott, T., Mills, G., and Sidiropoulos, E., 2000, The EU-SA Agreement: South Aftica, 
southern Aftica and the European Union, SAIIA, Johannesburg. 
Bhorat, H., 2000, 'The impact of trade and structural changes on sectoral employment in South 
Africa', Development Southern Aftica, 17,3,437-466. 
Black, L, and White, M., 2001 (18 June), 'Travel ban to block 'anarchist' leaders', The Guardian, 
Available at: http: //www. guardian. co. uk, accessed 24 October 2001. 
Blaikie, N., 1993, Approaches to Social Enquiry, Polity, Cambridge. 
Bleaney, M., and Fielding, D., 1995, 'Investment, Trade Liberalisation and Structural Adjustment', 
Journal of Development Studies, 32,2,175-194. 
Bolin, L., 2001 (5 September), 'Dispute over wine export figures'. Available at: http: //www. bdfm. 
co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl, accessed, 5 September 2001. 
Bond, P., 1997, 'From reconstruction and development to neo-liberal modernisation in South 
Africa: The retreat of progressive intellectual leadership, 1960s-1990s - and a possible way 
forward', Paper presented at Julius Nyerere Institute, Tanzania, 15-16 December. 
Bond, P., 1999, 'Foreign aid and development: South Africa's negative experiences and perceptions, 
1994-99', submitted June 1999 to Development Southern Africa. 
Bond, P., 2000, Elite Transition. from Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa, Pluto Press, London, 
Sterling (USA) and Scottsville (South Africa). 
Botes, L., and van Rensburg, D., 2000, 'Community Participation in development: nine plagues and 
twelve commandments', Community Development Journal, 35,1,41-58. 
Bothma, S., 1999 (30 September), 'Cabinet says no to foreign advisers', Business Day, Available at: 
http: //www. bday-co. za, accessed, 30 September 1999. 
Boulding, KE., 1959, 'National Images and International Systems', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 3, 
120-131. 
Brink, B., 1999, 'The TDCA and the textile industry, Seminar Report - South Aftican Business and the 
European Union in the Context of the New Trade and Development Agreement, Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung, Johannesburg, pp. 31-34. 
Brink, B., 2001 (5 March), private correspondence. 
Brohman, J., 1995a, 'Economism and critical silences in development studies: a theoretical critique 
of neoliberalism', Third World Quarterly, 16,2,297-318. 
Brohman, J., 1995b, 'Universalism, Eurocentrism, and ideological bias in development studies: 
from modernisation to neoliberalism', Third World Quarterly, 16,1,121-140. 
Brookes, E. G., 1968, Apartheid, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. 
Brookfield, H., 1975, Interdependent Development, Methuen, London. 
Bruton, H. J., 1985, 'The Search for Development Economics', World Development, 13,10/11,1099- 
1124. 
292 
References 
Bryman, A., and Burgess, R. G., 1994, Analyzing qualitative data, Routledge, London. 
Business Day, (editor), 1997 (23 July), Editorial, Available at: http: //www. bday. co. za, accessed, 15 
March 2000. 
Business Day (anon. ), 2000 (February 18), 'Growth act is a bonus for textile importers', Business 
Day, Available: http: //www. bdfm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print, accessed 11 November 2000. 
Business Day (anon. ), 2000 (June 28), 'Raising spirits of wine industry', Business Day, Available: 
http: / /www. bday. co. za/bday/content/direct/0,3523,647102-6078-0,00. html, accessed 3 July 2000. 
Business Day (anon. ), 2000 (November 3), 'Win some, lose some', Business Day, Available: 
http: //www. bdfm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl, accessed 8 November 2000. 
Business Day (anon. ), 2001 (February 23), 'For SA textiles, the battle cry is export or die', Business 
Day, Available: http: //www. bdfm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl, accessed 26 February 2001. 
Business Day (anon. ), 2001 (March 7), 'Trade accord may harm SADC', Business Day, Available: 
http: //www. bdfm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl, accessed 12 March 2001. 
Bussolo, M., 2000, Regional or Multilateral agreements? An evaluation of Southern-Africa Trade Policy 
Scenarios, European Development Policy Study Group, Discussion Paper No. 17, March 2000, 
European Development Policy Study Group, Manchester, 25 pps. 
Butler, A., 1998, Democracy and Apartheid - Political theory, Comparative politics and the Modern 
South African State, MacMillan, London. 
Cape Business News (anon. ), 1996 (December), 'Through the Looking Glass', CBN Archive, 
Available at: http: //www. mb. co. za/archive/96-dec/through. htm, accessed, 19 October 2000. 
Cape Business News (anon. ), 1997 (October), 'South Africa - The real wine producers', CBN 
Archive, Available at: http: //www. mb. co. za/archive/97-oct/wineco2. htm, accessed, 19 October 
2000. 
Cape Business News (anon. ), 1997 (November), 'South Africa - Wine's contribution to the 
economy', CBN Archive, Available at: http: //www. cnb. co. za/archive/97-nov/wine2. htm, 
accessed, 19 October 2000. 
Cape Business News (anon. ), 1998 (May), 'South Africa - Finding a new deal in horticulture', CBN 
Archive, Available at: http: //www. mb. co-za/archive/98may/grower. htm, accessed, 19 October 
2000. 
Cape Business News (anon. ), 1999 (July), 'Exports up, but local market still in doldrums'. CBN 
Archive, Available at: http: //www. mb. co-za/archive/99-jul/wine. htm, accessed, 19 October 2000. 
Cape Business News (anon. ), 1999 (November), 'South Africa- November '99 -A business view on 
the deal' CBN Archive, Available at: http: //www. cnb. co. za/archive/99-nov/view. htm, accessed, 
19 October 2000. 
Capernedia (undated), 'Clothing and Textile Industry, Available: http: www. capemedia. co. za 
/export/articles/textiles. htm, accessed 8 November 2000. 
Cape Times (anon. ), 2001 (30 January), 'Kiss of life for clothing industry', The Cape Times, 3. 
Cassim, R., 1998, 'The Political Economy of Trade Negotiations in Post-Apartheid South Africa', 
Paper presented at the University of Cape Town, January. 
Castles, F., 1982, The Impact of Parties, Sage, London. 
293 
Refcrerices 
Centre for Rural Legal Studies, 2001, 'About the CRLS', Available at: http: //users. iafrica. com/r/ 
ru/rulegstu/, accessed, 25 October 2000. 
Chatterjee, P., and Finger, M., 1994, The earth brokers, Routledge, London and New York. 1994. 
Chisti, S., 2000, 'Democratic Decision Making in the World Trade Organization: An Assessment', 
International Studies, 37,2,85-96. 
Chowdhry, G., 1995, 'Engendering Development? ', In: Feminism, Postmodernism, Development 
(Marchand, MH., and Parpart, JL., editors), Routledge, London and New York, pp. 26-41. 
Christians, C. G. (2000), 'Ethics and Politics in Qualitative Research'. In: Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, (N. Denzin, and Y Lincoln, editors), 2" edition, Sage, London, pp. 133-155. 
CIDSE, 2000. - 'Towards true partnership: EU-Africa Summit -A CIDSE Position Paper, 
Coop6ration Internationale pour le D6veloppement et la Solidarit6', www. cidse. org/pubs/ 
euafpt3. htm, accessed, 28 June 2001. 
Citizen (The), (anon. ), 1999 (20 October 1999), 'EU Trade Pact will boost FDI in SA', reproduced by 
South African Embassy Electronic Newsletter, Available at: http: //zuidafrika. nl/newsletter/ 
05_11_1999. htm, accessed, 8 May 2001. 
Cloke, P., Goodwin, M., Milbourne, P., and Thomas, C., 1995, 'Deprivation, poverty and 
marginalization in rural lifestyles in England and Wales', Journal of Rural Studies, 11,4,351-365. 
Cochrane, JD., and Sloan, JW., 1973, 'LAFTA & the CACM: A Comparative analysis of integration 
in Latin America' The Journal of Developing Areas, 8,1,13-37. 
Connolly, W., 1983, The Terms of Political Discourse, 2nd edition, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey. 
Cook, D., 1997, Poverty, Crime and Punishment, CRAG, London. 
Cook, G., (ed. ), 1998, The Economics and Politics of International Trade, Routledge, London and New 
York. 
Cook, L., 2000 (13 September), 'Black farmers particularly do not benefit', Business Day, Available 
at: http: //www. bday. co. za/bday/content/direct/0,3523,698005-6078-0,0O. html, accessed, 18 
September 2000. 
Corbridge, S. (ed. ), 1995, Development Studies -A reader, Edward Arnold, London. 
Cornford, J. P., 1973, 'The Illusion of Decision', British Journal of Political Science, 4,2,231-243. 
COSATU, 1999, Submission on EU-RSA Trade Development and Co-operation Agreement, Presented to a 
joint sitting of the Portfolio Committees on Trade and Industry, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture and 
Land Affairs, and the NCOP Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 26 October 1999. Available at: 
http: //www. cosatu. org. za/docs/1999/eutrade. htm, accessed, 27 February 2001. 
Cotton South Africa, undated, 'Your partner in the Industry, pamphlet, Cotton SA, Pretoria. 
Cox, R., 1967, 'Roles in National Development: Policy Decision-Making', Lecture to International 
Institute for Labour Studies East African Seminar on labour problems in Economic Development, 
Nairobi 
Cox, R. W., and Sinclair, T. J., 1996, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK. 
Cox, T. S., 1983, 'Northern Actors in a South-South Setting: External Aid and East African 
Integration', Journal of Common Market Studies, XXI, 3,283-312. 
294 
Refcrerices 
Crang, M., 1997, Analyzing qualitative materials' in: Methods in Human Geography -A guide to 
students doing a research project (R. Flowerdew and D Martin, editors), Addison Wesley Longman, 
Harlow, Essex, pp. 183-196. 
Crapanzano, V., 1980, Tuhami - Portrait of a Moroccan, Chicago of University Press, Chicago. 
Craven, E., and Mather, C., 2000, 'Geographical Indications and the South Africa-European Union 
Free Trade Agreement', unpublished paper, submitted to Area, 2000. 
Crush, J., (ed. ), 1995, Power of Development, Routledge, London and New York. 
Crush, J., 1996, 'A Bad Neighbour Policy? Migrant Labour and the New South Africa', Southern 
Africa Report, November, 3-5. 
Crush, J., (ed. ), undated, Borderline Farming: Foreign Migrants in South African Commercial 
Agriculture, Migration Policy Series No. 16, Southern African Migration Project, Cape Town. 
Cutting, B., and Kouzmin, A., 1999, 'From Chaos to Patterns of Understanding: Reflections on the 
dynamics of effective government decision making', Public Administration, 77,3,475-508. 
Dale, G., 1999, 'Capitalism and Migrant Labour', In: The European Union and Migrant Labour (G. 
Dale, and M. Cole, editors), Berg, Oxford and New York, pp. 281-314. 
Daniels, G., and Macfarlane, D., 2001 (16 to 22 February), 'The global revival of the left', Mail & 
Guardian, 32-33. 
Davies, R., 2000, 'Forging a New Relationship with the EU', in The EU-SA Agreement: South Aftica, 
southern Aftica and the European Union, (Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, Greg Mills and Elizabeth 
Sidiropoulos, editors), SAIIA, Johannesburg:, pp. 5-16. 
Davenport, T., 1977, South Africa -A Modern History, MacMillan, London. 
Davenport, T., 1991, South Africa -A Modern History, MacMillan, London. 
Delorme, J., 2000, 'The dead white man's clothes', Trade Union World, 2, February, 21-22. 
De Mesquita, B. B., 1997, 'A Decision Making Model: Its Structure and Form', International 
Interactions, 23,3-4,235-266. 
Dennis, N., 1997, The invention of permanent poverty, IEA Health and Welfare Unit, London. 
Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S., (eds. ), 2000, Handbook of Qualitative Research, 2' edition, Sage, 
London. 
Department of Labour, 1999, 'Statement by the Minister of Labour, Mernbathisi Mdladlana at the 
Winelands Conference', Available at: http: //www. labour. gov. za/docs/sp/1999/splOO8. html, 
accessed, 1 March 2001. 
de Senarclens, P., 1998, 'Governance and the crisis in the international mechanisms of regulation', 
International Social Science journal, 155,91-104. 
Diaz-Bonilla, E., and Robinson, S., 1998, Globalization, Trade Reform, and the Developing countries, 
International Food Policy Research Institute, New York, 9 pps. 
Dickenson, J., et al., (eds. ), 1996, Geography of the Third World, Routledge, London. 
Dickson, A., 1997, Development and International Relations -A Critical Introduction, Polity Press, 
Cambridge. 
295 
References 
Dludlu, J., 1999 (12 April), 'Sacrifices in trade deal were worth it', Business Day, 9. 
Duval Smith, A., 2001 (25 May), 'Aids, trade and war top Powell's African agenda', The 
Independent, 20. 
Edelman, M., 1988, Constructing the Political Spectacle, Chicago University Press, Chicago, Ill. 
Ellis, S., 1996, 'Africa and International Corruption: The strange case of South Africa and 
Seychelles'. - African Affairs, 95,165-196. 
Ensor, L., 2001 (4 April), 'Fisheries accord with EU impossible'. Business Day, Available at: 
www. bday. co. za, accessed, 9 April 2001. 
Enterprise (anon. ), 1997, 'Twixt The Cup and the Lip', Enterprise, December 1997,28-30. 
Erwin, A., 2000, 'Preface', in, The EU-SA Agreement: South Africa, southern Africa and the European 
Union, (Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, Greg Mills and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, editors), SAIIA, 
Johannesburg:, pp. vii-viii. 
Escobar, A., 1988, 'Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the 
Third World', Cultural Anthropology, 3,4,428-443. 
European Centre for Development Policy Management, 2001, 'The Cotonou Agreement at a 
Glance', Available at: www. oneworld. org/ecdpm/en/cotonou/02-gb. htm, accessed, 15 June 2001. 
European Commission in South Africa, 1999, The European Union and South Africa. An overview of the 
relationship in light of the conclusion of the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement, Brussels and 
Pretoria, European Commission, 26 pps. 
European Union in South Africa, undated, 'EU-SA Trade and Economic Cooperation', Available at: 
www. eusa. org. za, accessed, 12 May 2001. 
Eurostep, 2000, The EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement: An analysis of its 
implications in Southern Africa, Eurostep Briefing Paper, Available at: 
http: //www. oneworld. org/eurostep/eusouth. htm, accessed, 26 April 2001. 
Evans, D., 1999, Deindustrialisation in Southern Africa? A General Equilibrium Analysis, IDS Working 
-Paper 88, Sussex, UK: IDS, 21 pps. 
Ewert, 2000 (13 October), Private correspondence. 
Ewert, 2001 (4 May), Private correspondence. 
Ewert, J., and Hamman, J., 1996, 'Labour Organisation in Western Cape Agriculture: An Ethnic 
Corporatism? ', Journal of Peasant Studies, 23,2/3,146-165. 
Ewert, J., and Hamman, J., 1999, 'Why Paternalism Survives: Globalization, Democratization and 
Labour on South African Wine Farms', Sociologia Ruralis, 39,2,202-221. 
Fine, B., and Rustomjee, Z., 1996, The Political Economy of South Africa - From Minerals-Energy 
Complex to Industrialization, Hurst & Co, London. 
Flowerdew, R., and Martin, D., (eds., ) (1997), Methods in Human Geography -A guide to students doing a research project, Addison Wesley Longman, Harlow, Essex. 
Foundation for Global Dialogue, 1997, Trading On Development, Foundation for Global Dialogue 
and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Braamfontein, Johannesburg. 
296 
References 
Fontana, A., and Frey, J. H., 2000, 'The Interview: From Structured Questions to Negotiated Text', 
In: Handbook of Qualitative Research (N. Denzin, and Y Lincoln, editors), 2"dedition, Sage, London, 
pp. 645-672. 
Founou-Tchuigoua, B., 1996, 'Africa confronted by the ravages of neoliberalism', Aftica 
Development, M, 2-3,5-24. 
Frank, AG., 1967, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. Historical Studies of Chile and 
Brazil, Monthly Review Press, London. 
Fraser, J., 2001 (21 June), 'Lawyer warns SA over EU trade deal', Business Day, Available at: 
http: //www. bdfm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl, accessed, 25 June 2001. 
Friends of the Earth, 2001, 'Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) and the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing (ATC)', Available from: www. foei. org/ activist-guide/tradeweb/mfa. htm, accessed on 19 
March 2001. 
Geldenhuys, D., and Kotzi, H., 1983, 'Aspects of political decision-making in South Africa', 
Politikon, 10,1,33-45. 
Ghosh, J., 1999, 'Openness, deficits and lack of development', Available at: Third World Network, 
www. twnside. org. sg/souths/twn/title/ghosh-en. html, accessed, 20 January 2000, (First appeared 
in Frontline, 22 October 1999). 
Gibb, R., and Michalak, W., 1994, Continental trading blocs: the growth of regionalism in the world 
economy, John Wiley, London. 
Gibb, R., and Michalak, W., 1996, 'Regionalism in the world economy', Area, 28,4,446-458. 
Gilpin, R., 1987, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ. 
Glaser, D., 1997, 'South Africa and the Limits of Civil Society', Journal of Southern African Studies, 23, 
1,5-25. 
Glaser, D., 2001, Politics and Society in South Africa, Sage, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi. 
Goetz, A. M., 1998, 'Women in Politics and Gender Equity in Policy: South Africa and Uganda', 
Review of Aftican Political Economy, 76,241-262. 
Goldman, T., (undated - 1999? ), Customs and Excise, Private report commissioned for COSATU, 
Johannesburg. 
Goodison, P., 1999, 'Marginalisation or Integration? Implications for South Africa's partners of the 
South Africa-European Union trade deal', IGD Occasional Paper, No. 22, IGD, Johannesburg. 
Graham, E., 1997, 'Philosophies underlying human geography research', In: Methods in Human 
Geography -A guide to students doing a research project, (R. Flowerdew and D. Martin, editors) 
Addison Wesley Longman, Harlow, Essex, pp. 6-35. 
Graumans, A., 1998, The European Union-South Africa negotiations - The sting is in the tail, 
Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa, Amsterdam. 
Graybill, L., 2000, 'Lingering legacy: apartheid and the South African press', Current History, 99, 
636,227-230. 
Gillalp, H., 1998, 'The Eurocentrism of dependency theory and the question of "authenticity": a 
view from Turkey', Third World Quarterly, 19,5,951-961. 
297 
References 
Gwynne, R. N., 1985, Industrialisation and urbanisation in Latin America, Routledge and John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, MD. 
Habib, A., and Taylor, R., 1999, 'South Africa: Anti-Apartheid NGOs in transition', Voluntas: 
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 10,1,73-82. 
Hale, A., 1998, 'What Does Trade Liberalisation Mean for Women's Work? ', Trade Myths and 
Gender, Global Publications Foundation, Uppsala, Sweden. 
Hall, D., and Hall, 1., 1996, Practical Social Research, MacMillan, London. 
Hall, P. A., 1986, Governing the Economy: the Politics of State Intervention in Britain and France, Polity 
Press, Cambridge. 
Hall, R., 2000 (1 November), private correspondence. 
Hansen, W. L., and Ok Park, K., 1995, 'Nation-State and Pluralistic Decision Making in Trade 
Policy: The Case of the International Trade Administration, International Studies Quarterly, 39,2, 
181-211. 
Harrison, D., 1988, The Sociology of Modernization and Development, Routledge, London. 
Hassim, S., and Gouws, A., 1998, 'Redefining the Public Space: Women's Organisations, Gender 
Consciousness and Civil Society in South Africa', Politikon, 25,2,53-76. 
Hazlewood, A., 1979, 'The End of the East African Community: What lessons are there for regional 
integration schernes? ', Journal of Common Market Studies, XVIII, 1,40-58. 
Head, J., 1998, '"Ek het niks" -I have nothing - The Impact of European Union Policies on Women 
Canning Workers in South Aftica', University of Cape Town Press, Cape Town, 24 pps. 
Heineman R. A., Bluhm, W. T., Peterson, S. A., and Kearney, E. N., 1997, The World of the Policy 
Analyst, 2"dedition, Chatham House Publishers, Chatham, New Jersey. 
Held, D., 1996, Models of Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Herbert, S., 2000, 'For ethnography', Progress in Human Geography, 24,4,550-568. 
Herbst, J., 1996/7, 'Responding to State Failure in Africa', International Security, 21 (Winter 1996/7), 
pp. 120-144. 
Herod, A., 1999, 'Reflections on interviewing foreign elites: praxis, positionality, validity, and the 
cult of the insider', Geoforum, 30,313-327. 
Hilliard, V. G., and Kemp, N. D., 1999, 'Citizen participation indispensable to sustainable 
democratic governance and administration', International Review of Administrative Sciences, 65,3, 
353-370. 
Hill-Lanz, S., and O'Grady, K., 1997, 'Westem Cape fruit and wine farms: land, labour and housing 
tenure', In, Women, Land and Authority, (S. Meer editor), Oxfam, Oxford, UK, pp. 111-120. 
Hine, RC., 1992, 'Regionalism and the Integration of the World Economy', Journal of Common 
Market Studies, XXX, 2,115-123. 
Hirsch, A., 1997, The Role of Growth and Development in South Africa's Trade Policy, In: Trading 
on Development - South Aftica's relations with the ELl', Foundation for Global Dialogue and Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, Johannesburg, pp. 70-77. 
Hlangani, M., 1999 Uuly 20), 'Textile workers stage stoppages', Sowetan. 
298 
References 
Hodd, M., 1987, 'Africa, the IMF and the World Bank', Aftican Affairs, 86 (344), 331-342. 
Hoddinott J., Adato, M., Besley, T., and Haddad, L., 1999, 'Participation and Poverty Reduction: 
Issues, Theory, and New Evidence from South Africa', IFPRI Discussion Paper 98, International 
Food Policy Research Institute, Washington. 
Horton, C., 1999, 'Made in SADC, sold in South Africa', SA Labour Bulletin, 23,1, February, 47-50. 
Hudson, P., 2000, 'Liberalism, democracy and transformation in South Africa', Politikon, 27,1,93- 
102. 
Human Rights Watch, 1998, "Prohibited Persons" - Abuse of Undocumented Migrants, Asylum-Seekers, 
and Refugees in South Aftica, Human Rights Watch, New York and London. 
Huyssteen, A., 1999 (8 January) 'Top 1998 Companies - Making hay while the sun shines', Financial 
Mail, Available at: http: //www. fm. co. za/topco98/topagri. htm, accessed, 23 October 2000. 
Iafrica. com, 2000 (4 September 2000), 'Wine regions - Stellenbosch', Available at: www. iafrica. 
com/wineregions, accessed 4 September 2000. 
IDC, 1999a, Measures and Policies Impacting on South Aftican Industry, Information Series IS2/1999, 
Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, Sandton, South Africa. 
IDC, 1999b, Wine Industry report, Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, Sandton, 
South Africa. 
IDC, 1999c, Industry Analysis - Spinning & Weaving, Industrial Development Corporation of 
South Africa, Sandton, South Africa. 
IDS and BIDPA, 1998, Study to Assess the Economic Impact of the Proposed European Union- 
South Africa Free Trade Agreement on Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, Institute of 
Development Studies (IDS) and the Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis, Brighton 
and Gaborone. 
ILRIG, 1998, An Alternative View of Globalisation, ILRIG Globalisation Series No. 1, International 
Labour Resource and Information Group (ILRIG), Cape Town. 
Imani Development, 1997, Study on the Economic Impact of the Proposed EU-SA Free Trade Agreement 
on the BLNS countries, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
Isandla, 2001, 'Isandla Institute', Available at: http: //www. isandla. org. za/main. htrnl, accessed, 25 
February 2001. 
Jachia, L., and Te1jeur, E., 1998, Free Trade with Europe - the winners and losers: The results of the 
SMART simulation, TIPS working Paper No. 11, TIPS, Braamfontein, South Africa. 
James, W., and Caliguire, D., 1996, Renewing Civil Society', Journal of Democracy, 7,1,56-66. 
Jansen, H., 1999 (December), Women Workers Take On Globalisation, ILRIG, Cape Town, 4 pps. 
Jansen, H., 2000 (April), Globalisation of thefootwear and leather industries, ILRIG, Cape Town, 8 pps. 
Jansen, H., and Pape, J., 2000 (October), 'The New Sweatshop', Workers World News, 19, October 
2000, ILRIG, Cape Town, 8 pps. 
Jarvis, D., 1997, 'Textile, clothing and footwear workers: poorly paid and on short-time, Agenda, 
35,18-23. 
Jenkins, C., and Siwisa, N., 1997, Overview of Trade Policy in South Africa, TIPS, Braamfontein, 
South Africa. 
299 
Refercnces 
Jenvey, N., 2000 (1 June), 'Act will boost textile industry', Business Day. Available from 
http: //www. bdfm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl [Accessed 8 November 2000]. 
Jenvey, N., 2001 (14 August), 'Patching together a better lot for textile workers', Business Day. 
Available from http: //www. bday. co. za [Accessed 20 August 2001]. 
Jones, D., 2001 (19 March), 'Mandela, Meyer secure free speech from Clinton', Business Day, 
Available at: http: //www. bdfm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl, accessed, 26 March 2001. 
Jones, J., 2001, (29 January), 'Patience key to changing perceptions'. Business Day, 11. 
Jones, S., 1996, 'Tripartism in the Clothing and Textile Industries', Industrial Democracy Review, 5,4, 
37-42. 
Kay, C., 1993, 'For a Renewal of development studies: Latin American theories and neoliberalism 
in the era of structural adjustment', Third World Quarterly, 14,4,691-702. 
Keet, D., 1999, 'Globalisation and regionalisation - Contradictory Tendencies? Counteractive 
Tactics? Or Strategic Possibilities? % IGD Occasional Paper Series, No. 18., Institute for Global 
Dialogue, Braamfontein, South Africa, 39 pps. 
Keet, D, 1997(a). 'Europe's free-trade plans with South Africa: Strategic responses from and 
challenges to South and Southern Africa', Development South Africa, 14,2,285-294. 
Keet, Dot, 1997(b), 'Rallying the region: SA/EU Negotiations continue', Southern Aftica Report, 
June, 30-33. 
Kelle, U., 1995, Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis, Sage, London. 
Kelle, U., and Laurie H., (1995) 'Computer Use in Qualitative Research and Issues of Validity', in, 
U. Kelle, (Ed. ), Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis, (London: Sage), pp. 19-28. 
Keenan, T., 1998, 'KWV - Reflecting the changing SA', Finance Week, July 16-22,43-54. 
Kgoroba, K. G., 1999, 'Opening Statement'l Workshop on EU-SA Agreement on Trade, 
Development and Co-operation, Gaborone, July 22-23. 
Khan, F., 1998, 'Public participation and environmental decision making in South Africa', South 
Aftican geographical journal, 80,2,73-80. 
Khoza, R. J., 1999, 'The Institutional Structures that Should Underpin the African Renaissance', In: 
Aftican Renaissance, (Malegapuru Makgoba editor), Mafube Publishing, Sandton and Tafelburg, 
Cape Town, pp. 279-288. 
Khula, 2001, 'The Land Reform Credit Facility, Available at: http: //www. khula. org. za/ 
landreformcredi-facility. htm, accessed, 3 May 2001. 
Kiely, R, 1998, 'Neo liberalism revisited? A critical account of World Bank concepts of good 
governance and market friendly intervention, Capital & Class, 64, Spring 1998,63-118. 
Kitchin, R., and Tate, N. J., 2000, Conducting Research in Human Geography: Theory, Methodology and 
Practice, Prentice Hall, London. 
Koo, H., 1981. 'Centre-Periphery Relations and Marginalization: Empirical Analysis of the 
Dependency Model of Inequality in Peripheral Nations', Development and Change, 12,1,55-76. 
Krueger, AO., 1995, Trade Policies and Developing Nations, Brookings Institute, Washington. 
Krugman, P., 1994, Peddling Prosperity, W. W. Norton & Company, New York. 
300 
References 
Kvale, S., 1996, Interviews - An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing, Sage, London. 
KWK, undated, 'The international trade environment - Producer subsidy equivalent by country, 
1998', figures produced by KWK, Cape Town. 
KWV, 1997, Macro-Economic Impact of the Wine Industry on the Western Cape, KWV, South 
Africa. 
KVvrV, 2000, A Summary of KWV's Empowerment Initiatives, Available at: www. kwv- 
intemational. co. za/comp-phil/group. htn-d, accessed 16 September 2000. 
KWV, 2001, The Chairmans Address, Available at: www. kwv. co. za/chairý_address_ 
lourens_jonker. htm, accessed, 5 May 2001. 
Labour Proposal on the EU-SA TDCA, 1997, Working Document prepared by South African 
Labour Negotiators to the EU-SA TDCA policy formulation process. 
Lace, W., 2000, 'Textiles & Clothing Manufacture - Relief expected for embattled industry', 
Engineering News, 25-31 August 2000,51. 
Ladson-Billings, G., 2000, 'Racialized Discourses and ethnic epistemologies', In: Handbook of 
Qualitative Research (N. Denzin and Y Lincoln, editors), 2dedition, Sage, London, pp. 257-277. 
Lal, D., 1993, 'Trade Blocs and Multilateral Free Trade', Journal of Common Market Studies, 31,3,349- 
358. 
Lal, D., 1995, 'The Misconception of "Development Economics", (first written in 1985), In: 
Development Studies -A reader (Stuart Corbridge, editor), Edward Arnold, London, pp. 56-63. 
Lal, D., and Rajapatirana, S., 1987, 'Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries', Research Observer, Published by The International Bank for Reconstruction/The World 
Bank, Washington, 2,2,189-217. 
Lall, S., 1993, 'Trade Policies for Development -A Policy Prescription for Africa', Development 
Policy Review, 11,1,47-65. 
Lanegran, K., 1995, 'South Africa's Civic Association Movement; ANC's Ally or Society's 
"Watchdog"? Shifting Social Movement-Political Party Relations'A Aftican Studies Review, 38,2,101- 
126. 
Langhammer, Rj., 1992, 'The Developing Countries and Regionalism', Journal of Common Market 
Studies, XXX, 2,211-231. 
Larrain, J., 1989, Theories of Development, Polity, Cambridge. 
Lasswell, H. D., 1956, The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis, University of 
Maryland, College Park, Md. 
Lehrnbruch, G., and Schmitter, P. C., (editors), 1982, Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, Sage, 
London. 
Lemon, A., 1976, Apartheid -A Geography of Separation, Saxon House, Westmead, Hants, UK 
Lemon, A., 1987, Apartheid in Transition, Gower, Aldershot, UK. 
Lester, L., Nel, E., and Binns, T., 2000, South Africa: Past, Present and Future, Pearson/Longman, 
London. 
301 
References 
Levermore, R., 2000, 'Constructing the Inter-statal worldview', unpublished paper presented at 
British International Studies Association Conference, Bradford, December 19,2000. 
Levermore, R., Gibb, R., and Cleary, M., 2000, The SA-EU TDCA: An Analysis of Decision-making 
Procedures and Processes in South Africa, SAIIA Report No. 15, SAIIA, Johannesburg, 28 pps. 
Lewis, J. D., Robinson, S., and Thierfelder, K., 1999, 'After Negotiations: Assessing the Impact of 
Free Trade Agreements in southern Africa' Discussion Paper, No. 46, International Food Policy 
Research Institute, Washington, 43 pps. 
Leys, C., 1996, The Rise and Fall of Dependency Theory, James Curry, Oxford. 
Lieberfeld, D., 2000, 'Getting to the negotiating table in South Africa: domestic and international 
dynamics', Politikon, 27,1,19-36. 
Lister, M., 1997, The European Union and the South - Relations with Developing Countries, 
Routledge, London. 
Lodge, T., 1999a, South African Politics since 1994, David Philip Publishers, Claremont, South Africa. 
Lodge, T., 1999b, 'Policy Processes within the African National Congress and the tripartite 
alliance', Politikon, 26,1,5-32. 
Lonkila, M., 1995, 'Grounded Theory as an Emerging Paradigm for Computer-assisted Qualitative 
Data Analysis', In: Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis (U. Kelle, editor), Sage, London, pp. 
41-51. 
Louw, 1., 2001 (29 January), 'SA unions fail globalisation test, Business Day. 
Lowe, P., 2000, 'Main parameters of the EU-SA partnership', in The EU-SA Agreement: South 
Africa, southern Africa and the European Union, (Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, Greg Mills and 
Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, editors), SAIIA, Johannesburg, pp. 39-45. 
Lucas, J. R., 1976, Democracy and Participation, Penguin, London. 
Lutz, M., and Singer, H"W., 1994, 'The Link between increased trade openness and the terms of 
trade: An Empirical Investigation', World Development, 22,11,1697-1709. 
Maasdorp, G., 1974, Economic Development Strategy in the African Homelands, Report for the South 
African Institute of Race Relations, 4"' Annual Council Meeting, Cape Town. 
Maasdorp, G., 1997, 'The Impact of Regional Integration on Southern African Agriculture', Agrekon, 
36,4,385-406. 
Madakufamba, M., 1999 (June), 'Mixed reactions to SA-EU trade agreement', SADC Today, 3,1,1 
and 4. 
Madge, C., 1993, 'Boundary disputes: comments on Sidaway (1992)', Area, 25,3,294-9. 
McGreal, C., 2001 (26 July), 'South Africans vow to grab the land', The Guardian, Available at: 
http: //www. guardian. co. uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4228209,00. html, accessed, 8 October 2001. 
Mail and Guardian, 1997, (13 June), 'ZA now' Available at: http: //www. mg. co. za, accessed, 24 
October 2000. 
Mail and Guardian (anon. - editorial? ), 2001 (2-8 February), 'Who's fooling who? ', Mail & Guardian, 
22. 
Marchand, MH., 1994, 'Gender and new regionalism in Latin America: inclusion/exclusion', Third 
World Quarterly, 15,1,63-76. 
302 
References 
Maree, J., 1998, 'The COSATU participatory democratic tradition and South Africa's new 
parliament: Are they reconcilable? ', African Affairs, 97,29-51. 
Marchand, MH., and Parpart, JL., (editors. ), 1995, Feminism, Postmodernism, development, Routledge, 
London and New York. 
Masemola, K., 2001, 'Seattle Ministerial Conference - Collapse at talks a breakthrough for 
progressive forces, Available at: http: //www. cosatu. org. za/shop/shop09O2/shopO9O2-05. html, 
accessed 23 January 2001. 
Mateme, M., 2001 (31 August), 'Wake-up call for Wine Industry', Financial Mail, Available at: http: 
//www. fm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl, accessed, 31 August 2001. 
Mathiane, N., 2001 (20 February), 'Hailed by some and traduced by others, the organisation has 
nothing on its record so far', Business Day, 4. 
May, T., 1997, Social Research -Issues, Methods and Process, 2ý0 edition, Open University Press, 
Buckingham, UK. 
Mbeki, T., 1999a, 'Prologue', In: African Renaissance, (Malegapuru Makgoba editor), Mafube 
Publishing, Sandton and Tafelburg, Cape Town, pp. xiii-xxi. 
Mbeki, T., 1999b, 'Speech of the President of South Africa, at the launch of the African Renaissance 
Institute, Pretoria, 11 October 1999', South African Embassy Electronic Newsletter, 5 November 1999, 
Available at: http: //www. zuidafrika. nl/newsletter/05-11-1999. htm, accessed, 8 May 2001. 
Mbendi, 2000, South Africa: Textiles Manufacturing, Available at: www. mbendi. co. za/indy/txtl/ 
af/sa/pOO05. htm, accessed, 8 November 2000. 
Mboweni, T., 1994, 'Formulating Policy for a democratic South Africa: Some observations', IDS 
Bulletin, 25,1,69-73. 
McDonald, M., (1998a), 'Is a Free Trade Agreement with Europe still worth pursuing? ', 
unpublished monograph, Johannesburg. 
McDonald, M., (1998b), 'Free Trade Agreements at any price may not be so free', unpublished 
monograph, Johannesburg. 
Mcllroy, Anne, 2001 (23 April), 'Violence stops short of the summit', The Guardian, Available at: 
http: //www. guardian. ac. uk, accessed, 26 April 2001. 
Meer, S., (editor), 1997, Women, Land and Authority, Oxfam, Oxford, UK. 
Mgibi, L., 1997, Ubuntu - The African Dream in Management, Knowledge Resources, Pretoria. 
Michie, J., and Padayachee, V., 1997, The Political Economy of South Africa's transition, Dryden Press, 
London. 
Miller, S., 1995, 'Freedom of the press', Politikon, 22,1,24-35. 
Moll, T., 1993, 'Macroeconomic Policy in Turbulent Times', in, State and Market in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa (eds. Merle Lipton and Charles Simkins), Witwatersrand University Press, 
Johannesburg. 
Moore, M., 2001 (28 May), 'Vantage Point: Level the trading fields', Business Day, Available at: 
http: //www. bdfm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl, accessed, 28 May 2001 (article first appeared in the 
Financial Times). 
303 
RefLrcnees 
Mossop, T., 2001 (22 January), 'Are we racists, or whatT, Wine Today, Available at: 
http: //www. winetoday. co. za/pages/opinion/racists. htm, accessed, 22 January 2001. 
Mudde, H., 1998, 'A "watchdog" group: Report on Eurofic web conference on civil society 
participation', Available at: www. oneworld. org/acpsec/gb/research/biblioý_e. html, accessed 19 
October 1999. 
Mullings, B., 1999, 'Insider or outsider, both or neither: some dilemmas of interviewing in a cross- 
cultural setting', Geoforum, 30,337-350. 
Mwase, N., 1995, 'Economic Integration for Development', The Round Table, 336,477-493. 
Nabli, M. K., 1997, 'The European Union-Tunisia Free Trade Area Agreement and Some Lessons for 
South Africa', paper presented TIPS annual forum, Johannesburg. 
Nagel, S. S., 1990, 'Conflicting evaluations of policy studies', In: Public Administration (Lynn and 
Wildavsky, editors), Chatham House, Chatham, N. J., pp. 421-461. 
Ndrman, A, 1999 'Getting towards the beginning of the end for traditional development aid', In., 
Development theory as practice (Simon and Ndrman, editors), Longman, London, pp. 149-180. 
National Department of Agriculture, 1999a, Information Document: Agreement on Trade, 
Development and Co-operation between the European Union and South Africa, NDA, Pretoria. 
National Department of Agriculture, 1999b, Notice 20584 of 1999 - Procedures for the Application, 
Administration and Allocation of Export Permits to the EC, NDA, Pretoria. 
Nayyar, D., 1999, Trade and Development: Some reflections on the linkages', Available at: www. 
twnside. org-sg/souths/ twn/ title /linka-cn. html, accessed, 20 January 2000. 
NEDCOR, 1999, 'The South Africa-EU Trade Agreement: Opportunity Knocks? ', Guide to the 
Economy, NEDCOR Economic Unit, Johannesburg, 1-5. 
NEDLAC, undated, National Economic Development and Labour, A guide to the National Economic 
Development and Labour, NEDLAC, Johannesburg, 8 pps. 
Netshitornboni, N., 2000, 'Causes of job losses in labour-intensive industries', SA Labour Bulletin, 24, 
3, June, 67-69. 
New Farmers Development Company, 2001, 'New Farmers Development Company Limited, New 
Farmers Development Company Limited, Durbanville, Cape Town. 
Ng, F, and Yeats, A., 1997, 'Open Economies work better', World Development, 25,6,889-904. 
Ntsika, 2000, The Impact of the SA-EU Agreement on Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises in South 
Aftica, Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency, June 2000, pp. 55. 
NTSIKA, 2001, 'Mission Statement', Available: http: / /www. ntsika. org. za/frameset. html, accessed 
30 August 2001. 
Offe, C., 1984, Contradictions of the WeVare State, Lexington Books, New York. 
Palma, G., 1981 'Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a methodology for the 
analysis of concrete situations of Underdevelopment?, in, Streeton and Jolly, eds., Recent issues in 
world development: A collection of Survey Articles, Pergamon Press, Oxford. 
Panafrican News Agency (anon. ), 2001 (15 February), 'South Africa's Wesgro', Available at: 
http: //aRafrica. com/stories/200102150509. html, accessed, 2 May 2001. 
304 
References 
Panos, 1998, 'Trading in Futures - EU-ACP Relations: Putting Commerce before cooperation? ' 
Panos Briefing No. 31, Available at: http: //www. oneworld. org/panos/briefing/brief3l. htm, 
accessed 11 March 2000. 
Pape, J., 2000, Gender and Globalisation in South Aftica: Increasing Burdens for Women?, International 
Labour and Resource and Information Group, Cape Town, 17 pps. 
Parry, G., 1993, 'The Interweaving of Foreign and Domestic Policy-Making', Government and 
Opposition, 28,2,141-169. 
Parsons, W., 1995, Public Policy - An introduction to the theory and practice of policy analysis, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. 
Patel, E., 1999 (10 September), 'SA must protect fashion industry', Business Day, Available at: 
http: //www. bday. co. za, accessed, 10 September 1999. 
Payne, A., 1981 'The rise and fall of Caribbean regionalisation', Journal of Common Market Studies, 
XIX, 3,255-280. 
Peet, R., 1991, Global Capitalism, Routledge, London. 
Perry, B., 2000, Rhetoric or Reality? EU policy towards South Africa, 1977-2000, DSA European 
Development Policy Study Group Discussion Paper, No. 19, October, Manchester. 
Peshkin, A., and Cohen, R., 1967, 'The Values of Modernization', The Journal of Developing Areas, 11, 
7-22. 
Peterson, J., and Bomberg, E., 1999, Decision-Making in the European Union, MacMillan, London. 
Petras, J., 1997, 'Imperialism and NGOs in Latin America', Monthly Review, 49,7,10-27. 
Phasa, H. L., 1999 (20 October), 'EU trade deal: where are the jobs? ', Business Day, Available at: 
http: //www. bday. co. za, accessed, 20 October 1999. 
Phaswana, F., 2000, 'Foreword: Assessing the EU-SA Agreement', In: The EU-SA Agreement: South 
Africa, southern Africa and the European Union, (Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, Greg Mills and Elizabeth 
Sidiropoulos, editors), SAIIA, Johannesburg, pp. 1-4. 
Pienaar, J., 1999, 'Agricultural Panel: Implications of the EU-South Africa Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement', Seminar Report - South African Business and the European Union in the 
Context of the New Trade and Development Agreement, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Johannesburg, pp. 
27-30. 
Pile, S., 1991, 'Practising interpretative geography', Transactions, Institute of British Geographers, 16, 
458-69. 
Poon, JP., 1997, 'The Effects of Regionalisation on Trade Flows', Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale 
geografie, 88,4,369-380. 
Potter, R. B., Binns, T., Elliott, J. A., and Smith, D., 1999, Geographies of Development, Addison Wesley 
Longman, New York and Harlow, UK 
Poulanzas, N., 1978, State, Power, Socialism, New Left Books, London. 
Preston, PW., 1996, Development Theory: An Introduction, Blackwell, Oxford. 
Pr6gler, Y., 2000, 'Economic neo-liberalism: the target of popular protests against global 
capitalism', Cresent International, May 1-15, Available at: 
http: //www. muslimmeadia. com/archives/ featuresOO/capitahsm. htm 
305 
References 
Radebe, S., 2000 (16 February), 'Frames Investment in new technology pays off', Business Day, 
Available at: http: //www. bdfm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl, accessed, 8 November 2000. 
Radcliffe, S. A., 1994, '(Representing) post-colonial women: authority, difference and feminisms', 
Area, 26,1,25-32. 
Raghavan, C., undated, The Perils of excessive trade and financial liberalisation, Available at: 
www. twnside. org. sg/souths/twn/title/peril-cn. html, accessed, 20 January 2000. 
Ranyard, R., Crozier, E. Ray., Svenson, 0., (editors), 1997, Decision Making - Cognitive models and 
explanations, Routledge, London. 
Rhodes, R. A. W., 1988, Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-Central Governments of Britain, 
Unwin Hyman, London. 
Rhodes, R. A. W., 1992, 'Intergovernmental relations: unitary systems', In: Encyclopedia of 
Government and Politics Vols I and 2, (Hawkesworth and Kegan, editors), Routledge, London, pp. 
315-335. 
Richards, B., 1999, '1999 Annual Reports', Clothing Industry News, December 1999,3-5. 
Richards, GA., and Kirkpatrick, C., 1999, 'Reorienting Interregional Co-operation * 
in the Global 
Political Economy: Europe's East Asian Policy', Journal of Common Market Studies, 37,4,683-710. 
Roberts J. T., and Hite, A., (editors), 2000. From Modernization to Globalization - Perspectives on 
Development and Social Change, Blackwell, Oxford. 
Robinson, M., 2000, 'Making the new economy work for human rights', oecd Observer, Available at: 
http: //www. oecdobserver. org/news/fullstory. php/aid/318. html, accessed, 14 September 2001. 
Robson, P., 1993, 'The New Regionalism and Developing Countries, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 31,3,329-348. 
Rose, G., 1997, 'Situating knowledges: Positionality, reflexivities and other tactics'.. Progress in 
Human Geography, 21,3,305-320. 
SACOB, 1999, 'SA/EU Free Trade Agreement', South African Chamber of Business, Johannesburg, 
8 pps. 
SADC Today (anon. ), 1999, 'Entrenching a democratic culture in southern Africa', SADC Today, 
July, 1 and 4. 
Salazar, PJ, 2000, 'Press freedom and citizen agency in South Africa: a rhetorical approach', javnost, 
VII, 4,55-68. 
Sampson, A., 2001 (22 April) 'Monochrome grip on the rainbow nation', The Observer, 22. 
Samuels, J., Wilkes, M. J., and Brayshaw, R., 1999, Financial management and decision making, 
International Business Thomson Press, London. 
Salinger, B. L., Bhorat, H., Flaherty, D. P., and Keswell, M., 1999, Promoting the Competitiveness of 
Textiles and Clothing Manufacture in South Africa, research report, funded by United States Agency 
for International Development, Available at: http: //www. eagerproject. com/rsatex. shtml, accessed 
12 November 2000. 
Sarantakos, S., 1993, Social Research, MacMillan, London. 
SATIEC, 2001, 'Profile', Available at: www. satiec. co. za/pages/pedigree. html, accessed 30 August 
2001. 
306 
References 
Saul, J. S., 1999, 'Magical Market Realism and the South African Transition'f Transformation, 38,49- 
67. 
Schoenberger, E., 1991, 'The corporate interview as a research method in economic geography', 
Professional Geographer, 43,2,180-189. 
Schutte, G., 2000, 'Being African in South Africa: the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion', Social 
Identities, 6,2,207-222. 
Schweitzer, S., undated, Wine X Magazine, 'Special Report - From Steen to Gain: South.. Africa', 
Wine Magazine, Available at: www. winexwired. com/4pointl/sr4l. htm, accessed 9 October 2000. 
Seers, D., (editor), 1981, Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassessment, Frances Pinter Publishers, 
London. 
Segal, A., 1967, 'The Integration of Developing Countries: Some thoughts on East Africa and 
Central America', Journal of Common Market Studies, 5,3,252-282. 
Seidel, J., and Kelle, U., 1995, 'Different Functions of Coding in the Analysis of Textual Data', In: 
Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis (U. Kelle, editor), Sage, London, pp. 52-61. 
SEIFSA, 1997, Tariff, Proposal on the EU-SA TDCA, Working Document prepared by SEIFSA to the 
EU-SA TDCA policy formulation process. 
Sen, A., 2001 (19 July), 'Slicing up the spoils', The Guardian, 21. 
Sharer, I; L, 1999, 'Trade: An Engine of Growth for Africa', Finance and Development, 36,4, 
Available at: http: //www. imf. org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1999/12/sharer. htm, accessed, 20 
January 2000. 
Shaw, J., 1999, Privatising Britain's Passenger Railway: Expectations and Outcomes of the 'Free' Market 
Approach, University of Plymouth. 
Shaw, T. M., and Inegbedion, E. J., 1994, 'The Marginalization of Africa in the New world 
(Dis)Order', In: Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (R. Stubbs, and G. Underhill, 
editors), MacMillan, London, pp. 390-403. 
Short, C., 1998, 'The Meaning of Globalization for Development Policy', Social Policy & 
Administration, 32,5,456-463. 
Sibisi, B., 1999 (5 November), 'Time to Turn noble words into deeds', South African Embassy 
Electronic Newsletter, Available at: http: //zuidafrika. nl/newsletter/05_11-1999. htm, accessed, 8 
May 2001 (the article first appears in Business Day, 20 October 1999). 
Sidaway, J. D., 2000, 'Recontextualising Positionality: Geographical Research and Academic Fields 
of Power', Antipode, 32,3,260-270. 
Sidaway, J. D., 1992, 'In other worlds: on the politics of research by 'First World' geographers in the 
'Third World", Area, 24,4,403-8. 
Sidjanski, D., (editor), 1973, Political Decision-Making Processes, Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
Simeoni, W., 2000, 'Extracts from Walter Simeoni's Speech at the Springbokvlakte Agri and Cotton 
Expo 2000, Cotton SA -A Journal of the Cotton Industry, October/November 2000,6 and 16. 
Simon, D., 1990, 'The Question of Regions', in Third World Regional Development -A Reappraisal 
(David Simon, editor), Paul Chapman Publishers, London. 
Simon, D., 1997, 'Development Reconsidered; New Directions in Development Thinking', 
Geografiska Annaler, 7913,4,183-201. 
307 
References 
Simon, D., 1998a, 'Introduction: Shedding the Past, Shaping the Future, in, South Africa in southern 
Africa - Reconfiguring the Region (David Simon, editor), James Curry, Oxford. 
Simon, D., 1998b, 'Rethinking (post)modemism, postcolonialism, and posttraditionaism: South- 
North Perspectives', Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 16,2,219-245. 
Simon, D., 1999, 'Development revisited: thinking about, practising and teaching development 
after the Cold War', In: Development as Theory and Practice, (David Simon and Anders Ndrman 
editors), Longman, London, pp. 17-54. 
Simon, D., 2001, 'Trading spaces: imagining and positioning the 'new' South Africa within the 
regional and global economies', International Affairs, 77,2,377-405. 
Simon, D., and Ndrman, A., (eds. ) 1999, Development as Theory and Practice, Longman, London. 
Simpson, A., 2001 (15 August), 'The real anarchists are in the cordon sanitaire', The Guardian, 12. 
Sindane, J., undated, Democracy in Aftican Societies and Ubuntu, Human Sciences Research Council, 
Pretoria. 
Skeldon, R., 1997, Migration and Development -A Global Perspective, Longman, London. 
Slater, D., 1993, 'The geopolitical imagination and the enframing of development theory', 
Transaction Institute of British Geographers, 18,419-437. 
Smith, G., and Naim, M., 2000, Altered states: globalization, sovereignty and governance, IDRC, Canada. 
Smith, L-A., 1999, 'A tough year', Textiles Africains, February/March 1999,12-15. 
Snyder, R. C., Bruck, H. W., and Sapin, B., 1969, 'The decision-making approach to the study of 
international politics, In: International Politics and Foreign Policy -A Reader in Research and Theory 
(James Rosenau, editor), The Free Press, New York, pp. 199-206. 
South Africa Foundation, 1999, 'South Africa and the European Union: The Free Trade Agreement 
and Related Developments'.. Occasional Paper No. 2/99, South Africa Foundation, Johannesburg. 
South African Council of Churches, 2000, 'The European Union-South Africa Trade Agreement: 
Implications for Post-Lom6 Relations', Available at: http: //www. sacc-ct. org. za/ppu-lome. htn-d, 
accessed, 22 June 2001. 
South African Government, 1999, Skills Development Levies Act, Available at: http: //www. gov. za, 
accessed, 24 April 2001. 
South African Press Agency (anon. ), 1999 (25 October), 'Globalisation ravages Third World', 
Available at: http: //www. anc. org. za/anc/newsbrief/1999/newslO26, accessed, 26 October, 1999. 
South African Press Agency (anon. ), 1999 (26 October), 'Change Negative Mindset: Negotiator 
Urges', Available at: http: //www. anc. org. za/anc/newsbrief/1999/newslO27, accessed, 27 
October, 1999. 
South African Wine and Spirit Industry Employers' Association, 2000, Statistical Information, 
private correspondence. 
South African Wine Industry Information and Systems (SAWIS), 2000, various statistics, Available 
at: http: //www. landbou. com/sawis/sawis-index. asp, accessed, 30 October 2000. 
Spence, J., 1999, 'Second chance for the ANC: the 1999 South African general election', Government 
and Opposition, 34,4,456-472. 
308 
References 
Statistics South Africa, 2000, 'South Africa's agricultural exports, Available at: www. ssa. gov. za, 
accessed, 19 August 2000. 
Stevens, C., and McQueen, M., 1999, 'Regional Trade Agreements', Trade & Investment, Background 
Briefing, No. 2, Available at: http: //www. ids. ac. uk/tradebriefings/ti2. pdf, accessed, 16 September 
2001. 
Stone, D., 1997, Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making, W. W. Norton and Company, 
New York. 
Streek, B., 1999 (9 December), 'Number of farm workers declines, Available at: 
http: //www. mg. co. za/mg/news/99decl/9dec-farms. html, accessed, 16 August 2000. 
Tangara, M., 2001, 'Empowering the people - EU-The Gambia cooperation', the Courier - the 
magazine of ACP-EU development cooperation, Issue 186, European Commission, Brussels, 58-60. 
Tapscott, C., 1995, 'Changing Discourses of Development in South Africa', In: Power of Development 
(Jonathan Crush, editor), Routledge, London and New York, pp. 176-191. 
Textile Federation, 2000, Textile Statistics & Economic Review, 199912000, Textile Federation, 
Johannesburg, 28 pps. 
Textile Federation, undated, 'Profile', Available at: http: //www. texfed. co. za/main. htm, accessed 4 
September 2000. 
Theron, P., 2000, 'Economic Conditions in the SA Clothing Industry', Clothing Industry News, June, 
3. 
Townsend, J., 1993, 'Gender Studies: Whose Agenda', in., Beyond the Impasse - New Directions in 
Development Theory (F. J. Schuurman, editor), Zed Books, London and New Jersey, pp. 169-186. 
Turner, M., and Hulme, D., 1997, Governance, administration and development: making the state 
work, Macmillan, London. 
Turok, B., 1998, 'Canned Peaches in an equitable global order'. Conference paper presented at the 
EU-SADC Conference, Vienna, 12-14 October, 8 pps. 
TURP, 200 1, South Africa in the global economy, Trades Union Research Project, Johannesburg, pps., 
217. 
US Department of Commerce, 1999, State of the Wine Industry in South Africa, Available at: 
http: //strategis. ic. gc. ca/SSG/dd72113e. html, accessed 18 September 2000. 
US Department of Commerce, 1998, Textile Industry in South Africa, Available at: 
ht! p: //strategis. ic. gc. ca/SSG accessed 18 September 2000. 
Valentine, G., 1997 'Tell me about ... : using interviews as a research methodology', In: Methods in 
Human Geography -A guide to students doing a research project (F- Flowerdew and D Martin, editors), 
Addison Wesley Longman, Harlow, Essex, pp. 110-126. 
Verplanken, B., and Svenson, 0., 1997, 'Personal involvement in human decision making: 
conceptualisations and effects of decision processes', In: Decision Making - Cognitive models and 
explanations (R. Ranyard, E. Ray Crozier, and 0. Svenson, editors), Routledge, London, pp. 40-57. 
Visser, G., 2000, 'In other worlds: on the politics of research in a transforming South Africa', Area, 
32,2,231-235. 
Vroom, V. H., and Yetton, P. W., 1973, Leadership and Decision-Making, Pittsburgh, University of 
Pittsburgh Press. 
309 
References 
Wadula, P., 2000 (30 March), 'EU, SA scheduled for co-operation council talks', Business Day, 
Available at: http: //www. bday. co. za/00/0330/news/nll. htm, accessed, 30 March 2000. 
Wadula, P., 2000 (31 March), 'Media 'ignored benefits of deal', Business Day, Available at: 
http: //www. bday. co. za/00/0331/news/nl5. htm, accessed, 31 March 2000. 
Wadula, P., 2000 (3 April), 'SA, EU hold first council meeting', Business Day, Available at: 
http: //www. bday. co. za/00/0403/news/news5. htm, accessed, 3 April 2000. 
Wadula, P., 2000 (13 November), 'Sacob and Nafcoc form nonprofit company', Business Day, 
Available at: http: //www. bdfm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl, accessed, 13 November 2000. 
Wadula, P., 2001 (22 March), 'SA is called to knock WTO dispute system', Business Day, Available 
at: http: //www. bdfm. co. za/cgi-bin/pp-print. pl, accessed, 26 March 2001. 
Wadula, P., 2001 (17 September), 'SA close to deal with EU over wine, spirits', Business Day, 
Available at: http: //www. bday. co. za/bday/content/direct/1,3523,929521-6078-0,00, accessed, 17 
September 2001. 
Walton, S., 1997, The Complete Atlas of Wine, Ultimate Editions, London. 
Weale, A., 1999, Democracy, MacMillan, London. 
Webster, A., 1990, Introduction to the Sociology of Development, MacMillan, London. 
Wilensky, H., 1975, The Welfare State and Equality, University of California Press, Berkeley. 
Williams, A. J., and Hanival, S., 1999, 'Clothing and textiles - ensuring the survival of the South 
African industry', SA I-abour Bulletin, 23,6, December, 71-76. 
Williams, G., 1999, '1 Symposion de la Asociaci6n Intemacional de Historia y Civilizaci6n de la Vid 
y el Vino', paper presented at El Puerto de Santa Maria, Spain. 
Williams, P., and Taylor, 1., 2000, 'Neoliberalism and the Political Economy of the 'New' South 
Africa', New Political Economy, 5,1,21-40. 
Williams, W. E., 1989, South Aftica's War against Capitalism, Praeger, New York 
Williams, W. E., 2000, 'Review of The Origins and Demise of South African Apartheid: A Public 
Choice Analysis', The Independent Review, 4,1, Available at: www. independent. org/tii/ 
content/pubs/review/books/TIR41-ýLowenburg. html, accessed 30 November 2000. 
Wills, J., 2000, 'Political Economy II: the politics and geography of capitalism', Progress in Human 
Geography, 24,2,641-652. 
Willson, M., 2001 (12 February), 'Cape cut flower industry battles red tape', Business Day, 1. 
Wines of South Africa, (2000), 'The South African Wine Industry Today', Available at: 
www. wosa. co. za/Overview. asp, accessed, 19 October 2000. 
Women on Farms Project, undated, Available at; http: //users. iafrica. com/r/ 
ru/rulegstu/html/links. htm, accessed 25 October 2000. 
Worden, N., 1994, The Making of Modem South Africa: Conquest, Segregation and Apartheid, Blackwell, 
Oxford. 
World Bank, 2000, Entering the 21" Century, World Development Report 199912000, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford and New York and The International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development/The World Bank, Washington, Available at: http: //www. worldbank. org/wdr/ 
2000/, accessed, 13 April 2000. 
310 
References 
Wynboer (anon. ), 1999, 'Wine Industry Trust (SAWIT) Visits Resource Limited Producers', 
Wynboer -A Technical Guide for Wine Producers, Available at: http: //www. wynboer. co-za/ 
recentartciles/0300sawit. php3, accessed, 23 October 2000. 
Xako, S., 2001 (12 February), 'Mbeki slams west for 'nice words", Business Day, 3. 
Zack-Williams, T., 2000, 'No Democracy, No Development: Reflections on Democracy and 
Development in Africa', Conference Paper at the British International Studies Association, 
Bradford, December. 
Zuern, E. K., 2001, 'South Africa's civics in transition'l Politikon, 28,1,5-20. 
Zulu, L., 1998, 'Role of Women in the Reconstruction and Development of the New Democratic 
South Africa', Feminist Studies, 24,1,147-157. 
311 
